R.C. 4123.56(F) Requires a Two-Sentence Causation Analysis for TTD During School Recess, Displacing Glenn’s Stretch-Pay Shortcut

1. Introduction

This mandamus appeal arises from a recurrent workers’ compensation problem in school employment: whether an injured nine-month school-district employee may receive temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation during a summer recess when the employee elected stretch pay (salary earned over the school year but paid in 12 monthly installments).

Parties. Appellant-relator is Columbus City Schools, Columbus Board of Education (“Columbus Schools”). Appellee is employee Julie A. Brookbank-Mizer, a speech therapist. The Industrial Commission of Ohio is also an appellee.

Core issue. After Brookbank-Mizer’s compensable injury and an award of TTD beginning in September 2021, Columbus Schools challenged continued TTD payments over the 2022 summer recess when she was not scheduled to work. The Commission awarded TTD through the summer largely by invoking State ex rel. Glenn v. Indus. Comm., 2009-Ohio-3627. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission must apply the full causation framework in R.C. 4123.56(F), including its second sentence, and not merely rely on Glenn.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Tenth District’s denial of a writ and issued a limited writ ordering the Industrial Commission to: (1) vacate its order awarding TTD during the 2022 summer recess; and (2) determine Brookbank-Mizer’s eligibility for TTD during that recess under R.C. 4123.56(F).

The Court held that both the first and second sentences of R.C. 4123.56(F) must be considered. A physician’s certification that the claimant is medically unable to work does not, by itself, resolve the statutory question whether the claimant was “not working” during the recess as the direct result of reasons unrelated to the allowed injury.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• State ex rel. AutoZone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-5519
  Role: This is the controlling interpretive authority on R.C. 4123.56(F). The Court imported AutoZone’s key instruction into this case: “Both sentences must be considered.” Influence: AutoZone supplied the conceptual separation between (a) “unable to work” (first sentence) and (b) “not working” for reasons unrelated to the injury (second sentence), and required a causation analysis for each. The Court treated the Commission’s failure to perform that two-sentence inquiry as legal error.
• State ex rel. Glenn v. Indus. Comm., 2009-Ohio-3627
  Role: The Commission’s principal authority for awarding summer-recess TTD when stretch pay was elected and the claimant was not receiving wages during the summer. Influence (negative): The Court explained that Glenn predates the 2020 enactment of R.C. 4123.56(F) and did not address the “not working for reasons unrelated” inquiry that division (F) now makes unavoidable. Reliance on Glenn as a substitute for statutory analysis was deemed improper.
• State ex rel. Crim v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2001-Ohio-1268
  Role: Columbus Schools argued Crim made the claimant’s intent to work a summer job relevant. The Tenth District read Crim narrowly as “voluntary abandonment” discussion only. Influence: The Supreme Court clarified that Crim discussed intent as part of a loss-of-earnings inquiry, but held Crim is factually distinguishable and, more importantly, that intent’s relevance now flows from R.C. 4123.56(F)’s second sentence rather than from Crim as controlling precedent.
• State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 2000-Ohio-168
  Role: Provided the quoted definition/description of the former voluntary-abandonment doctrine as a break in the causal chain. Influence: Used as background to explain what R.C. 4123.56(F) supplanted (the “voluntary/involuntary” framework), while emphasizing that causation remains central.
• State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2021-Ohio-3669
  Role: Standard mandamus elements (clear legal right/duty; no adequate remedy). Influence: Anchored the Court’s threshold authority to grant mandamus when the Commission fails to follow governing law.
• State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2008-Ohio-1593
  Role: Mandamus lies when the Commission has a legal duty to perform or abuses discretion in carrying out duties. Influence: Supported judicial intervention where the Commission’s analysis is legally defective.
• State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 1997-Ohio-181
  Role: “Some evidence”/deference principle for adequately explained orders. Influence: The Court implicitly distinguished this case from a mere evidentiary dispute: the problem was not lack of evidence but legal misapplication/omission.
• State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64 (1975)
  Role: Mandamus issues when the Commission incorrectly interprets Ohio law. Influence: Characterized the Commission’s failure to apply R.C. 4123.56(F) as a correctable legal error.
• State ex rel. McDonald v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-1620
  Role: Cited for the principle that a relator has a right to correct application of the relevant statute. Influence: Reinforced that proper statutory application is a mandamus-enforceable duty.
• State ex rel. Heilman v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-5518
  Role: “Long-standing practice” of granting a limited writ when evidentiary questions remain and full relief is not shown. Influence: Provided the remedial template: remand for proper application of R.C. 4123.56(F) rather than outright termination of benefits as a matter of law.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is a statutory-causation correction, not a wage-calculation dispute. The Commission treated the question as largely answered by whether Brookbank-Mizer received stretch-pay wages during the summer and by Glenn’s logic that TTD can substitute for deferred earnings when wages stop. The Supreme Court held that, after the 2020 enactment of division (F), the analysis must be anchored in the statute’s two complementary causation rules.

