Purely Regulatory Fraud Does Not Trigger the MVRA’s Property-Offense Provision

Case: In re: Creighton Bloyd
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Decided: October 26, 2026
Docket: No. 26-2159

Precedential status: The opinion is expressly nonprecedential under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7. It applies and clarifies existing restitution principles but does not establish a binding rule for future panels.

1. Introduction

This case concerns the limits of criminal restitution following Purdue Pharma L.P.’s guilty pleas arising from its opioid-related misconduct. Creighton Bloyd, who described receiving medication-assisted treatment for opioid-use disorder, sought an order requiring Purdue to subsidize medical treatment for victims. After the district court accepted a negotiated plea agreement providing substantial financial penalties but no restitution, Bloyd petitioned the Third Circuit under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”).

The central question was whether Purdue’s fraudulent interference with federal drug regulation constituted an “offense against property” triggering mandatory restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). A related issue was whether the district court permissibly declined discretionary restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”).

The court denied relief. Its principal distinction was between fraud that interferes with regulatory authority and fraud directed against property interests. Fraudulent conduct does not automatically fall within the MVRA’s property-offense provision merely because it involves deception or causes serious harm.

2. Background and Procedural History

Purdue’s offenses and negotiated sentence

According to the opinion, Purdue undermined Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) safeguards intended to prevent opioid misuse and unlawful distribution. Its conduct included supplying misleading sales information, continuing to market opioids to providers issuing unlawful prescriptions, and misrepresenting its diversion-control measures. Purdue also paid illegal kickbacks connected to opioid prescriptions reimbursed by federal healthcare programs.

Purdue agreed to plead guilty to three conspiracy counts under 18 U.S.C. § 371:

  1. Conspiring to defraud the United States and violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act;
  2. Conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute through payments to healthcare providers; and
  3. Conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute through payments to an electronic health records vendor.

The agreement, negotiated under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), stipulated a $3.544 billion criminal fine and a $2 billion forfeiture judgment. Purdue agreed to pay $225 million of the forfeiture judgment to the Government, with the remainder credited toward resolving governmental claims in bankruptcy. The negotiations also accounted for a separate $2.8 billion civil settlement and Purdue’s ongoing reorganization.

The agreement excluded restitution because calculating and administering it would allegedly complicate and prolong sentencing beyond the benefit of providing it. The district court initially accepted Purdue’s guilty plea but deferred acceptance of the agreement until sentencing.

Bloyd’s participation

More than 200 individuals submitted victim impact statements. Bloyd submitted a statement and moved to require the Government to confer with him about restitution. He proposed subsidized medical treatment, funded from the $225 million Purdue would pay the Government. Government counsel met virtually with Bloyd and his attorney the day before sentencing. Bloyd later withdrew his conference-related motion after judgment.

At sentencing, the district court heard from the Government, Purdue’s bankruptcy counsel, and thirty-six affected individuals, including Bloyd. Many urged rejection of the agreement. Bankruptcy counsel explained that pursuing greater federal payments could materially delay and substantially reduce recoveries available through the reorganization.

The district court acknowledged Purdue’s sustained misconduct and the suffering it caused but accepted the agreement as fair and reasonable. It emphasized the substantial financial sanctions and the contemplated restructuring into a public-benefit entity supporting opioid-related programs. It imposed the agreed sentence without restitution.

Bloyd then sought CVRA mandamus relief directing the district court to award restitution. The parties stipulated to an extension of the CVRA’s usual seventy-two-hour appellate decision deadline, which the court approved.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit denied the petition on the following grounds:

  • The CVRA does not independently authorize restitution. Its protection of restitution rights depends on another statute establishing entitlement.
  • Fraud is not automatically an offense against property. The MVRA’s reference to offenses committed through fraud or deceit remains qualified by the requirement that the offense be against property.
  • Count One involved regulatory interference, not property deprivation. Purdue obstructed the DEA’s oversight, but the conduct underlying that count did not deprive the agency or another person of a property interest.
  • The anti-kickback counts did not establish Bloyd’s entitlement. The court did not decide whether those counts were property offenses because Bloyd did not explain how he qualified as their statutory victim.
  • Bloyd forfeited a VWPA argument. Nevertheless, the court explained that the record supported declining discretionary restitution because of the scale and complexity of the claims and the consequences for bankruptcy recoveries.
  • Sentencing courts should make express findings. Despite denying relief, the panel reminded district courts to explain specifically why restitution-related complexity outweighs the need to provide restitution.

