1. Introduction
People v. Johnson addresses a fundamental tension in criminal procedure: how to preserve the finality of guilty pleas without insulating proceedings in which the defendant’s mental fitness was never adequately established. The Illinois Supreme Court held that an issue inadvertently omitted from a defendant’s postplea motion is forfeited, rather than intentionally waived, and therefore may receive plain-error review. In doing so, the court partially overruled People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, and restored the approach taken in People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337.
The decision also clarifies the remedy for a defective restoration-to-fitness proceeding. A reviewing court may order a retrospective fitness hearing only when there is a reasonable probability that the defendant’s earlier fitness can be accurately determined from contemporaneous evidence. Such hearings remain exceptional, not automatic.
The defendant, Gregory A. Johnson Jr., had been charged with murdering Timothy Ellis. After being found mentally unfit to stand trial, Johnson received treatment and was subsequently declared restored to fitness. He later pleaded guilty under a negotiated agreement. The central problem was that the restoration ruling rested on an extremely abbreviated stipulation concerning an unidentified doctor’s opinion, without the underlying report or meaningful supporting clinical information.
The court affirmed the appellate court’s decision to vacate the restoration order and remand for a limited retrospective hearing. It did not immediately vacate Johnson’s guilty plea. Whether that plea survives depends on whether reliable contemporaneous evidence establishes that he had regained fitness before pleading guilty.
2. Background and Procedural History
The initial finding of unfitness
Johnson was charged with first degree murder in October 2017. His behavior during arraignment, his attorney’s observations, and concerns about his mental condition led to a fitness examination. In March 2018, the circuit court found him unfit, with the expectation that treatment could restore him to fitness.
Although the original evaluation and written unfitness order were absent from the appellate record, the parties agreed that an unfitness finding had been entered. Treatment records supported that understanding. Johnson was admitted to Chester Mental Health Center in May 2018, initially with diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder. He received olanzapine and lorazepam.
Conflicting treatment information
An August 2018 progress report stated that Johnson lacked a rational understanding of court proceedings and could not assist his public defender. Later records were less consistent. An unsigned October 22 treatment plan review reported that his primary diagnosis had changed to adult oppositional defiant disorder and contained statements indicating that he had become fit. Yet it also identified fitness as an ongoing treatment goal and expressly stated that the treatment team considered him unfit.
An October 30 transport order referred to a progress report indicating restored fitness. At the subsequent restoration hearing, counsel identified that report as dated October 25, 2018. The report itself, however, was missing from the appellate record. A separate November notice stated only that Johnson had been discharged and “recommended as fit to stand trial.”
The restoration hearing and guilty plea
At the November 14, 2018, restoration hearing, the presiding judge stated that the progress report was not in the court file. Defense counsel proposed that the parties stipulate that the doctor would testify consistently with the report. The court understood this as an opinion restoring Johnson to fitness and entered its ruling on that basis.
The stipulation did not identify the doctor, establish professional qualifications, describe an examination, explain the clinical findings, address medication dependence, or state that Johnson could understand the proceedings and assist counsel.
On March 11, 2019, Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder in exchange for a 45-year prison sentence, followed by three years of mandatory supervised release, and dismissal of other charges. During the plea hearing, he said he had not taken mental-health medication since November 1, 2018, but affirmed that he was thinking clearly.
Postplea litigation
Johnson sought to withdraw his plea. After an initial timeliness ruling was reversed in People v. Johnson, No. 4-19-0412 (2020), appointed counsel filed an amended motion alleging that lack of medication impaired Johnson’s understanding at the plea hearing and that plea counsel was ineffective.
The circuit court denied that motion. On appeal, Johnson specifically challenged the earlier restoration ruling. The appellate court found plain error, vacated the restoration order, and directed a retrospective fitness hearing while retaining jurisdiction over a separate claim concerning Johnson’s requests to represent himself during postplea proceedings.
Johnson appealed because he wanted immediate vacatur of his plea. The State sought cross-relief, arguing that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and, alternatively, that plain-error review was unavailable or unwarranted.
