Plain-Text Removability Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) for Any Illegal Export Activity (Including 18 U.S.C. § 554 Firearms Smuggling), Rejecting Noscitur a Sociis

1. Introduction

Peniel Olibris, a Haitian national and lawful permanent resident admitted in 2016, pleaded guilty to smuggling goods under 18 U.S.C. § 554 after exporting (without required licensing) firearms to Haiti concealed in shipped vehicles. DHS initiated removal proceedings, charging removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) for engaging in activity to violate U.S. law prohibiting the export of goods. Olibris also sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), later narrowing his request to deferral of removal under CAT.

The central legal issue was interpretive: whether § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i)—a provision housed in the “Security and related grounds” section—reaches any illegal-export activity as its text suggests, or whether, as Olibris argued under the canon of noscitur a sociis, it should be limited to conduct presenting national-security/public-safety concerns akin to espionage and sabotage. The Fifth Circuit also addressed (i) substantial-evidence review of the CAT denial and (ii) an asserted due process violation tied to the IJ’s administrative notice of a BBC report and to procedural sequencing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. It held that Olibris’s § 554 conviction and admitted unlawful export of firearms satisfy the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i), and it rejected his attempt to narrow the statute using noscitur a sociis. The court further held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s denial of CAT deferral, given the generalized and speculative nature of Olibris’s feared harm and the lack of proof of government consent or acquiescence. Finally, the court found no reversible due process violation because any assumed error was harmless and did not affect the outcome.

Judge King dissented, arguing that statutory context limits § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) to export violations that endanger public safety or national security, and that the Government failed to carry its burden to prove such endangerment here.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2007): Set the review framework—ordinarily reviewing only the BIA, but also the IJ when the IJ’s ruling affects the BIA’s decision; factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo. This framing authorized the court’s de novo statutory-interpretation holding on § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) while applying deference on CAT factfinding.
• Hightower v. Tex. Hosp. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam): Provided the court’s baseline textualist approach (“start with the text; if clear, end there”), underpinning its rejection of a context-driven narrowing of § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i).
• U.S. Postal Serv. v. Konan, 607 U.S. 391 (2026): Supplied the “cardinal canon” that legislatures mean what they say, and supported the view that broad language is often deliberate. The court used Konan to subordinate noscitur a sociis to clear text.
• Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024): Quoted for the definition of noscitur a sociis (a word gains meaning from its neighbors). The court invoked it only to emphasize that the canon is an aid—not a license to override plain statutory language.
• Tula Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015): Cited for the expansiveness of “any.” This supported the court’s reading that “any activity” to violate export prohibitions is sweeping by design.
• Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001): Cited to limit the role of context (“context matters only to the extent it clarifies text”), reinforcing the majority’s view that statutory surroundings cannot be used to “shorn” text of its ordinary meaning.
• Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting): Cited for interpretive-canons discussion, used to underscore that canons are tools, not controlling commands—supporting the court’s stance that noscitur a sociis cannot “roam” into rewriting the statute.
• Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131 (5th Cir. 2006); Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2018); Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam): Provided the substantial-evidence standard for CAT and withholding-related eligibility determinations and the “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude otherwise” formulation, which the court applied to deny CAT relief.
• Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224 (2021): Used to explain that evidentiary gaps count against the noncitizen seeking relief from removal—central to rejecting Olibris’s generalized and unspecified fear claims.
• Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904 (5th Cir. 2019); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015): Used to reject reliance on generalized country conditions and to support the conclusions that (i) relocation evidence can undermine a torture-likelihood showing and (ii) a government’s inability to protect does not equal “acquiescence” under CAT.
• Mullin v. Doe, 146 S. Ct. 2121 (2026): Cited for the proposition that difficult home-country conditions cannot themselves erase statutory burdens; deployed to rebut the argument that state fragility alone establishes CAT acquiescence.
• Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F.4th 698 (5th Cir. 2023): Distinguished; unlike that case (where officials specifically warned the petitioner a gang “would kill” him), Olibris’s evidence lacked comparable specificity and certainty.
• Deep v. Barr, 967 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam): Supported the conclusion that the BIA need not respond exhaustively to every argument so long as it meaningfully considered issues and enabled review.
• Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 965 (5th Cir. 2018); Enrique-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2010); Rangel-Betancourt v. Barr, 820 F. App'x 253 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 584 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)): Established the “substantial prejudice” requirement for due process claims in immigration proceedings and the harmless-error principle applied to the BBC report and procedure complaints.
• Matheus v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 757 F. App'x 803 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam): Cited as persuasive, noting that the Eleventh Circuit has denied petitions challenging removability under § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) based on § 554 firearms export conduct, lending cross-circuit practical support to the majority’s reading.
• Authorities emphasized in the dissent—including Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 143 S. Ct. 665 (2023); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001); Tex. Educ. Agency v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 908 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2018) (Smith, J.) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); and Santos-Sanchez v. Holder, 744 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2014)—shaped a competing methodology centered on contextual reading, anti-superfluity, and the Government’s burden.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The removability holding: plain text over contextual narrowing. The majority treated § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) as unambiguous: a noncitizen is removable if, after admission, he engages in “any activity” to violate “any law” prohibiting the export of “goods.” With Olibris’s § 554 conviction (exporting merchandise contrary to law/regulation) and his concession that he unlawfully sent firearms from the United States to Haiti, the court found the statutory elements satisfied on their face.