The court also granted Bloyd leave to file his reply and considered it. It did not conclusively determine his statutory victim status or whether he had sufficiently asserted his CVRA rights below; it assumed those matters in his favor for purposes of resolving the petition.

4. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Significance

CVRA procedure and appellate review

  • In re Doe, 50 F.4th 1247, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2022), supported the approved extension of the CVRA decision deadline. The cited decision explains that appellate courts may approve stipulated extensions so long as district-court proceedings are not delayed more than five days. Its relevance was procedural, not substantive: it did not establish a right to restitution.

  • In re Ryan, 88 F.4th 614, 621 (5th Cir. 2023), together with In re Doe, 57 F.4th 667, 672–73 (9th Cir. 2023), and In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244, 1254 n.10 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc), supported applying ordinary appellate standards to CVRA petitions. Although the procedural vehicle is mandamus, the governing statute directs ordinary appellate review rather than the conventional, exceptionally demanding mandamus standard.

  • United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 125 (3d Cir. 2023), supplied the controlling review framework: plenary review of whether restitution is legally permitted, abuse-of-discretion review of an award’s appropriateness, and clear-error review of factual findings. This framework separated statutory coverage from discretionary sentencing judgments.

The CVRA’s dependence on substantive restitution law

United States v. Kovall, 857 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017), provided the foundational proposition that the CVRA does not expand substantive restitution rights. The phrase “full and timely restitution as provided in law” therefore incorporates limitations found in the MVRA, VWPA, and other applicable statutes. It does not authorize compensation solely because a claimant suffered serious consequences from criminal conduct.

Why fraud must still be directed against property

  • United States v. Collins, 854 F.3d 1324, 1330, 1333–35 (11th Cir. 2017), was central to the statutory interpretation. It explains that the reference to fraud or deceit does not broaden “offense against property” into an independent category covering all fraudulent crimes. It also surveys differing formulations of property offenses and supports examining the actual circumstances of the conviction.

  • United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 678 (10th Cir. 2002), reinforced that neither conspiracy nor fraud is necessarily directed against property. A conspiracy falls within the property-offense provision when its underlying purpose is an offense against property. This reasoning directly answered Bloyd’s attempt to treat deception itself as sufficient.

  • United States v. Luis, 765 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), described an offense “against property” as one infringing a victim’s property interest. United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2013), was also cited in support of the property-interest inquiry. Together, these authorities anchored the analysis in interference with property rather than generalized wrongdoing.

Distinguishing an earlier Third Circuit statement

Bloyd relied on United States v. Cammarata, 145 F.4th 345, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2025), which had described the MVRA as applying to offenses “against property” and “offenses committed by fraud or deceit.” Read in isolation, that wording could suggest two separate categories.

The panel rejected that reading because the defendant in United States v. Cammarata had conceded the MVRA’s applicability. The earlier court therefore had no occasion to decide the statutory question and supplied no analysis resolving it. Relying on Patel v. Sun Co., Inc., 141 F.3d 447, 462 (3d Cir. 1998), the panel treated the statement as dictum rather than a binding holding. The distinction allowed the panel to follow the statutory text without treating the earlier shorthand description as controlling.

Examining the underlying conduct rather than only the offense label

The opinion drew on a substantial body of circuit authority for a fact-specific inquiry:

  • United States v. Betts, 99 F.4th 1048, 1058–59 (7th Cir. 2024), expressly rejected a categorical approach to identifying an offense against property.
  • United States v. Hagen, 60 F.4th 932, 953 (5th Cir. 2023), supported examining the conduct underlying the conviction.
  • United States v. Razzouk, 984 F.3d 181, 187–89 (2d Cir. 2020), and United States v. Ritchie, 858 F.3d 201, 208–10 (4th Cir. 2017), likewise supported that circumstances-based analysis.
  • United States v. Sawyer, 825 F.3d 287, 292–93 (6th Cir. 2016), supplied additional support for looking beyond the statutory label.

These authorities mattered because § 371 encompasses conspiracies with different objectives. The name of the offense could not establish whether Purdue’s particular conspiracy targeted property.

Regulatory authority versus governmental property

  • Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114, 133 (2025), explained that statutes prohibiting conspiracies to defraud the United States, including § 371, are not limited to schemes seeking money or property. It demonstrated why a valid fraud conviction does not itself establish an MVRA property offense.

  • Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 20–21 (2000), distinguished governmental regulatory interests from property interests. Its treatment of a fraudulently obtained video poker license supplied the analogy: impairment of the government’s licensing or supervisory function is not necessarily deprivation of governmental property.

  • United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2011), supplied the contrast. There, the government’s entitlement to proceeds from illegally harvested lobsters went beyond a regulatory interest. The comparison showed that government-related fraud can involve property, but only when an actual property entitlement is implicated.