3. Summary of the Decision
| Issue |
Resolution |
| Appellate jurisdiction |
The notice appealing denial of the motion to withdraw the plea encompassed the earlier, interlocutory restoration order under the merger rule. |
| Preservation |
The lead opinion concluded that Johnson’s motion challenged the plea proceedings, not the November 2018 restoration ruling, and therefore did not preserve that specific claim. |
| Plain-error review after a guilty plea |
Available for forfeited claims not independently barred by the waiver-by-guilty-plea doctrine. The contrary portion of People v. Ratliff was overruled. |
| Sufficiency of restoration evidence |
The vague stipulation and conclusory discharge notice did not establish restored fitness by a preponderance of the evidence. |
| Invited error |
Agreeing to the stipulation prevented an objection to its consideration, but did not prevent a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. |
| Remedy |
A limited retrospective hearing was permissible because the record suggested that a contemporaneous progress report probably existed and could establish Johnson’s earlier fitness. |
| If reliable reconstruction fails |
The plea must be vacated and proceedings begun anew. The court specifically required that result if the missing report cannot be located or is inconclusive. |
The significance of the separate opinions
Justice Cunningham’s lead opinion was joined by Justices Rochford and O’Brien. Chief Justice Neville and Justice Overstreet separately concurred in the judgment; Justice Holder White dissented. Justice Tailor did not participate.
These divisions matter. Four justices supported overruling the relevant portion of People v. Ratliff, because Chief Justice Neville expressly agreed with that action. But the lead opinion’s conclusion that Johnson failed to preserve his claim did not command four votes: both special concurrences considered the claim adequately raised, while the dissent considered the pertinent procedural bar inapplicable. The judgment authorizing the conditional retrospective hearing received five votes.
4. Analysis: Jurisdiction, Preservation, and Guilty-Plea Waiver Are Different Questions
A central contribution of the decision is its separation of three concepts that can otherwise become confused:
- Jurisdiction: Does the appellate court have authority to review the order?
- Preservation: Did the defendant present the particular claim adequately in the circuit court?
- Waiver by guilty plea: Did a valid plea relinquish the underlying right or objection?
A claim may fall within appellate jurisdiction yet remain forfeited. A forfeited claim may qualify for plain-error review. But plain error cannot revive a claim independently relinquished through a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
A. The merger rule brought the restoration order within appellate jurisdiction
The State argued that Johnson’s notice of appeal identified only the order denying withdrawal of his plea and therefore did not permit review of the earlier restoration order. The court rejected that position.
People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32 (2009), supplies the threshold requirement to consider jurisdiction first. People v. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, states the general rule that appellate jurisdiction extends to the judgments or portions of judgments identified in the notice. That rule operates alongside, rather than displaces, the merger doctrine.
Under People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122 (2003), drawing on Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427 (1979), an appeal from a final judgment also brings up earlier nonfinal orders that formed part of the procedural progression producing that judgment. People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, reinforces the distinction between appellate jurisdiction and other procedural requirements by identifying the timely notice of appeal as the jurisdictional step initiating review.
The statutory distinction between initial unfitness and restoration was decisive. An order finding a defendant unfit is immediately appealable under section 104-16(e) and Rule 604(e). A restoration order is not immediately appealable; it returns the prosecution to its ordinary course and therefore is interlocutory.
People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464 (2006), establishes that due process prohibits prosecution of an unfit defendant. People v. Elsholtz, 136 Ill. App. 3d 209 (1985), describes prosecution as dependent on fitness. Together, these authorities explain why restoration is necessarily part of the procedural progression toward conviction. People v. Finlaw, 2023 IL App (4th) 220797, provides a practical example of reviewing a restoration determination after final judgment.
B. A guilty plea does not eliminate appellate jurisdiction over antecedent orders
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), characterizes a guilty plea as a break in the preceding criminal process. Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), similarly recognizes that guilty pleas ordinarily preclude challenges to earlier case-related governmental conduct. The court nevertheless emphasized that this limitation generally concerns which claims survive a plea, not the appellate court’s jurisdiction.
The opinion relied on United States v. Riojas, 139 F.4th 465 (5th Cir. 2025), United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2012), United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007), and State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, as authorities distinguishing guilty-plea waiver from jurisdiction. It acknowledged the contrary federal approach in United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2011), which treated preplea claims as outside an Article III case or controversy. Illinois did not adopt that approach.
C. The jurisdictional holding in Ratliff survives, but narrowly
In People v. Ratliff, the defendant abandoned his request to withdraw his plea, pursued only sentencing reconsideration, and filed a notice directed to the sentencing ruling. An attempted amendment expanding the appeal came too late.
