PFAS Disclaimers Cannot Defeat Federal-Officer Removal When the Gravamen Is Riverwide Contamination and a Contractor Plausibly Links AFFF to the Harm

Case: The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company  |  Court: Eleventh Circuit  |  Date: 2026-09-02

1. Introduction

The Town of Pine Hill (“Pine Hill”), a municipal water provider drawing raw water from the Alabama River, sued 3M Company (“3M”) in Alabama state court for state-law tort claims (negligence, wantonness, nuisance, trespass) arising from PFAS contamination in its drinking-water source. Pine Hill alleged it would need to install new treatment systems because PFAS are difficult to remove with its existing filtration.

3M removed under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), asserting that PFAS contamination plausibly included military-related sources because PFAS were used in aqueous film forming foam (“AFFF”) manufactured by 3M pursuant to military specifications and allegedly released at Maxwell Air Force Base. Pine Hill sought remand and attempted to avoid § 1442 by expressly disclaiming any relief “related to Aqueous Film Forming Foam.”

The district court remanded, reasoning that the “heart” of Pine Hill’s case was 3M’s supply of PFAS products to Alabama paper mills—conduct not taken under color of federal office. The Eleventh Circuit vacated that remand order.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred by not crediting 3M’s removal theory and by unduly narrowing the “act” relevant to § 1442(a)(1). Applying the circuit’s three-part test from Caver v. Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop., the court concluded 3M plausibly alleged:

• Acting-under: 3M is a “person” “acting under” a federal officer when manufacturing products to government specifications, including AFFF.
• Relates-to (causal connection): Pine Hill’s claims, properly understood by their gravamen, concern broader PFAS contamination of the Alabama River, plausibly connected to AFFF-related PFAS releases near Maxwell Air Force Base.
• Colorable federal defense: 3M plausibly raised the federal government contractor defense under Boyle v. United Techs. Corp..

The court further held Pine Hill’s AFFF disclaimers were not dispositive because they would require a state court to decide the nexus between the charged conduct and federal authority—an “artful pleading” problem. The remand order was vacated and the case returned to federal district court for further proceedings.

3. Analysis

3.1. The New/Clarified Rule Emerging from the Decision

3.2. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Core Eleventh Circuit framework

Caver v. Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. supplied the governing three-pronged test: (1) “acting under” a federal officer, (2) causal connection / “under color of federal office” (now framed as “for or relating to”), and (3) a “colorable federal defense. The panel repeatedly emphasized Caver’s instruction that the causal hurdle is “quite low.”

State v. Meadows contributed two important analytic tools used by the majority: (i) “gravamen” analysis—courts define the “act” by looking to the gravamen of the claims; and (ii) cautioning how to identify the “act” anchoring removal. The majority acknowledged debate about whether Meadows limits removal for “past conduct,” but avoided resolving that issue by holding 3M is still “acting under” federal authority. Judge Kidd’s concurrence criticized this move as inconsistent with prior circuit precedent and framed it as a temporal “mismatch” problem.

B. Supreme Court precedents on § 1442 breadth and pleading-stage posture

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc. was used to define “acting under” as assisting federal officers with tasks the government would otherwise perform, requiring a relationship of “subjection, guidance, or control.” The majority relied on Watson to distinguish mere regulatory compliance from performing work “on behalf of the government.”

Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker anchored a key procedural directive: the court must credit the removing party’s theory of the case at the removal stage. The majority used Acker to fault the district court for focusing on Pine Hill’s characterization of the dispute rather than 3M’s plausible contamination/commingling theory.

Willingham v. Morgan supported the principle that a plaintiff cannot defeat federal-officer removal by pleading maneuvers that would force a state court to decide whether the defendant acted under federal authority—the precise mischief the statute seeks to avoid.

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parishes. (1) confirmed that the “relates to” prong “sweeps broadly” and does not require strict causation; and (2) underscored that a defendant need not show federal duties “specifically required” the challenged conduct. Both the majority and Judge Newsom’s concurrence leaned on Plaquemines to reject a demanding causation showing at the removal stage. Judge Kidd invoked Plaquemines differently—warning against conflating the first and second prongs.

C. Disclaimer doctrine and out-of-circuit PFAS/AFFF decisions

Gov't of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts, Inc. supplied the decision’s most explicit doctrinal development: disclaimers fall into (1) true disclaimers that “fully eliminate” federal-officer grounds (e.g., by time/location limits that make federal-direction factually impossible), and (2) “artful pleading” disclaimers that still require adjudicating the federal nexus. The Eleventh Circuit adopted this reasoning as persuasive and applied it to hold Pine Hill’s AFFF disclaimers ineffective.

The panel also situated itself among other PFAS/AFFF removal rulings involving 3M:

• Illinois ex rel. Raoul v. 3M Co. — discussed as a case where the State’s oral-argument concession effectively functioned as a true, unequivocal disclaimer of mixed contamination.
• New Hampshire v. 3M Co. and Maine v. 3M Co. — referenced to show divergent outcomes on different grounds (timeliness vs. merits of § 1442 prongs).
• Maryland v. 3M Co. — invoked for the proposition that a disclaimer is not dispositive of § 1442 applicability.

D. The asserted federal defense

Boyle v. United Techs. Corp. provided the elements of the government contractor defense. The panel held 3M plausibly alleged all three: reasonably precise government specifications, conformity (via the Department of Defense Qualified Products List), and adequate warning/knowledge parity as to dangers known to 3M but not the government.

