Competency First: A Defendant Must Be Competent Before Undergoing a § 16-8-107(3)(b) Mental-Condition Examination

Case: The People of the State of Colorado v. Maria Laida Day
Citation: People v. Day, 2026 CO 16 (Colo. Mar. 16, 2026)
Court: Colorado Supreme Court (en banc)

1. Introduction

People v. Day arises from a fatal incident in which Maria Laida Day struck her boyfriend with a car and drove away; he later died from injuries. The People charged Day with second degree murder and other offenses, and Day’s culpable mental state—particularly whether she acted “knowingly”—became central at trial.

Although Day did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”), she sought to introduce expert testimony about her mental condition under § 16-8-107(3)(b), C.R.S. (2025). That statute allows certain expert mental-condition evidence without an NGRI plea, but only if the defendant gives notice and undergoes a court-ordered mental-condition examination under § 16-8-106. Despite years of litigation and multiple orders, no such examination was completed. The trial court excluded Day’s expert (Dr. Karen Fukutaki) and the jury convicted Day. A division of the court of appeals reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, establishing a key procedural rule: a defendant must be competent before a § 16-8-107(3)(b) mental-condition examination may proceed.

The case therefore presented intertwined issues: (1) how Colorado’s statutory scheme separates “mental condition” evidence from “insanity” evidence; (2) what to do when the statutorily required examination is not completed; and (3) how competency limits what the court can require of, and hold against, a defendant.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment reversing Day’s convictions on counts for which culpability was at issue, and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion.

The Court’s principal holding is narrow but consequential: a defendant must be competent before undergoing a mental-condition examination under § 16-8-107(3)(b). Because Day was deemed “uncooperative” at a time she was incompetent, the trial court abused its discretion in using that “noncooperation” to exclude all expert mental-condition testimony.

The Court also addressed how trial courts should screen proffered mental-condition testimony after People v. Moore, requiring courts to separate what is probative of statutory “insanity” (inadmissible without an NGRI plea) from what is not. Finally, the Court clarified that even if testimony clears the statutory bar, it remains subject to the Colorado Rules of Evidence—including CRE 403—and the CRE 403 inquiry must consider the purpose for which evidence is offered.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The decision is built on two doctrinal pillars: (a) the statutory/definitional boundary between “insanity” evidence and other mental-condition evidence, and (b) the constitutional and statutory limitations on prosecuting an incompetent defendant.

  • People v. Day, 2023 COA 115, 544 P.3d 1242: The division reversed because the trial court faulted Day for noncooperation when she was incompetent and because the trial court failed to “parse” the testimony under Moore. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal but grounded its reasoning differently on the scope of the competency noncooperation statute.
  • People v. Moore, 2021 CO 26, 485 P.3d 1088: This was the controlling framework for distinguishing inadmissible “insanity” evidence from admissible “mental condition” evidence when no NGRI plea is entered. The Court reiterated Moore’s instruction that trial courts must determine whether proposed testimony is “probative of what the legislature has defined as insanity” and exclude only those parts that meet that definition.
  • People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo. 1994): Cited for the baseline rule that when competency is at issue, proceedings must be suspended until competency is determined. The Court used this principle to support its conclusion that a mental-condition examination requiring personal participation should not proceed while a defendant is incompetent.
  • Jones v. Dist. Ct., 617 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1980): Cited for the broader proposition that the bar on prosecuting an incompetent defendant attaches at formal proceedings and continues through sentence execution. This contextualized why competency is not a momentary technicality but a continuing constraint.
  • Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, 288 P.3d 116 and People v. Johnson, 2021 CO 35, 486 P.3d 1154: These cases supplied the harmless-error framework. Because the excluded evidence impaired Day’s ability to present a complete defense, reversal was required unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • People v. West, 2025 CO 61, 578 P.3d 832 (quoting People v. Kent, 2020 CO 85, 476 P.3d 762): Provided the abuse-of-discretion definition and underscored that a legal misapplication constitutes an abuse of discretion.
  • People v. Griego, 2018 CO 5, 409 P.3d 338: Supplied core statutory-interpretation method (plain meaning; effectuate legislative intent).
  • People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42M, 575 P.3d 400 (quoting People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, 544 P.3d 1202): Cited for applying the law in effect at the time of appeal, explaining why Moore informed review of the trial court’s earlier decision.
  • People v. Vanrees, 125 P.3d 403 (Colo. 2005): Reinforced that Colorado’s insanity framework is not “all or nothing”; mental-condition evidence may be relevant to culpable mental state without necessarily triggering an NGRI posture.
  • People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, 496 P.3d 430: Cited for the CRE 403 principle that courts must be mindful of the purposes for which evidence is offered (relevant to the Court’s clarification that statutory admissibility and CRE 403 are distinct steps).
  • Dissent’s statutory-interpretation and evidentiary-burden authorities: The dissent invoked Town of Minturn v. Tucker, 2013 CO 3, Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortg. Invs. Enters. LLC, 2018 CO 12, and Dep't of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41 for textualist principles; and cited People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221, People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729, and People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192 for the rule that proponents bear the burden of meeting prerequisites for admission.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The statutory gateway: § 16-8-107(3)(b) and § 16-8-106

