“Relating To” in § 2252A(b)(2) Is Broad: Indiana Child Molesting (§ 35-42-4-3(b)) Categorically Triggers the Mandatory Minimum

I. Introduction

United States v. Joshua Schatz (7th Cir. June 9, 2026) addresses how far the federal child-pornography sentencing enhancement reaches when it turns on a prior state conviction “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” The defendant, Joshua Schatz, pled guilty to possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) but preserved a challenge to the enhanced mandatory minimum in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).

The enhancement raises the penalty to a 10-year mandatory minimum if the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction. Schatz’s prior was under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (child molesting by “fondling or touching” with sexual intent, where the child is under 14).

Core issue: Whether Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) categorically qualifies as a state law “relating to” the federal benchmark of sexual abuse offenses for purposes of § 2252A(b)(2), despite differences between Indiana’s age coverage and federal sexual-abuse provisions (notably 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of § 2252A(b)(2)’s 10-year mandatory minimum. Guided by its en banc decision in United States v. Liestman, the court held that:

  • The phrase “relating to” in § 2252A(b)(2) has a broad, ordinary meaning, not a strict element-by-element congruence requirement with federal sexual-abuse statutes.
  • Applying the categorical approach, the court identified the least serious conduct with a realistic probability of prosecution under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) as sexual touching of intimate parts (with the required intent), potentially even between minors under 14.
  • Even if Indiana’s statute covers some conduct that federal sexual-abuse statutes might not reach (e.g., certain peer conduct under 14), it still “relates to” sexual abuse because it targets the same kind of harm and bears the necessary connection to the federal benchmark.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Taylor v. United States

Taylor v. United States established the modern “categorical approach”: courts examine the statutory elements of the prior offense, not the defendant’s real-world conduct. Schatz’s case required that framework because § 2252A(b)(2) turns on the existence of a qualifying prior conviction. Taylor supplies the basic method; the dispute here was how that method operates when Congress uses the expansive connector “relating to.”

2. United States v. Liestman (en banc)

United States v. Liestman was the opinion’s central driver. Liestman held that “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) carries its ordinary, broad meaning—rejecting a strict “congruence” requirement between state and federal child-pornography offenses. Schatz extends Liestman’s interpretive approach to the nearly identical language in § 2252A(b)(2).

Liestman contributed three key interpretive moves that Schatz adopts:

  • “Relating to” presumptively means “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with,” a definition drawn from Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc..
  • Statutory-structure clues support breadth: “relating to” is broader than narrower connectors like “involving.”
  • Legislative-history/parallel-language clues matter: Congress knew how to require strict congruence when it wanted to, yet used different language for these enhancements.

3. United States v. Kraemer

United States v. Kraemer supplied both a framework and a concrete example. It recognized that where the benchmark includes “relating to,” courts must determine the benchmark’s scope and then assess whether the state statute’s least culpable realistic conduct bears the required connection. Kraemer also stands for the proposition—relied on here—that slight age differences between state and federal schemes do not defeat the enhancement when “relating to” is read broadly.

4. United States v. McSwain

United States v. McSwain was cited for the standard of review: statutory interpretation at sentencing is reviewed de novo. This matters because the Seventh Circuit treated the meaning of “relating to” and the categorical approach methodology as pure legal questions.

5. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. furnished the ordinary-meaning definition of “relating to,” which—via Liestman— becomes the semantic foundation for the court’s broad reading of § 2252A(b)(2).

6. United States v. Kaufmann

United States v. Kaufmann appeared as a supporting quote in Liestman’s logic: laws may sufficiently relate when they address the same harm, even if they are not element-by-element matches. Schatz uses that harm-based linkage to treat Indiana’s child-molesting prohibition as aligned with the federal sexual-abuse benchmark.

7. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC

Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC contributed the interpretive canon that identical words in related statutes are presumed to share the same meaning. Because § 2252(b)(1) and § 2252A(b)(2) contain the same “relating to” phrase and sit adjacent in the Code, Liestman’s construction effectively carried over.

