“Relating To” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) Retains Its Ordinary Broad Meaning Under the Categorical Approach

I. Introduction

United States v. Mendoza (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2026) addresses two recurring issues in federal child-pornography sentencing: (1) when a prior state conviction qualifies for the heightened mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), and (2) what the record must show to sustain mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 as construed by Paroline v. United States.

The defendant, Ignacio Sanchez Mendoza, III, pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Because he had a 2004 Texas conviction for possession of child pornography under Tex. Penal Code § 43.26, the district court applied § 2252A(b)(1)’s enhancement, raising the statutory range from 5–20 years to 15–40 years. The court also ordered $94,000 in restitution to fourteen victims. Mendoza appealed both the enhancement and restitution.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Sentencing enhancement affirmed: The Fifth Circuit held that the phrase “relating to” in § 2252A(b)(1) carries its ordinary broad meaning. A prior state child-pornography-possession conviction can qualify even if its elements are broader than the federal definition, so long as it has a sufficient connection to possession of child pornography.
  • Restitution partially affirmed and partially vacated: The district court plainly erred by ordering restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A rather than 18 U.S.C. § 2259, but the error did not warrant reversal because Mendoza did not show prejudice under plain-error review. On the merits under § 2259/Paroline, restitution for eleven victims was affirmed, while restitution for three victims was vacated and remanded due to an insufficient basis to infer a Paroline-compliant proximate-cause determination.
  • Dissent: Judge Graves would have vacated the restitution awards entirely, emphasizing that key restitution materials were not filed in the district court and were added only via a supplemented appellate record.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Enhancement: “Relating to” and the categorical approach

  • United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), and Fifth Circuit applications such as United States v. Wikkerink, 841 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2016): These anchor the court’s use of the categorical approach—comparing statutory elements rather than underlying facts. Mendoza relied on this framework to argue Texas is broader than federal.
  • Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992), and Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S. 87 (2017): These supply the interpretive baseline that “relating to” is ordinarily broad—“a connection with, or reference to.”
  • Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600 (2023): Cited to show the Supreme Court has applied a broad “relating to” concept even in categorical-approach settings.
  • BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006), and Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: Used for the ordinary-meaning rule absent a statutory definition.
  • United States v. Taylor, No. 24-20303, 2025 WL 2206975 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025) (unpublished), relying on United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2007): The panel treated this as persuasive authority rejecting the same Texas-overbreadth argument, emphasizing that “relating to” does not demand an element-by-element match. The court cited Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2006) to explain the nonprecedential status of unpublished opinions.
  • Circuit consensus and split: United States v. Trahan, 111 F.4th 185 (1st Cir. 2024); United States v. Portanova, 961 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Liestman, 97 F.4th 1054 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc); United States v. Mayokok, 854 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316 (10th Cir. 2016) (broad reading) versus United States v. McGrattan, 504 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2018) (narrower approaches). The Fifth Circuit expressly aligned with the broad-reading majority.
  • Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020): Invoked (via United States v. Liestman) to contrast narrower connector language—e.g., “involves”—with Congress’s choice of “relating to” in § 2252A.
  • Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015): Mendoza’s primary authority for narrowing “relating to.” The panel distinguished it as driven by specific statutory cross-references and historical context not present in § 2252A.

2. Restitution: correct statute, standard of review, and proximate cause

  • United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Curry, 125 F.4th 733 (5th Cir. 2025): Establish plain-error review when the defendant failed to object to restitution.
  • Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), plus waiver/forfeiture applications such as United States v. Sanches, 86 F.4th 680 (5th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Capistrano, 74 F.4th 756 (5th Cir. 2023): Used to enforce that plain-error reversal requires showing prejudice and seriousness; Mendoza failed to brief prongs three and four on the “wrong statute” point.
  • United States v. West, 137 F.4th 395 (5th Cir. 2025): Central to both parties’ restitution arguments. It holds child-pornography restitution is governed by § 2259, not § 3663A, and vacates a restitution award where the record was “devoid of any proximate-cause analysis” and the amount was “free-floating.”
  • Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014), and United States v. Winchel, 896 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2018): Paroline requires restitution only to the extent the defendant’s offense proximately caused the victim’s losses, and Winchel treats a failure of that constraint as exceeding statutory limits.
  • United States v. Teijeiro, 79 F.4th 387 (5th Cir. 2023): Supports affirmance where the district court did not utter “Paroline” but the adopted PSR and supporting materials reflected a sufficient basis for the amounts.
  • Reply-brief waiver and issue-framing: United States v. Alfred, 60 F.4th 979 (5th Cir. 2023) (distinguishing types of claims) and McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), N.A., 788 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2015) (arguments first raised in reply are waived).
  • Dissent’s record-based concerns cite In re Montes, 677 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Rudolph, 103 F.4th 356 (5th Cir. 2024), emphasizing appellate limits and skepticism toward new evidence furnished on appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why Texas § 43.26 qualifies under § 2252A(b)(1)

Mendoza’s core enhancement argument was a classic categorical-overbreadth claim: Texas defines prohibited depictions to include “any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola,” while the federal definition focuses on “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area.” Under a strict elements-match view, Texas could criminalize conduct beyond the federal definition.