(a) Division (F) creates a two-part causation screen.

Following AutoZone Stores, Inc., the Court emphasized that these sentences address different factual states—“unable to work” versus “not working”—and the Commission must evaluate both. That is why a medical certification of disability, while relevant, cannot be dispositive: the second sentence asks whether the claimant’s unemployment during the period at issue is directly attributable to non-injury reasons (such as not being scheduled to work during summer recess).

(b) The Commission’s error was methodological and legal.

The Commission stated only that the SHO “erroneously found” R.C. 4123.56(F) barred TTD, then awarded benefits by invoking Glenn. The Supreme Court found this insufficient because the Commission did not: (1) interpret division (F)’s operative phrases (“as the direct result of”); or (2) make findings that resolve whether Brookbank-Mizer was “not working” during summer for reasons unrelated to her injury. This is precisely the kind of statutory non-application that mandamus can correct under Gassmann.

(c) “Intent to work” becomes relevant through division (F), not through “voluntary abandonment.”

Columbus Schools argued that Brookbank-Mizer’s intent to work during the summer matters (and pointed to Crim). The Court agreed the intent question can matter, but it grounded that relevance in R.C. 4123.56(F)’s second sentence: if she had no intention to work during the recess, her “not working” could be directly caused by the school calendar (a non-injury reason); if she intended to work (for the district or elsewhere) and the injury prevented it, the causal chain to the injury is stronger. The Court also corrected the Tenth District’s too-narrow reading of Crim, while still treating Crim as factually distinguishable rather than controlling.

(d) Remedy: limited writ rather than outright vacatur without further proceedings.

Columbus Schools sought a writ compelling the Commission to vacate the award; the Court instead issued a limited writ. Because the Commission never made the findings needed under division (F)—and because the record contained competing assertions about Brookbank-Mizer’s summer work history— the proper course under Heilman is remand for the Commission to apply the correct legal test and make the necessary factual determinations.

3.3 Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal impact is to reframe “school recess + stretch pay” cases as R.C. 4123.56(F) causation cases, not as automatic applications of Glenn. Several consequences follow:

• Commission orders must expressly address sentence two. Post-2020, an order awarding (or denying) summer-recess TTD must explain whether the claimant was “not working” because of the injury or because of non-injury reasons (e.g., the employment term, recess, no summer position sought, or other independent causes).
• Medical disability is necessary but may be insufficient. A C-84/physician certification may establish “unable to work,” but the Commission still must decide whether the claimant’s “not working” during the period is directly attributable to non-injury factors.
• Evidence about summer work intentions becomes more central. Parties should expect increased litigation over intent and opportunity: prior summer employment patterns, applications for summer work, district summer assignments, outside employment history, and credible testimony about plans may become pivotal.
• Glenn’s role narrows. Glenn may still inform understanding of stretch pay and “loss of earnings” concepts, but it cannot substitute for the statute’s required causation analysis.
• Broader reach beyond schools. Although the facts involve a nine-month school employee, the opinion reinforces AutoZone’s general rule: any claimant whose “not working” status stems from a non-injury cause risks ineligibility under sentence two even if medically unable to work.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation: wage-replacement benefits paid when an allowed injury temporarily prevents the worker from performing work.
• Stretch pay: a payroll option for certain school employees where nine months of earned salary is paid out over twelve months. It affects timing of payments, not necessarily whether wages were “earned” during a particular month.
• Mandamus (in workers’ compensation): a lawsuit used to correct certain Industrial Commission orders (including TTD awards) that are not directly appealable; the relator must show a clear legal right and a clear legal duty, among other elements.
• R.C. 4123.56(F)’s “direct result” test: a statutory causation requirement. Sentence one asks whether injury directly caused inability to work or wage loss; sentence two asks whether non-injury reasons directly caused the worker to be “not working” or to have wage loss.
• Voluntary abandonment doctrine (superseded in this context): older caselaw that could bar TTD when a worker “voluntarily” left employment, breaking the causal chain. Division (F) replaces the voluntary/involuntary label with a direct-causation inquiry.
• Limited writ: the court does not decide the ultimate entitlement; it orders the Commission to redo its analysis under the correct legal standard and issue a new order.

5. Conclusion

Brookbank-Mizer establishes that, in post-2020 TTD disputes, the Industrial Commission must apply both operative sentences of R.C. 4123.56(F) and make findings that resolve whether the claimant’s “not working” status during the contested period is directly caused by the injury or by independent, non-injury reasons such as the structure of the employment term. The Court rejected the Commission’s reliance on State ex rel. Glenn v. Indus. Comm. as a stand-in for the statute and clarified that intent to work during a recess can be material, but its relevance now derives from division (F)’s second sentence.

The decision’s broader significance is institutional: it demands reasoned, statute-driven causation analysis in TTD awards, and it signals that pre-division-(F) shortcuts—however intuitive in stretch-pay settings—must yield to the legislature’s “direct result” framework as interpreted in State ex rel. AutoZone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm..