Qualified Immunity for Repeated Taser Deployments and Knee Strikes Where Video and Undisputed Facts Show Active Resistance

1) Introduction

The Estate of Jeremy Marr v. City of Glasgow, Kentucky is a Sixth Circuit decision affirming summary judgment for the City of Glasgow and three police officers after Jeremy Marr died following a prolonged struggle during an arrest in April 2020. Marr had reportedly broken into an elderly woman’s home and displayed behavior consistent with methamphetamine intoxication. During the attempted handcuffing and ensuing ground struggle, officers used a taser (approximately 8–11 times) and delivered multiple knee strikes before ultimately restraining him. Marr later died; the medical examiner identified “agitated/excited delirium complicating acute methamphetamine intoxication during process of law enforcement subdual/arrest.”

The plaintiffs (Marr’s estate and family) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force, and asserted Kentucky tort claims. The key appellate issues were:

• Whether the officers were protected by qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim.
• Whether the City could be liable under Monell for alleged failures in hiring/training/supervision.
• Whether state-law claims survived, including vicarious liability and negligent hiring/retention/supervision/training.
• Whether the district court should have granted post-judgment relief under Rule 59(e).

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. Most importantly, it held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to show the officers violated a clearly established right. The court emphasized that the record—including bodycam video—showed Marr actively resisted by pulling away, thrashing, and preventing handcuffing, and that the challenged force (taser use and knee strikes) ceased once he was restrained.

The court also affirmed summary judgment for the City because, under Sixth Circuit doctrine, a municipality cannot be deliberately indifferent to a constitutional right that was not clearly established at the time. State-law claims largely failed due to waiver (lack of developed appellate argument) and because Kentucky vicarious liability and negligent-hiring/supervision theories required an underlying employee tort. Finally, the court upheld denial of Rule 59(e) relief because plaintiffs largely re-argued prior points and did not demonstrate manifest injustice.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Drive the Result)

A. Summary judgment, video evidence, and factual framing

• Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. and Helphenstine v. Lewis County (quoting Wilmington Tr. Co. v. AEP Generating Co.): establish de novo review and traditional summary-judgment standards.
• LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek (quoting Scott v. Harris): where video “blatantly contradicts” a party’s version, courts need not adopt the contradicted version; however, the court must still treat gaps/uncertainties in video in the nonmovant’s favor.
• Latits v. Phillips: reinforces that video gaps are construed for the plaintiff—but only within the limits of evidence, not conjecture.
• Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC (quoting Laster v. City of Kalamazoo): nonmovant must identify specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

These cases set the opinion’s methodological backbone: video is powerful, but “gaps” do not automatically create triable disputes; plaintiffs still must point to affirmative record evidence of what occurred during the gap.

B. Excessive force and qualified immunity framework

• Graham v. Connor: supplies the Fourth Amendment excessive-force factors (severity, threat, resistance/flight).
• Binay v. Bettendorf (quoting Turner v. Scott): establishes personal liability pathways (active participation, supervision, duty to protect).
• Pearson v. Callahan (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald): defines qualified immunity’s protective scope.
• Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai: places the burden on plaintiffs to show qualified immunity is inappropriate.
• Roell v. Hamilton County (quoting Est. of Hill v. Miracle): gives the two-prong test (constitutional violation; clearly established right) and allows addressing either prong first.
• Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off.: authorizes choosing the “easier” qualified-immunity prong; also becomes a core comparator for taser use against drug-impaired, thrashing suspects.
• Reed v. Campbell County: requires officer-by-officer and force-by-force analysis.

C. “Clearly established” specificity and active resistance as the key divider

• Est. of Hill v. Miracle (quoting Anderson v. Creighton): the right must be clear enough that a reasonable official would know the conduct was unlawful.
• Baynes v. Cleland (quoting Hope v. Pelzer): focuses on fair warning.
• Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Kisela v. Hughes (quoting Mullenix v. Luna): warn against defining rights at a high level of generality; demand fact-specific precedent in the Fourth Amendment context.
• Neague v. Cynkar, Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off., Shumate v. City of Adrian (quoting Palma v. Johns, abrogated on other grounds by Barnes v. Felix): the abstract right to be free from excessive force is not enough; plaintiffs must identify precedent prohibiting the specific type of force in the specific setting.
• Champion v. Outlook Nash., Inc.: frames the need for a prior articulation prohibiting the particular force at issue; also supplies diminished-capacity considerations (used later).
• Kent v. Oakland County; Wright v. City of Euclid: for tasers, “active resistance” is the central pivot—clearly established violation when tasing non-resisting suspects; not clearly established when the suspect is actively resisting.
• Rudlaff v. Gillispie: similarly distinguishes permissible knee strikes during active resistance from impermissible force when resistance stops; requires force to cease upon compliance.
• Moore v. Oakland County: collects examples (kicking, flailing, wriggling away, pulling an arm away from cuffs) as resistance allowing escalated restraint.
• Siders v. City of Eastpointe; Roell v. Hamilton County; Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off.: apply qualified immunity where suspects thrashed/refused cuffing and were tased during that resistance.
• King v. City of Rockford (citing Rudlaff v. Gillispie): “minimal resistance still constitutes resistance,” reinforcing the low threshold for the resistance category.