8. United States v. Wilson

United States v. Wilson was invoked for a pragmatic test: a sufficient connection exists when two laws target the same type of harm. Schatz relies on this to conclude that Indiana’s statute relates to federal sexual-abuse offenses because both aim at preventing sexual exploitation/abuse of minors.

9. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez and Zaragoza v. Garland

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez provided the “realistic probability” constraint: courts cannot hypothesize far-fetched applications of a statute without evidence the state actually prosecutes such conduct. Zaragoza v. Garland reinforced that the minimum conduct is what can realistically be prosecuted, not what can be imagined. These cases were decisive in narrowing Schatz’s proposed “least serious conduct” scenarios (e.g., innocuous touching like shoulders/feet).

10. Indiana cases on the reach of § 35-42-4-3(b) and related concepts

The court relied heavily on how Indiana courts have interpreted and applied the “fondling or touching” language:

  • Bond v. State: The Indiana Supreme Court held the child molesting statute contemplates physical contact between adult and child, rejecting a broader non-contact reading adopted by a lower court. The Seventh Circuit used Bond to reject Schatz’s argument that § 3(b) covers purely non-contact conduct.
  • Altes v. State, In re Brown, and Gilliland v. State: Schatz cited these to show that touching non-intimate body parts could suffice, but the Seventh Circuit found them unhelpful: Altes involved escalating contact beyond feet; Brown and Gilliland did not involve § 3(b) prosecutions.
  • Clark v. State, DeBruhl v. State, and Jones v. State: These were used to show Indiana courts have overturned convictions where the evidence did not support the necessary sexual intent, especially involving non-intimate touching. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that intent is inferred from conduct and context, citing Nuerge v. State and Pedrick v. State.
  • State v. J.D. and C.D.H. v. State: These cases established that Indiana’s child molesting statute applies to offenders regardless of age, including children within the protected age range, a point relevant to identifying the statute’s least serious conduct.

11. United States v. Gauld and the juvenile-adjudication question

The government invoked United States v. Gauld to argue juvenile adjudications do not count as “prior convictions.” The Seventh Circuit distinguished that question from the categorical approach’s task of identifying the statute’s minimum covered conduct. The court assumed without deciding that conduct subject only to juvenile adjudication could still inform the “least serious conduct” analysis—because the enhancement applied either way.

12. United States v. Osborne

United States v. Osborne was Schatz’s primary counterweight. Osborne held that Indiana’s “sexual misconduct with a minor” statute (Indiana Code § 35-42-4-9(b)) did not categorically relate to “abusive sexual contact” because it could reach behavior “common among students in high school,” not ordinarily understood as “abusive.”

Schatz distinguished Osborne by emphasizing potential peer conduct; the Seventh Circuit distinguished it by emphasizing the victim age line: Osborne itself noted that sexual contact with very young victims could be deemed abusive by virtue of youth, and it referenced Indiana’s separate statute for victims 13 or younger—functionally aligning with § 3(b)’s under-14 coverage.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s three-step categorical approach for “relating to” benchmarks

Following United States v. Liestman and United States v. Kraemer, the court applied a structured sequence:

  1. Define the federal benchmark’s scope, including the breadth of “relating to.”
  2. Identify the least serious conduct with a realistic probability of conviction under the state statute.
  3. Determine whether that conduct bears the necessary connection to the federal benchmark.

2. Step one: “Relating to” is expansive in § 2252A(b)(2)

The court treated Liestman as essentially controlling because the “relating to” phrase is identical and appears in adjacent provisions (§ 2252(b)(1) and § 2252A(b)(2)). It also reinforced the point with statutory-history context: both provisions received the “relating to” phrase in the same enactment—the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.

Practical consequence: a defendant cannot defeat the enhancement merely by pointing to modest mismatches between the state statute’s coverage (e.g., victim ages or lack of an age-gap requirement) and the precise federal elements in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2244.

3. Step two: the “least serious conduct” is constrained by realistic probability

Schatz attempted to frame the minimum conduct as innocuous touching (e.g., shoulders/feet) or non-contact conduct. The court rejected these hypotheticals because he did not show Indiana actually prosecutes such scenarios under § 3(b). Bond v. State was pivotal in confirming that Indiana’s molesting statute contemplates physical contact.

