Preserving Disability Appeals and Reviewing RFC Findings for Substantial Evidence

Case: Maxfield v. Bisignano
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Decided: October 22, 2026
Case number: 25-4136

Precedential status: This order and judgment expressly states that it is not binding precedent, except under law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited for persuasive value under the applicable federal and circuit rules. Its significance lies in applying existing law, rather than establishing a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

In Maxfield v. Bisignano, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of disability-insurance benefits to Charity Maxfield, a self-represented claimant. The appeal concerned both the procedural requirements for obtaining appellate review and the substantive standards governing an administrative law judge’s assessment of symptoms and medical opinions.

Maxfield initially claimed disability arising from neck and back problems, tinnitus, incontinence, and a cyst. After the Social Security Administration denied her application initially and on reconsideration, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing. The ALJ identified several severe impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, pulsatile tinnitus, urinary incontinence, inflammatory arthritis, and bilateral shoulder bursitis.

Nevertheless, the ALJ found that Maxfield retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work subject to restrictions. At the fifth step of the disability evaluation, the ALJ identified work she could perform as a router, deli cutter, and information clerk. The Appeals Council declined review, and the district court upheld the denial.

On appeal against Commissioner Frank Bisignano, Maxfield presented seven broad issues. The court limited its consideration to arguments properly preserved and developed, principally whether the ALJ adequately accounted for her tinnitus and properly evaluated certain medical providers’ opinions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and affirmed the district court’s judgment. Its analysis had three principal components:

  1. Appellate preservation: Arguments not presented to the district court would not be considered without an adequately developed request for plain-error review. Maxfield’s cursory reference to plain error in her reply brief was insufficient.
  2. Tinnitus and RFC: Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment. The ALJ had discussed Maxfield’s reported symptoms, diagnostic testing, specialist evaluations, treatment response, and the relevant state-agency assessment before restricting her exposure to noise.
  3. Medical opinions: Maxfield did not establish reversible error in the treatment of Dr. Howard Reichman’s or physician assistant Mark Udy’s opinions. Statements that a claimant is disabled concern an issue reserved to the Commissioner, while functional assessments are evaluated for their evidentiary support and consistency with the record.

The court separately declined to consider an abandoned argument about quiet environments and an inadequately developed challenge concerning a physical therapist’s functional capacity evaluation.

3. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Judicial review does not permit a fresh weighing of disability evidence

The court began with the familiar distinction between reviewing an administrative decision and deciding disability anew. Judicial review asks whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports the factual findings.

Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support the conclusion. It does not require the court to regard the agency’s interpretation as the only possible reading of the record. Conversely, deference to factual findings does not excuse the application of an incorrect legal standard.

This framework shaped both substantive issues. Maxfield’s disagreement with the ALJ’s conclusions did not, without an identified legal or evidentiary defect, authorize the court to substitute its own assessment of her symptoms or providers’ opinions.

B. Preservation restricted the scope of the appeal

The court distinguished the seven broad issues presented on appeal from the narrower arguments made in the district court. There, Maxfield had challenged the ALJ’s treatment of tinnitus in the RFC assessment and the evaluation of her providers’ opinions.

New arguments or theories ordinarily are forfeited unless the appellant demonstrates plain error. Maxfield did not request that review in her opening brief. Her reply brief mentioned plain error only cursorily, without applying its demanding requirements. The court declined to construct that argument itself, emphasizing the absence of adversarial briefing and an opportunity for the Commissioner to respond.

This was a rule about preserving issues between the district court and the court of appeals. It was not a ruling about administrative issue exhaustion before the Social Security Administration. Nor did a general challenge to “medical opinions” necessarily preserve every provider-specific argument later advanced.

The court also applied a distinct briefing rule to issues that were abandoned or insufficiently developed on appeal:

  • Maxfield had argued in district court that quiet surroundings worsened her tinnitus and that the noise restriction could therefore aggravate her condition. Because she did not pursue that theory on appeal, the court did not decide it.
  • She mentioned physical therapist Dell Felix’s functional capacity evaluation but offered only a brief assertion that the ALJ had disregarded objective testing. Without a developed argument, that issue was waived.

Maxfield’s self-represented status did not exempt her from these requirements. The practical consequence was substantial: several potential objections never reached merits review.

C. The tinnitus assessment rested on a documented evidentiary explanation

Maxfield argued that the RFC failed to accommodate concentration and task-persistence difficulties caused by tinnitus. She also asserted that the ALJ had not evaluated the intensity and persistence of her symptoms.

The court rejected that characterization because the ALJ had expressly recounted her descriptions. These included constant beating or whooshing sounds, dizziness, nausea, visual disturbances, impaired concentration, sleep difficulty, and severe psychological distress. The ALJ therefore had not simply overlooked the alleged consequences of the condition.