The Court began with the statutory structure. Section 16-8-107(3)(a) generally bars “evidence relevant to the issue of insanity” absent an NGRI plea. But § 16-8-107(3)(b) permits “evidence in the nature of expert opinion concerning the defendant’s mental condition” even without an NGRI plea if (1) the defense provides notice and (2) the defendant undergoes a court-ordered exam under § 16-8-106.

Section 16-8-106(2)(c) adds a cooperation requirement: if a defendant does not cooperate, “the court shall not allow” defense expert testimony about mental condition. The Court gave “cooperate” its ordinary meaning (drawing from Merriam-Webster): to work with the evaluator and comply so the examination can be completed.

B. Competency is different from mental condition at the time of the offense—and it limits examinations

The Court then separated two concepts that often blur in practice:

  • Competency concerns a defendant’s present ability to rationally understand proceedings and assist counsel. See § 16-8.5-101(12).
  • Mental condition at the time of the offense can be evidence relevant to mens rea, post-event conduct, or other issues, so long as it is not “probative of insanity” under the statutory definition.

Critically, Colorado law requires suspension of proceedings when competency is in doubt, allowing only matters “susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.” § 16-8.5-102(1). From that premise, the Court reasoned that a mental-condition exam necessarily requires the defendant’s personal participation; if a defendant cannot meaningfully participate in her defense, she “likely can’t meaningfully participate” in such an exam either. Therefore, a mental-condition examination under § 16-8-107(3)(b) should not proceed until the defendant is competent.

C. Application to Day: “Noncooperation” during incompetency cannot be used to preclude the defense

The trial court excluded Dr. Fukutaki’s testimony, stating that because no § 16-8-107(3)(b) exam occurred due to Day’s noncooperation, it could deny admission “on this basis alone.” The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court abused its discretion—but not because § 16-8.5-105(2) directly barred considering noncooperation in this context. Instead, the Court held § 16-8.5-105(2) governs admissibility of noncooperation at competency/restoration hearings, not at trial.

The Court’s core move was broader: because Day’s incompetence made any mental-condition exam attempt “a nullity,” it was error to treat her lack of cooperation (while incompetent) as a valid basis to bar mental-condition evidence. The Court also faulted the trial court for not enforcing its own outstanding orders to obtain the required exam once Day was competent and before ruling to exclude the evidence.

D. Statutory admissibility vs. CRE 403: distinct steps

The Court clarified an important sequencing point from Moore:

  1. Statutory screening (insanity-relatedness): Under Moore, the court must determine whether the proffered testimony (in whole or part) is “probative of insanity” as statutorily defined. If it is, it is inadmissible absent an NGRI plea.
  2. Evidentiary screening (rules of evidence): Even if the testimony is statutorily admissible, it must still satisfy the Colorado Rules of Evidence—including CRE 403’s balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice, confusion, etc. Here, unlike the statutory analysis, the CRE 403 analysis does consider the purpose for which the evidence is offered. (The Court cited People v. Cooper for that proposition.)

Because the required examination had not yet occurred—and the examination could affect the CRE 403 balance—the Court declined to resolve the CRE 403 question on the existing record and left it for the trial court on remand after an examination.

