Post-Prince/Watson Anders Dismissals: § 922(g)(1) Challenges Are Frivolous for Drug-Delivery Felons and Scrivener’s-Error Indictment Fixes Are Permissible

1. Introduction

In United States v. James Cooper (7th Cir. July 23, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit dismissed James Cooper’s appeal after appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that any appellate issues would be frivolous. Cooper had pleaded guilty—without a plea agreement—to multiple drug-distribution offenses and firearm offenses, including 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking), and received a 180-month sentence (the combined mandatory minimums).

The appeal teed up familiar post-plea issues: (i) whether the guilty plea—especially to the § 922(g) count—was valid under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11; (ii) whether the district court committed error in correcting a statutory citation “scrivener’s error” in the § 924(c) count; (iii) whether any sentencing argument could succeed where the court imposed mandatory minimums; and (iv) whether the Second Amendment could invalidate § 922(g)(1) after the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in United States v. Prince, 171 F.4th 1009 (7th Cir. 2026) and United States v. Watson, 171 F.4th 1012 (7th Cir. 2026).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. It concluded that:

  • Any challenge to the guilty plea would fail under plain-error review because the Rule 11 plea colloquy was adequate. Rule 11 does not require the judge to explain the option of pleading guilty to some counts and not guilty to others.
  • Ineffective-assistance arguments were unsuitable for direct appeal because the record was not developed.
  • No nonfrivolous sentencing challenge existed because Cooper received mandatory minimums and guideline-consistent supervised release.
  • The district court permissibly amended the indictment to correct an “obvious clerical or typographical error” in a statutory citation.
  • Any Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed: Prince rejected facial invalidity, and Watson rejected as-applied challenges by felons with prior drug-dealing convictions—matching Cooper’s criminal history.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)

Anders supplies the procedural framework: appointed counsel may seek to withdraw if, after a conscientious review, counsel concludes the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues. The court then independently reviews potential issues to ensure the defendant is not deprived of meaningful appellate review. Here, the Seventh Circuit’s order functions as that independent check—walking through plea validity, sentencing, indictment amendment, and the Second Amendment claim.

United States v. Prince, 171 F.4th 1009 (7th Cir. 2026)

Prince held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional. The Cooper panel expressly relied on that holding to label any facial Second Amendment challenge frivolous. Notably, counsel had sought to suspend proceedings pending Prince, reflecting how central that case was to determining whether there was any viable appellate question at all.

United States v. Watson, 171 F.4th 1012 (7th Cir. 2026)

Watson addressed the as-applied dimension and concluded Congress may lawfully disarm felons based on prior convictions for drug dealing. The Cooper panel treated Watson as dispositive because Cooper had two prior felony drug-delivery convictions, making an as-applied attack untenable under controlling circuit law.

United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020)

Schaul supplies the standard of review: because Cooper did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, any plea-validity challenge on appeal would be reviewed for plain error. That choice of standard is pivotal—plain-error review is difficult to satisfy and often turns plea-colloquy sufficiency into a threshold barrier.

United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2020)

Cates supports the routine appellate practice of deferring ineffective-assistance claims to collateral proceedings (typically under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), unless the issue was raised and a full record developed in the district court. The Cooper panel relied on Cates to deem the issue nonviable on direct appeal.

United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2019)

Lickers provides the presumption of reasonableness for sentences (and supervised release terms) within the advisory Guidelines range. The Cooper panel invoked that presumption in concluding no nonfrivolous supervised-release-term challenge existed, especially given that the court imposed the statutory minimum five-year supervised release term tied to § 841(b)(1)(A).

United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449-50 (7th Cir. 2019)

Flores helped in two ways. First, it supported the conclusion that Cooper’s confirmation that he read the proposed supervised release conditions and raised no objection undercut any later challenge. Second, the Cooper panel cited Flores when addressing waiver/forfeiture principles—particularly the idea that some “fundamental rights” may require the defendant’s personal waiver—while still concluding that review would be at most for plain error and that no plain error occurred.

United States v. Field, 875 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1989)

Field supplies the key rule for the indictment amendment: a district court may amend an indictment to correct “obvious clerical or typographical errors.” The Cooper panel treated the erroneous statutory citation in the § 924(c) count (a reference to § 924(c)(1)(B)(i), concerning specific weapon types not relevant to Cooper) as precisely the kind of scrivener’s error Field permits courts to correct—especially where the defendant did not object and the correction did not alter the substance of the charge to which he pleaded.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Rule 11 and plea validity under plain-error review

The court’s reasoning follows a standard structure: identify the applicable review standard (plain error), then examine the plea colloquy for Rule 11 compliance. The panel emphasized that the district court ensured Cooper understood: (i) the nature of the charges, (ii) the penalties, and (iii) the rights waived by pleading guilty.

