Reaffirming Mt. Healthy at the Preliminary Injunction Stage: First Amendment Retaliation and Local Permitting in Minocqua Brewing Company LLC v. Hess

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Minocqua Brewing Company LLC v. Hess, No. 25‑2092 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), sits at the intersection of local land-use regulation and First Amendment protections for political speech. The case involves a politically outspoken brewery owner, repeated violations of local permitting rules, and an allegation that county officials retaliated against him because of his progressive advocacy and criticism of local government.

At stake doctrinally is not whether political speech on controversial topics is protected (it is), but how that protection operates when the same speaker repeatedly violates neutral permitting requirements. The opinion is particularly important for how it applies and synthesizes:

• The federal standard for preliminary injunctions after Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024); and
• The Mt. Healthy “same-decision” defense, as read through Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175 (2024), in First Amendment retaliation cases.

The key holding: even where a plaintiff plausibly alleges that protected political speech may have motivated government action, a preliminary injunction will be denied if the government can show that it would have taken the same adverse action on concededly valid, non-retaliatory grounds—here, the plaintiff’s serial permit violations and declared intent to continue violating the law.

II. Case Background

A. The Parties

Plaintiffs-Appellants: Minocqua Brewing Company LLC and its owner, Kirk Bangstad. The Brewery is a seasonal microbrewery and pub in Minocqua, Wisconsin, operating mainly from May through September. Bangstad uses the Brewery and its social media presence as a platform for progressive political advocacy, including political merchandise and pointed criticism of local officials.

Defendants-Appellees: Individual members of the Oneida County Planning and Development Committee (the “Committee”): Daniel Hess, Mitchell Ives, Scott Holewinski, William Fried, and Robert Almekinder. They are sued in their capacities as local officials responsible for zoning and permitting decisions.

B. The Factual Dispute in Brief

The dispute centers on the Brewery’s efforts to operate an outdoor beer garden and the County’s repeated enforcement of zoning and permit conditions:

• The Brewery obtained an administrative review permit in March 2022 for an indoor retail outlet that expressly did not authorize outdoor operations.
• Despite that limitation, the Brewery operated some outdoor sales during summer 2022.
• In 2022–2023 the Brewery sought a conditional use permit (“CUP”) specifically authorizing an outdoor beer garden; its first application was denied (for reasons including a driveway proposal that depended on town-owned land).
• In October 2023, after revised applications, the County granted a CUP for an outdoor beer garden—but conditioned its operation on the Brewery’s compliance with a series of specified conditions before opening.
• The Brewery admits it opened and operated the beer garden in 2024 and 2025 without satisfying all conditions, continued operations after a suspension, operated without any permit after revocation, and publicly declared it would remain open regardless of permitting decisions.

The plaintiffs contend that the Committee’s revocation of the 2023 CUP and its denial of a 2025 CUP application were not simply neutral enforcement of zoning rules, but retaliation for Bangstad’s progressive political messaging and his criticism of town and county officials.

C. Procedural Posture

In the district court (W.D. Wis., Chief Judge James D. Peterson), the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. They asked the court to:

• Order the County to reinstate the outdoor beer garden permit; and
• Prohibit further retaliation for their First Amendment activity.

The district court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim given:

• Their own concessions that they had violated multiple permit conditions and continued operations in defiance of suspensions and revocations; and
• The lack of evidence that the stated enforcement reasons were pretext for political retaliation.

The plaintiffs appealed that denial. The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Rovner (with Judges Easterbrook and St. Eve joining), affirmed.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion proceeds in three main steps:

