R.C. 3513.311(C) Allows Late Lieutenant-Governor Replacement Only Upon Death; Ohio Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction Bars Declaratory and Prohibitory-Injunction Claims

I. Introduction

State ex rel. Hill v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1601 (May 4, 2026), is an expedited election dispute arising days before Ohio’s May 5, 2026 primary. Relator Heather Hill, a gubernatorial candidate, sought to substitute a new lieutenant-governor running mate after her original running mate, Stuart Moats, withdrew 13 days before the primary. Respondent Secretary of State Frank LaRose refused the substitution, reasoning that R.C. 3513.311(C) authorizes a late replacement only when the lieutenant-governor candidate dies within the statutory window.

Hill filed an original action in the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking: (1) a writ of mandamus compelling certification of the replacement candidate and ballot access; (2) a declaratory judgment construing (or invalidating) R.C. 3513.311(C); and (3) injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of LaRose’s decision. The case presented two core issues: (a) whether R.C. 3513.311(C) permits replacement after withdrawal within 70 days of a primary; and (b) whether the Supreme Court of Ohio can entertain declaratory-judgment and prohibitory-injunction claims in its original jurisdiction.

II. Summary of the Opinion

In a per curiam decision, the court:

  • Dismissed the mandamus claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), holding that R.C. 3513.311(C) does not permit replacing a lieutenant-governor candidate within 70 days of a primary election unless the original candidate died.
  • Rejected Hill’s constitutional “as-applied” challenge under the Anderson-Burdick framework, concluding the statute imposes a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction justified by important state interests (orderly election administration, clarity, avoiding gamesmanship).
  • Dismissed sua sponte the counts seeking declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction for lack of original jurisdiction.
  • Denied Hill’s emergency motion for immediate relief.

Justice Brunner concurred in judgment only, agreeing with the constitutional analysis but flagging a remedial “tension” with State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-3396 concerning what remedies courts can supply after finding election statutes unconstitutional.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion relies on several lines of authority—procedural (Rule 12(B)(6)), statutory interpretation, election-constitutional scrutiny, and jurisdiction.

1. Pleading and dismissal standard

  • State ex rel. Yeager v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2024-Ohio-1921: The court used Yeager for the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) posture—accepting factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences for the nonmovant. This framing mattered because Hill could not plead around the statutory text: she alleged withdrawal, not death.

2. Mandamus elements and election-timing adequacy

  • State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-3396: The court cited Tjaden for the three mandamus elements and, critically, for the election-law proposition that proximity to an election can establish lack of an adequate ordinary remedy—yet still requires a “clear legal right/duty.” Tjaden also reappears in Justice Brunner’s concurrence as a caution about remedies.

3. Statutory interpretation: text primacy and no judicial rewriting

  • Stingray Pressure Pumping, L.L.C. v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-2598: Cited for the court’s role to give a fair reading of what the legislature wrote, not to rewrite the statute to cure perceived gaps.
  • In re Establishing the Solar Generation Rider, 2022-Ohio-4348: Quoted for the principle that courts may not add or delete words when construing statutes.
  • Erickson v. Morrison, 2021-Ohio-746: Used to reinforce that courts apply the words enacted, not those the legislature “could have—but did not” write—key to rejecting Hill’s proposed “implied” withdrawal-replacement right.
  • The court also invoked the “omitted-case canon” through Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: if the statutory text does not cover a matter, courts treat it as not covered—directly undermining Hill’s “silence means permission” argument.

