Prop-Gun “Active Shooter” Encounters: Objective Reasonableness and Limited ADA Accommodation Duties Under Exigency

Felicia Morgan v. City of Charlotte (4th Cir. June 29, 2026) (Wilkinson, J.)

I. Introduction

This published Fourth Circuit decision addresses two recurring, high-stakes questions arising from police responses to mental-health crises involving firearms (or firearm-like objects): (1) when officers may constitutionally use deadly force under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, and (2) how the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) constrains police tactics during an exigent, potentially lethal standoff with a person known to have serious mental illness.

The plaintiff, Felicia Morgan, sued individually and as guardian ad litem for her son Bobby Morgan, who has bipolar and schizoaffective disorders. The defendants were the City of Charlotte and three Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department officers—Joshua Skipper, Edward Gonzalez, and Derek Rud.

The encounter escalated from Bobby’s threats to shoot neighbors, to Bobby firing what appeared to be a real handgun from within and around his home, to officers returning fire and striking him three times. After the fact, Bobby’s weapon was discovered to be a realistic prop gun capable of firing only blanks. Felicia claimed (i) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and (ii) failure to accommodate Bobby’s disabilities in violation of the ADA due to inadequate de-escalation and crisis-handling measures. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Fourth Amendment: The court held the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because a reasonable officer would have believed Bobby posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm after repeatedly discharging a gun-like weapon in a residential neighborhood while defying police commands. That the gun later proved to be a blank-firing prop did not change the analysis.
• Effect of Barnes v. Felix: The panel acknowledged the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Barnes v. Felix, which requires consideration of “earlier facts and circumstances,” abrogating Greenidge v. Ruffin. The panel applied the corrected framework itself and found the outcome unchanged.
• ADA: The court held the City did not violate the ADA because officers attempted reasonable accommodation and, once exigent circumstances existed, the ADA did not require additional measures that would unreasonably endanger officers or the public. The panel relied heavily on Waller ex rel. Est. of Hunt v. Danville.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1. Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” and deadly force

• Graham v. Connor: The decision is anchored in Graham’s “objective reasonableness” test—judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” not with “20/20 vision of hindsight.” The court uses Graham both to (i) justify focus on rapidly evolving danger and (ii) reject arguments hinging on post-hoc discoveries (e.g., the prop gun’s inability to fire bullets).
• Tennessee v. Garner: The court invokes Garner for the proposition that deadly force is permissible where the suspect poses a serious risk of harm “to others,” and for the relevance (but not rigidity) of warnings. Here, Bobby’s repeated firing in a neighborhood supplied the “serious physical harm” predicate.
• Lewis v. Caraballo: Cited for the centrality of the “immediate threat” factor. The panel treats Bobby’s conduct—repeated discharges and defiance—as squarely meeting that factor.
• Kingsley v. Hendrickson: Used to frame proportionality (“relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used”), reinforcing the panel’s view that officers responded to lethal risk with lethal force.
• United States v. Alexander: Though a criminal case, it supports the common-sense point that firing a weapon—even if not aimed at a specific person—creates grave bystander risk via stray rounds, bolstering the court’s “threat to others” rationale under Garner.

2. “Mistaken but reasonable” perceptions of deadly danger

• Elliott v. Leavitt: The court quotes Elliott to underscore that police are not required to act with “omniscience.” This is pivotal to the “prop gun” issue: outward appearance and behavior of the weapon controlled the reasonableness inquiry.
• Slattery v. Rizzo and Anderson v. Russell: These cases supply the doctrinal template that an officer may use deadly force based on a reasonable belief a suspect poses an imminent deadly threat—even if that belief is mistaken (beer bottle; reaching to turn off a Walkman). The panel deploys them to argue that if deadly force can be reasonable where there is no gun (or no hostile gun use), it is even more reasonable where Bobby was visibly firing a realistic gun-like object.
• Benton v. Layton: Cited for the proposition that “furtive movements” plus a reasonable belief of weapon possession can justify deadly force. The panel uses it to reinforce that Bobby’s actual firing exceeds the threshold in “furtive movement” cases.

3. Distinguishing plaintiff-favorable shootings

• Cooper v. Sheehan and Hensley ex rel. N.C. v. Price: The court distinguishes these as cases involving deadly force in response to mere possession/holding of a firearm, pointed downward, without prior warning or escalation. In contrast, Bobby repeatedly fired while defying orders.
• Clem v. Corbeau, Cooper v. Doyle, and Livingston v. Kehagias: These are invoked to emphasize how this case differs from the “typical excessive force claim surviving summary judgment”—because core facts (armed, discharged weapon, resisting) are undisputed here.

4. Totality of circumstances after the Supreme Court’s intervention

• Barnes v. Felix: The court treats Barnes as a mid-appeal doctrinal correction: Fourth Amendment analysis considers both the “precise time” of force and “earlier facts and circumstances.”
• Greenidge v. Ruffin (abrogated by Barnes v. Felix): The panel acknowledges the district court followed then-binding Fourth Circuit law focusing on the precise moment of force, but holds that under Barnes the result still favors defendants.
• Anderson v. Crouch and Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.: These provide the procedural footing for resolving the case without remand despite an intervening legal change, because the record was extensive and further development would not change the analysis.

5. De-escalation and warning are not rigid prerequisites

• McLenagan v. Karnes: Cited for rejecting an inflexible rule requiring warnings before firing.
• Scott v. Harris: Used to reject “rigid preconditions” and to reiterate that the constitutional question is reasonableness, not whether officers used every possible alternative.
• Deorle v. Rutherford: Cited by Felicia, but the panel distinguishes it due to different threat dynamics (unarmed or not posing to use the weapon), reinforcing that de-escalation duties are context-dependent.

