Probable Cause to Search a Vehicle Exists When a Suspect Is Found at His Car and the Gun Evidence Is Missing Elsewhere—No “Last Resort” Requirement Under the Automobile Exception

Case: United States v. Stephen Duane Woods, Jr. (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Stephen Duane Woods, Jr., the Sixth Circuit addressed a recurring Fourth Amendment question: when police have reason to believe a firearm was used in an assault, and they locate the suspect at his vehicle but cannot find the gun on his person or in the immediately searched surroundings, do they have probable cause to search the car without a warrant under the automobile exception?

The case arose from a reported domestic assault at an apartment complex in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The victim and her daughter told police that Stephen Woods slapped and kicked the victim and placed a “small” gun against her chest. Officers received information that Woods drove an orange Dodge. After a search of the complex and a pat-down of Woods failed to locate the gun, officers unlocked Woods’s car with his keys and found a pistol under the front passenger seat. Woods—charged federally as a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—moved to suppress the firearm as the product of an unconstitutional warrantless vehicle search.

The central issue on appeal was narrow but important: whether the officers had probable cause to believe the gun (as evidence of crime) was in Woods’s car.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression. It held that the officers had probable cause to search Woods’s car under the automobile exception because, based on the totality of circumstances, there was a “fair probability” that the gun would be found in the vehicle. The court rejected Woods’s contention that police must pursue other search options first or “eliminate” alternative locations before searching a car without a warrant.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is built around a familiar chain of Fourth Amendment authority—starting from the automobile exception, then defining probable cause, and finally applying the “fair probability” standard to the facts.

• California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 578-80 (1991)
  The court invoked Acevedo for the modern statement of the automobile exception: officers may search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime. This framing matters because it makes the analysis turn on one question—probable cause—rather than on exigency, officer safety, or arrest-related doctrines.
• United States v. Simpson, 138 F.4th 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2025)
  Simpson supplied the Sixth Circuit’s recent articulation of the same rule: probable cause to believe evidence is in a car is enough to search it. Woods’s “last resort” argument was directly answered by Simpson’s formulation—once the fair probability exists, the warrantless search is lawful regardless of other investigative options.
• District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)
  Cited for the reminder that “probable cause is not a high bar.” The Sixth Circuit used Wesby to reject any attempt to transform probable cause into a near-certainty or exhaustive-elimination standard.
• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)
  Gates provided the controlling definition: probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that evidence will be found in the place to be searched. The opinion’s doctrinal move is to treat “fair probability” as compatible with multiple plausible locations for the evidence.
• United States v. Harness, 453 F.3d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 2006)
  The court used Harness to emphasize that eyewitness accounts can establish probable cause. Here, both the victim and her daughter described the assault and the gun’s use, supporting probable cause that Woods committed assault and intentionally pointed a firearm at another.
• United States v. White, 990 F.3d 488, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2021)
  White was crucial to rejecting Woods’s “could be elsewhere” theory. It stands for the proposition that officers need not eliminate all other possible locations before probable cause exists to search the chosen place.
• Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)
  Woods invoked Wong Sun to argue that the officers were “exploit[ing] illegality,” suggesting a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree concern. The court treated this citation as misplaced: where the search is supported by probable cause and falls within the automobile exception, there is no illegality to exploit.
• United States v. Stevens, No. 21-4065, 2022 WL 11684811, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, 2022)
  Woods cited Stevens for a supposed requirement that police must eliminate alternatives to establish probable cause. The Sixth Circuit rejected that reading, explaining that although officers in Stevens did eliminate alternatives, they were not required to do so, and that fact pattern does not raise the probable-cause bar.
• United States v. Haynes, 301 F.3d 669, 679 (6th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 645 (10th Cir. 2001)
  These were offered as contrary “robbery evidence in car” cases. The Sixth Circuit distinguished them on a key factual axis: in both, officers did not arrest the suspects at or near their cars. Here, Woods was detained immediately after emerging from his orange Dodge, tightening the inference that the missing gun was stashed where he had just been.
• United States v. Charles, 801 F.3d 855, 861 (7th Cir. 2015)
  The Sixth Circuit adopted Charles for a commonsense inference: if a suspect is found at his car, the weapon is not on him, and it is not located nearby, a reasonable officer would consider it likely the gun was stashed in the vehicle.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: (1) the gun is evidence of a crime; (2) there is a fair probability the gun is in the car.