4. Election-law constitutional framework (Anderson-Burdick) and supporting authorities

  • Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983): Provide the balancing framework—severity of burden determines scrutiny; reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions are upheld if justified by important state interests.
  • State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2014-Ohio-4022: Hill relied on Brown (plurality) for strict-scrutiny framing, but the court distinguished the burden here as not severe.
  • Daunt v. Benson, 999 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2021) and Mazo v. New Jersey Secretary of State, 54 F.4th 124 (3d Cir. 2022): Cited to show Anderson-Burdick’s broad reach and the burden-dependent scrutiny concept.
  • Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992): Quoted via Burdick for the “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance” standard when burdens are severe.
  • State ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2000-Ohio-318: Cited as an example defining “severe burden,” such as discrimination based on political content or lack of alternative ballot access.
  • State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 1997-Ohio-278: Used to emphasize that limiting the candidate field does not automatically trigger close scrutiny.
  • Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2020) and Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2020): Support the methodological point that courts evaluate the election system “as a whole,” not a single provision in isolation—important because R.C. 3513.311(A) provides earlier withdrawal replacement, contextualizing the later cutoff.
  • Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) and Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971): Cited for the state’s strong interest in orderly elections and avoiding confusion and chaos—central to upholding the late-replacement limitation.

5. Rights invoked and constitutional grounding

  • Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964): Cited for the foundational nature of voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2006) and Florida Indep. Party v. Florida Secretary of State, 967 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2020): Cited to connect ballot access and association claims to the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
  • State ex rel. Trumbull Cty. Republican Cent. Commt. v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2022-Ohio-3268: Used to illustrate that even when a relator’s pleading is imprecise, courts may understand voting-rights challenges as First/Fourteenth Amendment claims.
  • VVF Intervest, L.L.C. v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-5680: Cited for the presumption of constitutionality—a significant hurdle for Hill’s as-applied challenge.

6. Anderson-Burdick at the motion-to-dismiss stage

  • Beiersdorfer v. LaRose, 397 F.Supp.3d 1037 (N.D.Ohio 2019) and Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. Marshall, 746 F.Supp.3d 1203 (N.D.Ala. 2024): Cited to note a split on whether Anderson-Burdick is suitably applied at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court “assum[ed] without deciding” it was proper here, noting Hill did not object.

7. Original jurisdiction limits: declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction

  • State v. Davis, 2011-Ohio-5028: Cited for the principle that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised sua sponte.
  • State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson, 2023-Ohio-3028: The key jurisdictional rule: the Supreme Court of Ohio lacks original jurisdiction over actions in the nature of declaratory judgment.
  • State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 1997-Ohio-274: The key rule for injunctive relief: neither the Supreme Court nor courts of appeals have original jurisdiction in prohibitory injunction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory holding: R.C. 3513.311(C) is death-triggered

The decisive textual move was straightforward. R.C. 3513.311(C) begins: “If a candidate for the office of lieutenant governor dies on or after the seventieth day…” The court treated that conditional clause as a strict gatekeeper: the late replacement mechanism exists only when the lieutenant-governor candidate dies. Moats withdrew; Hill did not (and could not) allege death; therefore the statute did not apply.

The court then rejected three interpretive efforts to expand the statute:

  • “Silence” argument: the court held statutory silence does not authorize judicial insertion of additional triggering events.
  • Structural argument from R.C. 3513.311(A): because R.C. 3513.311(A) expressly covers withdrawal before the 70th day, the omission of a parallel withdrawal rule after day 70 suggests deliberate legislative line-drawing, not an oversight the judiciary may correct.
  • Implied-right theory: the court treated this as another attempt to “amend” the statute under the guise of interpretation.

2. Constitutional holding: no severe burden; important state interests suffice

Applying Anderson-Burdick (assuming it can be done at the pleading stage), the court characterized the burden as not severe. The statute is neutral (not content-based), does not impose an outright ban on lieutenant-governor replacement (it allows it earlier for withdrawal and later for death), and is justified by the state’s interests in ballot clarity and orderly election administration.

A notable feature of the analysis is its system-wide lens: R.C. 3513.311(C) was read together with R.C. 3513.311(A). The availability of an earlier replacement procedure for withdrawals supported the view that the later cutoff is a reasonable anti-chaos measure as election day approaches.

The court also supplied a concrete anti-gamesmanship rationale: allowing late substitutions after withdrawal could enable tactical “ticket reordering” based on polling, creating confusion and administrative disruption—concerns long recognized in Storer v. Brown and Jenness v. Fortson.