Alternative restitution, victim status, and preservation

  • Singh v. Att'y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 512 n.10 (3d Cir. 2012), supported the availability of discretionary VWPA restitution when the MVRA does not apply.

  • United States v. Abrams, 165 F.4th 784, 812 (3d Cir. 2026), explained that VWPA restitution may account for victims’ losses and the defendant’s financial resources. It reinforced the distinction between mandatory statutory entitlement and discretionary sentencing relief.

  • United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449, 465 n.9 (3d Cir. 2025), supported treating Bloyd’s unraised VWPA theory as forfeited. The panel’s subsequent VWPA discussion therefore supplemented, rather than displaced, that preservation ruling.

  • United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 68–70 (3d Cir. 1996), served two functions: it supported the technical limits on who qualifies as a restitution victim and the consideration of complexity when deciding whether to order restitution.

  • In re Doe, 264 F. App’x 260, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2007), likewise supported the proposition that statutory victim status has defined limits. Its citation underscores that experiencing harm from a defendant’s broader conduct does not automatically establish restitution eligibility.

The court also cited United States v. Hagen, 60 F.4th at 937, 955, for restitution payable to Medicare following an Anti-Kickback Statute violation. That example explained why the healthcare programs were relevant victims of Purdue’s kickback counts, while leaving unanswered Bloyd’s own eligibility under those counts.

The obligation to explain a restitution decision

United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985), requires specific findings concerning factual issues relevant to VWPA restitution. In re Brown, 932 F.3d 162, 173 (4th Cir. 2019), emphasizes articulating the statutory balancing analysis when restitution is denied. These authorities supplied the opinion’s closing instruction: record support for denying restitution does not eliminate the need for an explicit explanation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The CVRA supplies an enforcement mechanism, not an independent compensation entitlement

The court began with the CVRA’s qualification that restitution must be “as provided in law.” That language required Bloyd to identify a substantive statute authorizing the requested award. The CVRA permitted him to seek appellate enforcement of an existing restitution right, but it could not create a right absent from the underlying restitution statutes.

This distinction prevented the severity of the opioid crisis, by itself, from answering the legal question. The court recognized the gravity of Purdue’s conduct while requiring compliance with Congress’s conditions for criminal restitution.

2. The MVRA’s fraud language remains subordinate to the property requirement

The relevant provision covers offenses against property, “including any offense committed by fraud or deceit.” Bloyd argued that every fraudulent offense necessarily qualifies. The court instead read the inclusive phrase as identifying a subset of property offenses: those accomplished through fraud or deceit.

Under this reading, deception describes how a qualifying property offense may be committed; it does not eliminate the need for a property-related objective or infringement. The court therefore declined to convert the MVRA into a mandatory restitution statute for every fraud-based prosecution.

3. Purdue’s regulatory conspiracy did not satisfy that requirement

The court examined the conduct supporting Count One. Purdue misrepresented its safeguards, withheld or distorted information relevant to DEA oversight, and permitted dispensing without valid prescriptions. Those acts impaired the DEA’s ability to regulate opioid distribution.

But the Government did not allege that Purdue deprived the DEA of money or other property to which it was legally entitled. The agency’s interest in preventing diversion was regulatory. Accordingly, the court concluded that Count One was not an offense against property.

The analysis did not require choosing a comprehensive definition of every possible property offense. The panel recognized varying formulations across the circuits but concluded that Purdue’s Count One conduct failed under any of them.

4. Medical-treatment provisions do not independently establish coverage

Bloyd invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(2)(A), which addresses necessary medical care where a victim suffers bodily injury. His request for treatment costs nevertheless depended on satisfying the MVRA’s threshold coverage requirements.

The opinion thus distinguishes what losses a restitution order may compensate from whether the statute requires restitution for the offense and claimant at issue. A medical need does not itself resolve offense coverage or statutory victim status.

5. The anti-kickback counts did not resolve Bloyd’s eligibility

The panel did not decide whether Counts Two and Three qualified as property offenses. It identified the federal healthcare programs as the statutory victims of those offenses and observed that Bloyd had not explained why he qualified as a victim of those counts.

This is a significant limit on the decision. It does not hold that anti-kickback conspiracies are categorically outside the MVRA. Instead, it leaves their classification unresolved here because Bloyd’s connection to those particular offenses was not established.

6. The record supported declining discretionary restitution

Although Bloyd forfeited his VWPA argument, the court explained why the district court’s decision was supportable under that statute. Section 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii) permits a court to decline restitution where the complication and prolongation of sentencing would outweigh the need to provide it.