(1) The gun as evidence of crime. The victim and her daughter reported that Woods slapped and kicked the victim and pressed a gun to her chest. Those eyewitness statements supported probable cause that Woods committed Michigan crimes, including assault and intentionally pointing a gun at another person (Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.81(1), 750.233(1)). Once those crimes were reasonably suspected, the firearm became direct physical evidence—both corroborating the witnesses and evidencing the gun-related offense.

(2) Fair probability the gun is in the car. The court relied on a converging set of facts:

• Witnesses last saw the gun in Woods’s possession.
• Officers did not find the gun on Woods after detention and a pat-down.
• Officers did not see the gun in plain view through the car windows.
• Officers did not find Woods or the gun during a canine search of the complex.
• Officers located Woods in the orange Dodge described by witnesses.
• It is common for contraband or weapons to be concealed inside vehicles out of sight.

From these circumstances, the court concluded there was at least a “fair probability” that the gun was in the vehicle—enough to satisfy Gates.

Rejection of the “greater probability / last resort” theory. Woods argued there was “no greater probability” the gun was in his car than elsewhere. The court treated that as a category error: probable cause does not require “greater probability” than every alternative, only a fair probability. Further, the Sixth Circuit rejected Woods’s suggestion that police must exhaust other possible searches (or search more “thoroughly”) before using the automobile exception. Once probable cause exists, officers may search the vehicle without a warrant; the Fourth Amendment does not impose a sequential “least intrusive means” or “last resort” requirement for this exception.

3.3. Impact

The opinion strengthens and clarifies several practical points for future Sixth Circuit suppression litigation involving vehicles and missing weapons:

• Probable cause can arise from a narrowing inference rather than direct sighting. Officers need not see the gun in the car to have probable cause; it can be inferred from (i) credible witness reports of recent possession and (ii) the failure to find the gun on the suspect or in searched nearby areas.
• No exhaustion requirement. Defense arguments framed as “police should have tried X first” are less likely to succeed where the automobile exception applies and probable cause is supported by a totality-of-circumstances analysis.
• Proximity to the vehicle matters. Distinguishing United States v. Haynes and United States v. Edwards, the court signaled that when officers encounter a suspect at or immediately adjacent to his vehicle, the inference that evidence is stashed in the car is materially stronger.
• Domestic-violence firearm allegations. In cases involving reported threats with a gun, the decision provides a roadmap for probable cause where the weapon is not recovered until after the suspect is located at his vehicle.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Automobile exception: A Fourth Amendment rule permitting warrantless searches of vehicles when police have probable cause that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. It is not limited to searches incident to arrest and does not require officers to show they could not get a warrant in time.
• Probable cause / “fair probability”: More than a hunch, less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It asks whether the facts would make a reasonable officer think evidence is likely to be found in the place searched.
• Suppression: A remedy that excludes evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used by the government in its case.
• “Fruit of the poisonous tree” (from Wong Sun v. United States): Evidence can be excluded if it was derived from an unlawful search or seizure. But if the search is lawful (here, supported by probable cause under the automobile exception), the doctrine does not apply.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Stephen Duane Woods, Jr. reinforces a practical Fourth Amendment principle in the Sixth Circuit: when credible witnesses report a suspect possessed and used a gun during an assault, the suspect is found at his car, and the gun is missing after reasonable efforts to locate it elsewhere (including a pat-down and area search), officers may infer a fair probability that the gun is in the vehicle and search it without a warrant under the automobile exception. The decision rejects any notion that police must first exhaust all other investigative avenues or eliminate every alternative location before searching a car based on probable cause.