Cooper’s specific complaint—that he was not told he could plead guilty to some counts and not guilty to others—failed because the panel read Rule 11(b)(1)(B) as requiring an explanation of the right to plead not guilty (and persist in that plea) in general, not a count-by-count menu of mixed-plea options. The decision reflects a pragmatic approach: where the court otherwise ensured understanding of each charge’s elements and confirmed consultation with counsel, the alleged omission does not rise to plain error.

(b) Ineffective assistance reserved for collateral review

Applying Cates, the panel concluded that ineffective assistance would be better litigated in collateral proceedings, where factual development (attorney strategy, advice, and prejudice) can occur. The court’s approach reflects institutional competence: appellate courts generally cannot adjudicate ineffectiveness claims on a thin trial-court record.

(c) Sentencing: guidelines calculations, mandatory minimums, and reasonableness

The panel addressed both procedural and substantive sentencing issues and found neither viable. Procedurally, it noted Cooper’s guideline computations (career offender offense level and criminal history category VI) were unobjected-to and correctly applied. Substantively, the decisive fact was that Cooper received the mandatory minimum—meaning the judge lacked legal authority to go lower absent a recognized exception (not implicated in the order). With mandatory minimums setting the floor, a “substantive reasonableness” challenge becomes effectively foreclosed.

(d) Indictment amendment: correcting a statutory-citation scrivener’s error

Cooper also sought to attack the district court’s amendment to Count 11 correcting an erroneous citation to § 924(c)(1)(B)(i). The panel’s reasoning is straightforward: (i) defense counsel did not object (so review would be, at best, plain error), and (ii) Field permits corrections of obvious clerical/typographical errors.

The key conceptual move is treating the change as non-substantive: striking an irrelevant subsection citation where the charged conduct and applicable subsection (§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) for possessing a handgun in furtherance of drug trafficking) were otherwise clear. That understanding reduces the risk that the amendment altered the grand jury’s charging decision or impaired notice to the defendant.

(e) Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) after Prince and Watson

The panel’s most time-sensitive reasoning concerns the Second Amendment claim. The court expressly held it was frivolous in light of new, controlling circuit authority:

  • Facial challenge: Prince foreclosed it by holding § 922(g)(1) not facially unconstitutional.
  • As-applied challenge: Watson foreclosed it for defendants with prior convictions for drug dealing; Cooper’s criminal history included two prior felony drug-delivery convictions.

Importantly, this portion shows how Anders practice interacts with evolving constitutional doctrine: when intervening precedent resolves a once-live constitutional question, the appeal can become dismissible as frivolous because the appellate court is bound by controlling authority.

3.3. Impact

Although expressly designated nonprecedential, the disposition has practical significance in three ways:

  1. Operational effect of Prince/Watson in the Seventh Circuit: The order illustrates that, post-Prince and Watson, most § 922(g)(1) Second Amendment challenges—especially by defendants with drug-dealing priors—will be treated as foreclosed on direct appeal, including in Anders cases.
  2. Clarifying the “scrivener’s error” lane for indictment corrections: By relying on Field, the order reinforces a line between permissible clerical corrections (e.g., fixing an internal statutory citation) and impermissible substantive amendments that would alter the offense charged.
  3. Reaffirming plain-error and preservation dynamics in guilty-plea appeals: The decision exemplifies how failure to move to withdraw a plea or to object at sentencing dramatically narrows appellate options, particularly where mandatory minimums govern the sentence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anders brief / Anders withdrawal: A process allowing appointed counsel to withdraw if the lawyer finds no nonfrivolous issues to appeal; the court independently checks that assessment.
  • Plain-error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when an issue was not preserved in the district court; the defendant must show a clear, outcome-affecting error that seriously affects the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
  • Rule 11 plea colloquy: The judge’s on-the-record questioning to ensure a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, including understanding of rights, charges, and penalties.
  • Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge claims a law is invalid in all applications; an as-applied challenge claims the law is unconstitutional as applied to the specific defendant’s circumstances.
  • Scrivener’s error in an indictment: A clerical mistake (like a wrong statutory subsection citation) that does not change the substance of the charge; courts may correct such errors when the true charge is clear.
  • Mandatory minimum: A statutory minimum sentence the judge cannot go below absent a legal exception; it often forecloses substantive-reasonableness arguments seeking a lower sentence.

5. Conclusion

United States v. James Cooper is a textbook Seventh Circuit Anders disposition in the wake of intervening constitutional precedent. The court found no nonfrivolous issues because the plea colloquy complied with Rule 11 under plain-error review, sentencing challenges were blocked by mandatory minimums and unchallenged guideline calculations, the indictment amendment fit within the clerical-correction rule of United States v. Field, and—most notably—any Second Amendment attack on § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by United States v. Prince (facial validity) and United States v. Watson (as-applied validity for drug-dealing felons). Even as a nonprecedential order, the decision concretely signals how quickly Prince/Watson can convert once-arguable § 922(g)(1) claims into frivolous ones for purposes of direct appeal.