The court rejected Pine Hill’s request to rely on an MDL-stage determination outside the removal record, noting that Pine Hill’s challenge was facial and that the cited MDL ruling (In Re Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Prods. Liab. Litig.) did not foreclose the defense as a matter of law.

3.3. Legal Reasoning (Prong-by-Prong)

Prong 1 — “Acting under” a federal officer

The majority held 3M satisfied “acting under” by plausibly alleging a government-contractor relationship involving customized manufacturing to detailed governmental specifications—both historically (AFFF) and, in the majority’s view, presently (ongoing federal contracts). Relying on Watson and Caver, the court found the relationship exceeded mere compliance and reflected federal “control” over what 3M makes for the government.

Intra-panel tension: Judge Kidd agreed 3M met prong one but criticized the majority’s reliance on 3M’s current contractor status to satisfy “acting under” for a suit based on past conduct, urging instead a time-matched inquiry (was 3M acting under a federal officer “when it took the actions complained of”).

Prong 2 — “For or relating to” acts under color of federal office (“causal connection”)

The decisive move was definitional: the court identified the “gravamen” of Pine Hill’s claims as the broader “overall PFAS contamination of the Alabama River,” not merely the paper-mill discharges described in the complaint. That broader framing allowed the court to treat AFFF-related PFAS releases as plausibly connected to the harm.

Critically, the panel reaffirmed that removal does not require strict proof of causation; at this stage the defendant need only plausibly allege a non-tenuous connection. The court credited 3M’s allegation that PFAS from Maxwell groundwater flowed toward the river and commingled with other PFAS sources, making source isolation difficult and connecting the town’s claimed injury to federal-contract activity.

Disclaimers: Pine Hill’s attempt to exclude AFFF-related injury did not sever prong two because it would still force a state court to determine whether AFFF contributed to the contamination (and thus whether 3M acted under federal authority “for or relating to” the injury). Under the adopted Express Scripts distinction, that is “artful pleading,” not an effective jurisdictional disclaimer.

Prong 3 — Colorable federal defense

The court emphasized the low bar: the defense need only be plausible at removal. Applying Boyle, 3M plausibly alleged precise military specifications for AFFF, conformity (Qualified Products List), and government awareness of AFFF/PFAS environmental migration and health concerns—supporting knowledge parity.

3.4. Impact

• Heightened skepticism of “PFAS-source disclaimers”: Plaintiffs in PFAS cases within the Eleventh Circuit will face greater difficulty defeating § 1442 removal through complaint disclaimers if the alleged injury (e.g., watershed contamination) plausibly implicates commingled or mixed sources tied to federal contracting.
• Broader gravamen framing: Trial courts are directed to look past discrete allegations to the gravamen of the claims; in contamination cases, that gravamen may be defined at an ecosystem level (riverwide contamination) rather than at a point-source level (a specific facility).
• Procedural posture favors removers: By reiterating that courts must credit the defendant’s theory (Acker) and apply a low causation hurdle (Plaquemines; Caver), the decision likely increases successful removals where defendants can plausibly link harm to federal-direction activities—especially in complex, commingled-source environmental litigation.
• Doctrinal friction on “acting under” timing: The concurrences forecast future litigation about whether a defendant’s current federal contracts can satisfy prong one for suits about historically completed federal work, and whether State v. Meadows bears on contractors. That uncertainty may prompt en banc review or Supreme Court attention if district courts diverge.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Federal officer removal (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)): A special removal pathway allowing federal officers and certain private parties working for them (contractors) to move cases from state to federal court so federal defenses can be decided in a federal forum.
• “Acting under”: More than being regulated. It means helping the federal government carry out its tasks, typically under detailed direction or specifications (e.g., manufacturing to military specs).
• “For or relating to” / causal connection: Not strict causation. The defendant must show a meaningful connection between the federal-directed conduct and the plaintiff’s claims. After Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parishes., the connection can be broad.
• “Gravamen”: The real substance of the complaint—what the plaintiff is actually complaining about—used to define the “act” relevant to removal.
• Disclaimer vs. artful pleading: A disclaimer can defeat removal only if it truly removes any federal-directed conduct from the case so a state court never has to decide the federal nexus. If the disclaimer merely re-labels claims while the facts still require deciding whether federal conduct caused harm, it is ineffective.
• Government contractor defense (Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.): A federal defense that can shield contractors from state tort liability when they built a product to precise federal specifications, conformed to them, and the government was warned (or already knew) of relevant dangers.
• Commingled contamination: When pollutants from multiple sources mix, making it difficult to isolate which source caused which portion of harm—an evidentiary reality that can keep federal-source theories “in” the case despite disclaimers.

5. Conclusion

The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company strengthens federal officer removal in complex PFAS contamination cases by (1) requiring courts to credit the contractor’s plausible theory at removal, (2) defining the relevant “act” by the claims’ gravamen (here, riverwide contamination), and (3) treating AFFF disclaimers as ineffective where they would still require adjudicating the federal nexus. By adopting the First Circuit’s disclaimer/artful pleading framework from Gov't of Puerto Rico v. Express Scripts, Inc. and reiterating the low thresholds for prongs two and three, the Eleventh Circuit makes federal forum access more attainable for contractors plausibly implicated through federal-specification products and mixed-source contamination theories—while leaving a live, concurrences-highlighted debate about the temporal scope of the “acting under” inquiry.