These cases do the decisive work: the Sixth Circuit treats “active resistance” as the doctrinal switch that often determines whether taser/knee-strike force violates clearly established law. Once the panel characterized Marr’s conduct as active resistance (pulling away, thrashing, preventing cuffing), plaintiffs faced an uphill climb to identify “squarely governing” precedent forbidding the force used in that setting.

D. Quantity of taser deployments and “gratuitous” force

• Chrestman ex rel. Wooden v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County (quoting Goodwin v. City of Painesville): recognizes clearly established law against gratuitous/excessive taser use, but requires showing the force was gratuitous in context.
• Sheffey v. City of Covington; Williams v. Sandel; Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off.: the panel uses these as comparators demonstrating that even multiple taser uses (including 12 or 37 discharges in cited cases) have still resulted in qualified immunity where resistance persisted.

The opinion does not adopt a numeric “cap” on taser cycles. Instead, it treats the count as contextual: if force is used during continuing resistance and stops upon restraint, precedent does not “squarely govern” the conduct as unlawful.

E. Diminished capacity, policy violations, and constitutional standards

• Guptill v. City of Chattanooga (quoting Mullins v. Cyranek): policy violations may be relevant to reasonableness but are not per se constitutional violations.
• Martin v. City of Broadview Heights (quoting Champion v. Outlook Nash., Inc.): requires consideration of diminished capacity when assessing force.
• Helms ex rel. Helms v. Boyd Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't: diminished capacity does not bar officers from using necessary force to gain control and end resistance, even if resistance stems from delusions.
• Caie v. W. Bloomfield Twp.; Roell v. Hamilton County; Sheffey v. City of Covington: qualified immunity has been granted where officers used force—including tasing—against intoxicated/mentally ill individuals who physically resisted.

The panel treats diminished capacity as a factor, not a trump card: it must be weighed, but it does not eliminate the legal significance of active physical resistance.

F. Municipal liability (Monell) and “clearly established” limits on failure-to-train

• Burgess v. Fischer (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.): sets the municipal policy/custom requirement and recognized routes to Monell liability.
• City of Canton v. Harris: failure to train requires “deliberate indifference.”
• Chrestman ex rel. Wooden v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County (quoting Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights): a policymaker cannot be deliberately indifferent to a constitutional right that was not clearly established.

This is a critical doctrinal move: even if the plaintiffs criticized training, the absence of a clearly established right in the officers’ conduct foreclosed deliberate indifference.

G. Kentucky tort doctrines and appellate waiver

• United States v. Bankston (quoting United States v. Sandridge): perfunctory treatment of issues results in waiver on appeal.
• Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hall: defines vicarious liability (respondeat superior) as imputation of employee torts.
• Haugh v. City of Louisville (citing City of Louisville v. Bergel): no vicarious liability without primary employee liability.
• Grand Aerie Fraternal Ord. of Eagles v. Carneyhan: elements of negligent hiring/retention/supervision/training include knowledge (or reason to know) of harmful propensities.
• Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks (quoting Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale): negligent hiring/retention theories require an underlying employee tort.

H. Rule 59(e) and “manifest injustice”

• Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp. (citing Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.): enumerates Rule 59(e) grounds and emphasizes district court discretion.
• Mich. Flyer LLC v. Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth. (quoting Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler): Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle to re-argue the case.