The State read that decision as effectively eliminating merger. The court instead confined it to its circumstances. Merger cannot be used to bypass Rule 604(d)’s requirement that a defendant seeking to challenge a guilty plea first pursue the required postplea motion.
People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34 (2011), and People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291 (2003), establish the significance of that motion requirement as a condition precedent to maintaining an appeal challenging the plea. Johnson, unlike the defendant in People v. Ratliff, actually pursued a motion to withdraw his plea and appealed its denial.
Thus, the decision does not permit merger to cure every failure to comply with postplea procedure. It distinguishes the absence or abandonment of the required motion from omission of a particular issue within a motion that was pursued.
5. Analysis: Rule 604(d), Forfeiture, and the Partial Overruling of Ratliff
A. Why the lead opinion found the claim unpreserved
People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988), explains that postplea motions give the trial court an opportunity to correct errors or develop a record before appellate review. Applying that purpose, the lead opinion distinguished a challenge to fitness at the March 2019 plea hearing from a challenge to the evidentiary basis of the November 2018 restoration order.
Johnson’s motion emphasized lack of medication, impaired understanding when pleading guilty, and counsel’s failure to seek another fitness inquiry. Its references to the restoration hearing were largely background. The motion and the State’s response focused on the plea transcript rather than the restoration transcript.
For the lead opinion, requiring the trial court to infer a distinct challenge to the restoration proceeding would improperly require the court to construct an argument. The special concurrences disagreed, illustrating the continuing difficulty of determining when related factual allegations adequately preserve the same essential claim.
B. “Deemed waived” does not turn inadvertence into intentional relinquishment
Rule 604(d) states that an issue not raised in the postplea motion “shall be deemed waived.” The State argued that this language conclusively creates intentional waiver, even if the omission was inadvertent, and therefore forecloses plain-error review.
The court rejected that interpretation. People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, distinguishes forfeiture, a failure timely to assert a right, from waiver, the intentional relinquishment of a known right. People v. Sophanavong applied that distinction to Rule 604(d), explaining that Illinois decisions historically used the two terms interchangeably.
The supporting authorities include People v. Hughes, 2015 IL 117242, and People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, on inconsistent historical terminology; Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, on procedural forfeiture; and People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, on using “forfeited” for issues that could have been raised but were not. References to Rule 604(d) as a “waiver rule” in People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, did not establish that every omission was a knowing abandonment.
C. The established guilty-plea precedents permitted plain-error review
Three Illinois Supreme Court decisions supplied the strongest precedential foundation:
-
People v. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d 484 (1985):
The court reviewed an unpreserved claim that defective plea admonishments made a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary, expressly recognizing plain-error review after a plea.
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People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240 (1991):
The court described plain error as an exception to Rule 604(d)’s waiver rule and explained that deficient Rule 402 admonishments could qualify.
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People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308 (2002):
The court repeated that plain error can provide an exception when required plea admonishments are omitted.
The discussion in People v. Davis also placed People v. Tannenbaum, 82 Ill. 2d 177, within a rule-and-exception framework. Its treatment of People v. Adkisson, 78 Ill. App. 3d 923, clarified that reversal of that appellate decision rested on harmlessness, not the categorical unavailability of an exception. People v. Waldorf, 94 Ill. App. 3d 976, and People v. Young, 33 Ill. App. 3d 443, likewise supported relief from procedural default for sufficiently serious errors.
In re Timothy P., 388 Ill. App. 3d 98, expressly used forfeiture terminology while permitting plain-error analysis, drawing on In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, and People v. Blankley, 319 Ill. App. 3d 996. Other cited decisions showed that review was not confined to admonishment errors:
- People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, and People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, considered charging-instrument claims bearing on whether pleas were knowing and voluntary.
- People v. Reher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 32, and People v. Jones, 88 Ill. App. 3d 737, addressed allegedly unfulfilled prosecutorial promises inducing pleas.
- People v. Thomas, 246 Ill. App. 3d 708, reviewed an unpreserved claim that unfitness rendered a plea involuntary.
People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, and People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, further demonstrated the historical use of “waiver” to describe defaults that remained subject to plain-error review. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, supplied the overarching principle: fairness is the foundation of plain-error jurisprudence.