The relevant circumstances included:

  • Thousands of potential victims;
  • Unquantified losses depending on numerous variables;
  • Complicated causation inquiries;
  • The likelihood of lengthy additional proceedings;
  • The interaction with Purdue’s bankruptcy plan; and
  • The prospect that additional demands would reduce and delay recoveries through that plan.

The reasoning was not simply that large penalties substitute for restitution. Rather, the court assessed the feasibility and consequences of constructing an additional restitution mechanism within a complex criminal and bankruptcy setting. Its complexity discussion concerned discretionary VWPA restitution; it did not establish that an accepted plea agreement or bankruptcy proceeding can automatically displace an otherwise applicable mandatory restitution obligation.

7. Express findings remain important

The panel found sufficient support in the record to deny relief but stated that the relevant findings should be made expressly. Courts should identify the factual obstacles and articulate why the resulting delay and complexity outweigh victims’ restitution interests.

This qualification prevents the decision from becoming a general endorsement of unexplained “administrative infeasibility.” A developed record and a reasoned statutory balance remain important even where the ultimate denial is sustainable.

C. Potential Impact

Regulatory-fraud prosecutions

The opinion offers persuasive guidance for cases involving deception of regulators. A § 371 conspiracy may be criminal because it obstructs lawful governmental functions without being directed against property. Future restitution disputes should therefore identify the specific property interest affected rather than rely on the word “fraud.”

Mass-harm restitution claims

The decision illustrates the difficulty of translating widespread public-health injury into criminal restitution. Claimants must connect their requested compensation to a covered offense and satisfy the relevant statutory victim definition. The seriousness or breadth of the defendant’s misconduct cannot replace those requirements.

Coordination with bankruptcy remedies

For discretionary restitution, the practical relationship between sentencing and bankruptcy can matter. Courts may consider whether additional restitution proceedings would consume resources, delay distributions, or diminish recoveries. The decision does not establish a categorical preference for bankruptcy compensation or eliminate criminal restitution whenever bankruptcy is pending.

Sentencing practice and appellate advocacy

District courts should make specific findings rather than rely solely on a plea agreement’s assertion that restitution is infeasible. Victim advocates should preserve alternative statutory theories, address offense-specific victim status, and distinguish the existence of compensable medical expenses from the threshold entitlement to restitution.

Because the opinion is nonprecedential, these implications are persuasive rather than binding. Its principal value lies in synthesizing existing authorities and applying them to an unusually complex prosecution.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

CVRA mandamus
A statutory procedure allowing a person asserting crime-victim rights to ask an appellate court to correct a denial of those rights. Here, ordinary appellate review standards applied.
Mandatory and discretionary restitution
Mandatory restitution must be ordered when the governing statute’s requirements are satisfied, subject to applicable statutory limitations. Discretionary restitution permits the court to weigh specified considerations before deciding whether to order payment.
Regulatory interest versus property interest
A regulatory interest concerns government supervision, licensing, or enforcement. A property interest concerns ownership or a legally protected entitlement to money or other property. Interfering with the former does not necessarily infringe the latter.
Fact-specific inquiry versus categorical approach
A fact-specific inquiry examines what happened in the particular offense. A categorical approach focuses on the legal elements of the offense rather than the defendant’s particular conduct.
Dictum
A statement not necessary to resolve an issue actually decided. The court treated the earlier description in United States v. Cammarata as dictum because MVRA coverage had been conceded.
Forfeiture of an argument
Failure to raise a legal theory at the required stage, potentially preventing a party from relying on it later. This differs from the monetary forfeiture judgment imposed on Purdue.
A Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement
A plea agreement specifying a sentencing outcome that binds the sentencing court if the court accepts the agreement.
Restitution, fines, and criminal forfeiture
Restitution compensates qualifying victims for legally recoverable losses. Fines impose monetary punishment. Criminal forfeiture addresses property or proceeds connected to crime. One does not automatically confer an entitlement to another.

6. Conclusion

In re: Creighton Bloyd emphasizes that criminal restitution depends on statutory boundaries, not solely on the severity of harm. Purdue’s interference with DEA regulation did not make Count One a property offense, and Bloyd did not establish entitlement through the anti-kickback counts.

The decision also recognizes the relevance of mass-claim complexity and bankruptcy consequences to discretionary restitution while insisting that courts explain their balancing. Its broader significance is persuasive, not precedential: it carefully separates regulatory fraud from property crime, victim participation from compensation entitlement, and a supportable sentencing result from the obligation to give clear reasons.