The court rejected Olibris’s attempt to narrow § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) via noscitur a sociis—i.e., that because neighboring subsections and labels focus on security threats, the export clause must be limited to national-security/public-safety export violations. The court’s key move was methodological: interpretive canons are “subordinate” to the “cardinal canon” that clear statutory text governs. It further agreed with the BIA that Olibris’s reading would require “impermissible addition of language” from § 1227(a)(4)(A)(ii) and (iii)—effectively rewriting subsection (i) to include an endangerment requirement not expressed there.

(b) CAT deferral: generalized fear and missing acquiescence proof. Applying substantial-evidence review, the majority held that Olibris did not show it was more likely than not he would be tortured in Haiti with government “consent or acquiescence.” His fear was framed in broad terms (“everyone” in Haiti; “Haitian people in general”), without identification of specific perpetrators, their capability, their persistence, or evidence elevating harm to “torture.” The court emphasized evidentiary gaps (per Pereida v. Wilkinson) and the limited probative value of generalized country conditions (per Qorane v. Barr).

The opinion also treated “state weakness” arguments as legally insufficient: instability or inability to protect does not equal acquiescence. The court distinguished Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland because the record here lacked concrete official statements or comparably specific threats. Relatives’ continued safety and relocation evidence further undercut the likelihood of targeted torture.

(c) Due process: harmless error and lack of prejudice. Even assuming the IJ erred in admitting the BBC report or in the sequencing of briefing relative to the removal findings, the court held Olibris failed to show “substantial prejudice”: no prima facie showing that the alleged violation changed the outcome. The BIA’s express disclaimer of reliance on the BBC report and its harmless-error finding were pivotal.

The dissent’s counter-theory. Judge King argued the majority “tunnel visions” on a clause and ignores the statutory setting: “Security and related grounds,” neighboring subsections, and related provisions (including PATRIOT Act detention cross-references) indicate Congress targeted national-security/public-safety threats. The dissent used anti-superfluity and contextual reading to argue “other” in § 1227(a)(4)(A)(ii) makes that subsection a catchall for conduct like (i), implying (i) also concerns endangerment. On this view, the Government failed its “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” burden to prove endangerment.

3.3 Impact

Doctrinal impact (Fifth Circuit): The majority opinion effectively establishes that removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i)’s export clause does not require the Government to prove that an export violation threatens national security or public safety. If the record shows activity violating a U.S. law prohibiting export of goods, the statute applies as written—even though the provision sits within “Security and related grounds.”

Practical impact (charging and litigation): DHS may be more likely to charge § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) in export cases, using the decision to defeat “security-only” narrowing arguments. For noncitizens, the decision raises the stakes of export offenses (and potentially export-regulatory violations) because the court treated the statutory hook as categorical and text driven, rather than context limited.

CAT litigation: The opinion reinforces Fifth Circuit themes: generalized country conditions and diffuse fears rarely compel reversal; CAT requires individualized likelihood evidence and a specific showing of official consent/acquiescence.

Forward-looking friction: The dissent tees up a potential circuit split or en banc/High Court interest by emphasizing statutory context, perceived “absurd results,” and collateral consequences (e.g., cross-references to detention provisions). Future cases may test how far “export of goods” extends in less intuitively “security-related” export scenarios.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Noscitur a sociis: A rule of thumb that a word’s meaning can be clarified by surrounding words. Here, Olibris argued “export of goods” should be read narrowly because it appears next to “espionage” and “sabotage.” The majority said that even if the canon is relevant, it cannot override clear statutory text.
• Plain-text (textualist) interpretation: Courts begin with the statute’s words. If those words are clear, courts generally stop there. The majority treated § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) as clear.
• Substantial evidence review: A deferential standard for agency factfinding. The court asks whether the record compels the opposite conclusion—not whether the court might have decided differently.
• CAT “acquiescence”: For CAT protection, the applicant must show not only likely torture, but that government officials would consent to it or at least acquiesce (turn a blind eye with awareness). A government’s weakness or inability to protect, by itself, does not automatically prove acquiescence.
• Harmless error / substantial prejudice (due process): Even if a procedural mistake occurred, a petitioner must show it likely changed the outcome. If the same result would occur anyway, the error is “harmless.”

5. Conclusion

Olibris v. Blanche cements a Fifth Circuit rule that the export-related clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) operates by its plain terms: activity violating U.S. export prohibitions (including a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 554) triggers removability without an additional showing of national-security or public-safety endangerment. The decision also reiterates strict evidentiary demands for CAT deferral—individualized, non-speculative threats and proof of official consent or acquiescence—and it applies harmless-error principles to reject due process challenges absent demonstrated prejudice.

The dissent highlights an unresolved interpretive tension—textual breadth versus security-context narrowing—that may shape future litigation over the outer limits of § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i).