Private Reporting to Police, Without Public Cooperation, Fails “Social Distinction” for a Particular Social Group

1. Introduction

In Raul Matos-Salazar v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. June 2, 2026) (not precedential), the Third Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection.

The lead petitioner, Raul Matos-Salazar, a citizen of Peru, sought asylum/withholding based on claimed persecution by organized criminals and framed his claim through three proposed “particular social groups” (PSGs), chiefly: “Peruvian nuclear families who report organized crime groups to the police.” The central legal issue on review was whether this proposed PSG is legally cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), particularly the “social distinction” requirement.

Separately, petitioner challenged denial of CAT relief, raising whether the record compelled a finding that he would more likely than not be tortured in Peru with required government involvement or acquiescence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit upheld the BIA’s conclusions:

  • Asylum/Withholding: The proposed PSG of families who report organized crime to police failed the social distinction requirement because the reporting/cooperation was not public and thus did not create a group perceived by Peruvian society as distinct. Because the PSG was not cognizable, asylum failed, and withholding necessarily failed as well.
  • CAT: The evidence did not compel a finding that petitioner was more likely than not to face “torture” as defined by regulation, nor that Peruvian officials would instigate, consent to, or acquiesce in such torture—especially given that petitioner filed a police report and police apparently arrested and incarcerated one perpetrator.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appellate posture and standards of review

  • Singh v. Att'y Gen., 839 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2016): Cited for the principle that the court reviews the BIA’s decision and also the IJ’s decision to the extent the BIA adopted it.
  • Sesay v. Att'y Gen., 787 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen., 781 F.3d 677 (3d Cir. 2015)): Cited to frame de novo review of legal determinations and substantial-evidence review of factual findings.
  • Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001): Reinforces the highly deferential substantial-evidence standard—agency findings stand unless the record compels the contrary conclusion.

2) Asylum vs. withholding burden

  • Gomez- Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008): Used for the familiar proposition that withholding imposes a higher burden than asylum; failure to meet asylum typically forecloses withholding.

3) PSG doctrine: the “social distinction” pivot

  • S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen., 894 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2018): Supplies the governing three-part PSG test: immutable characteristic, particularity, and social distinction. The opinion draws specifically on S.E.R.L.’s formulation that a group cannot be defined by persecutory conduct alone.
  • Radiowala v. Att'y Gen., 930 F.3d 577 (3d Cir. 2019): This is the decision’s doctrinal anchor. It is cited for: (i) the content of the social distinction inquiry (societal perception of separateness); (ii) the “public” nature of cooperation as a marker of societal recognition; and (iii) the prohibition that “persecutory conduct alone cannot define a group.” The panel applies Radiowala to treat private or non-public informing as insufficiently socially distinct.
  • Guzman Orellana v. Attorney General, 956 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2020): Invoked by petitioners, but distinguished: it involved “witnesses who have publicly provided assistance to law enforcement” (e.g., public cooperation like open court testimony), which “lends itself to societal recognition.” The court accepts the BIA’s view that petitioner’s non-public cooperation places him outside that rationale.
  • Ngugi v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2016): Cited as persuasive support: a “witnesses” group was rejected where there was no evidence of public testimony or public proceedings, aligning with the Third Circuit’s emphasis on publicity as relevant to social distinction.
  • DeLeon-Ochoa v. Att'y Gen., 622 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2010): Cited for the petitioner’s burden on review: the evidence must compel reversal, not merely support an alternative interpretation.

4) CAT standards: torture severity and state action

  • Quinteros v. Att'y Gen., 945 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2019): Provides the two CAT elements used by the court: (1) likelihood of torture; and (2) public officials’ commission or acquiescence.
  • Galeas Figueroa v. Att'y Gen., 998 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2021): Supports the regulatory understanding that torture is an “extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment” involving “severe pain or suffering.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1) PSG “social distinction” turns on societal visibility, not merely persecutor awareness

The court’s decisive move is to treat the proposed PSG—families who report organized crime to police—as lacking social distinction because petitioner did not show that Peruvian society would perceive such individuals as a distinct group. The panel adopts the BIA’s reasoning that the cooperation/reporting was not public, and therefore does not “lend itself to societal recognition” in the way public testimony or widely known assistance might.

