Private, Uncirculated Social-Media Messages Lack “Terroristic Threat” Intent; Direct Threats to a Media Outlet May Qualify

1. Introduction

In People v. Rainey (2026 NY Slip Op 04451 [3d Dept July 16, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Third Department reviewed convictions arising from a series of threatening social-media communications:

• June 2019 (Whisper): anonymous posts referencing bombs placed in cars and targets in Plattsburgh (including “downtown,” “Walmart,” and “Chik Fil A,” and “the interstate”).
• September 2019 (Snapchat): a private message to an acquaintance stating that being lied about could make defendant “the greatest mass murder” and that “Saranac is on my list now” (admitted to refer to Saranac High School). A screenshot was later circulated by others.
• February 2020 (emails to WPTZ): multiple emails to a local television station’s general tips address describing revenge fantasies and detailing ways to blow up the station, including an apparent remote-detonation method.

The key issues on appeal were (i) whether the evidence supported two convictions for making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20), particularly the element of intent “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” (ii) whether the Whisper posts supported false reporting in the first degree (Penal Law § 240.60[6]), (iii) whether statements to police should have been suppressed, (iv) whether County Court correctly granted the People’s reverse Batson challenge (gender discrimination by defense counsel), and (v) sentencing (consecutive vs. concurrent terms and harshness).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department reversed one terroristic-threat conviction (the September 2019 Snapchat statement), holding the evidence was legally insufficient to show defendant made that statement with the specific intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, because it was made in a private exchange and there was no proof defendant sought or encouraged its dissemination.

The Court affirmed (i) the terroristic-threat conviction based on the February 2020 WPTZ emails (finding legal sufficiency and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence), and (ii) the conviction for falsely reporting an incident in the first degree based on the June 2019 Whisper bomb posts (as not against the weight of the evidence). It also upheld denial of suppression, sustained the People’s reverse Batson challenge, and declined to modify the remaining sentence as harsh or severe after vacatur of one count.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Legal sufficiency and weight review framework

• People v Santiago, 206 AD3d 1466 (3d Dept 2022): supplied the core articulation of (1) legal-sufficiency review (view evidence in the light most favorable to the People) and (2) weight-of-the-evidence review (neutral light; whether different result would be unreasonable; weighing conflicting inferences).
  Role here: The court used this framework to separate the insufficiency of intent evidence for the private Snapchat statement from the sufficiency/weight support for the direct-to-WPTZ email threats.
• People v Warner, 194 AD3d 1098 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1030 (2021): reaffirmed sufficiency methodology.
• People v Paige, 211 AD3d 1333 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 1143 (2023); People v Tenace, 229 AD3d 908 (3d Dept 2024); People v Jones, 202 AD3d 1285 (3d Dept 2022):
  Role here: reinforced deference to the jury on credibility and weight.

B. Terroristic threat doctrine and intent

• Matter of Jose M.F., 236 AD3d 1465 (4th Dept 2025):
  Role here: supported the court’s conclusion that a statement not made with the specific intent to intimidate a civilian population (including where dissemination is not shown to be intended by the speaker) cannot sustain Penal Law § 490.20. The Third Department relied on it to reverse the Snapchat-based count.
• People v Morales, 20 NY3d 240 (2012):
  Role here: underpinned the analysis that intent may be inferred from the circumstances and content of the threat; also cited in the harmless-error discussion in the footnote.
• People v Jenner, 39 AD3d 1083 (3d Dept 2007), lv denied 9 NY3d 845 (2007):
  Role here: supported the proposition that threats aimed at influencing others’ actions can satisfy the terrorism intent element.
• People v Van Patten, 48 AD3d 30 (3d Dept 2007), lv denied 10 NY3d 845 (2008):
  Role here: cited as authority on reasonable fear/expectation of imminent commission and also (by comparison) on Miranda/custody considerations; the Court used it to support that technical details of a bomb/trigger mechanism can make imminent fear reasonable.

C. False reporting, “public place,” and bomb warnings

• People v Surdis, 275 AD2d 553 (3d Dept 2000), lv denied 95 NY2d 908 (2000):
  Role here: central to the false-reporting analysis. The Court quoted its rule that “a warning of the existence of a bomb carries with it the implication of an impending explosion,” supporting Penal Law § 240.60(6) applicability to the Whisper posts.
• People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738 (2012):
  Role here: used “generally” for understanding “public place” under Penal Law § 240.00(1), supporting that Walmart/Chick-fil-A/interstate areas are within the statute’s scope.
• People v Burwell, 183 AD3d 173 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1043 (2020):
  Role here: provided a comparator for the significance of actual law-enforcement response (K-9 sweeps and investigation) in showing likely public alarm/inconvenience.

