Proportionality and Preservation Rules in Supervised-Release Revocations: Meaningful Two-Test Analysis Required; Unraised Constitutional Claims Not Reviewed

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from the third revocation of James Leonard Riley III’s supervised release. Riley was originally indicted in 2008 for multiple offenses including failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act, sexual abuse by a custodian, and third-degree sexual abuse. He pled guilty to one count of failure to register and one count of sexual abuse by a custodian. In 2009, the circuit court imposed consecutive prison sentences (one-to-five years and ten-to-twenty years) and ordered fifty years of supervised release under West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(a).

After discharging his underlying prison sentence in 2019, Riley accumulated successive revocations: a first in 2020 (one year in jail), a second in 2021 (455 days served), and the third in 2022—based on alleged residence-change violations and absconding supervision—during which he also acknowledged awaiting sentencing elsewhere after pleading guilty to three counts of failure to register.

On the third revocation, the circuit court imposed twenty years of imprisonment and stated that the remaining supervised release term would be served upon Riley’s release. On appeal, Riley did not contest the revocation itself; instead, he argued (1) disproportionality based largely on the length of supervised release remaining and his age at completion, and (2) that a condition requiring permission to attend church violated religious-freedom guarantees.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Riley failed to meaningfully develop a proportionality argument under the governing two-part proportionality framework and failed to support his claims with authority and factor-based analysis. The Court further declined to review the religious-freedom assignment of error because it was not raised in the circuit court at the third revocation hearing and was inadequately briefed on appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Standard of review framework

• State v. White (Syl. Pt. 1): Supplies the three-pronged standard for reviewing an order modifying or revoking supervised release under W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(h): abuse of discretion for the decision/order, clearly erroneous for factual findings, and de novo for legal/statutory questions. The Court uses this as the gateway to place Riley’s arguments into the proper review posture.
• State v. Lucas (Syl. Pt. 1, in part): Reinforces that sentencing is reviewed deferentially for abuse of discretion unless statutory or constitutional commands are violated—framing Riley’s proportionality and constitutional arguments as the only potential basis for heightened scrutiny.
• State v. Patrick C.: Clarifies that when constitutional protections are implicated, review is de novo. The Court cites it to explain the standard, but then effectively never reaches merits review of the church-condition claim because of waiver and inadequate briefing.

Proportionality doctrine and its application to supervised release

• State v. Vance (Syl. Pt. 8): Anchors proportionality in Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution (“Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence.”). The citation signals that proportionality is a state-constitutional principle with independent force.
• Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher (Syl. Pt. 4, in part; Syl. Pt. 5, in part as quoted via Cooper): Provides two key points. First, proportionality review is “ordinarily” limited to certain categories (no statutory maximum or life recidivist). Second, it contributes the objective-factor set later quoted in Cooper.
• State v. Brautigam: Central to the Court’s supervised-release analysis. The Court relies on Brautigam for two propositions: (1) West Virginia “often” reviews supervised release sentences for proportionality even if proportionality review is ordinarily limited; and (2) proportionality in this setting uses the same two-step framework (subjective “shocks the conscience,” then objective multi-factor comparison), understood in light of supervised release purposes (rehabilitation, conditional liberty, protection of society) and the defendant’s breach of trust.
• State v. Cooper: Supplies the statement of the subjective test (“shocks the conscience”) and the objective test (nature of offense, legislative purpose, inter-jurisdiction comparison, intra-jurisdiction comparison), and it quotes Wanstreet’s factor articulation. The Court uses Cooper to identify what Riley needed to argue—and to show that he did not.
• State v. Hargus: Applied as a “failure of analysis” precedent. Hargus supports the Court’s refusal to find an objective proportionality violation where the appellant fails to address the relevant factors.
• State v. LaRock: Supports the Court’s approach to underdeveloped appellate points: issues “mentioned only in passing” without pertinent authority need not be addressed.

Preservation and briefing requirements

• State v. Jessie: States the preservation rule that “nonjurisdictional questions not raised at the circuit court level will not be considered” for the first time on appeal. This is the primary basis for declining review of the church-attendance condition claim.
• State v. Kaufman: Reinforces that assignments of error not argued or adequately briefed will not be addressed. This dovetails with the Court’s criticism that Riley presented no developed constitutional argument or supporting authority.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Proportionality challenge to the supervised release term

Riley’s disproportionality claim was narrow: he emphasized that, given the remaining supervised release, he would be approximately 112 years old when completed, and asserted—without support—that “other jurisdictions” would not impose such a lengthy period.