3. Jurisdictional holdings: declaratory and prohibitory-injunctive claims do not belong in this original action

Even though the Secretary of State did not move to dismiss the declaratory-judgment and injunction counts, the court dismissed them sua sponte as jurisdictional defects. Under State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson, the Supreme Court of Ohio cannot entertain declaratory-judgment actions in its original jurisdiction. Under State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, it cannot issue a prohibitory injunction in original jurisdiction.

This portion of the opinion functions as a procedural “boundary-setting” precedent in election emergencies: litigants must fit relief into an extraordinary writ (like mandamus) or proceed in a court with appropriate jurisdiction for declaratory/injunctive remedies.

4. Justice Brunner’s concurrence: remedial tension with Tjaden

Justice Brunner agreed the constitutional claim failed, but highlighted a recurring remedial problem illustrated by State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-3396. In Tjaden, the court suggested that invalidating a ballot-access statute could leave a candidate worse off if no alternative statutory pathway remains. Brunner suggested that, at least in some circumstances, the court has equitable power in an original action to fashion a meaningful remedy if a constitutional violation is found—e.g., by extending the statute’s application.

Although the majority did not adopt that remedial framing, Brunner’s concurrence spotlights a live doctrinal question for future election litigation: when a statute is unconstitutional, must courts only nullify, or can they sometimes extend or reshape remedies to avoid right-without-remedy outcomes?

C. Impact

  • Clear rule for late replacements: In Ohio primaries, a gubernatorial candidate cannot replace a lieutenant-governor running mate within 70 days of the election due to withdrawal; under R.C. 3513.311(C) the triggering event is death. Practically, campaigns must lock ticket stability well before the 70-day deadline unless the death contingency arises.
  • Reduced leverage for last-minute tactical substitutions: The court’s gamesmanship rationale signals skepticism toward eleventh-hour alterations that could destabilize election administration.
  • Pleading and forum discipline in election emergencies: The jurisdiction holdings reinforce that parties cannot append declaratory-judgment and prohibitory-injunction claims to an original-action writ case in the Supreme Court of Ohio; such claims must be brought in a proper forum.
  • Constitutional challenges may be screened early: By entertaining Anderson-Burdick analysis at the motion-to-dismiss stage (without deciding the general propriety), the opinion suggests a path for early dismissal where the statutory burden is facially modest and state interests are evident from the election framework.
  • Remedy questions remain open: Justice Brunner’s concurrence keeps alive the debate about whether, and how, courts can craft equitable relief after finding ballot-access statutes unconstitutional—an issue that may resurface when a constitutional violation is clearer than it was here.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus: a court order compelling a public official to perform a clear legal duty. Hill had to show a clear legal right, a clear legal duty by LaRose, and no adequate ordinary remedy—timing helped on the third element, but the statutory text defeated the first two.
  • Civ.R. 12(B)(6): a motion arguing the complaint fails to state a claim even if its facts are true. Here, “withdrawal” could not satisfy a statute written for “death.”
  • Omitted-case canon: if the legislature addressed some situations but not another, courts generally treat the unaddressed situation as intentionally excluded, rather than filling the gap.
  • As-applied constitutional challenge: a claim that a law is unconstitutional in how it operates on these specific facts, not necessarily invalid in all applications.
  • Anderson-Burdick: a balancing test for election rules. Severe burdens trigger strict scrutiny; modest, neutral burdens are upheld if supported by important state interests.
  • Original jurisdiction limits: the Supreme Court of Ohio can hear certain actions first (like extraordinary writs), but it cannot, in original jurisdiction, decide pure declaratory-judgment actions or issue prohibitory injunctions.

V. Conclusion

State ex rel. Hill v. LaRose establishes a crisp election-law boundary: R.C. 3513.311(C) authorizes late replacement of a lieutenant-governor candidate only upon death, not withdrawal. It also reasserts structural limits on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s original jurisdiction by dismissing declaratory-judgment and prohibitory-injunction claims sua sponte. Together, these holdings prioritize textual fidelity, administrable election rules, and jurisdictional discipline—while Justice Brunner’s concurrence underscores an unresolved remedial question that may shape future constitutional ballot-access litigation.