Refining Notice Requirements in Habeas Corpus Reviews: Express Invitation to Reply Not Constitutionally Required

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Teague, decided April 11, 2025, in which the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) for Anthony David Teague’s Rule 60(b)(4) challenge to the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas corpus motion. Teague, a federal prisoner convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for making interstate threats, argued that the district court’s failure to expressly invite him to file a reply brief violated his procedural due process rights and rendered the 2007 § 2255 judgment void. The key issue is whether a court must affirmatively notify a § 2255 movant of the right to reply before adopting a magistrate judge’s proposed findings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit held that:

Rule 60(b)(4) relief is available only when a judgment is “void” for lack of jurisdiction or a fundamental due process violation depriving notice or opportunity to be heard (United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)).
Local rules already permitted Teague to file a reply; he received all pleadings at his correct address, so he had adequate notice and opportunity.
Even if failure to invite a reply were a procedural irregularity, it was harmless: the magistrate judge did not rely on the affidavit attached to the government’s response, and Teague’s speculative claims of what he “would have” done could not void the judgment.
Teague failed to make the “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” required for a COA (28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)).

Accordingly, the court denied a COA and dismissed the consolidated appeals (Nos. 24-2178 & 25-2015).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010): Defined “void” judgments and held that Rule 60(b)(4) applies only to jurisdictional defects or violations of due process that deprive notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Established that, when a district court rejects constitutional claims on the merits, a COA requires showing that reasonable jurists could debate the court’s ruling.
Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2006): Clarified that a COA is required to appeal the denial of Rule 60(b) relief in a § 2255 context.
Bartch v. Barch, 111 F.4th 1043 (10th Cir. 2024): Reaffirmed that Rule 60(b)(4) has no fixed time limit but applies only to truly void judgments.
James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2013): Reminded that pro se filings are construed liberally, but courts do not act as advocates.
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010): Held that when a court considers materials outside the complaint, it must convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment with proper notice, a principle Teague invoked but that the Tenth Circuit found inapplicable here.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s logic proceeded in three steps:

Threshold for Rule 60(b)(4): Relief lies only for judgments fundamentally void due to jurisdictional error or a due process breach depriving actual notice and an opportunity to be heard. A mere procedural misstep under the rules does not rise to that level.
Actual Notice and Opportunity: The Tenth Circuit found that Teague received all filings at his correct address, and the local rules expressly permitted reply briefs. Thus, he was neither unaware of nor precluded from filing a reply.
Harmlessness and Speculation: Even assuming arguendo a procedural lapse, there was no prejudice: the magistrate judge did not rely on the contested affidavit, and Teague’s conjecture about a more persuasive amendment failed to establish a void judgment.

Impact

This decision clarifies and cements the following principles:

Court systems need not go beyond established local or federal rules to give express, affirmative invitations to file reply briefs where notice already exists.
The bar for a judgment to be deemed “void” under Rule 60(b)(4) remains appropriately high, limiting collateral attacks to truly fundamental defects.
Future § 2255 litigants will find that procedural rules alone rarely support voiding a judgment absent a concrete denial of notice or hearing.
Appellate courts will continue to enforce Slack’s standard for COAs, requiring a debatable constitutional issue, thereby discouraging piecemeal or speculative appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Appealability (COA): A court-issued permission slip required to appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion or certain Rule 60(b) motions in habeas cases.
Rule 60(b)(4): A provision allowing courts to set aside judgments that are void—meaning they suffer from a fundamental jurisdictional or due process defect.
§ 2255 Motion: A post-conviction petition by a federal prisoner seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentence on grounds such as ineffective assistance of counsel.
Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (PFRD): A magistrate judge’s draft ruling, which becomes final only after the district judge reviews and adopts or rejects it.
Summary Judgment Conversion (Rule 12/56): When a court considers evidence outside the pleadings, it must usually convert a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, giving parties notice and an opportunity to respond.

Conclusion

United States v. Teague reaffirms that procedural rules permitting replies suffice to satisfy due process in habeas corpus proceedings. A court’s failure to issue an explicit invitation to reply does not render a § 2255 judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4) where the movant nonetheless has actual notice and opportunity. The decision underscores the narrow scope of “void judgment” relief, preserves the high hurdle for obtaining a COA, and provides clarity for future litigants challenging procedural aspects of post-conviction review.