PPP Fraud Sentencing: Loss “Detection” Occurs When the Lending Bank Flags/Feezes Accounts; Co‑Conspirator PPP Loans and SBA Fees Are Attributable for Loss and Restitution

1. Introduction

In United States v. Shelitha Robertson (11th Cir. June 5, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence of Shelitha Renee Robertson for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering arising from a large Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) scheme orchestrated during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The government alleged that Robertson and her close associate and attorney, Chandra Norton, submitted PPP applications for multiple entities controlled by Robertson (and additional entities controlled by Norton) that falsely claimed hundreds of employees and substantial payroll—despite most entities having no employees and being non-operational. Banks disbursed nearly $15 million before freezing accounts and investigating. Most funds were repaid, but the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) ultimately sustained a multi-million-dollar loss.

On appeal, Robertson challenged: (i) sufficiency of the evidence; (ii) a deliberate-ignorance jury instruction; (iii) evidentiary rulings (including lay vs. expert testimony and summary charts); and (iv) loss and restitution calculations—especially attribution of Norton’s loans and denial of credit for repayments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

  • The evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, including money laundering based on the purchase of a $128,000 diamond ring.
  • The deliberate-ignorance instruction was proper (and, alternatively, harmless because the jury was also instructed on actual knowledge).
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings: a co-conspirator could explain ambiguous recorded conversations; an SBA attorney could testify as a lay witness about PPP background and SBA processes; and summary charts were properly used as demonstrative aids (not admitted into evidence).
  • The loss amount properly included loans obtained by both Robertson and Norton as “jointly undertaken criminal activity,” and repayment after detection did not reduce loss.
  • Restitution properly held Robertson jointly and severally liable for the SBA’s loss, including lender processing fees and related SBA costs.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Sufficiency of the Evidence Framework

  • United States v. Godwin: Used for the appellate posture—reviewing trial evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict.”
  • United States v. Sosa and United States v. Wright: Provide the governing standard: a conviction stands unless “no rational trier of fact” could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Elements of Wire Fraud / Conspiracy and Proof of Intent

  • United States v. Rodriguez: States the two elements of wire fraud—participation in a scheme to defraud and use of interstate wires.
  • United States v. Maxwell: Defines materiality (a misstatement/omission with a tendency to influence a decisionmaker).
  • United States v. Bradley: Reinforces that intent to defraud is required.
  • United States v. Feldman: Supplies conspiracy-to-commit-wire-fraud elements (agreement, knowledge, voluntary participation).
  • United States v. Brown: Permits the jury to disbelieve a defendant’s testimony and infer the opposite.
  • United States v. Maurya: Supports using circumstantial indicators (e.g., receiving far more money than legitimate distributions would suggest) as evidence of knowing participation and fraudulent intent.
  • United States v. McCarrick: Distinguished; it limits inferring intent at the time of application where the only proof relates to later conduct. The court explained Robertson’s case contained abundant pre-application evidence of fraudulent planning and document fabrication.

Money Laundering Elements

  • United States v. Iriele: Provides the five elements for 18 U.S.C. § 1957 monetary-transaction money laundering; the court mapped trial evidence (ring purchase with PPP proceeds) onto those elements.

Deliberate Ignorance Instruction

  • United States v. Rivera: Sets the test—awareness of a high probability of a fact and purposeful contrivance to avoid learning it.
  • United States v. Arias (1993): Approves giving the instruction when evidence supports both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance.
  • United States v. Arias (2005): Notes that account activity can “put [a defendant] on notice of fraudulent activity,” supporting deliberate ignorance.
  • Steed and United States v. Hill: Establish harmlessness where the jury could alternatively convict on actual knowledge.

