Previously Admitted Adjustment Applicants Must Prove Admissibility by a Preponderance of the Evidence

Case: Sintia Nivar Santana v. Todd Blanche, No. 22-2114
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided: November 2, 2026
Opinion: Published, unanimous opinion by Judge Thacker, joined by Judges King and Heytens.

1. Introduction

This decision addresses the evidentiary burden governing admissibility when a previously admitted noncitizen seeks adjustment of status during removal proceedings. The Fourth Circuit holds that an applicant in that position must establish admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, not “clearly and beyond doubt.” Its central distinction is between demonstrating eligibility for admission and actually being an “applicant for admission” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Sintia Dines Nivar Santana, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States with a visitor visa in 2000 and remained after her authorized stay expired. Her son later became a United States citizen through honorable Army service and sponsored her application for permanent residence.

The dispute arose from a 2013 employment eligibility form containing a checked box asserting United States citizenship. Immigration authorities denied Santana’s initial adjustment application because of that representation. After she was placed in removal proceedings, she conceded removability for overstaying her visa but renewed her adjustment application.

The immigration judge (IJ) found the evidence inconclusive about who checked the citizenship box. Applying the “clearly and beyond doubt” standard, the IJ denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and the Fourth Circuit initially upheld that determination through deference to the agency’s interpretation. Following Supreme Court vacatur and remand, the court reconsidered the question without that deference.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit granted Santana’s petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. Its decision rests on four conclusions:

  1. Judicial interpretation controls. Under Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, courts must independently determine the meaning of the relevant immigration statutes.
  2. Previously admitted adjustment applicants are not automatically applicants for admission. Seeking permanent residence does not itself amount to seeking a new physical entry into the United States.
  3. The ordinary relief-stage burden applies. For applicants in Santana’s position, admissibility is an eligibility requirement to be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
  4. The contrary statement in an earlier circuit decision was dicta. Dakura v. Holder did not bind the panel on the standard-of-proof question because that question was unnecessary to its outcome.

The court did not decide that Santana had established admissibility or that her adjustment application must be granted. It held that the agency evaluated her application under the wrong evidentiary standard.

3. The Evidentiary and Procedural Background

The employment form was central because a false claim to United States citizenship can render an adjustment applicant inadmissible. Yet the evidence did not conclusively establish who made the disputed checkmark.

  • Santana’s account: Her affidavit initially stated that she did not recognize the form as something she had read or signed. At the hearing, she recognized her handwriting and acknowledged completing the top portion, but testified that she did not remember checking the citizenship box.
  • The administrator’s testimony: Kathy DeVeau recognized handwriting belonging to herself and her supervisor on different portions of the form. She believed the supervisor probably checked the box because she had seen the supervisor do so on other documents. DeVeau also testified that Santana had disclosed that she was not a citizen.
  • The supervisor’s letter: Jan Hamilton denied checking the box and suggested that DeVeau might have done so. Nevertheless, Hamilton stated that she would be surprised if Santana knowingly claimed citizenship, describing Santana as honest and noting that she had never claimed to be a citizen.

Neither party submitted the form before the evidentiary hearing, despite the IJ’s filing deadline. The Department of Homeland Security produced it during the hearing, and the IJ admitted it over Santana’s authenticity objection. The BIA later upheld that ruling as fundamentally fair.

Both agency decisions emphasized the uncertainty surrounding the checkmark. Because no witness definitively identified its author, the agency concluded that Santana had not established admissibility clearly and beyond doubt. That reasoning made the applicable burden especially consequential: uncertainty that defeats a demanding standard may not defeat proof by a preponderance.

4. Analysis

A. Legal Reasoning: Admissibility Is Not the Same as Admission

The statutory definitions govern

The court begins with Congress’s definitions rather than the agency’s longstanding analogy between adjustment applicants and people seeking entry at the border.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), “admission” and “admitted” concern lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. Section 1101(a)(4) likewise distinguishes an application for admission into the country from an application for a visa.

Section 1225(a)(1), in turn, identifies two categories of applicants for admission: noncitizens present in the United States who have not been admitted, and noncitizens arriving in the United States. Santana fell into neither category. She had already been inspected and admitted, and she was applying for adjustment from within the country rather than seeking entry after crossing the border.

Her overstay established removability, but it did not erase the historical fact of her admission. That distinction is essential: unlawful presence following a lawful admission does not automatically convert the person into someone who has never been admitted.