1. Standard of review and record scope: The court reviews the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, legal questions de novo, and factual findings for clear error, citing Richwine v. Matuszak, 148 F.4th 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2025). It notes that district courts, under Rule 52(a)(2), need only find facts necessary to resolve the motion, citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976), and it supplements those limited findings with uncontested record facts for context, consistent with Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir. 2011).
2. Application of the preliminary injunction and retaliation frameworks: Reaffirming Starbucks v. McKinney, the court applies the traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctions, emphasizing that “likelihood of success on the merits” carries particular weight (citing A.C. by M.C. v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Martinsville, 75 F.4th 760, 771 (7th Cir. 2023)). It then layers on the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim from FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth, 11 F.4th 574 (7th Cir. 2021):
   • Protected activity;
   • Deprivation likely to deter such activity; and
   • Causation (protected activity as a motivating factor).
   The first two elements are uncontested—Bangstad engaged in protected political speech, and the denial of permits is a material deprivation. The analysis turns entirely on causation and the government’s Mt. Healthy same-decision defense.
3. Mt. Healthy and same-decision defense at the preliminary injunction stage: Even assuming (without deciding) that plaintiffs could show their speech was a motivating factor, the court holds that the defendants easily satisfy their burden of showing they would have revoked and denied the permits even absent the protected speech. The reasons: the Brewery’s admitted prior violations of permit conditions, continued operation after suspensions, ongoing operation without any permit, and open declaration that it would continue to operate regardless of the Committee’s decisions. Without evidence of pretext or similarly situated comparators treated more leniently, plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success. Because that failure is dispositive, the court declines to reach the remaining injunction factors and notes that plaintiffs waived key balancing arguments by raising them only in their reply brief (citing United States v. Williams, 85 F.4th 844, 849 (7th Cir. 2023)).

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirms the denial of the preliminary injunction.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural and Factual Framework

1. Standards of Review and Rule 52(a)(2)

The court begins with a careful framing of its role:

• Abuse of discretion review applies to the ultimate decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction.
• De novo review applies to underlying legal rulings.
• Clear error review governs the district court’s factual findings.

Citing Richwine v. Matuszak, the panel underscores that appellate courts do not re-try the motion; they assess whether the district court misapplied law or relied on clearly erroneous facts.

The court also acknowledges that the district court’s factual findings were “quite limited,” largely because the judge found the plaintiffs’ own concessions dispositive. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2), a district court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on a preliminary injunction, but—as Bagamasbad explains—it need not resolve every contested factual detail, only those necessary to decide the motion.

To provide context, the Seventh Circuit thus supplements those minimal findings with uncontested record facts while explicitly noting that such background does not constitute binding factual determinations for later merits proceedings. This is consistent with Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which holds that factual findings at the preliminary injunction stage are not controlling at trial.

2. Factual Chronology and the Pattern of Noncompliance

The opinion carefully reconstructs a timeline that is central to the Mt. Healthy analysis:

• August 2021 – March 2022: The Brewery applies for, and receives, an administrative review permit for a “craft brewery retail outlet.” That permit explicitly does not authorize outdoor operations; a separate conditional use permit would be required for such activities. Nevertheless, the Brewery conducts some outdoor operations in summer 2022, contrary to permit terms.
• November 2022 – April 2023: The Brewery submits a conditional use permit (CUP) application for an outdoor beer garden. The application is not complete until February 2023 and proposes, among other things, a driveway partly on town-owned land. When Minocqua officials refuse permission to use town land, the Committee denies the CUP in April 2023. The Brewery does not appeal that denial to the Board of Adjustment and instead files a revised application in May 2023.
• Summer 2023: While that revised application is pending, the Brewery continues to violate the existing administrative review permit by operating outdoors. On August 2, 2023, the Committee:
  • Revokes the administrative review permit for the retail outlet based on ongoing violations; and
  • Tables the revised beer garden CUP.
  The Brewery appeals the revocation of the retail permit to the Board of Adjustment but does not separately appeal the denial of the first beer garden CUP. Instead, it submits three new alternative beer garden plans to the Committee.
• October 6, 2023: The Planning and Zoning Department grants a CUP for one of the proposed beer garden options. Critically, the permit is conditioned on the Brewery meeting all specified conditions before start-up of outdoor operations.
• June 2024 – Suspension and Continued Operation: The Brewery opens the beer garden for the 2024 tourist season despite not having satisfied all conditions. At a June 20, 2024 Committee meeting:
  • The Brewery’s lawyer concedes noncompliance with some conditions.
  • The Brewery offers only to be in full compliance by October 2024—after the lucrative summer season.
  • The Committee suspends the CUP for 90 days, with the option to lift the suspension earlier if compliance is achieved.
  The Brewery does not appeal this suspension to the Board of Adjustment and continues operating in defiance of the suspension order.
• July 24, 2024 – Revocation: After a second hearing, at which plaintiffs do not dispute continued operation post‑suspension, the Committee revokes the CUP entirely, citing both past and ongoing violations and defiance of the suspension.
• February 20, 2025: The Board of Adjustment denies the Brewery’s appeal of the revocation. As of that date, the Brewery has neither an administrative review permit nor a CUP for either the retail outlet or the beer garden.
• April–June 2025 – New Application and Open Defiance: The Brewery submits a new CUP application for essentially the same beer garden project on April 7, 2025 but, on May 1, 2025, begins operating the beer garden without any permit. On June 11, 2025—the very day of the Committee’s public hearing on the new application—Bangstad posts on social media that the beer garden will remain open regardless of the Committee’s decision. He later concedes that the beer garden in fact remained open throughout the 2025 season without a permit.
• June 11, 2025 – Denial of New CUP: At the hearing, Committee member Scott Holewinski articulates the rationale for denial:

  “So this isn't about parking spaces or fencing or traffic markings. That all can be handled in conditions of the CUP. This is about an applicant refusing to follow specific conditions in the past and violating every permit he had for the past three plus years. In fact, he is currently violating a known permit right now. And this morning he, Mr. Bangstad, put on social media that no matter what happens today, he will be open anyway. So it just shows that he doesn't follow the rules. He doesn't.”

Parallel to these local administrative events, the County also sued in state court (April 12, 2024) to impose forfeitures for ordinance violations. The Seventh Circuit notes that this local enforcement action, which does not involve First Amendment claims, has no abstention consequences for the federal suit, citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), and J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2021).

B. Precedents and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

1. Preliminary Injunction Standards: Starbucks, A.C. by M.C., and AM General

The opinion relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s re‑affirmation in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney that courts must use the traditional four‑factor test for preliminary injunctions:

1. Likelihood of success on the merits;
2. Likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction;
3. Balance of equities; and
4. Public interest.

Citing A.C. by M.C. v. Martinsville, the court emphasizes that likelihood of success on the merits is often the “most weighty” factor. This case exemplifies that principle: because the plaintiffs fail at that first step, the court, quoting AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 830 (7th Cir. 2002), finds it has “reason enough to deny the motion for preliminary injunction without further discussion.”

Moreover, the court notes an independent, procedural barrier: even if the merits hurdle were cleared, the plaintiffs waived their arguments on the balance of harms and the public interest by first raising them in their reply brief, citing United States v. Williams, 85 F.4th 844, 849 (7th Cir. 2023).

2. First Amendment Retaliation Framework: FKFJ, Kidwell

The court takes its retaliation framework from FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth, 11 F.4th 574 (7th Cir. 2021), which sets out three elements:

1. Engagement in activity protected by the First Amendment;
2. Subject to a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and
3. Causation: the protected activity was at least a motivating factor in the government’s action.

The court has no difficulty with the first two:

• Bangstad’s political advocacy and criticism of local officials are core political speech.
• Denial and revocation of permits necessary to operate a core component of the Brewery’s business (its outdoor beer garden) constitutes a meaningful deprivation.

Causation is the sticking point. Drawing on FKFJ and Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2012), the court notes that plaintiffs can prove retaliatory causation through:

• Direct evidence (e.g., explicit statements linking adverse action to speech); or
• Circumstantial evidence (e.g., suspicious timing, differential treatment, ambiguous statements suggesting animus, etc.).

The plaintiffs attempted to rely on “new evidence” of Holewinski’s June 2025 statement and alleged disparate treatment regarding parking waivers and permit timing. As the court explains, however, neither suffices when weighed against the admitted pattern of noncompliance and the absence of concrete comparator evidence.

3. Causation, Mt. Healthy, and the Same-Decision Defense: Mt. Healthy, Vullo, Lozman, Massey

The opinion’s most consequential doctrinal work lies in its application of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework at the preliminary injunction stage.

Under Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), once a plaintiff shows that protected activity was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the adverse action, the burden shifts to the government to show that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct. That same-decision defense, if accepted, defeats liability.

The Seventh Circuit aligns this with the Supreme Court’s more recent articulation in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 204 (2024), which, citing Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. 87 (2018), underscores that:

“Even if retaliation is a motivating factor in the government’s action there is still no liability unless the First Amendment violation is the but-for cause of the adverse action.”