D. Why stare decisis did not preserve Ratliff’s contrary language
People v. Ratliff had rejected the terminology adopted in People v. Sophanavong. The court now concluded that this rejection misunderstood both the historical use of “waiver” and the longstanding availability of plain-error review.
More importantly, People v. Ratliff had not discussed or justified departure from People v. Walker, People v. Davis, or People v. Fuller. The court considered that failure particularly significant when assessing the force of stare decisis.
People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, recognizes that poorly reasoned or unworkable decisions may be overruled for good cause. People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, confirms that stare decisis does not prevent correction of a mistake. The quotation from Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Henslee v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, served as a rhetorical endorsement of correcting error rather than a substantive source of Illinois procedure.
The overruling is limited: inadvertent omission from a postplea motion is forfeiture and may receive plain-error review. The court made that ruling effective immediately and applicable to cases pending on review in the appellate court and supreme court. It did not announce automatic reopening of final convictions.
6. Analysis: Plain Error Does Not Undo a Valid Guilty Plea’s Actual Waivers
The court carefully limited its restored plain-error rule. Under People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543 (2004), a knowing and voluntary guilty plea generally relinquishes objections to antecedent nonjurisdictional defects. Plain error does not restore rights actually surrendered by that plea.
People v. Townsell applied that principle to the jury-factfinding right recognized in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). A defendant who validly gives up a jury trial cannot use plain error simply to reclaim the jury’s role.
The opinion also acknowledged established exceptions. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), permits a vindictive-prosecution challenge; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), recognizes survival of a double-jeopardy claim in the circumstances addressed there; and Class v. United States establishes that a guilty plea does not by itself foreclose a constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction.
Johnson’s claim was different from an ordinary challenge to preplea conduct: it attacked his capacity to enter a valid plea at all. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), rejects the contradiction inherent in treating a possibly incompetent defendant as having knowingly waived determination of competency.
The court supported that principle with State v. Cleary, 2003 VT 9, while noting its overruling on other grounds by In re Bridger, 2017 VT 79; State v. Bishop, 679 P.2d 1054; People v. Armlin, 332 N.E.2d 870; State v. Wead, 609 N.W.2d 64; and People v. Parney, 253 N.W.2d 698. These decisions reject using a plea to validate the allegedly defective competency determination necessary to make that same plea lawful.
The resulting distinction is precise: plain error may excuse procedural forfeiture, but it cannot reverse a valid substantive waiver; a claim that the plea itself was invalid is not defeated by assuming the plea was valid.
7. Analysis: What the State Must Prove at a Restoration Hearing
A. The statutory standard concerns functional ability
Section 104-10 defines unfitness by inability, because of a mental or physical condition, to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or assist in the defense. The inquiry is functional. A diagnostic label, standing alone, neither establishes nor defeats fitness.
Although defendants initially are presumed fit, an adjudication of unfitness changes the position. People v. Finlaw recognizes a continuing presumption of unfitness until the State proves restoration. People v. Maynard, 347 Ill. 422 (1932), supplies the historical continuity principle. Its older terminology does not replace the modern statutory test.
Under section 104-11(c), the State bears both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of establishing fitness by a preponderance of the evidence. The question was therefore not merely whether a clinician had recommended return to court, but whether the evidence established the required capacities.
B. Stipulated expert evidence is permissible, but must be meaningful
People v. Lewis, 103 Ill. 2d 111 (1984), is the principal precedent governing stipulated evidence in restoration proceedings. It permits the parties to stipulate to a psychiatrist’s expected testimony, including an opinion that the defendant understands the charges and can cooperate with counsel.
That authority does not permit counsel to bind the court to a legal finding of fitness. The court remains free to find restoration proved, request further information, or find the evidence insufficient. People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d 294, places the ultimate determination with the court.
People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, and Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281 (1917), distinguish permissible factual stipulations from agreements purporting to control legal conclusions. Illinois Rule of Evidence 704, meanwhile, permits expert testimony touching an ultimate issue. Thus, an expert may express a fitness opinion without displacing the judge’s independent responsibility.
The crucial point in Johnson’s case was evidentiary sufficiency, not a categorical prohibition on oral stipulations. The unidentified doctor’s unexplained conclusion carried essentially no probative value. The court lacked the information needed to connect the opinion to the statutory test.