The two stages of removal proceedings serve different purposes

The opinion separates the determination of removability from the later adjudication of relief:

  1. Stage one: The IJ determines whether the noncitizen is removable. Different burdens apply depending on the person’s admission status and the statutory basis for removal.
  2. Stage two: If removability is established or conceded, the noncitizen may seek relief and must establish the requirements for the particular remedy requested.

Santana conceded removability at stage one. Her adjustment application therefore presented a stage-two eligibility question. Section 1229a(c)(4) places the burden of proving eligibility for relief on the applicant; the court identifies 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) as supplying the applicable preponderance standard.

By contrast, the heightened standard in § 1229a(c)(2)(A) applies to an “applicant for admission.” The agency could not import that standard merely because adjustment requires an applicant to demonstrate admissibility.

Section 1255 does not transform adjustment into entry

The government’s position drew support from adjustment terminology: § 1255(a) requires an applicant to be “admissible,” and § 1255(b) directs the recording of a “lawful admission for permanent residence.” The court acknowledges that these phrases might suggest equivalence when read in isolation.

Read within the statutory scheme, however, they do not override the defined meaning of admission. An applicant can possess the qualifications necessary for admission without presently seeking to enter the country. The recording of permanent-resident status likewise does not turn an adjustment proceeding into a new border crossing.

The resulting rule is narrower than a universal rule for all adjustment applicants: a previously admitted applicant in Santana’s position must establish present admissibility under § 1182 by a preponderance of the evidence.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Administrative deference and independent judicial review

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

The Fourth Circuit’s earlier decision deferred to the BIA’s treatment of adjustment applicants as analogous to applicants for admission. Under the former Chevron framework, a permissible agency construction of an ambiguous statute could control. That framework explains why the court originally accepted the agency’s heightened burden.

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)

This decision supplied the governing method on remand: the reviewing court, rather than the agency, must resolve legal questions and interpret statutory provisions. The Fourth Circuit consequently sought the best reading of the INA instead of asking whether the BIA’s interpretation was permissible. Loper Bright changed the analytical framework; the immigration statutes, regulations, and relevant precedent supplied the substantive answer.

Santana v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 1042 (2025)

This was the Supreme Court’s order vacating the Fourth Circuit’s earlier judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of Loper Bright. It reopened the legal question but did not itself determine the proper burden of proof.

Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2021)

The court cites this case for de novo review of whether the IJ and BIA applied the correct legal standard. It confirms that identifying the governing burden is a legal question, distinct from evaluating the underlying evidence.

Statutory definitions and the distinction between admission and adjustment

Lopez Garcia v. Guadian, 2026 WL 2661092 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 2026)

This recent circuit precedent provides two important propositions: statutory definitions must be respected, and “applicants for admission” is a term of art understood through § 1225(a)(1). It supplies a direct doctrinal basis for classifying Santana by statutory category rather than agency analogy.

Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 59 (2024)

Quoted through Lopez Garcia, this decision establishes the interpretive principle that courts must use Congress’s chosen definition when Congress defines a statutory term. Its role is methodological rather than immigration-specific.

Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012)

Bracamontes explains that “admission” and “admitted” contemplate an authorized physical border crossing, not adjustment of status. It therefore undermines the premise that seeking adjustment necessarily means seeking admission.

Azumah v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 107 F.4th 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2024)

Azumah distinguishes the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” from admission in the statutory entry sense. It helps explain why the language recording permanent residence under § 1255(b) does not determine whether someone is an applicant for admission.

Aremu v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 450 F.3d 578 (4th Cir. 2006)

Aremu supplies the opinion’s central conceptual distinction: being admissible means possessing the qualifications for admission; it does not mean an admission is occurring. It also held that, for a previously admitted noncitizen, adjustment does not constitute a new admission date. The court uses this reasoning to separate Santana’s eligibility showing from the classification that triggers the heightened burden.

Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020)

The court cites this decision in identifying the two statutory categories of applicants for admission. It supports the categorical analysis under § 1225(a)(1), rather than extending that label to everyone required to establish admissibility.

Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 609 U.S. 258, 268 (2026)

Cited in a footnote, this decision explains that a person “arrives in the United States” upon crossing the border. It reinforces why Santana’s domestic adjustment application does not place her within the arriving-person category.

The assimilation approach and its limits

Crocock v. Holder, 670 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 2012)

The IJ relied on Crocock’s characterization of an adjustment applicant as occupying the position of someone applying for admission. It represents the analogy underlying the agency’s application of the heightened burden. The Fourth Circuit’s independent statutory analysis rejects that analogy as controlling for Santana.

