Pro Se Removal Proceedings: Immigration Judges Must Develop the Record on Dispositive, Favorable Issues Raised by the Applicant

I. Introduction

Ildar Ruzmetovich Niyazov v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2026) concerns the statutory role of an Immigration Judge (IJ) when an asylum applicant appears pro se. Ildar Niyazov, a Tatar ethnic minority citizen of Uzbekistan, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) after describing years of ethnic and religious abuse and government targeting linked to a housing dispute in Tashkent, including a suspicious 2015 hit-and-run that killed his sister.

Although the IJ found Niyazov credible and found past persecution (and initially “torture”), the IJ denied relief on the ground that the Government rebutted the presumption of future persecution by showing Niyazov could internally relocate—especially to Samarkand. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the IJ failed to develop the record on issues the IJ treated as dispositive, preventing meaningful substantial-evidence review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded with instructions for the BIA to remand to the IJ for a new hearing on asylum (including humanitarian asylum), withholding, and CAT relief. The central holding is that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) imposes an affirmative obligation on IJs to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” and, in pro se cases, this requires the IJ to develop the record concerning favorable evidence the applicant raises, particularly on dispositive issues (here, internal relocation and the severity/likelihood components relevant to humanitarian asylum and CAT).

The court also rejected the Government’s exhaustion arguments, applying the Third Circuit’s liberal exhaustion approach and holding the BIA abused its discretion in deeming humanitarian-asylum arguments waived.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The statutory duty to develop the record (especially for pro se respondents)

  • Toure v. Att'y Gen., 443 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2006): The Third Circuit reiterated that an IJ has a “duty to develop an applicant's testimony,” especially on a potentially dispositive issue. The majority treated this as core Third Circuit authority anchoring the remand remedy when the record is too underdeveloped to apply substantial-evidence review.
  • Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1998): Stands for the principle that an IJ cannot fault a pro se applicant for not volunteering details when the IJ never asked for them; lack of elicited detail can make an adverse finding unsupported by substantial evidence.
  • Saravia v. Att'y Gen., 905 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2018): Emphasizes the special importance of the record-development duty when the respondent lacks counsel and underscores procedural safeguards tied to corroboration and notice.
  • Out-of-circuit decisions were used to reinforce (not replace) the statutory interpretation of § 1229a(b)(1): Yang v. McElroy, Buckley v. Blanche, Diahn v. Blanche, Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v. Mullin, Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, and Lacsina Pangilinan v. Holder. Collectively, these cases frame IJs as more than passive adjudicators: they must help create an adequate evidentiary record in removal proceedings.
  • United States v. Dohou, 948 F.3d 621 (3d Cir. 2020): Cited to distinguish IJs’ executive “quasi-judicial” function from Article III judging; the distinction supports why Congress could impose an affirmative inquisitorial obligation in § 1229a(b)(1).

2. The obligation not to ignore favorable evidence

  • Herrow v. Att'y Gen., 93 F.4th 107 (3d Cir. 2024) and Huang v. Att'y Gen., 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010): The IJ need not address every record item, but may not ignore favorable evidence. The majority “put these lines together” with the record-development duty: when a pro se applicant raises potentially favorable facts, the IJ must probe and develop them.

3. Internal relocation doctrine and limits on BIA factfinding

  • Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2012): Central to the majority’s critique. It clarifies that internal relocation must be not only safe but also “practical,” and even if safe it may still be unreasonable “under all the circumstances,” including social and cultural constraints and familial ties.
  • Gambashidze v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2004): Used to justify remand when the record “says virtually nothing” supporting a relocation determination. The majority applied it to a different kind of “virtually nothing”: not absence of any testimony, but absence of developed testimony on relocation-reasonableness factors that the pro se applicant flagged.
  • Alimbaev v. Att'y Gen., 872 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2017) (and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)): Cited for the proposition that the BIA may not make its own factual findings; this mattered because the BIA referenced relocation to Xorazm more than the IJ did.

4. CAT and humanitarian asylum standards

  • Pllumi v. Att'y Gen., 642 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2011) and Matter of L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 705 (BIA 2012): Cited to define humanitarian asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) and the severity/other-serious-harm pathways.
  • Saban-Cach v. Att'y Gen., 58 F.4th 716 (3d Cir. 2023): Requires considering the cumulative effect of past harm in humanitarian-asylum analysis.
  • Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017) and Kaplun v. Att'y Gen., 602 F.3d 260 (3d. Cir. 2010): Provide the two-step CAT inquiry: predict what is likely to happen upon removal, then determine whether that predicted harm qualifies as “torture,” considering all relevant evidence (8 C.F.R. § 1206.16(c)(3) as quoted by the opinion).
  • Sheriff v. Att'y Gen., 587 F.3d 584 (3d Cir. 2009): Used for the principle that omitted discussion of key incidents can prevent a reviewing court from knowing whether the agency considered material evidence relevant to predictive judgments.