Thus, the causation structure is:

• Plaintiff’s initial burden: show that protected speech was at least a substantial or motivating factor.
• Defendant’s burden: produce evidence that it would have taken the same action even without the protected speech (i.e., show a lawful, independent, and sufficient ground).
• Plaintiff’s rebuttal: show that the proffered ground is pretextual—a cover for retaliatory animus (see Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2006)).

In this case, the court explicitly notes that it need not even resolve the initial motivating-factor question. Even if it were assumed that Bangstad’s criticism played some role, the County’s same-decision showing is overwhelming:

• The Brewery violated its administrative review permit by conducting outdoor operations in 2022 and 2023.
• It violated the 2023 CUP by opening and operating before satisfying all conditions.
• It continued operations after the CUP was suspended in June 2024.
• It continued operating after the CUP was revoked and after losing before the Board of Adjustment.
• It operated the beer garden without any permit in 2025, including after filing a new CUP application.
• Bangstad publicly declared on the day of the June 11, 2025 hearing that the beer garden would be open “no matter what happens today.”

Against that record, the court concludes that “any reasonable permit-issuing body” would have denied and revoked the permits, regardless of political speech. The plaintiffs failed to produce:

• Evidence that the permit conditions themselves were unusual for this type of use;
• Evidence that the conditions were materially different from those the Brewery itself proposed; or
• Evidence that similarly situated businesses with comparable violations received more lenient treatment.

Without such evidence, the plaintiffs cannot show pretext; thus, even if speech played some role, it was not the but-for cause of the permit denial. The same-decision defense therefore defeats their retaliation claim at the merits-likelihood stage.

4. Treatment of Plaintiffs’ “New Evidence” and Comparator Arguments

The plaintiffs styled Holewinski’s June 11, 2025 statement as “new evidence” of retaliatory motive. The court rejects that characterization. It observes that Holewinski’s statement focuses entirely on:

• The “refus[al] to follow specific conditions in the past;”
• Violating “every permit [the Brewery] had for the past three plus years;”
• Ongoing violations; and
• The recent social media vow to ignore the Committee’s decision.

Crucially, the statement does not mention political views, signs, or criticism of officials. It expresses exasperation with consistent non-compliance, not with speech content.

Plaintiffs also asserted that they received only a one-space parking waiver while similarly situated businesses got larger waivers and that their applications were delayed. The court, however, notes the plaintiffs offered no evidence:

• Establishing the criteria for parking waivers;
• Showing that they met those criteria while others did not; or
• Proving that the same defendants were responsible for allegedly more favorable treatment of others.

In addition, the district court had earlier refused to credit certain evidence, such as conclusory statements that “no other business” was subject to similar requirements, where the plaintiffs lacked personal knowledge or tied the statements to non-decisionmakers. The Seventh Circuit agrees that such weak, unsupported assertions cannot overcome the County’s straightforward explanation grounded in undisputed noncompliance.

C. Legal Reasoning and Application

1. Layering the Two Multi-part Tests

A central theme of the opinion is the “layering” of the preliminary injunction test on top of the First Amendment retaliation framework. To obtain preliminary relief, plaintiffs had to show:

• A likelihood of success on the retaliation claim, which itself requires them to:
  • Prove protected activity (met);
  • Prove a material deprivation (met);
  • Make at least a threshold showing that their speech was a motivating factor; and
  • Defeat the County’s same-decision defense (or at least show a likelihood of defeating it at trial) by demonstrating pretext.

The Seventh Circuit emphasizes that even if one assumes the motivating-factor step in plaintiffs’ favor, their concessions make it impossible to show that speech was the but-for cause of the permit denial. This is a powerful application of Mt. Healthy/Vullo in a preliminary injunction context: courts may focus on the strength of the government’s same-decision defense in evaluating likelihood of success, rather than resolving disputed motive questions at an early stage.