6. ADA policing and exigency

• Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs Frederick Cnty.: Establishes that the ADA applies to police investigations and arrests and requires “reasonable accommodations” to known limitations.
• Waller ex rel. Est. of Hunt v. Danville: The controlling analogue. The panel uses Waller to hold that, in volatile standoffs with mentally ill individuals posing lethal risk, the ADA does not mandate accommodations that second-guess on-scene judgments or increase danger (e.g., bringing in family or mental-health professionals).
• Tartaro-McGowan v. Inova Home Health, LLC: Quoted for the principle that the ADA demands “reasonableness, not perfection,” framing the ADA standard as pragmatic under emergency conditions.
• Pickett v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.: Used to emphasize the notion of an “interactive process” and to support the court’s view that officers attempted engagement but Bobby rebuffed it.
• Printz v. United States: Raised in dicta to question whether Congress could compel state police to arrest immediately as an “accommodation,” highlighting the court’s skepticism toward redefining “accommodation” as coercive state action.

7. Standard of review and posture

• Quinn v. Zerkle: Supplies the de novo summary judgment standard and the instruction to draw inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
• Pearson v. Callahan: The panel, after finding no constitutional violation, declines to reach the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity.
• Rambert v. City of Greenville: Cited to reject claims that “defie[d] the reality of the situation”—here, assertions that Bobby “did not have a gun” when he plainly had a realistic gun-like weapon.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “prop gun” does not reduce the constitutional threat assessment

A core holding—likely the opinion’s most practically significant—is that a blank-firing prop gun can be treated as a real firearm for Fourth Amendment purposes when it: (1) appears real, (2) sounds real, and (3) is used in a manner consistent with a functional firearm (discharge, muzzle flash, realistic handling). The court reasons that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to correctly diagnose, in seconds, whether a realistic weapon is incapable of firing lethal rounds, particularly amid active and repeated discharges.

The court also rejects “no bullet holes” reasoning as impermissible hindsight under Graham v. Connor, emphasizing the rapid timeline (e.g., Gonzalez firing within seconds) and plausible alternative explanations (dud rounds, missed shots, unseen impacts).

2. Barnes v. Felix expands the temporal lens—but does not erase the primacy of the shooting moment

The panel meaningfully incorporates Barnes v. Felix by acknowledging that earlier circumstances matter. Yet it clarifies a limiting principle embedded in Barnes itself: “the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most.” Thus, earlier opportunities for de-escalation (or prior peaceful encounters) do not disable officers from responding decisively to an active, escalating, present threat.

3. De-escalation is relevant but not constitutionally mandatory in any particular form

The court treats de-escalation as a factor within the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, not as a standalone legal prerequisite. Relying on McLenagan v. Karnes and Scott v. Harris, it refuses to constitutionalize a fixed “warn-and-negotiate” sequence. On the facts, the court finds officers did attempt measures consistent with accommodation and de-escalation (conversation, suggestions for peaceful dispute handling, perimeter containment, waiting), but Bobby’s actions—threats, gunfire, and defiance—overtook those efforts.

4. ADA reasonableness under exigency: “accommodate” does not mean “increase danger”

On the ADA claim, the court reasons in a manner that closely tracks Fourth Circuit precedent: once the scenario becomes exigent and life-threatening, accommodations that could be reasonable in calm circumstances may become unreasonable to demand. The panel underscores that officers did not immediately storm the home; they contained and waited, using force only in response to renewed gunfire. The court characterizes Felicia’s proposed accommodations (allow Felicia to enter, summon specialized professionals, further delay) as either already attempted in substance (talking, waiting) or unreasonably risky given the active shooter dynamics.

C. Impact

1. Firearm-like objects and “active shooter” fact patterns

The decision strengthens the defense-side position that when a suspect repeatedly discharges a realistic firearm-like object in a populated area, deadly force will often be deemed objectively reasonable—even if the weapon later proves incapable of firing bullets. Practically, this pushes litigation toward (i) whether the object was sufficiently realistic and (ii) what officers reasonably perceived in real time, rather than post-incident ballistics or product specifications.

2. Post-Barnes litigation framing in the Fourth Circuit

The opinion is an early example of how the Fourth Circuit will operationalize Barnes v. Felix: plaintiffs may litigate “earlier facts and circumstances,” but defendants can still prevail where later developments convert an encounter into a clear imminent-threat situation. Expect more briefing on which pre-force facts are legally “part of the interaction” (and known to the officer), and whether any pre-force tactical decisions materially created or escalated the danger.

3. ADA claims in armed mental-health crises

By leaning heavily on Waller ex rel. Est. of Hunt v. Danville, the court signals that ADA liability will be difficult to establish where: (1) police know of mental illness, (2) attempt some form of engagement/containment, and (3) the suspect poses an immediate lethal danger (especially through gunfire). The decision may discourage ADA theories premised on failure to bring in family members or mental-health specialists during volatile standoffs, absent facts showing those measures were feasible without materially increasing risk.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

V. Conclusion

Felicia Morgan v. City of Charlotte affirms summary judgment for officers and the City in a tragic, mental-health-driven standoff, and it does so on two doctrinally important grounds. First, under Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, officers acted reasonably in using deadly force against a person repeatedly firing a realistic gun-like object in a residential neighborhood; the later discovery that the weapon was a blank-firing prop does not retroactively make the perception of deadly threat unreasonable. Second, applying Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs Frederick Cnty. and especially Waller ex rel. Est. of Hunt v. Danville, the court holds the ADA does not require additional accommodations that would increase risk or demand perfection during exigent, life-threatening police operations.

The opinion’s broader significance lies in its synthesis of the Supreme Court’s mandate in Barnes v. Felix—to consider earlier circumstances—while reaffirming that rapidly evolving, imminent-threat realities often remain decisive.