D. Suppression, Miranda custody, and voluntariness

• People v Saunders, 232 AD3d 1039 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 1058 (2025):
  Role here: stated the People’s burden on suppression—voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and Miranda waiver for custodial interrogation.
• People v Gentry, 218 AD3d 919 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1012 (2023):
  Role here: provided the “reasonable person innocent of wrongdoing” custody test and supported the finding that the apartment/motel questioning was noncustodial until handcuffing.
• People v Abdullah, 206 AD3d 1340 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 939 (2022); People v Green, 208 AD3d 1539 (3d Dept 2022):
  Role here: enumerated factors for determining custody (location, length, atmosphere, restriction, cooperation, accusatory vs investigatory nature).
• People v Moore, 162 AD3d 1123 (3d Dept 2018):
  Role here: reinforced deference to suppression-court credibility determinations.

E. Reverse Batson (gender discrimination in peremptories)

• People v Morgan, 230 AD3d 864 (3d Dept 2024), affd 45 NY3d 940 (2025):
  Role here: supplied the three-step Batson framework and confirmed it applies in this context (including reverse Batson challenges).
• People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172 (1996); People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101 (1995):
  Role here: supported comparative-juror analysis principles showing pretext (striking women for reasons that did not lead to strikes of similarly situated men).
• People v Wright, 42 NY3d 708 (2024):
  Role here: bolstered modern comparative analysis of peremptory reasons and pretext.
• People v May, 173 AD3d 1435 (3d Dept 2019); People v Ardrey, 92 AD3d 967 (3d Dept 2012), lv denied 19 NY3d 861 (2012):
  Role here: supported mootness of step-one arguments once step two/three are reached and ruled upon.
• People v Leach, 125 AD3d 568 (1st Dept 2015), lv denied 25 NY3d 1074 (2015), cert denied 577 US 1033 (2015); People v Murphy, 79 AD3d 1451 (3d Dept 2010), lv denied 16 NY3d 862 (2011):
  Role here: upheld trial-court pretext findings where purportedly neutral reasons are inconsistently applied.
• People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625 (2010); People v Cruz, 238 AD3d 1327 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1054 (2025):
  Role here: reinforced appellate deference to trial courts’ credibility and factual findings on Batson step three.

F. Other evidentiary and sentencing authorities

• People v Guevara, 240 AD3d 1083 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 44 NY3d 1028 (2025):
  Role here: supported limited-purpose admission with curative instructions.
• People v Baghai-Kermani, 84 NY2d 525 (1994); People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 (1975):
  Role here: harmless-error principles—whether there is a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict.
• People v Brisman, 43 NY3d 322 (2025):
  Role here: cited on discretionary sentence review standards.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Terroristic threat: the intent element and the “private message” problem

Penal Law § 490.20(1) requires not only a threat of a specified offense (here, second-degree murder) but that the defendant act with the specific intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population (or influence/affect government conduct), and that the threat thereby causes a reasonable expectation or fear of imminent commission.

For the September 2019 Snapchat count, the Third Department treated dissemination and audience as central to proving intent to intimidate a “civilian population.” The Court emphasized:

• the statement was made in a direct, private exchange initiated by an acquaintance;
• others later circulated a screenshot with warnings, but there was no proof defendant requested or encouraged circulation;
• the message referenced mass murder and listed “Saranac,” but it did not, on this record, show defendant acted with the statutorily required intent to intimidate the school community or other civilian population.

On that reasoning, the Court held the evidence was legally insufficient and dismissed the superior court information for that count.

B. Terroristic threat: direct emails to a news station as intimidation/coercion

For the February 2020 WPTZ emails, the Court found the statutory elements satisfied. Critical features included:

• Defendant initiated contact and sent multiple emails to the station’s general tips address, not a private vent to a confidant.
• The emails expressed “revenge,” put the station “top of my list,” described multiple “fool proof” bombing plans, and provided an apparent method for remote detonation.
• The Court inferred the emails were meant to scare and influence WPTZ employees in their news coverage (i.e., intimidation aimed at conduct).
• Although defendant also wrote “I’m not going to hurt anyone” and suggested that describing the plan “prevents me from doing it,” the Court stressed that lack of intent to carry out the threat is not a defense under Penal Law § 490.20(2).

On weight of the evidence, the Court acknowledged the jury could have viewed WPTZ’s lack of evacuation/interrupting programming as cutting against “reasonable” fear of imminence. But the Court held the jury could credit evidence that staff immediately forwarded emails to police and took safety measures (e.g., leaving in pairs), and could treat the technical bomb details as supporting reasonable fear of imminent action.

C. False reporting in the first degree: anonymous bomb warnings tied to a local geography

On the June 2019 Whisper posts, defendant challenged weight of the evidence. The Court concluded the conviction was supported because:

• Whisper posts are anonymous but include a geographic scope; local users reasonably understood references to Walmart/Chik-fil-A/interstate as Plattsburgh locations.
• Those locations qualify as a “public place” for Penal Law § 240.60(6) purposes.
• Bomb warnings imply impending explosion (per People v Surdis), and the posts triggered actual police response (including K-9 vehicle sweeps).
• Defendant admitted authoring the posts and said he picked targets because they “would have the largest amount of people,” supporting likelihood of public alarm and knowledge of the nature of the report.