The Fifth Circuit rejected this by making the phrase “relating to” do the work Congress assigned it. The court held that “relating to” is a broad connector, so the enhancement does not require a state offense that mirrors the federal definition. Instead, the state conviction need only have a meaningful connection to possession of child pornography. In the panel’s view, Mendoza’s reading would effectively “read ‘relating to’ out of the sentencing enhancement,” contrary to United States v. Hubbard.

The court’s reasoning is also structural: it contrasted “relating to” with narrower connector terms Congress has used elsewhere, and noted that Congress has shown it can demand closer matches when it wants to. That context, combined with Supreme Court ordinary-meaning cases like Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., led the panel to adopt the broad interpretation and “join the majority of circuits.”

Finally, the court treated Mellouli v. Lynch as a limited exception driven by cross-referenced statutory definitions and history, not a general command to narrow “relating to.”

2. Restitution: wrong statute error, but partial affirmance under Paroline

The panel separated restitution into two layers:

  • Statutory authorization: The district court used § 3663A, but under United States v. West, child-pornography restitution must proceed under § 2259. This was “plain or obvious” error. However, on plain-error review the panel refused to reverse on that basis alone because Mendoza did not argue that the statutory mis-citation changed the outcome (i.e., he did not satisfy prongs three and four under Puckett v. United States).
  • Paroline proximate cause: The court then evaluated whether the record supported victim-by-victim restitution consistent with Paroline v. United States. It reiterated there is no “magic words” requirement (citing United States v. Teijeiro). For eleven victims, the panel found enough indicia that the district court relied on detailed restitution packets (victim-impact statements and attorney letters referencing Paroline, losses, and requested fractions of losses), even though those materials were not filed on the district court docket and were added to the appellate record by supplementation. For three victims, where documentation was thinner (missing estimated losses and/or attorney loss analyses), the panel found an insufficient basis to infer that Paroline’s proximate-cause assessment had been performed and thus vacated and remanded.

C. Impact

1. Sentencing enhancements in child-pornography cases

The opinion’s most consequential doctrinal move is its explicit holding that § 2252A(b)(1)’s “relating to” retains its ordinary, broad meaning. Practically, defendants in the Fifth Circuit will face a substantially higher bar when challenging § 2252A(b)(1) enhancements based on minor definitional mismatches between state and federal child pornography statutes. For Texas defendants in particular, the panel’s reasoning strongly signals that convictions under Tex. Penal Code § 43.26 will generally qualify.

The court also entrenches the Fifth Circuit’s alignment with the majority-circuit approach (e.g., United States v. Trahan, United States v. Liestman (en banc)), while acknowledging contrary authority (United States v. McGrattan, United States v. Reinhart). That split preserves a pathway for further review, but the Fifth Circuit’s internal rule is now clear.

2. Restitution practice and record-building

On restitution, the decision reinforces several practice points:

  • Courts and probation should ensure PSRs and judgments reflect the correct statute (§ 2259), consistent with United States v. West.
  • Prosecutors should build a record that ties requested amounts to Paroline factors and loss estimates; thin documentation risks remand even on plain-error review.
  • The panel’s willingness (on plain-error review) to uphold restitution based on materials “before the court” but not filed in the district court may influence how parties handle sensitive victim materials (often provided informally or under seal). The dissent, however, flags appellate-role and record-integrity concerns, suggesting this aspect could be litigated in future cases.
  • Remand is not necessarily defendant-favorable: the panel highlighted that, per United States v. West, renewed proceedings may yield higher restitution.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Categorical approach: A method that compares what a statute requires to convict (its “elements”) rather than what the defendant actually did. If the prior statute covers more conduct than the federal generic offense, it may not qualify—unless Congress used broader connector language like “relating to.”
  • “Relating to”: A broad statutory connector meaning “has a connection with.” Here, it allows qualifying prior offenses that are not perfect matches.
  • Plain error review: When a defendant did not object below, an appellate court corrects only clear errors that likely changed the outcome and seriously affect fairness or integrity. Failure to brief prejudice can be fatal.
  • Mandatory restitution under § 2259 and Paroline: Restitution is required, but only for losses the defendant’s conduct proximately caused. Paroline provides “rough guideposts” (e.g., number of offenders, defendant’s role, number of images) to estimate the defendant’s relative causal contribution.
  • Victim-by-victim analysis: Even in one case, the record may support restitution for some victims but not others depending on documentation of losses and causal assessment.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Mendoza establishes, for the Fifth Circuit, that “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) is broadly construed, so prior state child-pornography-possession convictions need not match the federal definition element-for-element to trigger the enhanced 15-year mandatory minimum. On restitution, the case reaffirms § 2259 and Paroline v. United States as controlling, approves restitution for eleven victims on a documentation-based, no-magic-words approach under plain-error review, but vacates awards for three victims where the record did not adequately support a proximate-cause assessment.