Plausible Racial Intent and Separate Consideration of Retaliation Under §§ 1981 and 1982

A. Plausibility Is Less Than Proof, but More Than an Accusation

The central distinction is between requiring a plaintiff to prove discrimination and requiring facts that plausibly suggest discrimination. Batista did not have to establish his case at the pleading stage. Nevertheless, merely characterizing Saba’s conduct as racially discriminatory could not substitute for factual allegations supporting that characterization.

• Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008): Supplied de novo review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, with factual allegations accepted as true and construed favorably to the plaintiff. The appellate court independently assessed the complaint’s legal sufficiency rather than deferring to the district court’s conclusion.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009): Provided the governing plausibility standard. Factual content must support a reasonable inference of liability; conclusory assertions and bare recitations of claim elements do not suffice. This distinction controlled the treatment of Batista’s allegations about discriminatory intent and other tenants.
• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007): Reinforced that allegations must raise entitlement to relief above speculation. The court invoked this principle when rejecting Batista’s contention that the district court had improperly demanded proof rather than plausible allegations.
• Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245–46 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2015): Explained that sufficient factual matter suggesting intentional discrimination is enough at this stage. Although discussing Title VII, its analysis was relevant because the opinion recognized the shared analytical framework and proof requirements for Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims.
• Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Established the critical boundary between pleading and proof. The latter supplies an evidentiary framework; the former explains why a complaint need not allege specific facts establishing every component of a prima facie case under that framework.

The court found no violation of that boundary. Batista’s hostile-comment allegations did not reference race or ethnicity, and his allegations about supposedly comparable tenants were too conclusory to supply the missing inference. The district court therefore rejected an unsupported inference of discriminatory intent rather than demanding a completed evidentiary showing.

Important limitation: The opinion does not establish that discriminatory intent can be pleaded only through explicitly racial remarks or detailed comparator allegations. Its conclusion concerns the insufficiency of the allegations presented, not an exclusive list of permissible ways to plead discrimination.

B. Distinct Statutory Rights Share an Intentional-Discrimination Requirement

Section 1981 protects equal rights to make and enforce contracts. Section 1982 protects citizens’ equal rights to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey property. Their substantive coverage differs, but both require intentional racial discrimination.

• Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021): Identified the requirements of a § 1981 claim: intentional racial discrimination causing contractual injury. The court relied on the first requirement because Batista’s allegations did not plausibly establish racial intent.
• Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 336, 341 (2020): Required a § 1981 plaintiff initially to plead, and ultimately to prove, that race was a but-for cause of the loss of a protected right. Its discussion of the similar origins and language of §§ 1981 and 1982 supported parallel treatment of their racial-discrimination requirements.
• Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 133 F.4th 1032, 1045 (11th Cir. 2025): Described § 1982’s broadly defined property protections, including equal use and enforcement of property rights. This established that § 1982 has meaningful property-specific coverage, even though that breadth did not cure Batista’s deficient allegations of racial intent.
• Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968): Confirmed that § 1982 addresses racial discrimination. Its relevance was to identify the kind of discrimination necessary for statutory liability.
• Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994): Expressly required § 1982 plaintiffs to allege intentional discrimination. This directly answered Batista’s argument that the district court had improperly collapsed his property-rights claim into his contract-rights claim.

The court’s reasoning was element-specific: the same missing allegation defeated both discrimination theories. It did not hold that §§ 1981 and 1982 are interchangeable, or that a contractual injury is always necessary for a property-rights claim. Nor did it need to resolve every other statutory element once the common discriminatory-intent requirement was unsatisfied.

C. Liberal Construction Does Not Require Futile Amendment

Batista proposed adding facts identifying individuals and entities that implemented or communicated enforcement measures at Saba’s direction. Those additions could have clarified who participated and what they did, but they did not explain why the conduct plausibly reflected racial discrimination.

• Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2021): Supplied de novo review when leave to amend is denied on futility grounds. The appellate court independently considered whether the proposed changes could save the discrimination claims.
• Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019): Recognized that an unrepresented plaintiff generally must receive at least one opportunity to amend before dismissal with prejudice when a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim. This protective principle does not confer unlimited opportunities to amend.
• Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004): Permitted denial of amendment where the amended complaint would remain subject to dismissal. Because Batista’s proposed additions left the racial-intent deficiency intact, this precedent supported affirmance.
• Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014): Required liberal construction of pro se pleadings while prohibiting courts from acting as counsel or rewriting deficient allegations. The court could interpret Batista’s filing generously, but could not invent facts connecting the challenged conduct to race.

The practical lesson is that amendment must address the reason for dismissal. More factual detail is not necessarily curative when it concerns participation in challenged conduct rather than the missing discriminatory motive.

D. Retaliation Required Its Own Threshold Assessment

The district court described the action as involving discrimination and retaliation, yet did not adjudicate retaliation in dismissing the complaint. Its observation that Batista’s sur-reply centered on retaliation did not resolve whether the operative complaint actually asserted such claims.

• CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008): Supported the recognition of retaliation claims under § 1981.
• Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005): Was cited for its discussion of retaliation protection under § 1982. The opinion used that discussion alongside CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries to explain that both statutes encompass retaliation.
• Moore v. Grady Mem. Hosp. Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1176 (11th Cir. 2016): Supplied the elements: protected activity, a materially adverse action, and a causal relationship between them. It also required that the protected activity assert rights encompassed by the relevant statute.

The remand was deliberately conditional. The district court must first decide whether Batista raised retaliation in the operative complaint. Only if he did must it decide whether the allegations plausibly satisfy the applicable elements. The appellate court did not hold that a retaliation claim existed, was sufficient, or would ultimately succeed.

This distinction matters because discrimination and retaliation address different alleged wrongs. Failure to plausibly allege that an underlying action was racially motivated does not, without further analysis, resolve whether a separate action was taken in response to protected activity.

E. Appellate Review Did Not Replace Initial District-Court Adjudication

• SA Palm Beach, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 32 F.4th 1347, 1363 (11th Cir. 2022): Provided an example of partial vacatur and remand for a district court to address an unresolved claim. It supported the procedural remedy chosen here.
• Callahan v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 939 F.3d 1251, 1266 (11th Cir. 2019): Emphasized that fact-sensitive questions ordinarily belong first in the district court: appellate courts review decisions rather than supply the first decision.
• Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976): Supplied the general rule against appellate consideration of issues not passed upon below.

These authorities explain why the Eleventh Circuit did not itself decide the existence or sufficiency of retaliation claims. The remand preserved the respective institutional roles of the trial and appellate courts.

F. Rule 59(e) Did Not Provide Another Opportunity to Relitigate Discrimination

Rule 59(e) permits a party to seek alteration or amendment of a judgment within 28 days. Its availability does not make it a routine mechanism for repeating arguments rejected before judgment.

• Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 719 (11th Cir. 2020): Established abuse-of-discretion review of the denial of Rule 59(e) relief.
• Smith v. Miorelli, 93 F.4th 1206, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 2024): Explained that discretion is abused through an incorrect legal standard, improper procedures, or clearly erroneous factual findings.
• Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007): Limited relief to newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact and prohibited using the motion to relitigate matters or present previously available arguments or evidence.
• Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 764 (11th Cir. 2025): Addressed employment-discrimination analysis at summary judgment, including why failure to establish a prima facie case does not automatically require defeat at that stage. The court distinguished it because Batista’s case involved pleading sufficiency, not summary judgment.

Batista offered no newly discovered evidence and demonstrated no manifest error in the discrimination analysis. The district court had neither imposed the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green framework as a pleading requirement nor improperly weighed credibility or resolved factual disputes.

The court expressly left unresolved whether the Rule 59(e) order mishandled retaliation, because the partial vacatur already returned that subject to the district court.

G. Losing Arguments Were Not Necessarily Sanctionable

• United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 2008): Was cited by comparison in considering Batista’s unrepresented status and the absence of a prior warning that his claims were frivolous.
• Woods v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993): Supported the distinction between arguments that lack merit and arguments that are clearly frivolous.

The denial of sanctions was contextual. It does not establish categorical immunity from sanctions for unrepresented litigants.