Remaindermen Liable for Property Taxes on Non-Income-Producing Life-Estate Property Despite §§ 44-4-6 and 44-9-6

I. Introduction

In Domenic Apostolico v. Deborah M. Pagliaro (R.I. Feb. 20, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed a Superior Court judgment requiring a remainderman (Deborah Pagliaro) to reimburse a co-remainderman (Domenic Apostolico, Jr.) for her one-third share of property and sewer taxes paid during their mother’s life tenancy.

The dispute arose from a common family estate-planning arrangement. In 2004, Dorothy Apostolico deeded her home to three of her children as joint tenants (Domenic, Deborah, and Lorraine), while reserving a life estate for herself. The deed did not allocate responsibility for taxes. Dorothy lived in the home until 2023; the property generated no rental or other income during the life tenancy. Domenic paid the taxes and later sued Deborah seeking reimbursement under quasi-contract/unjust enrichment theories after informal demands failed.

The central legal issue was whether, when life-estate property is not “income producing,” Rhode Island law places the tax burden on the remaindermen rather than the life tenant—and whether that rule can be reconciled with the tax statutes, G.L. 1956 §§ 44-4-6 and 44-9-6.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed summary judgment for Domenic on liability. Relying on Koszela v. Wilcox, 538 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1988) (and the older authority it reaffirmed), the Court held that when property subject to a life estate is not productive of income during the life tenancy, the remaindermen must bear the ordinary property taxes. The Court further held that the fact the parcel was a developed residential property—occupied by the life tenant—did not make it “income producing,” and did not alter the allocation rule.

The Court also rejected the argument that this allocation “contradicts” or “voids” § 44-4-6, and similarly concluded that § 44-9-6 does not displace the common-law exception for unproductive property. Final judgment for $38,466.42 (including prejudgment interest) was affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Koszela v. Wilcox, 538 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1988) (controlling authority)

Koszela provided the decisive rule. It states that although a life tenant ordinarily pays property taxes, an exception applies when “land is not productive of any income during the life tenancy”: in that circumstance, “the remainderman or remaindermen must pay” ordinary taxes and certain assessments. The Court in Apostolico treated Koszela not as a fact-bound decision limited to undeveloped land, but as a doctrinal rule keyed to income productivity. Because it was undisputed that the property produced no income during Dorothy’s life tenancy, Koszela dictated the outcome.

Importantly, Koszela also contained an interpretive bridge between common-law allocation principles and the tax statutes (especially § 44-4-6), explaining that statutory billing/collection mechanisms do not necessarily answer the equitable question of who should ultimately bear the economic burden as between life tenant and remaindermen. The Apostolico Court adopted that reconciliation and extended it to § 44-9-6.

2. Sheffield v. Cooke, 39 R.I. 217, 98 A. 161 (1916) (source of the exception)

Sheffield recognized the baseline rule: absent contrary provisions in the creating instrument, the life tenant is responsible for taxes. But it also articulated the crucial exception: “taxes assessed against unproductive real estate are not chargeable to the life tenant.” Apostolico used Sheffield to show that Koszela was not an outlier; it was the reaffirmation of a long-standing Rhode Island principle.

3. Calcagni v. Cirino, 65 R.I. 408, 14 A.2d 803 (1940) (supporting continuity)

The Court cited Calcagni alongside Sheffield and Koszela as part of a consistent doctrinal line. While the opinion did not rely on Calcagni for an independently dispositive test, its citation strengthens the Court’s portrayal of the “unproductive property” exception as embedded in Rhode Island property law rather than a modern innovation.

4. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123 (R.I. 2001) (later summary of the rule)

The Court noted that Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary summarized Sheffield as follows: “To the extent the property is not income-producing, it is taxable to the remainderman.” By invoking Delta Airlines, the Court reinforced that Rhode Island has continued to describe the allocation rule in terms of income productivity and ultimate tax responsibility—again undermining the defendant’s attempt to confine Koszela to undeveloped parcels.

5. Summary-judgment framework cases

The Court’s de novo review methodology and its articulation of the summary-judgment standard were anchored in:

  • New Phase Realty, LLC v. Fournier, 337 A.3d 695 (R.I. 2025) (de novo review; nonmovant must show disputed material fact with competent evidence);
  • Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386 (R.I. 2008) (summary judgment is “issue finding, not issue determination”);
  • Meeks v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC, 289 A.3d 1179 (R.I. 2023) (no genuine issue of material fact; entitlement as a matter of law).