The central question was whether the ALJ adequately explained why those allegations did not establish greater functional restrictions. The court relied on the ALJ’s extensive discussion of:

  • Emergency evaluation shortly after the reported onset of symptoms in July 2020, including an unremarkable examination and no acute vascular abnormalities on CT imaging;
  • Essentially normal ENT evaluation, audiogram, and brain and head MRI/MRA findings;
  • A vascular consultation identifying no explanatory arterial pathology;
  • Reports that medication relieved tinnitus-associated discomfort and improved functioning;
  • A May 2021 finding of a high-riding left jugular bulb, described as often associated with left tinnitus, followed by later imaging showing no change and no jugular bulb dehiscence;
  • A neurologist’s suggestion that sleep apnea might explain much of the symptom presentation, possibly including tinnitus; and
  • A state-agency consultant’s recommendation to avoid concentrated exposure to very loud noise.

The ALJ imposed a restriction requiring Maxfield to avoid even moderate noise exposure—a more protective noise limitation than the consultant had recommended. Considering the evidence discussed, the court concluded that the RFC had substantial evidentiary support.

The decision should not be read as holding that normal imaging or hearing tests disprove tinnitus. The ALJ recognized tinnitus as a severe impairment and imposed a related restriction. The court instead upheld the ALJ’s assessment of the condition’s claimed functional consequences on this particular record.

Likewise, the opinion does not establish that noise restrictions necessarily address every concentration problem associated with tinnitus. Its conclusion depended on the evidence supporting the ALJ’s refusal to adopt additional restrictions. Whether a quieter environment would worsen Maxfield’s symptoms remained undecided because she abandoned that argument on appeal.

The opinion also recounted that Maxfield apparently did not pursue a suggested psychological evaluation. It did not announce a separate rule permitting denial of benefits merely because a claimant fails to obtain such an evaluation.

D. Medical evidence must be classified before its persuasive value is assessed

The court’s medical-opinion analysis distinguished three categories that can appear together in a provider’s report:

  1. Functional opinions: Statements about what the claimant can still do and the impairment-related restrictions she experiences.
  2. Medical descriptions and prognoses: Judgments about the nature, severity, or expected course of an impairment, which are not themselves “medical opinions” under the regulation discussed.
  3. Conclusions reserved to the Commissioner: Statements that the claimant is disabled or unable to work within the meaning of the benefits program.

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c), the five factors for evaluating medical opinions are supportability, consistency, the source’s relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other relevant considerations, including familiarity with the claim’s evidence. The court’s application focused on supportability and consistency.

Dr. Howard Reichman

Dr. Reichman stated that Maxfield was disabled and unable to perform work of any kind. He also assessed extensive functional restrictions, including limited sitting, standing, and fingering, and permanent restrictions on numerous other activities. The ALJ found his opinion unpersuasive.

On appeal, Maxfield maintained that his opinions supported disability and had been undervalued. The court treated an invitation to assign them greater weight as an impermissible request to reweigh evidence. It also rejected any contention that his conclusion of disability should control: that determination belongs to the Commissioner.

A critical limit follows. The rule concerning reserved issues does not transform all functional limitations on the same form into nonmedical conclusions. Specific sitting, standing, lifting, or other restrictions remain analytically distinct from the statement “disabled.” The court did not hold otherwise; it concluded that Maxfield had failed to demonstrate error in the ALJ’s evaluation.

Physician assistant Mark Udy

Udy supplied both a “poor” prognosis and specific limitations: lifting up to ten pounds, standing or walking for two hours, and sitting for two to four hours during an eight-hour workday. Maxfield argued that the ALJ failed to address the opinion’s consistency with her pain records.

The court found that the ALJ had addressed precisely that issue. Udy’s own notes reported that opioid therapy provided reasonable or adequate pain relief and enabled greater activity and functioning. The ALJ also considered similar reports over time and the broader clinical record.

That explanation implicated two different factors:

  • Supportability: Whether Udy’s own findings and treatment documentation supported the restrictions he assessed.
  • Consistency: Whether those restrictions agreed with evidence from other treating providers and the longitudinal record.

The court upheld the ALJ’s explanation under the governing regulation. It separately held that the “poor” prognosis was not itself a medical opinion under the regulatory definition.

The ALJ’s description of the treatment as “fairly conservative” was part of the record-specific reasoning recounted by the court. The opinion does not establish that opioid treatment is categorically conservative, nor that pain relief alone proves an ability to work. Its reasoning rests on the combined treatment and functional evidence.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009)

The court cited this case to explain the agency’s five-step disability evaluation. Its role was structural: it situated the ALJ’s decision at step five, where the inquiry concerns the claimant’s ability to perform other work given the relevant limitations and vocational circumstances. The appeal did not establish a new interpretation of that process.

