Pre-Chiaverini Qualified Immunity in the Sixth Circuit: If Any One Charge Had Probable Cause, a § 1983 Malicious-Prosecution Claim Fails

1. Introduction

In Phillip Atsas v. Matthew Bowen (6th Cir. June 11, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a school superintendent and a police officer after a teacher/coach, Phillip S. Atsas, was charged with multiple theft-related offenses stemming from parents’ payments connected to youth soccer. The criminal case quickly unraveled: felony counts were dismissed, most misdemeanors were dismissed during trial, and a jury acquitted on the remainder.

Atsas then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio tort law. On appeal, the key issues were: (i) whether Atsas could revive a federal malicious-prosecution claim against Superintendent Matthew L. Bowen and Officer Ryan Young; (ii) whether the City could face Monell liability; and (iii) whether Bowen/CCSD committed Ohio abuse of process.

The most consequential aspect of the opinion is its qualified-immunity holding: for conduct predating the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Chiaverini, the Sixth Circuit treated it as not “clearly established” that a plaintiff may proceed on a malicious-prosecution theory when some charges lacked probable cause but at least one charge had probable cause.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Malicious prosecution (§ 1983): The panel acknowledged the district court erred by not doing a charge-by-charge probable-cause analysis (as later required by Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon), but held the claim still fails at qualified immunity step two under Howell v. McCormick. Because probable cause existed for at least some charges, Bowen and Young were immune.
  • Monell: Atsas’s municipal-liability theory depended on an underlying malicious-prosecution violation. With the individual claim failing, the City claim failed too.
  • Abuse of process (Ohio): Atsas could not point to an improper act taken during the criminal process (as opposed to initiating it or making statements to media). Summary judgment was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning is built from three clusters of precedent: (i) appellate/summary-judgment standards; (ii) § 1983 malicious-prosecution and probable-cause doctrine, including the post-2024 “charge-by-charge” requirement; and (iii) municipal liability and Ohio abuse-of-process limits.

A. Summary judgment and review framework

  • Howell v. McCormick, 148 F.4th 834 (6th Cir. 2025): cited for de novo summary-judgment review and, critically, for the “not clearly established” holding discussed below.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): governs summary judgment.
  • Petsche v. Hruby, 172 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2026) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): viewing evidence and drawing reasonable inferences for the nonmovant; “genuine dispute” standard.

B. Qualified immunity and “clearly established” law

  • Tanner v. Walters, 98 F.4th 726 (6th Cir. 2024) and Alford v. Deffendoll, 165 F.4th 490 (6th Cir. 2026): the familiar two-step qualified-immunity inquiry and flexibility in ordering the steps.
  • District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018): “substantial chance”/probability language in probable cause; also used for clearly-established standards.
  • Hodges v. Abram, 138 F.4th 980 (6th Cir. 2025) and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011): “beyond debate” articulation of clearly established law.
  • Rasawehr v. Grey, No. 24-3322, 2025 WL 1639164 (6th Cir. June 10, 2025): supports resolving the appeal on qualified-immunity step two without remand.

C. Malicious prosecution, probable cause, and the multi-charge problem

  • France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016) and Tanner v. Walters: supply the four elements of a Sixth Circuit Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim.
  • Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) and Clark v. Abdallah, 131 F.4th 432 (6th Cir. 2025): define probable cause as “reasonably trustworthy information” sufficient for a prudent person.
  • Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024): rejected the Sixth Circuit’s former categorical approach and required courts to analyze probable cause charge-by-charge. The panel faulted the district court for equating false-arrest and malicious-prosecution probable-cause analyses in ways inconsistent with Chiaverini.
  • Howell v. McCormick: the pivotal bridge between Chiaverini and qualified immunity. The panel treated Howell as binding that, before Chiaverini, it was not clearly established in the Sixth Circuit that a malicious-prosecution claim remains viable if some charges lack probable cause while others are supported by probable cause. Therefore, for pre-Chiaverini conduct, officials receive qualified immunity if any charge had probable cause.
  • Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999): eyewitness statements carry a presumption of reliability absent known reasons to doubt them.
  • Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 2000): distinguished—generic allegations about common property required more investigation; here, multiple parent statements plus contextual disciplinary history supported probable cause for at least some charges.
  • Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2007): used for the proposition that probable cause must be measured against elements of the charged state offenses.

D. Monell and municipal liability

  • Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): municipalities are liable only for constitutional violations caused by a municipal policy/custom.
  • Franklin v. Franklin County, 115 F.4th 461 (6th Cir. 2024); Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013); Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2005): set out recognized avenues to prove a municipal policy/custom.
  • Grote v. Kenton County, 85 F.4th 397 (6th Cir. 2023): acknowledged Monell liability can theoretically exist “qua municipality,” but this case did not fit that path because Atsas’s Monell theories hinged on the same failed malicious-prosecution claim.

E. Ohio abuse-of-process doctrine

  • Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., 626 N.E.2d 115 (Ohio 1994): sets the three elements and emphasizes no liability for merely carrying a proceeding to its authorized conclusion, even if motivated by malice.
  • Cox v. Oliver, 66 N.E.3d 1101 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) and Palivoda v. Felix, No. 2010-A-0017, 2011 WL 4790982 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011): plaintiff must identify an improper act during process plus ulterior motive.
  • Hershey v. Edelman, 932 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010): reinforces the “after process is set in motion” focus.
  • Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2016): applied similarly—plaintiff must show the process itself was perverted.