2. The Role of Concessions and Open Defiance

The opinion repeatedly notes that the district court’s limited fact-finding stemmed from the plaintiffs’ own admissions:

• Admitted violation of the administrative review permit by conducting outdoor operations;
• Admitted failure to satisfy conditions of the 2023 CUP before opening the beer garden;
• Admitted operation after the June 2024 suspension and after the July 2024 revocation;
• Admitted operation in 2025 without any permit; and
• Explicit, public statements promising to ignore future permit decisions.

Those concessions effectively “doom” the claims at the preliminary injunction stage, not because they eliminate all possibility of retaliation, but because they make it overwhelmingly likely that the government can prevail on the same-decision defense. As the court succinctly concludes:

“Given the concession of past and present willful violations of the permitting requirements, and a promise for future violations—the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Any reasonable permit-issuing body would revoke or deny permits under those circumstances.”

3. Abstention and Parallel State Enforcement

Although not central to the holding, the court briefly addresses a potential concern: a parallel state-court enforcement action by the County seeking forfeitures for local ordinance violations. Citing Exxon Mobil and J.B. v. Woodard, the panel explains:

• The state forfeiture action involves only local ordinance compliance and not First Amendment claims; and
• Its outcome will not control or preclude the federal constitutional claims.

The implication is that doctrines like Younger abstention or Rooker–Feldman do not bar or limit the federal suit; they are simply irrelevant given the nature and posture of the state proceedings.

D. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For First Amendment Retaliation Plaintiffs

This decision sends a clear message to litigants who allege retaliatory enforcement in licensing or permitting contexts:

• Compliance matters. Openly and repeatedly violating neutral, facially applicable regulations—even while making protected speech—dramatically weakens a retaliation claim, especially at the preliminary injunction stage.
• Mt. Healthy is a powerful filter. Even if some evidence suggests retaliatory motive, plaintiffs must confront and overcome the same-decision defense. They must be prepared with:
  • Comparator evidence (similarly situated entities treated better despite similar violations);
  • Evidence that the asserted compliance rationale is factually false or selectively enforced; or
  • Evidence that the process or conditions imposed are so anomalous that they plausibly reflect pretext.
• Preliminary injunctions require forward-looking proof. At the injunction stage, it is not enough to point to suspicious timing or rhetoric alone. Plaintiffs must show it is likely that the government’s neutral explanation will be rejected as pretext at trial.

Further, the decision underscores the importance of fully developing non-merits factors in preliminary injunction briefing. Plaintiffs who focus exclusively on constitutional theory but neglect irreparable harm and public interest—and especially those who raise such arguments only in reply—risk waiver under circuit precedent.

2. For Local Governments and Administrative Bodies

For municipal officials, Minocqua offers guidance and a measure of protection:

• Consistent, documented enforcement is key. Where there is a clear paper trail of neutral rule application—especially repeated notices, suspensions, and appeals—courts are more likely to credit compliance-based rationales, even in politically charged cases.
• Decisionmaker statements should focus on compliance, not content. Holewinski’s on-the-record explanation, centered on noncompliance and disregard for conditions, proved helpful. Had he referenced the plaintiff’s political views, the analysis could have been more fraught.
• Use and explain procedural remedies. The availability of appeals to a Board of Adjustment, and the Brewery’s partial use (appealing only some decisions), show that local governments can strengthen their position by providing and adhering to clear procedural channels.

The opinion also implicitly encourages local governments to maintain clear written standards (e.g., for parking waivers, conditional use criteria) and consistent application, as these standards will be scrutinized in any future comparator-based challenges.

3. Integration with Starbucks and Vullo

This decision sits squarely within the post-Starbucks, post-Vullo landscape:

• After Starbucks: Courts must rigorously apply the four-factor preliminary injunction framework, not a relaxed standard, even in cases involving constitutional claims. Minocqua is an illustration: the court insists on a robust likelihood-of-success showing before entertaining live business-impact and public-interest arguments.
• After Vullo: While Vullo emphasized that First Amendment plaintiffs can sue regulators who use informal pressure to chill protected expression, it simultaneously reaffirmed that the same-decision/but-for test remains an ultimate causation barrier. Minocqua shows that courts will vigorously enforce that barrier when there is a strong, non-retaliatory basis (like blatant rule violations) for the adverse action.