Staheli v. Comm'r, SSA, 84 F.4th 901 (10th Cir. 2023)

This was the opinion’s principal authority on several substantive points. It supplied the standard of judicial review, distinguished regulatory medical opinions from descriptions of impairment severity and prognosis, and confirmed that disability determinations are reserved to the Commissioner. Its applications to Reichman and Udy demonstrate why a court must classify a provider’s statements before deciding what evaluation the regulations require.

Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2016)

This precedent establishes that reviewing courts may not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for the ALJ’s. It governed the appeal generally and specifically defeated Maxfield’s request to give Reichman’s views greater weight without demonstrating a reviewable error. Its function was to separate a permissible challenge to the decision-making process from simple disagreement with the result.

Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2011)

This case supplied the forfeiture framework for arguments first raised on appeal. The court relied on it both for the availability of plain-error review and for the consequence of failing to argue that standard and its application. It therefore determined which of Maxfield’s appellate theories could receive substantive consideration.

Platt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 960 F.3d 1264, 1273 (10th Cir. 2020)

This authority explained why the court would not independently develop a plain-error analysis. Doing so would bypass the adversarial process and deny the opposing party an adequate opportunity to address the issue. It reinforced that merely mentioning plain error in a reply brief is not a substitute for reasoned argument.

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)

The court cited this case for the requirement that self-represented litigants comply with the rules governing other litigants. Its influence was procedural rather than medical: Maxfield’s pro se status did not cure forfeiture or inadequate briefing, and the court did not assume the role of constructing her arguments.

In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1181 (10th Cir. 2023)

This precedent addressed appellate waiver through omission or inadequate argument in the opening brief. It supported the refusal to consider both the abandoned quiet-environment theory and the undeveloped challenge concerning Felix’s functional capacity evaluation. Unlike Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., its role concerned the adequacy of appellate presentation rather than initial presentation in district court.

Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010)

This case supplied the definition of substantial evidence. The court invoked it after reviewing the ALJ’s discussion of tinnitus to explain why the documented examinations, testing, treatment response, and consultant assessment adequately supported the RFC. It linked the evidentiary record to the deferential standard of review.

5. Potential Impact

Because the disposition is nonprecedential, its broader influence is persuasive. It nevertheless offers several practical lessons for disability litigation.

  • Preservation must be specific. A claimant should present each material theory to the district court and develop it adequately in the appellate opening brief. Broad issue headings do not necessarily preserve every supporting argument.
  • Symptom challenges should identify a concrete analytical gap. Where an ALJ has discussed reported symptoms and the relevant record, a successful challenge requires more than repeating the claimant’s account. It should identify overlooked evidence, an unsupported inference, a legal error, or an inadequately explained functional finding.
  • Medical-opinion challenges should distinguish statement types. A provider’s disability conclusion, prognosis, and functional assessment are not interchangeable. Arguments should address the regulatory treatment applicable to each.
  • Supportability and consistency require targeted analysis. The decision illustrates how treatment notes may undermine a source’s own assessed restrictions and how the wider record may independently bear on consistency.

The opinion does not resolve vocational questions about the identified occupations, establish a general RFC rule for tinnitus, or decide the merits of the functional capacity evaluation. Those matters fell outside the issues substantively resolved.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Residual functional capacity
The most a claimant can still do despite impairment-related limitations. A severe diagnosis does not, by itself, establish the extent of work-related restrictions.
Step five
The final stage of the sequential disability inquiry, addressing whether other work is available that the claimant can perform. Here, the ALJ identified three occupations.
Substantial evidence
Enough relevant evidence for a reasonable person to accept the finding. The reviewing court checks the agency’s decision rather than deciding the facts from scratch.
Forfeiture and waiver
In this opinion, forfeiture concerned arguments not raised in district court. Appellate waiver concerned arguments omitted from, or inadequately developed in, appellate briefing.
Plain-error review
A demanding route for seeking review of an unpreserved argument. The court did not undertake that analysis because Maxfield failed to develop it.
Supportability and consistency
Supportability looks to the source’s own evidence and explanation. Consistency compares the opinion with the remaining record.
Issue reserved to the Commissioner
A legal or administrative conclusion, such as whether a claimant is disabled under the program. A provider’s statement on that ultimate question does not control the agency.
Nonprecedential disposition
A decision that may persuade other courts but does not ordinarily bind them. The stated exceptions concern its effect within the same litigation or through claim- and issue-preclusion principles.

7. Conclusion

Maxfield v. Bisignano reinforces established limits on disability appeals: arguments must be preserved and developed, factual disagreements do not authorize judicial reweighing, and medical-source statements must be evaluated according to their regulatory character.

The affirmance rested on the combination of procedural defaults and an adequately explained administrative record. Its persuasive significance is therefore methodological, not categorical: it illustrates how courts review disability decisions without establishing that tinnitus cannot be disabling or that treating providers’ functional assessments may be disregarded without proper evaluation.