Even though a jury could have credited his “blow off some steam” explanation, the appellate court held the guilty verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

D. Suppression: noncustodial home/motel questioning and post-Miranda waivers

The Court upheld denial of suppression after a Huntley hearing. It reasoned that defendant’s pre-Miranda admissions in his apartment and motel room were made while he was cooperative, not restrained, and not subjected to freedom-of-movement restrictions until after admissions—supporting a finding of noncustodial questioning. At the station, he was Mirandized and then chose to speak (including a conditional willingness to answer on August 2, 2019 and fuller cooperation on February 9, 2020), supporting a knowing waiver.

E. Reverse Batson: comparative analysis and credibility

The Court affirmed County Court’s finding that defense counsel’s peremptory strikes against women reflected purposeful discrimination. It relied on:

• the pattern: defendant used a large majority of peremptories to strike women across two panels;
• comparative juror analysis: women were struck for “background” or “failure to provide information,” while similarly situated men were not;
• the prosecutor’s representation that she overheard counsel state he intended to exclude women—an assertion counsel did not deny;
• strong appellate deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations at Batson step three.

F. Sentencing: mandatory consecutive terms absent mitigating circumstances

Because defendant committed the violent felony of making a terroristic threat while released on recognizance on the false-reporting case, the Court emphasized Penal Law § 70.25(2-b): consecutive incarceration terms are mandatory unless “mitigating circumstances affecting the manner” of commission justify concurrent terms in the interest of justice. The Court found no abuse of discretion in refusing concurrency despite mental-health arguments. After reversal of one count, the remaining aggregate sentence (7½ years plus 5 years PRS) was not unduly harsh or severe.

3.3 Impact

• Sharper boundary for Penal Law § 490.20 intent in social-media cases:
  The decision signals that when a threatening statement is made in a private communication and later circulated by others, the prosecution may need proof that the defendant intended intimidation of a broader audience (or intended/encouraged dissemination) to satisfy the “civilian population” intent element.
• Direct-to-institution threats are easier to characterize as “terroristic”:
  Threats sent to an organization’s general address—especially with retaliatory motive and operational detail—can support both the intimidation intent and the reasonableness of fear of imminence, even if the defendant includes disclaimers about not acting.
• False reporting liability remains robust for anonymous “bomb” posts tied to a location:
  The Court treated the platform’s geographic feature, the public nature of the targets, and actual police response as reinforcing the statute’s public-alarm/inconvenience purpose.
• Reverse Batson enforcement:
  The opinion reinforces that gender-based exclusion by the defense is policed with the same rigor as race-based challenges by the prosecution, with comparative-juror analysis and credibility findings often dispositive on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence:
  “Legal sufficiency” asks whether, viewing the proof most favorably to the People, any rational jury could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. “Weight of the evidence” is broader: the appellate court looks neutrally at the record and decides whether the verdict is supported by the overall credible proof, while still deferring to jury credibility assessments.
• Terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20):
  Not merely a scary statement. The statute requires a threat of a listed serious crime plus specific intent (e.g., to intimidate/coerce a civilian population) and that the threat causes a reasonable fear of imminent commission. Importantly, the law punishes the making of the threat; the prosecution need not prove the defendant truly planned to carry it out.
• False reporting in the first degree (Penal Law § 240.60[6]):
  Targets knowingly false/baseless warnings about fires/explosions/hazards in public places where people are likely present, under circumstances where public alarm or inconvenience is likely.
• Miranda custody:
  Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogation. Courts assess custody by asking whether a reasonable innocent person would feel free to leave, considering factors like location, restraints, tone, and whether questioning is accusatory.
• Reverse Batson:
  Batson prohibits discriminatory peremptory strikes. A “reverse Batson” is the People challenging the defense’s strikes. Courts apply a three-step test (prima facie case; neutral explanation; determination of pretext/purposeful discrimination).
• Mandatory consecutive sentencing (Penal Law § 70.25[2-b]):
  When a defendant commits a new violent felony while released (e.g., on recognizance) in another case, consecutive prison terms are generally required unless narrow, manner-of-commission mitigating circumstances justify concurrent terms.

5. Conclusion

People v. Rainey meaningfully clarifies how New York courts may evaluate “terroristic threat” intent in the social-media era: a threatening statement made in a private message—later reposted by others without proof the speaker sought that spread—may fail for lack of the statute’s civilian-population intimidation intent. By contrast, threats directed to an institution through its public-facing channels, especially when framed as retaliation and coupled with operational detail, can satisfy Penal Law § 490.20 even if the defendant disclaims actual intent to act.

The opinion also underscores the continued breadth of first-degree false reporting for bomb warnings tied to public locations, the deference given to suppression and Batson credibility findings, and the constraining effect of Penal Law § 70.25(2-b) on concurrent sentencing when a new violent felony occurs while a defendant is at liberty on a pending case.