F. Issue preservation/abandonment

  • Berry v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 115 F.4th 528 (6th Cir. 2024): unappealed claims are abandoned.
  • Clemons v. Couch, 3 F.4th 897 (6th Cir. 2021) and Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship, 731 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2013): perfunctory briefing forfeits issues.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The panel’s “two-level” holding on malicious prosecution

The Sixth Circuit made two important moves:

  1. Merits/analytic correction: It flagged that the district court did not perform the Chiaverini-mandated “charge-by-charge” probable-cause analysis and improperly treated false-arrest and malicious-prosecution probable cause as identical. (It also noted the parties largely “whistle past” Chiaverini on appeal.)
  2. Qualified-immunity resolution: It nonetheless affirmed because the events occurred in 2019, before Chiaverini. Under Howell v. McCormick, the “charge-by-charge” approach was not clearly established in the Sixth Circuit at the time. Thus, if probable cause supported any charge, Bowen and Young were entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious-prosecution claim.

B. Why at least some charges had probable cause (as the panel framed it)

The court concluded probable cause supported charges tied to two parents (Zatezalo-Greene and Kolidakis), based on: (i) multiple parent statements indicating payment for school-affiliated/intramural soccer; (ii) background knowledge of Atsas’s prior fundraising discipline and directives not to handle money; and (iii) the specificity of those particular statements (including one that did not mention TCSC at all and another that referenced TCSC “through Campbell City Schools”).

The court acknowledged facts that “cast significant doubt” on probable cause for “many” charges—e.g., the officer’s failure to investigate TCSC, the refusal to consider offered exculpatory checks, and general investigatory gaps. But it held those concerns did not negate probable cause for the subset of charges grounded in the most specific statements coupled with relevant context.

C. Monell falls with the underlying theory as pleaded

Atsas’s Monell theories (final policymaker and failure to supervise) were presented as dependent on the alleged malicious prosecution by Bowen/Young. Once the malicious-prosecution claim failed, the panel held, the City could not be liable on those theories.

D. Ohio abuse of process requires an improper act “during” the proceeding

Even crediting an “ulterior purpose” theory (pressuring a “last chance agreement”/driving Atsas out), the panel held Atsas did not identify an improper act taken in the normal conduct of the criminal case. The cited materials—settlement-discussion email, Bowen memo, release of memo via public-records request, and post-trial media comments—were not acts “during the process” of prosecuting the criminal matter in the sense required by Yaklevich, Cox, and Hershey.

3.3. Impact

  • Pre-Chiaverini shield for multi-charge prosecutions (qualified immunity): The opinion operationalizes Howell v. McCormick—for conduct before Chiaverini, the Sixth Circuit will treat it as not clearly established that a plaintiff may succeed on a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim when at least one charge had probable cause. Practically, defendants can defeat pre-2024 claims by identifying any single charge with probable cause.
  • Post-Chiaverini litigation will be more charge-specific (but not necessarily this case): The court’s critique of the district court’s analysis reinforces that future cases should not conflate false-arrest and malicious-prosecution probable cause and should proceed charge-by-charge, consistent with Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon and Sixth Circuit cases like Alford v. Deffendoll.
  • Investigatory omissions may matter—but not always: The panel’s discussion signals that ignoring exculpatory leads (like third-party payment records) can undermine probable cause, but eyewitness statements (especially specific ones) remain powerful under Ahlers v. Schebil, particularly when corroborated by contextual facts (e.g., prior discipline).
  • Ohio abuse-of-process claims remain narrowly cabined: Plaintiffs must point to a concrete misuse of the proceeding after it begins, not merely alleged bad motives for initiating the case or reputational fallout from public statements.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A defense that protects officials from damages unless the plaintiff shows both (i) a constitutional violation and (ii) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time. Here, even if the district court’s probable-cause analysis was imperfect under later law, the decisive point was whether the relevant rule was clearly established in 2019.
  • Malicious prosecution under § 1983 (Fourth Amendment): A claim that the government caused a person to be prosecuted without probable cause, resulting in a liberty deprivation beyond the initial arrest, and ending favorably to the accused.
  • Probable cause: Not proof beyond a reasonable doubt—only enough reliable information to create a “substantial chance” that the person committed the offense.
  • Charge-by-charge probable cause: After Chiaverini, courts must evaluate whether each charge had probable cause; the presence of probable cause for one charge does not automatically validate all others. This opinion explains why that rule did not defeat qualified immunity for pre-Chiaverini conduct.
  • Monell claim: A way to sue a municipality, but only when a policy/custom (or similar municipal action) causes the constitutional violation—respondeat superior is not enough.
  • Abuse of process (Ohio): Not simply “they sued/prosecuted me for bad reasons.” It requires using the legal process in an improper way after it starts, to achieve a purpose the process was not designed for.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms summary judgment across the board, but its core doctrinal contribution is the qualified-immunity holding for pre-2024 conduct: under Howell v. McCormick, it was not clearly established (before Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon) that a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim could proceed when some charges lacked probable cause but at least one charge had probable cause. As a result, the court treated probable cause for a subset of charges as sufficient to defeat Atsas’s malicious-prosecution claim on qualified-immunity grounds, which in turn collapsed his Monell theories and left his Ohio abuse-of-process claim unable to satisfy the requirement of an improper act during the criminal proceeding itself.