C. The remaining documents did not fill the gap
The unsigned October treatment plan review was not shown to have been before the court at the restoration hearing. Even if considered, its internal contradictions would prevent it from supporting restoration. The notice of changed status merely repeated a recommendation of fitness without explaining its basis.
Neither the State nor the court questioned Johnson about his understanding or ability to assist counsel. The supreme court treated that absence as part of the overall evidentiary deficiency, not as a declaration that every restoration hearing requires a particular scripted examination.
Nor did the decision impose a universal live-testimony requirement. The opinion noted a later statutory provision concerning testimony before inpatient restoration placement, but no issue concerning compliance with that provision was presented.
D. Invited error did not foreclose the sufficiency challenge
People v. Hughes and In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, prohibit a party from inducing a ruling and then attacking that same ruling on appeal. Because defense counsel proposed the stipulation, Johnson could not complain simply that the court considered it.
But agreement that evidence may be considered is not agreement that the evidence satisfies the opponent’s burden. Relying on People v. Lewis, the court held that Johnson could still argue that the entire evidentiary presentation failed to establish restoration.
E. The error affected the fundamental fairness of the proceedings
People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, describes second-prong plain error in terms generally associated with structural defects undermining the integrity and fairness of judicial proceedings. People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, establishes that prosecution amid a bona fide doubt about fitness is fundamentally unfair.
Here, the unsupported restoration ruling allowed prosecution to continue while the presumption of unfitness remained unrebutted. That established second-prong plain error. It did not, however, conclusively establish that Johnson was actually unfit when he pleaded guilty. That distinction explains why a retrospective inquiry remained possible.
8. Analysis: Retrospective Fitness Hearings Are Exceptional and Record-Dependent
A. The constitutional difficulty of reconstructing an earlier mental condition
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), Pate v. Robinson, and Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), emphasize the difficulties of retrospectively deciding competency. Memories fade, witnesses disappear, and a present-day examination cannot directly reveal a defendant’s capacities years earlier.
Nevertheless, the court rejected an absolute prohibition. People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, supports a case-specific inquiry into whether adequate contemporaneous evidence permits a fair and accurate determination. People v. Thomas, 43 Ill. 2d 328, recognized the relevance of whether evidence of the earlier mental condition could be reconstructed.
B. “Now the norm” did not mean automatic remand
Johnson argued that appellate courts had overread language in People v. Mitchell describing retrospective hearings as “now the norm.” The court explained that phrase against the development of Illinois law.
People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, reflected an earlier automatic-reversal approach. People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, retreated from that approach and upheld a retrospective determination supported by the available evidence. People v. Neal, 179 Ill. 2d 541, confirmed that retrospective determinations were not invariably improper, while reserving them for exceptional cases.
Read in context, People v. Mitchell described retrospective hearings as an available remedy within a case-by-case approach; it did not direct them whenever any fitness error occurred. The appellate court’s reliance on People v. Payne, 2018 IL App (3d) 160105, therefore did not establish that it had applied an automatic-remand rule.
C. The clarified threshold
A retrospective fitness hearing may be ordered when there is a reasonable probability that the defendant’s fitness at the original proceeding can be accurately determined from the contemporaneous record.
This threshold governs whether a hearing is appropriate; it does not reduce the State’s burden to prove restoration. The ultimate determination must be fair, accurate, and grounded in evidence of the relevant historical condition.
The court reaffirmed People v. Neal’s caution that retrospective hearings normally will be inadequate when more than a year has passed. But time is not an absolute bar. Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, upheld reconstruction despite a nine-year interval and emphasized the quality of contemporaneous medical evidence. United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, likewise recognized that substantial delay may be overcome by adequate contemporary evidence. Musaid v. Kirkpatrick, 114 F.4th 90, United States v. Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226, and United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, supported the record-sensitive approach.
The opinion also warned that entirely new testimony may create due-process concerns. That is not a blanket exclusion of all testimony at the retrospective hearing. Rather, it emphasizes that reliable reconstruction must be anchored in contemporaneous information instead of speculative present-day assessments.
D. Why a hearing was permissible despite the long delay
Two references supported the probable existence of the missing October 2018 progress report: the transport order and counsel’s identification of the report at the restoration hearing.