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a structured but outcome-driven way:

• Step 1: Identify the governing proportionality tests. By citing State v. Brautigam and State v. Cooper, the Court makes clear that supervised-release revocation sentences are assessed via (i) a subjective “shocks the conscience” test and, if needed, (ii) an objective multi-factor test.
• Step 2: Evaluate appellant’s argument against the required structure. The Court holds Riley failed to explain subjective disproportionality in relation to his original convictions and repeated revocations, and failed to analyze the objective factors at all (nature of offense, legislative purpose, comparisons across jurisdictions and within West Virginia).
• Step 3: Treat the failure as dispositive. Relying on State v. Hargus and State v. LaRock, the Court effectively applies an appellate-briefing sufficiency rule: without developed factor-based analysis and authority, the proportionality claim fails.

Notably, the Court does not hold that supervised release extending into extreme old age is categorically constitutional; rather, it holds that Riley’s presentation was insufficient to prove disproportionality under the established framework.

(B) Religious-freedom challenge to a church-attendance restriction

Riley argued that a requirement to obtain prior approval to attend church services violates the First Amendment and Article III, Section 15 of the West Virginia Constitution. The Court declined review for two reasons:

• Non-preservation: Riley did not present the issue during his third revocation hearing. Under State v. Jessie, the Court will not consider nonjurisdictional issues raised for the first time on appeal.
• Inadequate briefing: Riley offered no developed legal argument or supporting authority. Under State v. Kaufman, such assignments may be declined.

The result is procedural rather than substantive: the Court does not decide the constitutionality of church-attendance approval conditions; it holds only that Riley did not properly tee up the question for appellate resolution in this appeal posture.

(C) The Rule 35(a) “correction” footnote

The opinion notes, in a footnote, that after the appeal was filed the State moved under Rule 35(a) to correct the sentence, asserting the circuit court should reduce the remaining supervised release from approximately forty-seven years to twenty-seven years once jurisdiction returns. The Court “express[es] no opinion” on that motion. Practically, the footnote signals that any mathematical or legal miscalculation in the remaining term is being channeled into the proper procedural vehicle (Rule 35(a)), not resolved in this appeal.

3.3. Impact

• Appellate practice in revocation cases: The decision underscores that proportionality challenges must be briefed with the two-test structure and objective-factor content. Age-at-completion alone, without analysis and authority, is unlikely to carry the claim.
• Preservation of constitutional challenges to conditions: Even potentially significant constitutional issues (like restrictions on church attendance) will not be reviewed if not raised below and supported with developed argument on appeal.
• Supervised release as “breach of trust” discipline: By citing State v. Brautigam on supervised release purposes and breach-of-trust logic, the opinion reinforces that repeated violations will weigh heavily against claims of excessiveness.
• Limited doctrinal novelty, but strong procedural signal: As a memorandum decision, the case functions less as a new doctrinal statement and more as a clear signal that the Court will dispose of underdeveloped proportionality and constitutional claims on procedural/briefing grounds.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release: A court-ordered period of supervision after incarceration with conditions (reporting, residence restrictions, etc.). Violation can lead to revocation and additional imprisonment.
• Revocation: The court’s determination that the defendant violated supervision conditions, allowing the court to impose sanctions (including incarceration) and continue or re-impose supervision.
• Proportionality (West Virginia): A constitutional limit requiring penalties to fit the “character and degree” of the offense. In practice, West Virginia uses:
  • Subjective test: Does the sentence “shock the conscience”?
  • Objective test: Compare offense/purpose and compare punishments across jurisdictions and among other offenses in the same jurisdiction.
• Standards of review:
  • Abuse of discretion: appellate court gives deference; reverses only if the decision is outside reasonable bounds.
  • Clearly erroneous: deference to factual findings unless plainly wrong.
  • De novo: no deference; appellate court decides legal questions anew.
• Preservation/waiver: If you do not raise an issue in the trial court, you generally cannot raise it on appeal. The appellate court treats it as forfeited.
• Rule 35(a) motion to correct sentence: A mechanism to correct certain sentencing errors; the Supreme Court noted such a motion is pending but did not rule on it.

5. Conclusion

State of West Virginia v. James Leonard Riley III affirms a revocation sentence where the appellant’s disproportionality challenge was not supported with the required subjective/objective proportionality analysis and where a religious-freedom challenge to a church-attendance approval condition was neither preserved in the circuit court nor adequately briefed. The opinion’s principal significance lies in its enforcement of disciplined appellate presentation in supervised-release revocation cases: defendants must (1) meaningfully apply the established proportionality tests with supporting authority and (2) preserve and develop constitutional objections at the trial level to obtain merits review on appeal.