These cases mattered because the dispositive facts were uncontested: the deed was silent on taxes, and the property produced no income during the life tenancy. With no genuine factual dispute, the appeal became a pure question of law governed by Koszela.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Starting point—default tax burden on life tenant: The Court acknowledged the general rule (traced to Sheffield v. Cooke) that, absent a contrary allocation in the instrument creating the life estate, the life tenant ordinarily pays property taxes.
  2. Key exception—unproductive (non-income-producing) property: The Court applied the established exception (from Sheffield, reaffirmed in Koszela): if the property produces no income during the life tenancy, the remaindermen, not the life tenant, must pay ordinary property taxes.
    • The Court emphasized that “income producing” is about actual income generation (e.g., rent), not about the life tenant’s consumption of housing services.
    • Accordingly, Dorothy’s residence in the home without paying rent did not convert the property into an income-producing asset.
  3. Rejecting the “developed vs. undeveloped land” distinction: Deborah tried to distinguish Koszela because it involved undeveloped land. The Court rejected that framing: Koszela turned on productivity of income, not the physical development status of the parcel. A developed residential house that yields no rent is still “not productive of any income.”
  4. Reconciling the statutes (§ 44-4-6 and § 44-9-6) with common law:
    • § 44-4-6: The Court adopted Koszela’s explanation that § 44-4-6 functions as a taxation/billing authorization (life tenant “deemed the owner” for purposes of taxation in specified circumstances), and it permits parties to structure responsibility by the creating instrument. But it does not erase the equitable/common-law rule governing ultimate allocation where the instrument is silent and the property is unproductive.
    • § 44-9-6: Although § 44-9-6 states that a life tenant’s interest is “first” liable and the remainderman “secondarily” liable if assessed, the Court held that the same “unproductive property” exception applies. In effect, the statute addresses the municipality’s collection hierarchy, while the common-law rule governs the allocation of burden between life tenant and remaindermen when the property generates no income and the creating instrument does not shift responsibility.

C. Impact

  • Clarifies “income producing” in residential life-estate settings: The Court squarely rejected the notion that a life tenant’s mere occupancy (without rent) makes a property “income producing.” That clarification matters because many life estates arise in family homes where the life tenant resides until death or institutionalization.
  • Strengthens the practical reach of Koszela beyond vacant land: By stating that development status is irrelevant, the Court signals that the Koszela/Sheffield exception is broadly applicable to non-rental residential property.
  • Separates municipal collection rules from private allocation: The opinion reinforces that statutes governing how municipalities may assess/bill/collect do not necessarily resolve who, as between life tenant and remaindermen, should ultimately bear the economic burden. This has consequences for contribution and reimbursement litigation among family members and co-owners.
  • Drafting and counseling effect: Lawyers drafting deeds reserving life estates are on notice: if the grantor intends the life tenant (or one remainderman) to bear taxes regardless of income, the instrument should say so. Otherwise, non-income-producing property may shift tax responsibility to the remaindermen.
  • Litigation posture—summary judgment suitability: When the deed is silent and income productivity is undisputed, this case illustrates that liability can be resolved as a matter of law at summary judgment, leaving only accounting and interest calculations for later agreement or adjudication.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Life estate / life tenant
A life estate gives a person (the life tenant) the right to possess and use property for life. When the life tenant dies, ownership/possession passes automatically to others.
Remainderman
The person who holds the “remainder” interest—i.e., the right to full ownership after the life estate ends. Here, Dorothy’s children were remaindermen.
Income producing / unproductive property
In this context, “income producing” means the property generates actual income (typically rent). Personal use or occupancy value is not treated as “income.”
§ 44-4-6 (“deemed the owner” for taxation)
This statute authorizes taxation to the life tenant (or long-term tenant in certain leases) for administrative/collection purposes. The Court treated it as a mechanism for assessment and billing, not as a definitive rule of ultimate burden allocation between private parties when the creating instrument is silent.
§ 44-9-6 (primary/secondary liability)
This provision describes a sequence of liability for collection in life-estate situations. The Court held it does not displace the common-law exception that places taxes on remaindermen when the property produces no income.
Quasi-contract / unjust enrichment
These are equitable theories that can require repayment when one person pays a cost that, in fairness, another should bear—preventing a party from being unjustly enriched at someone else’s expense. Here, Domenic sought reimbursement for taxes he paid that the Court held were ultimately the remaindermen’s obligation.

V. Conclusion

Domenic Apostolico v. Deborah M. Pagliaro reaffirms and operationalizes a clear rule in Rhode Island property law: when a life-estate property produces no income and the deed is silent on taxes, the remaindermen bear responsibility for ordinary property taxes—even if the property is a developed residence occupied by the life tenant. The Court also confirms that §§ 44-4-6 and 44-9-6, while important for assessment and collection, do not negate the long-standing “unproductive property” exception rooted in Sheffield v. Cooke and reaffirmed in Koszela v. Wilcox.