Procedural Revocation-Sentencing Challenges Are Waived Without a Plain-Error Argument; General Advocacy for a Shorter Term Preserves Substantive Review

I. Introduction

United States v. Sletten (10th Cir. June 2, 2026) is an unpublished “Order and Judgment” affirming a statutory-maximum revocation sentence for a defendant on lifetime supervised release following a child-pornography conviction. The case primarily functions as a preservation and appellate-review decision: it shows how procedural challenges to revocation sentences can be lost through forfeiture and waiver, while a substantive-reasonableness challenge may still be preserved by even general advocacy for a shorter period of incarceration.

Parties: The United States (Appellee) and Marcus Sletten (Appellant).
Background: In 2011, Sletten pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and received 100 months’ imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release. After beginning supervision in 2018, he accumulated repeated violations leading to four revocations.
Key issues on appeal: (1) whether Sletten preserved procedural challenges to the revocation sentence; (2) whether his 24-month prison term (above the 4–10 months advisory range) was substantively unreasonable.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that Sletten’s procedural challenges were forfeited because he did not make contemporaneous objections in the district court and were waived because he did not request plain-error review on appeal. As to substantive reasonableness, the panel concluded Sletten preserved the issue by generally urging that any incarceration-related delay in treatment “be short,” and the court found no abuse of discretion in imposing the 24-month statutory maximum given Sletten’s repeated violations and public-safety concerns.

The panel also noted, in a footnote, that the district court briefly referenced language associated with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (respect for the law/just punishment), which is impermissible to consider at revocation under Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), but Sletten did not raise that issue on appeal, so the court did not address it.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and the procedural/substantive framework

  • United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2011): supplied the basic rule that revocation sentences are reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Sletten uses McBride as the entry point for the two-part reasonableness analysis.
  • United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2008)): framed reasonableness review as including both (i) a procedural component (method/calculation/explanation) and (ii) a substantive component (length/overall fairness).
  • United v. Eddington, 65 F.4th 1231 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2014)): defined procedural reasonableness as focusing on “the manner” of calculation.
  • United States v. Lawless, 979 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2020): cataloged common procedural errors (miscalculating the Guidelines, treating them as mandatory, failure to consider § 3553(a), clearly erroneous facts, inadequate explanation). Sletten invoked Lawless’s taxonomy to situate the claimed errors (rejecting Guidelines, predetermination, inadequate explanation).

2. Preservation, forfeiture, waiver, and plain-error review (procedural challenges)

  • United States v. Rocha, 145 F.4th 1247 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2007)): reinforced the “well-settled” rule requiring contemporaneous objection to procedural sentencing errors; absent such an objection, only plain-error review is ordinarily available.
  • United States v. Lucero, 130 F.4th 877 (10th Cir. 2025): applied as an example that failing to object after sentence imposition fails to preserve procedural issues.
  • Eddington, 65 F.4th at 1240, 1243, and United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019): provided the decisive waiver rule used in Sletten—if an appellant forfeits an issue below and then fails to argue plain error on appeal, the court treats the claim as waived and declines review entirely.
  • United States v. Sumka, 81 F.4th 1153 (10th Cir. 2023): cited as an additional authority supporting the court’s choice not to reach waived procedural issues.

3. Substantive reasonableness: deference, variance review, and what counts as “unreasonable”

  • United States v. Craig, 808 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2015): supplied the definition of substantive reasonableness as the reasonableness of the length in light of § 3553(a) and all the circumstances.
  • United States v. Maldonado-Passage, 56 F.4th 830 (10th Cir. 2022): provided the phrase that a substantively unreasonable sentence fails to “fairly reflect” relevant factors or defendant circumstances.
  • United States v. Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th 1174 (10th Cir. 2025): contributed several controlling review concepts: (i) no presumption of unreasonableness for outside-Guidelines sentences; (ii) abuse of discretion definition (“arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable”); (iii) substantial deference to district courts.
  • United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)): underscored that all sentences are reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard; Gall also provided the variance principle that the justification must be sufficiently compelling to support the extent of deviation.
  • Untied States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2009): cited (despite the typo) for the abuse-of-discretion formulation.
  • United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2019) and Rocha, 145 F.4th at 1277: supported the proposition that district courts need not address every factor or give equal weight to each factor.
  • United States v. Holt, 161 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2025): provided the “bounds of permissible choice” formulation, reinforcing appellate restraint.
  • United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2008), and Smart, 518 F.3d 800: used to reject reweighing § 3553(a) factors on appeal; Sletten treats balancing as primarily the district court’s domain.

