Performance-Based Violence by Sports Hooligans Lacks “Nexus” to Asylum Protected Grounds; New Social Group Theories Must Be Raised Before the IJ

1. Introduction

Bojan Andric, a Serbian professional soccer player, sought asylum after being attacked by members of a soccer fan group (“The Red Devils”) following a tie game. He alleged past persecution and a fear of future persecution based on (1) membership in a “particular social group” and (2) an imputed political opinion (that hooligans believed he was “anti-hooligan” or believed he had reported them to police).

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Andric credible but denied relief, concluding the harm did not rise to past persecution and, more importantly, that any harm lacked the required connection (“nexus”) to a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and also held that Andric waived a newly reframed social-group theory raised for the first time on appeal to the BIA (“former soccer players in Serbia”). The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review.

Key Issues

• Nexus: Were the beating and threats “on account of” a protected ground (particular social group or political opinion)?
• Particular social group (PSG) definition: Is “Serbian soccer players who are victims of violence from soccer hooligans” cognizable?
• Waiver/exhaustion: Can an applicant pivot to a new PSG (“former soccer players in Serbia”) at the BIA stage?
• Standard of review: How does Urias-Orellana v. Bondi shape appellate review of agency persecution determinations?
• Reasoned decision-making: Does an IJ’s use of a boilerplate “Addendum of Law” undermine meaningful review?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit denied Andric’s petition primarily because the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the harm he suffered was not inflicted “because of” a statutorily protected ground. The court held:

• The asserted social group based on being a professional soccer player targeted for poor play fails because it is not tied to an immutable or fundamental characteristic and, in any event, reflects personal/performance-based grievances rather than group-based persecution.
• The alternative PSG (“former soccer players in Serbia”) was properly deemed waived because it was not presented to the IJ. (Duarte-Salagosa v. Holder)
• Any political-opinion theory was waived in the Seventh Circuit briefing; and in any event, the evidence did not show hooligans harmed Andric because of Andric’s political opinion (actual or imputed), consistent with INS v. Elias-Zacarias.
• Although the court criticized the IJ practice of appending a boilerplate “Addendum of Law” and incorporating it by reference, it did not invalidate the practice here because the outcome was clear.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role)

Mohammed v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 1037 (7th Cir. 2026)

The court invoked Mohammed for the review posture: when the BIA adopts and expands the IJ’s decision, the court reviews the IJ’s reasoning alongside the BIA’s analysis. This frames the court’s willingness to scrutinize both the IJ’s and BIA’s rationales (including waiver determinations and nexus findings).

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845 (2026)

This was the opinion’s most consequential doctrinal anchor on appellate review. Quoting Urias-Orellana, the Seventh Circuit stated it must review “the entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the underlying factual findings and the application of the [INA] to those findings—for substantial evidence.” The court further emphasized that the agency’s determination whether undisputed facts rise to the level of “persecution” is treated as conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary” (tracking 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

Notably, the court distinguished (or at least reserved) one traditional Seventh Circuit practice: it reiterated that whether a proposed PSG is cognizable has been treated as a question of law reviewed de novo under Cece v. Holder, and it saw “no reason to think the standard has changed after Urias-Orellana,” even while acknowledging the Supreme Court’s directive does not address that specific question.

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)

Elias-Zacarias supplied two core constraints:

• Motive is critical: An applicant must provide some evidence—direct or circumstantial—of the persecutor’s motive tied to a protected ground.
• Victim’s political opinion, not persecutor’s: “Persecution on account of ... political opinion” means persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.

The court used this to reject the notion that hooligans’ nationalism (if any) could substitute for evidence of political opinion imputed to Andric. It also undercut Andric’s earlier “anti-hooligan”/reporting-to-police theory by emphasizing the absence of evidence that hooligans targeted him for such a belief.

Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 831 (7th Cir. 2025)

Cited for the statutory nexus standard: a protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). The court effectively treated the case as a nexus failure: even if harm occurred, it was not centrally motivated by a protected ground.

Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2016)

The court cited this for the familiar burden-shifting framework: proof of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. But the court bypassed this structure because nexus failed—illustrating that past persecution analysis is often academic if the motive element is missing.

Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc)

Cece provided the PSG definition: the group must be defined by characteristics that are immutable or so fundamental that a person should not be required to change them. The court leaned on Cece to reject “professional soccer player” as inherently immutable, while also acknowledging (in a noteworthy aside) that some occupations might, depending on the record, be so integral to identity that change should not be required.

Borja-Pacheco v. Blanche, No. 23-8052, 2026 WL 1145957 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026)

Cited as a comparative reference (“Cf.”) to suggest other circuits are grappling with review standards and/or PSG framing post-Urias-Orellana. It functions as a signal that the Seventh Circuit’s approach aligns with emerging cross-circuit treatment, though the court did not rely on it for a holding.

Duarte-Salagosa v. Holder, 775 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2014)

This case anchored the waiver/exhaustion principle: the applicant cannot present a new social group for the first time to the BIA. Applying that rule, the Seventh Circuit accepted the BIA’s waiver finding when Andric shifted from current soccer players targeted by hooligans to “former soccer players in Serbia.”

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824 (9th Cir. 2022); Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 545 (2024); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)

These authorities appeared in a footnote that, while not dispositive, is jurisprudentially important:

• Plancarte Sauceda illustrates a path for occupational PSGs where the relevant “trait” (skills/credentials) remains even if one stops working.
• Miguel-Pena (quoting Matter of Acosta) reflects the countervailing proposition: refugee law does not guarantee the right to work in the job of one’s choice; changing jobs may be expected to avoid harm.