Importantly, the opinion reinforces that a group is not socially distinct merely because criminals may suspect someone informed on them. Echoing Radiowala v. Att'y Gen., the court treats “indistinguishable from the general public” as fatal absent evidence of broader social perception.

2) Distinguishing “public witnesses” cases

Petitioners relied on Guzman Orellana v. Attorney General, but the court frames it as a “public assistance” case. The BIA’s distinction—that non-public cooperation “suggests that the proposed group is not cognizable”—is accepted as consistent with Third Circuit precedent. The court also underscores that disclosure of informant status to persecutors (as opposed to society at large) “does not change the analysis,” borrowing directly from Radiowala v. Att'y Gen.

3) Rejecting PSGs defined by risk or harm

The court also forecloses an alternative framing—people targeted for willingness to speak truth at great risk—because it is effectively defined by the harm or threatened harm itself. Consistent with S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen. and Radiowala v. Att'y Gen., “persecutory conduct alone cannot define a group.”

4) Withholding falls with asylum

After concluding the PSG is not cognizable, the court treats asylum as unavailable and, under Gomez- Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., withholding necessarily fails because it requires a higher likelihood of persecution.

5) CAT: no compelled finding of torture or governmental acquiescence

On CAT, the panel applies Quinteros v. Att'y Gen. and the regulatory torture definition (as elaborated in Galeas Figueroa v. Att'y Gen.) to conclude the record did not compel the required findings. The court highlights factual points adopted by the BIA: a single robbery, lack of subsequent threats or communications, and absence of direct evidence that petitioner is currently targeted.

On state action/acquiescence, the court points to evidence inconsistent with official tolerance: petitioner filed a police report, left shortly thereafter without follow-up, and police reportedly arrested and incarcerated a perpetrator—undermining the claim that officials would consent to or acquiesce in torture.

C. Impact

Even as a non-precedential decision, the opinion consolidates a practical rule within the Third Circuit’s PSG framework: private reporting to police (or non-public cooperation) is generally insufficient to establish “social distinction,” particularly where the only “distinctiveness” is inferred from criminal suspicion rather than broader societal perception.

For practitioners, the decision signals that PSGs tied to “reporting” or “informing” must be supported by evidence that the cooperation is publicly recognizable (or otherwise socially legible) in the country of origin—through country conditions, expert testimony, social labeling, media attention, formal witness programs, or other mechanisms demonstrating societal recognition beyond the persecutor’s awareness.

For CAT claims, the case illustrates the evidentiary significance of responsive police action (e.g., an arrest) in rebutting allegations of governmental acquiescence, and the difficulty of meeting the “more likely than not” standard when harm is speculative or episodic.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Particular Social Group (PSG): A protected category under asylum law. To qualify, the group must be defined in a way the law recognizes, not just as a collection of people at risk.
  • Social distinction: The key concept here. It asks whether the society in the home country would view the proposed group as a distinct social unit—not whether criminals can identify or suspect an individual.
  • “Persecutory conduct alone cannot define a group”: You cannot define a PSG as “people targeted by gangs” or “people threatened for reporting” if the defining feature is the harm itself. The group must exist independently of the persecution.
  • Nexus: The requirement that persecution be “on account of” a protected ground. The court did not need to reach this issue after rejecting the PSG, but noted timing issues that would undermine nexus.
  • CAT acquiescence: For CAT, it is not enough that criminals may harm someone; the applicant must show officials would likely participate in, consent to, or turn a blind eye (in a legally meaningful way) to the torture.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms denials of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief where the applicant’s principal PSG—families who report organized crime to police—lacked social distinction because the cooperation was not public and therefore not shown to be societally recognized as a distinct group. The opinion reinforces the Third Circuit’s existing PSG framework, particularly the line drawn in Radiowala v. Att'y Gen. between publicly visible cooperation (more likely to support social distinction) and private reporting (generally insufficient without additional proof of societal perception). On CAT, it underscores the demanding “more likely than not” standard and the centrality of evidence of governmental acquiescence.