4. Preserving a substantive-reasonableness challenge

  • United States v. Vasquez-Alcarez, 647 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2011): drew the key contrast with procedural claims—no post-sentencing objection is required to preserve the claim that a sentence is “unreasonably long.”
  • United States v. Kaspereit, 994 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2021), and Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020): supplied the preservation rule that advocating for a shorter sentence is enough to preserve a substantive challenge, and “nothing more is needed.”
  • United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2007): added that a defendant need not object so long as he does not invite error or affirmatively endorse the sentence.
  • Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th at 1190 n.13: tightened the concept—failure to preserve occurs only when the defendant offers no argument for a lower sentence.

5. Guarding the procedural/substantive boundary

  • United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024): recognized that explanation issues can overlap between procedural and substantive review.
  • United States v. Ulibarri, 737 F. App'x 410 (10th Cir. 2018): invoked to prevent defendants from “shoehorning” unpreserved procedural explanation arguments into substantive review. Sletten uses Ulibarri to confine the appeal to genuinely substantive claims.

6. Revocation-specific constraints on § 3553(a) factors (not decided, but flagged)

  • Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025): held district courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e). Sletten cites Esteras to note the district court’s brief reference to “promotion and respect for the law and the provision of just punishment,” but the panel does not apply Esteras because the point was not raised on appeal.
  • United States v. Reyes, No. 25-2144, 2026 WL 1004501 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026): an unpublished case cited for the proposition that Esteras forecloses § 3553(a)(2)(A) consideration at revocation.
  • United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003): used for the general appellate principle that issues not raised in the opening brief are not addressed.

7. Substantive reasonableness of upward variances in revocation sentences

  • United States v. Valdez, 128 F.4th 1314 (10th Cir. 2025): supported affirmance of a revocation upward variance to 24 months (from 4–10) based on public safety—closely analogous to Sletten’s facts and outcome.
  • United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 2010): upheld an upward variance in revocation due to recidivism and repeated violations; Sletten uses Steele to validate escalating sanction severity for serial noncompliance.
  • United States v. Yazzie, 757 F. App'x 772 (10th Cir. 2018): unpublished authority approving a 24-month revocation sentence above the range due to repeated violations.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The revocation sentencing framework (statute first; Guidelines advisory)

The district court sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which permits revocation after considering a specific subset of § 3553(a) factors. The court:

  • acknowledged and rejected the 4–10 months advisory range and stated it had “no data” supporting the Guidelines recommendation (a point Sletten attacked as “wholesale rejecting” the Guidelines);
  • turned to the applicable § 3553(a) factors (as incorporated by § 3583(e));
  • emphasized Sletten’s repeated violations, his continued nonconformity, and public-safety concerns, and imposed the 24-month statutory maximum with 55 years of supervised release.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether the district court’s handling of the Guidelines or explanation was procedurally sound, because Sletten failed to preserve and properly present those procedural claims.

2. Why the procedural challenges failed: forfeiture below, waiver on appeal

Sletten raised three procedural complaints (rejection of the Guidelines, a predetermined 24-month sentence, and inadequate explanation). The panel treated these as classic “procedural errors” under Lawless. Under Rocha and Romero, Sletten needed to object contemporaneously in the district court; he did not, so the issues were forfeited. The decisive step came from Eddington and Leffler: because Sletten did not ask for plain-error review on appeal, the forfeited claims became waived and were not reviewed at all.

This is the practical doctrinal “rule of decision” for the procedural portion: the appellate court will not rescue unpreserved procedural sentencing claims unless the appellant affirmatively pursues plain-error review.

3. Why the substantive challenge was preserved: “shorter than imposed” advocacy can be general

For substantive reasonableness, the panel applied the comparatively “forgiving” preservation standard from Vasquez-Alcarez, Kaspereit, and Holguin-Hernandez v. United States. Even though Sletten did not propose a specific number of months, he argued that incarceration would delay needed treatment and asked that the delay “be short.” The panel treated that as advocacy for a shorter sentence than 24 months, sufficient to preserve substantive review.