Evidentiary Rulings (Lay Opinion, Interpretation of Recordings, Summary Aids)

  • United States v. Perez-Oliveros and United States v. Jayyousi: Confirm abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings, including lay opinion.
  • United States v. Hawkins and United States v. Emmanuel: Caution against law-enforcement “interpretation” testimony that goes beyond code words and lacks firsthand participation. The court found those concerns absent because Norton participated in the calls and explained her own conversation.
  • United States v. Awan: Supports admitting a participant’s explanation of a conversation as Rule 701 lay opinion when based on firsthand perception.
  • United States v. Norton (1989): Supports permitting summary charts (as a general evidentiary tool), though here the charts ultimately were not admitted.
  • United States v. Milkiewicz: Cited to explain “pedagogical” demonstratives used to clarify complex evidence (the panel noted Rule 611(a)’s historical role).
  • United States v. Hill (bank-process testimony): Supports treating institution-process testimony as lay testimony when derived from personal workplace experience, not specialized methodology requiring Rule 702.

Sentencing Loss and Restitution in Conspiracies

  • United States v. Whitman: Confirms clear-error review for loss determinations and addresses attribution within conspiracy scope.
  • United States v. Foster: Recognizes loss reduction for money returned before detection; the court held Robertson repaid only after detection.
  • United States v. Kirchner and United States v. Dullum: Sister-circuit support that repayment after detection (e.g., after accounts are frozen or fraud discovered) does not reduce loss.
  • United States v. Baldwin: Supports holding conspirators responsible for foreseeable acts in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activity.
  • United States v. Obasohan: Confirms restitution may include losses from acts in furtherance of the conspiracy of conviction.
  • United States v. Grady: Supports joint-and-several restitution for full conspiracy losses.
  • United States v. Robertson (2007): Cited for restitution review standard (abuse of discretion).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Sufficiency—Why the Verdict Stood

The panel framed Robertson’s challenge against the highly deferential sufficiency standard and emphasized multiple independent evidentiary pillars: (i) Norton’s insider testimony that Robertson directed the scheme; (ii) documentary evidence (emails/documents) consistent with fabrication of payroll support; (iii) Robertson’s own admissions that most entities had no employees and that she used funds for luxury purchases; and (iv) post-detection conduct (texts urging deletion, urging Norton to “take the Fifth”) consistent with consciousness of guilt.

The court also highlighted the charging theory for substantive wire fraud: because the indictment included 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), the jury could convict if Robertson either directly committed the wire fraud or aided and abetted Norton’s wire fraud—making proof of coordinated participation particularly consequential.

(b) Deliberate Ignorance—Instruction Fit the Defense Theory

The court treated the deliberate-ignorance instruction as responsive to Robertson’s central defense (“Norton did it; I didn’t know”). Given the implausibility of receiving millions for non-operational companies with no employees and merely accepting reassurances, the jury could find Robertson either had actual knowledge or deliberately avoided confirming obvious fraud. Even assuming instructional error, the panel invoked the harmless-error doctrine because the jury was also instructed on actual knowledge and the evidence supported it.

(c) Evidence—Participant Context vs. Outsider Interpretation

The panel drew a sharp line between (i) improper interpretation of recordings by non-participants (as in United States v. Hawkins) and (ii) a participant explaining her own ambiguous conversation and why it used coded/elliptical references. Norton's testimony, grounded in her firsthand participation and perception, was deemed helpful under Rule 701.

(d) SBA Testimony—Institutional Process as Lay Evidence

Although Zelaya had decades of legal experience at the SBA, the panel treated her testimony largely as descriptive: the PPP’s purpose, eligibility requirements, and SBA procedures—information publicly available or based on personal work experience, not the kind of specialized methodology that triggers Rule 702 and Rule 16(a)(1)(G) expert disclosures.

(e) Summary Charts—Demonstrative Aids, Not Rule 1006 Summaries in Evidence

The district court sustained a Rule 1006 objection to admitting charts as evidence but permitted their use as demonstratives to assist witness testimony. The panel emphasized that because the charts were not admitted into evidence, the core Rule 1006 concerns (substituting summaries for underlying proof) did not control.