Matter of Bett, 26 I&N Dec. 437, 440 (BIA 2014)

The BIA cited this agency precedent to support requiring adjustment applicants to establish admissibility clearly and beyond doubt. The present opinion displaces that approach for previously admitted applicants within the decision’s scope: longstanding administrative practice cannot substitute for the best reading of the governing law.

Hashmi v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 2008)

Hashmi appears within the opinion’s quotation from Dakura. It describes adjustment applicants as similarly situated to people seeking entry. Its significance is as background support for Dakura’s burden statement, not as binding authority requiring the Fourth Circuit to adopt that statement.

Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994 (4th Cir. 2014)

Dakura was the government’s principal stare decisis argument. It stated that adjustment applicants must establish admissibility clearly and beyond doubt, but the applicant there admitted making the citizenship claim. The dispute concerned the legal effect of that claim, including arguments involving another person’s identity, lack of access to wages, and duress.

Because the underlying representation was undisputed, choosing between evidentiary standards would not have changed the outcome. The present panel therefore treats the burden statement as dicta while leaving Dakura’s substantive false-claim holding intact.

Distinguishing binding holdings from dicta

United States v. Horsley, 105 F.4th 193, 212 (4th Cir. 2024)

Horsley defines dictum as a statement that could be removed without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding. Applied here, Dakura’s burden statement was unnecessary because the citizenship claim was conceded.

Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 654–55 (4th Cir. 2021)

Payne explains both why peripheral statements may receive less consideration and why reasoning necessary to an outcome remains binding. It allows the panel to distinguish Dakura without purporting to overrule a controlling circuit holding.

C. Application to Santana’s Evidence

The agency’s repeated reliance on an “inconclusive” record demonstrates why the error mattered. Proof that leaves some doubt can still establish that one account is more likely than another. Testimony that Santana disclosed her noncitizenship, evidence that several employees completed parts of the form, and disagreement about who checked the box must therefore be evaluated under the correct threshold.

Nevertheless, a lower burden is not the absence of a burden. If the evidence remains evenly balanced, Santana has not established her position by a preponderance. Nor did the court resolve the credibility implications of her differing descriptions of the form.

The remand concerned a single legal issue. The opinion does not independently reverse the admission of the employment form, determine who checked the box, or announce a new rule concerning knowledge or intent under the false-claim bar.

D. Potential Impact

  • A lower evidentiary threshold: Previously admitted applicants seeking adjustment in removal proceedings within the Fourth Circuit should no longer face the heightened admissibility burden solely because they seek permanent residence.
  • Greater importance for circumstantial evidence: Cases involving disputed forms or incomplete records may have different outcomes when evidence need only tip the balance.
  • Sharper separation of statutory categories: The decision discourages treating substantive eligibility for admission as equivalent to applicant-for-admission status.
  • A practical illustration of post-Loper Bright review: Courts must independently test administrative interpretations against statutory definitions, structure, and applicable regulations.
  • Careful treatment of earlier precedent: The opinion demonstrates that a prior statement of a legal standard is not necessarily binding when the earlier case did not require its resolution.

The limits are equally important. The court does not decide the burden for every category of adjustment applicant, eliminate the false-citizenship ground of inadmissibility, or guarantee discretionary relief. Its decision also does not overrule decisions of other circuits or establish that every earlier judgment involving Chevron deference must be reopened.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjustment of status
A process allowing an eligible person already in the United States to obtain lawful permanent residence without completing that process through a new entry from abroad.
Admission versus admissibility
Admission is the legally authorized entry event. Admissibility concerns whether a person satisfies the legal qualifications for admission. The latter can be assessed without a new entry occurring.
Preponderance of the evidence
The applicant must show that the relevant proposition is more likely true than not. An evenly balanced record is insufficient.
“Clearly and beyond doubt”
A more demanding immigration-law standard applicable to specified applicants for admission. It should not be confused with the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
De novo review
The appellate court independently decides the legal question rather than deferring to the agency’s answer.
Dicta
Judicial statements unnecessary to deciding a case. They may be informative, but they do not bind later panels as holdings do.
Remand
Returning the matter for further proceedings under the correct legal rule—not granting the requested immigration status outright.

6. Conclusion

The opinion rejects the assumption that seeking adjustment of status automatically makes a previously admitted noncitizen an applicant for admission. For applicants in Santana’s position, admissibility must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Its broader significance lies in combining independent statutory interpretation after Loper Bright with careful attention to the limits of precedent. Santana receives reconsideration under the correct burden—not a determination that she is admissible or entitled to permanent residence.