The net result is a more structured and demanding environment for plaintiffs seeking interim relief in First Amendment retaliation disputes with regulators or licensing authorities.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction is a court order issued before a full trial. It aims to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm while the case is litigated. To get one, a plaintiff must show:

• They are likely to win at trial;
• They will be irreparably harmed if no injunction issues;
• The harm to them outweighs harm to the defendant and others; and
• The public interest supports an injunction.

It is an extraordinary remedy, not granted automatically even when constitutional rights are in play.

2. First Amendment Retaliation

Retaliation claims allege that the government punished someone for exercising free speech. The core components are:

• Protected speech: The plaintiff engaged in expression the First Amendment covers (e.g., political advocacy, criticism of officials).
• Adverse action: The government took action that would likely deter a reasonable person from similar speech (e.g., firing, denying licenses or permits).
• Causation: The speech caused or significantly motivated the adverse action.

Even if a plaintiff proves that speech was a factor, the government can still win if it shows it would have done the same thing for legitimate reasons (e.g., serious rule violations).

3. Motivating Factor vs. But-For Causation vs. Same-Decision Defense

• Motivating factor: Speech was one of the reasons the government acted—even if other reasons also existed.
• But-for causation: Without the speech, the government would not have taken the adverse action. If the government would have acted anyway, speech is not the but-for cause.
• Same-decision defense (Mt. Healthy): Even if speech played some role, the government can avoid liability by proving it would have taken the same action for independent, lawful reasons (e.g., persistent noncompliance). This is essentially a way of saying speech was not the but-for cause.

4. Pretext

Pretext means a false or insincere explanation used to hide the real motive. In this context, the plaintiffs needed to show that:

• The County’s stated reasons (permit violations) were not actually why it acted; and
• The real reason was hostility to their political speech.

They could do this by showing inconsistent treatment, factual inaccuracies, or shifting explanations. The court found no such evidence here.

5. Conditional Use Permit vs. Administrative Review Permit

• Administrative review permit: A more routine, generally non-discretionary permit for uses that fit within established rules, here allowing indoor retail operations.
• Conditional use permit (CUP): A discretionary permit allowing land uses that are not automatically allowed but may be permitted if certain conditions are met. Outdoor beer gardens in a particular zoning district often fall into this category.

In Minocqua, the Brewery had both types: an administrative permit for indoor retail (which it violated by going outdoors) and later a CUP for the beer garden (which it violated by noncompliance with conditions).

6. Board of Adjustment

A Board of Adjustment is a local administrative body that hears appeals from zoning and permitting decisions, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal. Applicants dissatisfied with a permit decision typically must appeal there before going to court. The Brewery did appeal certain decisions to the Board, which upheld the County’s actions.

7. Standards of Review: De Novo, Abuse of Discretion, Clear Error

• De novo: The appellate court decides a legal question from scratch, without deference to the district court.
• Abuse of discretion: The appellate court defers to the district court’s overall decision unless it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on legal error.
• Clear error: The appellate court defers to the district court’s fact findings and overturns them only if left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made.

In preliminary injunction appeals, these standards are layered: factual findings (clear error), legal rules (de novo), and the ultimate denial/grant decision (abuse of discretion).

VI. Conclusion

Minocqua Brewing Company LLC v. Hess is a significant application of First Amendment retaliation doctrine to a charged local permitting dispute. While reaffirming the robust protection of political speech, the Seventh Circuit underscores that:

• Constitutional protection does not immunize a speaker from neutral enforcement of zoning and permit conditions; and
• Where plaintiffs concede repeated violations and even promise continued defiance, the government’s same-decision defense will almost inevitably defeat claims of retaliatory animus—especially at the preliminary injunction stage.

The decision illustrates how post‑Starbucks preliminary injunction doctrine and post‑Vullo retaliation causation standards combine to impose a demanding burden on plaintiffs seeking interim relief. It teaches that successful retaliation plaintiffs must do more than show they spoke and suffered harm; they must also negate the government’s legitimate enforcement rationale by concrete, comparative, and fact-intensive proof of pretext.

For First Amendment litigants, the case is a cautionary tale about the strategic and legal costs of noncompliance during a dispute with regulators. For local governments, it offers a roadmap to structuring and documenting neutral enforcement decisions that will withstand constitutional scrutiny even in politically contentious environments.