3.2 Legal Reasoning (Step-by-Step)

1. Video + undisputed facts established “active resistance” as the operative category. Marr pulled away during cuffing, then thrashed and did not comply on the ground. Under Kent v. Oakland County and Rudlaff v. Gillispie, those facts place the case in the line where taser and knee-strike force is often treated as not violating clearly established law while resistance persists.
2. The court chose the “clearly established” prong. Although the panel acknowledged the constitutional-violation question was “not free from doubt,” it relied on Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off. to resolve qualified immunity on the second prong—whether prior precedent gave fair warning that the officers’ conduct was unconstitutional.
3. General excessive-force formulations were rejected as too abstract. Citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Kisela v. Hughes, and Sixth Circuit authorities like Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff's Off., the panel required plaintiffs to identify precedent “squarely” governing repeated tasing/knee strikes against a suspect actively resisting.
4. Force ended when resistance ended. The opinion treated it as significant that plaintiffs did not dispute force ceased once Marr was restrained, aligning with the Rudlaff v. Gillispie requirement that force must stop upon compliance.
5. “Too many tasings” failed without a controlling comparator. Even accepting 8–11 taser cycles, plaintiffs did not distinguish cases like Sheffey v. City of Covington or Williams v. Sandel, where qualified immunity was granted despite numerous deployments amid resistance.
6. Diminished capacity and policy/training issues did not clearly establish unlawfulness here. The court recognized diminished capacity is relevant (Martin v. City of Broadview Heights), but emphasized it does not eliminate officers’ authority to use necessary force to end resistance (Helms ex rel. Helms v. Boyd Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't). Department policy deviations, per Guptill v. City of Chattanooga, did not automatically equate to a constitutional violation.
7. Video “gaps” did not create a factual dispute without evidence. Plaintiffs speculated that unseen actions might have worsened Marr’s crisis or breathing; the panel required “specific facts” and rejected conjecture under K.V.G. Props., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co. (quoting Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc.), and emphasized plaintiffs’ burden under Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai.
8. Municipal liability failed as a matter of law. With no clearly established right violated, the City’s training choices could not reflect deliberate indifference under Chrestman ex rel. Wooden v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County and Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights.
9. State-law theories failed due to waiver and lack of predicate tort. Plaintiffs waived most Kentucky tort issues by not developing arguments (United States v. Bankston). The remaining claims against the City (vicarious liability and negligent hiring/supervision) failed because those theories require underlying employee tort liability (Haugh v. City of Louisville; Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks), and plaintiffs did not show the City knew or should have known of the officers’ harmful propensities (Grand Aerie Fraternal Ord. of Eagles v. Carneyhan).
10. Rule 59(e) relief was properly denied. Plaintiffs largely re-argued earlier points, which Mich. Flyer LLC v. Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth. forbids, and did not show “manifest injustice” under Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp..

3.3 Impact

• Active resistance remains the decisive axis for taser and knee-strike qualified immunity. The opinion reinforces that, in the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs must do more than show severe injury or multiple applications of force; they must identify precedent clearly forbidding the particular force used while the suspect is actively resisting.
• “Quantity of force” arguments require doctrinally comparable cases. By invoking cases with equal or higher numbers of taser discharges that still resulted in qualified immunity, the decision signals that numeric counts alone rarely “clearly establish” unlawfulness; context and resistance status are central.
• Video gaps are not a substitute for proof. The panel’s treatment of incomplete bodycam footage is practically important: plaintiffs must offer evidence of what happened during obscured intervals; courts will not infer unconstitutional conduct from missing video without record support.
• Monell training claims are constrained by “clearly established” doctrine. The court’s reliance on Chrestman ex rel. Wooden v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County underscores a significant limitation: municipalities are less likely to face failure-to-train liability when the underlying right is not clearly established at the time—regardless of tragic outcomes.
• Appellate waiver remains outcome-determinative in multi-claim civil-rights litigation. The ruling illustrates that undeveloped briefing can foreclose state-law recovery even when federal claims fail.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity

A doctrine shielding officials from damages unless prior law made it clear (“clearly established”) that what they did was unconstitutional in the specific situation they faced. Courts often resolve cases on the “clearly established” prong without deciding definitively whether the Constitution was violated.

“Clearly established” law

Not a broad statement like “don’t use excessive force,” but a sufficiently specific rule from existing precedent giving officers fair warning that their conduct was unlawful under similar facts.

Active resistance

Physical struggle, thrashing, pulling away, refusing to present hands for cuffing, or otherwise disobeying commands in a way that impedes restraint. In Sixth Circuit taser and strike cases, this classification often determines whether force violates clearly established law.

Monell liability

A city is not automatically liable for its employees’ actions under § 1983. The plaintiff must tie the violation to a municipal policy/custom (including inadequate training) and, for training claims, show “deliberate indifference.”

Rule 59(e)

A narrow post-judgment tool to correct clear legal error, consider new evidence, recognize intervening law changes, or prevent manifest injustice—not to re-litigate the same arguments.

5) Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms that, where undisputed evidence and video show an arrestee’s ongoing physical resistance, officers are likely to receive qualified immunity for taser deployments and knee strikes used to subdue that resistance—absent precedent that “squarely governs” the specific facts. It further clarifies that incomplete video does not, by itself, create a triable issue; plaintiffs must supply concrete evidence of what occurred in obscured moments. Finally, the ruling constrains municipal failure-to-train claims when the asserted right was not clearly established and highlights how appellate waiver can eliminate state-law routes to relief.