The Seventh Circuit did not decide the full scope of occupational immutability because Andric conceded professional soccer was “just a job.” But the footnote preserves space for future litigants to build a record showing an occupation is fundamental or effectively immutable in context.

Mustafa v. Holder, 707 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2013)

Mustafa reinforced a central analytic move: a “personal dispute” cannot support an asylum claim. The court treated hooligan retaliation for poor play (and possibly resentment over pay) as personal/performance-based targeting, not persecution “on account of” group membership.

Mengistu v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2004); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2007)

These cases framed the procedural critique. The Seventh Circuit reiterated that agency orders must show reasoned decision-making and build a “rational bridge” between record and conclusion (Mengistu). It acknowledged systemic workload pressures but stressed those pressures do not “excuse” egregious failures given the stakes in asylum cases (Kadia).

Even so, the court declined to reject the “Addendum of Law” practice categorically, emphasizing that the result here was clear and that no appellate court appears to have invalidated the practice to date.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The Case Turns on Nexus, Not the Severity of Harm

The court strategically bypassed the contentious question of whether a single beating with hospitalization and subsequent threats amounted to “persecution,” because it found a dispositive absence of nexus to a protected ground. This is a common asylum adjudication pattern: even serious harm does not qualify unless it is inflicted “on account of” one of the five protected grounds in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

B. Particular Social Group: Immutability/Fundamentality and the “Personal Grievance” Problem

Andric’s initial PSG—“Serbian soccer players who are victims of violence from soccer hooligans who were unsatisfied with their play”—failed for intertwined reasons:

• Immutability/fundamentality: Andric conceded professional soccer is not immutable/fundamental in his case (“just a job”), which undercuts PSG cognizability under Cece v. Holder.
• Nexus and circularity concerns: The court emphasized that the real driver of harm was dissatisfaction with Andric’s performance—“individual, transient factors”—rather than hostility to a socially recognized group. The logic implies the PSG is effectively “people targeted because they were targeted,” a framing that tends to collapse into non-protected personal retaliation.
• Personal dispute doctrine: Consistent with Mustafa v. Holder, the court characterized the hooligans’ conduct as personal/performance-based retaliation rather than persecution based on protected status.

C. The Attempted “Fix” (Former Players) Was Waived and Also Substantively Thin

Before the BIA, Andric reframed the PSG as “former soccer players in Serbia.” The Seventh Circuit accepted the BIA’s waiver finding under Duarte-Salagosa v. Holder. The court also explained why, even apart from waiver, the new PSG did not solve the core problem: former players are “no longer engaged in any activity that would expose them to angry fans,” and the record lacked evidence of long-term, retirement-based targeting.

D. Political Opinion: Waiver in the Court of Appeals and Evidentiary Deficiency

The court found that Andric waived political-opinion persecution because his argument section on appeal did not develop it. On the merits, the court invoked INS v. Elias-Zacarias to explain why (1) the hooligans’ possible political motivations do not suffice and (2) Andric offered no solid evidence that hooligans imputed a political opinion to him or attacked him because of it.

E. Standard of Review After Urias-Orellana

The opinion’s methodological significance is its explicit adoption of the Supreme Court’s instruction that appellate review applies substantial-evidence deference to the “entirety” of the agency’s conclusions, including application of the INA to the facts. While the Seventh Circuit did not need to push that principle to its limits here (because nexus failure was clear), it signals reduced room for appellate relitigation of mixed questions—especially “does this amount to persecution?” determinations—absent a record that would “compel” a contrary conclusion.

3.3 Impact

• Nexus as a gatekeeper: The decision reinforces that even credible, serious violence will not support asylum if the motive is personal retaliation (here, anger over performance and pay) rather than a protected ground.
• PSG discipline and waiver: The opinion underscores that applicants must precisely articulate their PSG to the IJ; attempts to reframe the group later risk waiver. This pressures counsel to develop PSG theories early and create a supporting factual record at the IJ hearing.
• Occupational PSGs remain possible—but record-dependent: The court’s footnote discussion (contrasting Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland with Miguel-Pena v. Garland and Matter of Acosta) keeps open the possibility that some professions, credentials, or non-transferable skills may be “fundamental” or practically immutable, but it will require careful evidence and theory.
• Post-Urias-Orellana deference: Future Seventh Circuit petitions should expect substantial-evidence deference not only to factfinding but also to agency applications of legal standards to those facts—especially around what constitutes “persecution.”
• Procedural signal to immigration courts: While not condemning the “Addendum of Law” format, the court’s critique invites future challenges where the addendum practice truly prevents meaningful review—particularly if the outcome is not “clear.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Andric v. Blanche is principally a nexus-and-procedure decision. It holds that violence by soccer hooligans triggered by dissatisfaction with an athlete’s performance is, on this record, personal/performance-based retaliation rather than persecution “on account of” a protected ground, and therefore cannot sustain asylum. The decision also reinforces that applicants must present their PSG theory to the IJ; reformulating the group at the BIA stage invites waiver. Finally, the opinion operationalizes the Supreme Court’s directive in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi toward substantial-evidence review of the agency’s application of the INA to facts, while cautioning immigration courts that boilerplate “Addendum of Law” practices risk undermining the “rational bridge” required for meaningful appellate review.