Notably, the opinion flags an intra-panel disagreement: Judge Federico would have found no preservation because Sletten did not “advocat[e] for a shorter sentence” in a sufficiently concrete way. The majority, however, read Sletten’s “keep it short” request as enough.

4. Why the substantive challenge failed on the merits: deference plus individualized facts

Applying Gall v. United States, Lente, and Guevara-Lopez, the panel reviewed the above-range sentence for abuse of discretion, considered the extent of deviation (from 4–10 months to 24 months), and asked whether the district court’s justification was sufficiently compelling.

The panel rejected Sletten’s “boilerplate” characterization because the district court tied the sentence to concrete, individualized considerations: repeated violations, the ineffectiveness of prior supervision, and the need to protect the public. Those rationales align with prior revocation variance affirmances like United States v. Steele and the especially analogous United States v. Valdez.

The panel also refused to let Sletten repackage procedural complaints as substantive ones, invoking United States v. Ulibarri to maintain the procedural/substantive boundary.

C. Impact

1. Appellate practice: the “plain-error or waiver” trap is reaffirmed

Sletten strengthens (at least persuasively, given its unpublished status) a recurring Tenth Circuit theme: unobjected-to procedural sentencing arguments are not merely disadvantaged—they are often effectively unrecoverable unless the appellant explicitly invokes and satisfies plain-error review under Eddington and Leffler. For defense counsel, the case is a reminder to:

  • make contemporaneous procedural objections at revocation sentencing; and
  • if an issue was forfeited, brief plain error explicitly on appeal.

2. Preservation of substantive reasonableness: courts may accept “pleas for lenity”

The majority’s approach confirms that a defendant can preserve a substantive challenge without naming a specific alternative term—general advocacy that imprisonment be “short” may suffice. That reading of Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, consistent with Vasquez-Alcarez, may be significant in revocation hearings where counsel sometimes focuses on treatment alternatives rather than numeric sentencing requests.

3. Revocation sentencing substance: repeated noncompliance can justify the statutory maximum

On the merits, the opinion reinforces the notion—illustrated by Steele, Valdez, and Yazzie—that serial violations and public-safety concerns can justify large upward variances, including to the statutory maximum. This supports a practical “escalation” model in revocation sentencing: as violations accumulate, appellate courts are reluctant to second-guess increased severity so long as the district court’s reasons are tethered to § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e).

4. Post-Esteras caution (issue preserved for future litigants)

Although not decided, the footnote discussion of Esteras v. United States underscores a newly clarified constraint: district courts may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“just punishment,” “respect for the law”) in revocation sentencing. Future litigants who object and properly brief the issue may use Esteras to challenge revocation sentences where the record suggests reliance on (a)(2)(A).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release / revocation
Supervised release is a period of court-ordered monitoring after prison. If the defendant violates conditions, the court may “revoke” supervision and impose additional imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
Advisory Guidelines range (revocation)
Revocation imprisonment ranges are generally drawn from U.S.S.G. Chapter 7 policy statements and are advisory. A court may vary upward or downward, but must do so through the statutory framework (here, § 3583(e) and the incorporated § 3553(a) factors).
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness
Procedural reasonableness concerns how the sentence was chosen (correct range, correct factors, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness concerns whether the length is reasonable in light of the facts and permissible factors.
Forfeiture vs. waiver
Forfeiture is failing to raise an argument in time (e.g., no objection at sentencing). Waiver, in this context, occurs when a forfeited issue is not presented under the correct appellate standard (e.g., failing to argue plain error), leading the appellate court to decline review entirely.
Plain-error review
A demanding appellate standard applied to unpreserved errors. The appellant must request it and satisfy specific requirements; otherwise the court may treat the issue as waived.
Upward variance
A sentence above the advisory Guidelines range. Under Gall v. United States, the court considers the extent of deviation and whether the reasons are sufficiently compelling.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Sletten affirms a statutory-maximum revocation sentence and, more importantly, clarifies (persuasively) two practical appellate principles in the Tenth Circuit: (1) procedural revocation-sentencing claims are effectively lost when not objected to below and not pursued under plain-error review on appeal; and (2) a defendant can preserve substantive reasonableness review through general advocacy for a shorter sentence, even without proposing a precise alternative. Substantively, the case reiterates that repeated violations and public-safety concerns can provide sufficiently compelling grounds for major upward variances in revocation sentencing.