(f) Sentencing Loss—Two Key Attribution Moves

The sentencing affirmance rested on two findings:

  • No credit for repayment after detection: Applying the Guidelines’ definition of “detection” (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i)), the panel agreed that repayment came only after banks flagged/froze accounts and began investigating. The district court also reasoned that banks administering PPP loans have statutory fraud-detection/reporting duties, functioning as government agents for detection timing in this context.
  • Jointly undertaken criminal activity: The panel upheld the finding that Robertson was responsible for losses caused by Norton’s reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of their conspiracy, citing evidence of coordinated planning, constant communication, reciprocal benefit, and transfers of proceeds.

(g) Restitution—Full SBA Loss, Joint and Several

Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, the court affirmed restitution for the SBA’s net loss (including lender processing fees and related SBA costs), holding Robertson jointly and severally liable with Norton because the losses resulted from acts in furtherance of the conspiracy of conviction.

3.3. Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” opinions are not binding precedent, this decision is likely to be cited persuasively in PPP and other bank-administered federal program fraud cases for several practical propositions:

  • Detection timing and repayment credit: Defendants who repay only after a bank flags/freezes accounts face an uphill battle claiming loss reduction. The decision reinforces that “detection” can occur before formal indictment and may be triggered by a bank’s fraud controls.
  • Loss attribution in conspiracies: District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have substantial latitude to attribute co-conspirator losses as relevant conduct when the record supports “jointly undertaken” activity and foreseeability.
  • Restitution scope: The inclusion of SBA-incurred fees/costs and joint-and-several liability underscores the significant restitution exposure for conspirators, even if one conspirator repays more than another.
  • Trial proof patterns in PPP cases: The opinion validates using cooperating insiders, recorded calls, and demonstrative summaries to explain voluminous financial proof, while clarifying that participant explanations differ materially from outsider “interpretation” testimony.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343): Using interstate communications (emails, bank wires) as part of a plan to obtain money/property by lies that matter to the decisionmaker.
  • Material misrepresentation: A falsehood that could influence the lender/government’s decision—here, fake payroll and employee counts central to PPP eligibility and loan size.
  • Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2(a)): You can be convicted as if you committed the crime yourself if you intentionally helped someone else commit it.
  • Deliberate ignorance: A substitute for proof of knowledge where a defendant strongly suspects a fact (e.g., money is fraud proceeds) but intentionally avoids confirming it.
  • Loss amount (Guidelines): A sentencing measure often keyed to the amount fraudulently obtained or intended. Returning money can reduce loss only if done before “detection,” which is defined by the Guidelines and can occur when a victim/agency discovers the offense or when the defendant should know it has been discovered.
  • Jointly undertaken criminal activity / relevant conduct: In a conspiracy, a defendant may be sentenced based on reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators done to advance the scheme.
  • Restitution (MVRA): A court-ordered payment to make victims whole; in conspiracies it can cover the full loss caused by the scheme and can be imposed jointly and severally.
  • Lay vs. expert testimony (Rules 701/702): A witness may testify from personal perception and experience as a lay witness; expert testimony requires specialized methodology and triggers disclosure obligations in criminal cases.
  • Demonstrative charts vs. Rule 1006 summaries: Demonstratives help the jury understand evidence but are not themselves evidence; Rule 1006 summaries are admitted as evidence to condense voluminous records and must satisfy stricter requirements.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Shelitha Robertson affirms a comprehensive PPP-fraud prosecution and clarifies (at least persuasively within the Eleventh Circuit) how courts may treat (i) knowledge defenses via deliberate-ignorance instructions, (ii) participant explanations of recorded conversations under Rule 701, (iii) SBA program/process testimony as lay evidence, and (iv) demonstrative summaries in document-heavy financial trials.

Most notably for sentencing and restitution, the opinion endorses attributing co-conspirator PPP loans as relevant conduct in a jointly undertaken scheme and signals that repayment after a lending bank flags/freezes accounts will not typically reduce Guidelines loss. In PPP-era litigation—and future fraud cases using private institutions as disbursement intermediaries—the decision provides a roadmap for proving detection, loss, and restitution in conspiracy prosecutions.