E. The dissent’s disagreement: who bears responsibility for the missing examination?

The dissent agreed with the “competency first” premise (a court may not fault an incompetent defendant for noncooperation) but would have affirmed the exclusion on a different textual ground: § 16-8-107(3)(b) states a defendant “is not permitted” to introduce expert mental-condition evidence “without having undergone” the exam. Because Day had never undergone the exam—whatever the reason—the dissent read the statute as a bright-line bar requiring exclusion.

The dissent also objected to what it viewed as the majority’s “shifting” of the burden of ensuring the exam occurs from the proponent (the defense) to the trial court, invoking the general rule that proponents bear the burden of showing admissibility prerequisites are satisfied (citing cases like People v. Vanderpauye, People v. Montoya, and People v. Sutherland).

3.3. Impact

1) A new procedural prerequisite in practice: competency before § 16-8-107(3)(b) exams. The Court’s holding that a defendant must be competent before undergoing a § 16-8-107(3)(b) mental-condition exam adds a competency “gate” that trial courts, prosecutors, and evaluators must account for. This will likely affect scheduling and sequencing in cases where a defendant’s competency fluctuates.

2) Limits on “noncooperation” sanctions. The opinion narrows when noncooperation can be used to exclude defense expert testimony under § 16-8-106(2)(c): noncooperation during incompetency cannot fairly be treated as disqualifying because the defendant cannot meaningfully participate.

3) Reinforced duty to parse mental-condition evidence under People v. Moore. Trial courts must avoid wholesale exclusion and instead separate inadmissible insanity-probative components from admissible mental-condition components. This promotes more tailored rulings and encourages limiting instructions and redaction of expert opinions rather than categorical suppression.

4) Clearer two-step admissibility framework (statutory bar, then CRE 403). The Court’s clarification that CRE 403 analysis is distinct—and purpose-sensitive—may shape more disciplined trial-court reasoning, particularly in cases where mental-condition evidence is offered to explain post-event conduct (as it was here) rather than to negate mens rea directly.

5) Ongoing tension on burden allocation. The dissent signals future litigation over who must ensure the exam occurs once ordered. The majority’s approach suggests trial courts must not treat an uncompleted exam—when incompletion is tied to incompetency and systemic delay—as an automatic forfeiture of the defense. But the dissent’s bright-line reading may be invoked by prosecutors in future cases to argue strict exclusion when the statutory condition is unmet.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Insanity vs. “mental condition” evidence

Colorado draws a line between:

  • Insanity evidence (generally inadmissible unless the defendant pleads NGRI): evidence that is “probative of what the legislature has defined as insanity,” i.e., a “mental disease or defect” that “grossly and demonstrably impair[s]” perception or understanding of reality. See § 16-8-102(7); People v. Moore.
  • Mental condition evidence (sometimes admissible without NGRI): expert testimony about a defendant’s mental condition that does not meet the statutory definition of insanity, offered for other issues (e.g., explaining behavior, rebutting inferences about mens rea), provided statutory notice and examination requirements are met. See § 16-8-107(3)(b); People v. Vanrees.

Competency

Competency is about a defendant’s ability right now to understand the case and work with counsel. An incompetent defendant cannot be tried, and proceedings must pause except for matters that can be fairly decided without the defendant’s participation. See § 16-8.5-101(12); § 16-8.5-102(1); People v. Zapotocky.

CRE 403 (balancing test)

Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is likely to unfairly prejudice the jury, confuse issues, or mislead the jury in a way that substantially outweighs its probative value. This is distinct from the statutory “insanity-relatedness” screen and requires attention to why the evidence is being offered. See CRE 403; People v. Cooper.

5. Conclusion

People v. Day establishes that a defendant must be competent before undergoing the court-ordered mental-condition examination required by § 16-8-107(3)(b). The decision constrains the use of “noncooperation” findings when the defendant was incompetent, reinforces People v. Moore’s requirement that trial courts parse mental-condition testimony to exclude only the insanity-probative parts, and clarifies that CRE 403 remains an independent, purpose-sensitive evidentiary checkpoint.

In broader context, the opinion reflects a balancing of statutory gatekeeping against the constitutional imperative of a meaningful defense: when the prosecution relies on post-event demeanor to prove mens rea, defendants must have a fair opportunity—consistent with statutory and evidentiary limits—to rebut that inference with properly vetted expert testimony.