The court accepted, based on State v. J.D. and C.D.H. v. State, that § 3(b) can cover offenders under 14. It therefore assumed (without resolving the juvenile-procedure wrinkle) that the minimum covered conduct might involve minors near in age. Even on that assumption, it identified the realistic minimum as touching intimate body parts with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires.

4. Step three: Indiana § 3(b) still “relates to” the federal benchmark

The court offered two mutually reinforcing reasons:

  • Connection to federal sexual-abuse conduct: The minimum realistic conduct under § 3(b) involves sexual touching of intimate areas with sexual intent, which bears a sufficient connection to federal “sexual act” and “abusive sexual contact” concepts, even if not a perfect match. The state statute’s age reach (under 14) being broader than one federal line (under 12 in § 2241(c), plus age-gap features elsewhere) is the kind of overbreadth Liestman and Kraemer permit under “relating to.”
  • Same harm targeted: Citing United States v. Wilson, the court concluded Indiana’s statute and the federal benchmark target the same harm: preventing the sexual exploitation/abuse of children. The court used Indiana’s own statement of purpose (quoted from C.D.H. v. State) to reinforce that the statute is aimed at exploitation and abuse.

C. Impact

1. Doctrinal impact within the Seventh Circuit

Schatz operationalizes a significant post-Liestman rule: for § 2252A(b)(2), “relating to” is not a narrow descriptor but an expansive connector. As a result, defendants face a higher bar in challenging predicate convictions by highlighting differences between state and federal sexual-abuse definitions (especially age lines and age-gap requirements).

2. Practical sentencing impact

The immediate consequence is large: Schatz’s guideline range absent the enhancement would have been 63–78 months, yet the enhancement imposed a 10-year floor. The opinion signals that defendants with prior state convictions for hands-on sexual offenses against children— even if drafted differently than federal statutes—will frequently fall within § 2252A(b)(2).

3. The “realistic probability” constraint as a litigation filter

The opinion underscores that categorical-approach litigation must be supported by state cases demonstrating real prosecutions of the hypothesized least culpable conduct. Defendants cannot rely on abstract textual possibilities; they must show actual applications.

4. Open question: juvenile adjudication and minimum-conduct analysis

The court expressly left unresolved whether conduct that would be handled only in juvenile court should be excluded from the minimum-conduct inquiry. Future cases may need to address how juvenile jurisdiction and waiver statutes interact with the categorical approach’s demand to “cut real-world facts out.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Categorical approach: A method for deciding whether a past conviction counts for a sentencing enhancement by looking at the statute’s elements, not what the person actually did. The court asks: “Could the statute be violated in a way that falls outside the federal benchmark?”
  • Federal benchmark: The federal description Congress chose to define which prior convictions count (here, crimes “relating to” various forms of sexual abuse).
  • “Relating to”: Expansive language that captures state crimes that have a sufficient connection to the federal benchmark, even if not identical. After Liestman (and now Schatz), “relating to” in these provisions generally means “connected to” the federal harm/category.
  • Least serious conduct: The minimum behavior that can realistically lead to conviction under the state statute. Courts look for the minimum real-world prosecutable scenario.
  • Realistic probability principle: Courts do not accept imaginative hypotheticals about far-fetched applications of a statute. A defendant must show that the state has actually applied the statute in the way the defendant claims.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Joshua Schatz cements, in the § 2252A(b)(2) context, the Seventh Circuit’s post-en-banc commitment to a broad reading of “relating to” and a disciplined use of the categorical approach. It holds that Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) categorically triggers the federal mandatory minimum because its realistic minimum conduct— intimate sexual touching with sexual intent involving children under 14—bears a sufficient connection to the federal sexual-abuse benchmark and targets the same underlying harm.

The decision both expands the practical reach of § 2252A(b)(2) predicates (by tolerating modest state/federal mismatch) and narrows speculative challenges (by insisting on a realistic probability showing).