Remand Required When Trial Courts Fail to Make Clear Findings on “Monitoring” or “Surveillance” Under Vermont’s Civil Stalking Statute

Melanie MacEachern v. Kurtis Mellett (Vt. Sup. Ct., May 8, 2026) (Entry Order)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a neighbor dispute on Lake Eligo in Craftsbury, Vermont, where the parties (and their spouses) were already engaged in separate litigation. Plaintiff Melanie MacEachern sought an order against stalking under Vermont’s civil stalking statute, alleging that defendant Kurtis Mellett repeatedly watched her home and movements—driving an ATV or vehicle along the property line, loitering near the boundary, and staring at or photographing her house—causing her fear and substantial emotional distress.

After a hearing with conflicting testimony, the Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Civil Division (Judge Benjamin Battles) denied relief. The central appellate issue was whether the trial court’s findings and legal conclusions adequately addressed whether defendant’s conduct constituted “monitoring” or “surveillance” (and the other statutory elements), particularly given the court’s own statements suggesting “both sides [were] watching each other’s every moves.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It held that the trial court’s findings were too sparse and internally unclear to permit meaningful appellate review of the denial of an anti-stalking order. The Court emphasized that:

  • Statements suggesting defendant was “watching [plaintiff’s] every move” could support “monitoring” or “surveillance” under the statute.
  • Later remarks characterizing the conduct as merely “going back and forth on their property” and “looking around” could imply the court credited a benign explanation instead—without resolving the conflict or making credibility determinations.
  • The trial court did not make express findings on key statutory elements, including whether defendant knew or should have known his conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress.

Because the Supreme Court could not discern the basis for the trial court’s ultimate conclusion, it ordered a remand for additional findings and clarifications on the elements of stalking.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Haupt v. Langlois, 2024 VT 3

  • Rule supplied: An anti-stalking order must issue if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant stalked plaintiff; appellate review defers to findings supported by evidence, but reviews legal conclusions de novo.
  • Role here: The Court used Haupt v. Langlois to frame both the burden of proof (“preponderance”) and the standard of review—particularly the distinction between deference to factfinding versus independent review of legal conclusions. This mattered because the problem was not simply evidentiary sufficiency; it was the absence of coherent, reviewable findings connecting evidence to statutory elements.

Scheffler v. Harrington, 2020 VT 93

  • Rule supplied: “Surveillance” requires an “intent to closely watch or carefully observe a person or place.” “Merely passing by someone’s property and looking around” is insufficient.
  • Role here: The Court used Scheffler v. Harrington to mark the line between non-actionable neighborly presence and actionable surveillance. It then highlighted that the trial court’s language (“watching each other’s every moves”) points toward the “closely watch or carefully observe” concept, while the court’s later minimization (“looking around”) points toward the non-actionable side—yet the trial court did not decide which factual account it credited.

Hinkson v. Stevens, 2020 VT 69

  • Rule supplied: “Monitoring . . . involves tracking or collecting some form of information about the person being monitored or their activities.”
  • Role here: The Court relied on Hinkson v. Stevens to explain why testimony about repeated circling, timed appearances when plaintiff exited her home, and prolonged boundary-line watching could constitute “monitoring” as “keeping close track” of a person’s movements—if credited. The trial court’s failure to make findings about what actually occurred (and why) prevented application of Hinkson’s definition.

Sec'y, Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. Irish, 169 Vt. 407 (1999)

  • Rule supplied: A trial court has a “fundamental duty” to make findings necessary to support its conclusions and to provide an adequate basis for appellate review.
  • Role here: This was the decisive procedural anchor. The Supreme Court treated the case as a classic Irish problem: the record contained conflicting versions of events and potentially outcome-determinative facts, but the trial court neither resolved them nor tied them to statutory elements. The remedy, consistent with Irish, was reversal and remand for adequate findings.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

  1. Identify the statutory elements that must be found. The Court recited the statutory structure: stalking requires a “course of conduct” (two or more acts) that includes acts such as following, monitoring, or surveilling, and that the actor knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer substantial emotional distress. (12 V.S.A. §§ 5131(1)(A)(i), 5131(6), 5133(d)).
  2. Recognize that certain articulated observations could satisfy key elements. The trial court’s remark that “both sides [were] watching each other’s every moves” is, if adopted as a factual finding about defendant’s conduct, consistent with “surveillance” (close watching) or “monitoring” (tracking a person’s activities).
  3. Conclude that appellate review is impossible without clarified, reconciled findings. The trial court’s later statements—suggesting mere property use and plaintiffs’ “interpretation”—create uncertainty about what the court actually found. Without credibility findings, resolution of factual conflicts, and express findings on required elements (including the “knows or should know”/reasonable-person distress component), the Supreme Court could not affirm or reverse on the merits of stalking; it could only require the trial court to do the necessary factfinding work.

Notably, the Supreme Court also flagged that the plaintiff’s alleged “watching” of defendant was irrelevant to whether defendant stalked plaintiff, especially where defendant did not seek an order and offered no evidence of repeated or regular monitoring by plaintiff.

3.3 Impact

The immediate, practical effect is procedural but consequential: trial courts adjudicating anti-stalking petitions must produce findings that (a) resolve material factual disputes, (b) include credibility determinations when testimony conflicts, and (c) connect specific conduct to statutory terms like “monitoring” and “surveilling,” as well as to the “knows or should know” and “reasonable person” distress components.

Doctrinally, the decision reinforces (and operationalizes) three points likely to shape future petitions:

  • “Monitoring/surveillance” often turns on intent inferred from patterns. Repetition, duration (e.g., “hours”), and responsive timing (appearing when someone exits) are the types of facts that can support the necessary inference—if the trial court clearly finds them and explains why.
  • Neutral explanations must be adjudicated, not merely recited. When a respondent claims legitimate purposes (walking for pleasure, observing road work), the court must decide whether it credits those explanations and why, particularly where petitioners allege targeted watching.
  • Appellate courts will not “fill in” missing findings. Even where evidence of distress appears “uncontroverted,” the trial court must still make the findings required by statute. Sparse findings risk reversal and remand under Sec'y, Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. Irish.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Preponderance of the evidence”: more likely than not (just over 50%).
  • “Course of conduct”: at least two acts (not a one-time incident), such as following, monitoring, or surveilling.
  • “Surveils” (from Scheffler v. Harrington): intentional close watching or careful observation; more than casually passing by and glancing.
  • “Monitors” (from Hinkson v. Stevens): tracking or collecting information about someone’s activities—often shown through repeated pattern-based observation.
  • “Knows or should know”: either actual awareness, or what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would understand about the likely impact.
  • “Substantial emotional distress”: significant distress often evidenced by concrete life changes (e.g., avoiding gardening or walks, stopping social visits), not mere annoyance.
  • “De novo” review: the appellate court independently reviews legal conclusions, while usually deferring to factual findings—if they are made and supported.

5. Conclusion

Melanie MacEachern v. Kurtis Mellett underscores that anti-stalking adjudication cannot rest on impressions or generalities when the statute requires specific, element-by-element determinations. Where evidence supports competing narratives—targeted “watching every move” versus ordinary property use—the trial court must resolve the conflict, make credibility findings, and clearly explain whether conduct constitutes “monitoring” or “surveillance,” and whether the defendant knew or should have known it would cause substantial emotional distress. Absent that, appellate review fails, and remand is required under Sec'y, Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. Irish.