5. Exhaustion/waiver on administrative appeal

  • Nunez v. Att'y Gen., 35 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2022) and Inestroza-Tosta v. Att'y Gen., 105 F.4th 499 (3d Cir. 2024): These cases support a “liberal exhaustion policy” for petitioners, especially where the issue is straightforward and the petitioner made some effort to alert the BIA.
  • Matter of Voss, 28 I. & N. Dec. 107 (BIA 2020) and Sanchez v. Att'y Gen., 147 F.4th 348 (3d Cir. 2025): The court applied these to hold the BIA abused its discretion by finding waiver of humanitarian-asylum arguments where Niyazov did raise the issue.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory anchor: § 1229a(b)(1) is affirmative, not passive. The majority treated the command that an IJ “shall … interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” as a statutory obligation to build an adequate record, especially when an applicant is unrepresented.
  2. Record-development duty is linked to the court’s ability to apply substantial-evidence review. Substantial-evidence review presupposes a record sufficiently developed on the issues that drive the outcome. Where the IJ treats an issue as dispositive (internal relocation rebuttal; severity/cumulative harm; likelihood of future torture) but does not develop relevant, favorable testimony the pro se applicant points to, the reviewing court cannot reliably evaluate whether the agency’s factual findings are supported.
  3. Internal relocation rebuttal required a developed “reasonableness” inquiry. Once past persecution is shown, the Government must prove both safety and reasonableness of relocation under all circumstances. The majority held the IJ’s questioning and analysis left key “reasonableness” considerations undeveloped even though Niyazov raised them (e.g., worse anti-Tatar discrimination in Samarkand; adult son’s continued flight/inquiries; who was behind the 2015 crash; Niyazov’s claimed pro-Tatar activism; wife’s Tajik ethnicity and children’s circumstances).
  4. Humanitarian asylum and CAT required fuller development of past incidents and predictive facts. The majority emphasized that severity/cumulative harm and future-risk assessments depend on “all evidence relevant” to future torture and the totality of past harm. Because the IJ did not inquire into multiple incidents described in the declaration and redirected questioning when Niyazov began describing harms, the majority concluded the record and the IJ’s discussion were insufficient to sustain denial of humanitarian asylum and CAT.
  5. Administrative review constraints mattered. The BIA could not cure the deficiency by factfinding (per Alimbaev v. Att'y Gen. and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)), so remand for a new hearing was the appropriate remedy.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is a clear, structured statement of how the Third Circuit understands § 1229a(b)(1) in pro se cases and how that duty interacts with appellate review.

  • Hearing management in pro se cases: IJs are on notice that when a pro se applicant flags potentially favorable facts, especially tied to a dispositive element (such as internal relocation), the IJ should probe enough to create an appellate-grade record—rather than later relying on the absence of detail.
  • Internal relocation litigation: The decision underscores that “no persecution in the relocation city” is not the end of the inquiry. “Reasonableness” may include family ties/hostility, social constraints, and practical feasibility (as framed by Matter of M-Z-M-R-), and these can require testimony-based development.
  • CAT/humanitarian asylum adjudication: The opinion signals that cursory treatment of “totality” evidence—particularly when the applicant described multiple discrete episodes—risks remand if the IJ’s questioning and written decision do not demonstrate that material incidents were meaningfully considered.
  • BIA waiver determinations: The court’s discussion of Nunez v. Att'y Gen., Inestroza-Tosta v. Att'y Gen., Matter of Voss, and Sanchez v. Att'y Gen. reinforces that waiver findings are reviewable for abuse of discretion and that the Third Circuit will construe pro se issue presentation liberally.
  • Potential friction point (highlighted by the dissent): The dissent warns the majority’s approach risks turning IJs into quasi-advocates and diluting substantial-evidence deference. Future cases may refine how much probing is “enough” and what constitutes a “dispositive” issue requiring deeper record development.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Past persecution presumption
If an applicant proves past persecution, the law presumes a well-founded fear of future persecution. The burden shifts to the Government to rebut that presumption, including through internal relocation.
Internal relocation (safety vs. reasonableness)
It is not enough that a person might avoid harm by moving within the country. The Government must also show it would be reasonable to expect relocation “under all the circumstances” (practical access, social constraints, family ties, cultural barriers, and other feasibility factors).
Humanitarian asylum
Even if future persecution is not likely, asylum can be granted based on the severity of past persecution or a reasonable probability of “other serious harm” in the future (8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)).
CAT protection
CAT requires showing it is more likely than not the person would be tortured if removed. Adjudicators must predict what is likely to happen and then decide whether that predicted harm meets the legal definition of “torture,” considering all relevant evidence.
Substantial-evidence review
On appeal, courts defer to agency factfinding unless the record would compel a reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite result. But this deference assumes an adequately developed record on the issues that decide the case.
Exhaustion and waiver
Generally, issues must be raised before the BIA to be reviewed in federal court. The Third Circuit applies a liberal standard in pro se cases: the petitioner must make some effort to alert the BIA to the issue, even if imperfectly.

V. Conclusion

Niyazov vacates and remands not because the Third Circuit found Niyazov entitled to relief on the merits, but because the IJ’s handling of a pro se hearing left critical, applicant-raised facts insufficiently explored on dispositive questions—most notably internal relocation and the cumulative and predictive assessments required for humanitarian asylum and CAT. The opinion reinforces a practical rule: when a pro se applicant points to favorable, potentially outcome-determinative circumstances, the IJ must probe enough to create a reviewable record; otherwise, substantial-evidence review becomes impossible and remand is warranted.