Section 104-18 required such a report when the treatment supervisor believed Johnson had attained fitness. The required contents included clinical findings and supporting facts, a fitness opinion, and relevant medication information. If prepared as required and still available, the report could supply precisely the contemporaneous evidence missing from the original hearing.
The court did not assume that the report existed, complied with the statute, or conclusively established fitness. Those matters remained for remand. Its probable existence justified the limited opportunity to locate and evaluate it.
E. The remedy is strictly conditional
- If the report cannot be found, Johnson’s plea must be vacated and proceedings begun anew.
- If it is inconclusive, the plea likewise cannot stand.
- If the court can fairly and accurately establish restored fitness from sufficient contemporaneous evidence, the plea may survive this challenge.
- In that event, the appellate court retains jurisdiction under Rule 615(b)(2) to address the unresolved self-representation claim.
Any renewed prosecution remains subject to the ordinary requirement that Johnson be fit to proceed. The decision authorizes neither trial of an unfit defendant nor automatic preservation of the plea.
9. The Separate Opinions and Their Broader Significance
A. Chief Justice Neville: competency obligations should precede procedural default
Chief Justice Neville agreed with jurisdiction, partial overruling of People v. Ratliff, and retrospective remand. He disagreed that plain-error analysis was necessary.
Relying on People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, and Pate v. Robinson, he emphasized the court’s independent duty to investigate bona fide competency concerns. In his view, Rule 604(d)’s forfeiture provisions should not apply to a defendant already found unfit unless a legally adequate restoration determination has been made.
He also considered Johnson’s factual allegations sufficient. Drawing an analogy to People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, he favored the more forgiving “gist of a constitutional claim” approach used at the first stage of postconviction review.
Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026), supported his emphasis on institutional fairness and preventing miscarriages of justice in plea proceedings. This broader exemption from procedural default was his proposed approach, not a rule adopted by the court’s lead reasoning.
B. Justice Overstreet: the claim was preserved, making overruling unnecessary
Justice Overstreet also supported the judgment but concluded that Johnson’s motion and supporting materials adequately raised the restoration issue. People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97, supported examining whether the trial court had an opportunity to consider the same essential claim; People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, emphasized Rule 604(d)’s error-correction purpose.
Because he found no default, Justice Overstreet considered reconsideration of People v. Ratliff unnecessary. He invoked People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, on judicial restraint, and People v. Sharpe on the need for compelling justification before overruling precedent.
He further argued that People v. Ratliff had followed Rule 604(d)’s ordinary language. People v. English, 2023 IL 128077, People v. Shunick, 2024 IL 129244, and People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, supplied the textual approach to interpreting court rules. People v. Brusaw, 2023 IL 128474, supplied the conventional meaning of intentional waiver.
His practical solution was formal rule amendment: replace “waived” with “forfeited” through the Rule 3 committee and public-comment process. He cited In re Michael D., 2015 IL 119178, in support of institutional consideration through that process, and People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, for the availability of plain-error review of forfeited issues.
Justice Overstreet also identified possible consequences beyond guilty pleas. People v. Marshall, 2026 IL 132129, had treated the law concerning similar language in Rule 604(h)(2) as settled for purposes of a mootness exception. He cited People v. Jackson, 2025 IL App (4th) 241411-U, People v. Burries, 2025 IL App (5th) 241033, People v. Romero, 2025 IL App (2d) 240581-U, People v. Peoples, 2025 IL App (4th) 241349-U, People v. Carlton, 2025 IL App (5th) 241245-U, and People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 241846-U, as examples of post-People v. Ratliff treatment of omitted detention-related issues.
These authorities explain his concern about consistency. The court’s express holding in Johnson, however, concerns Rule 604(d) and guilty-plea appeals; it does not expressly decide the operation of Rule 604(h)(2).
C. Justice Holder White: the plea should have been vacated immediately
Justice Holder White agreed that appellate jurisdiction existed and that the restoration proceeding was defective, but opposed retrospective remand.
She considered the competency-based claim outside Rule 604(d)’s procedural bar. People v. Boose, 33 Ill. App. 3d 250, affirmed at 66 Ill. 2d 261, supported the proposition that prejudicial defects in fitness proceedings can undermine a later plea. People v. Jones, 349 Ill. App. 3d 255, supported declining to enforce postplea-motion requirements where competency concerns prevent an assumption that the defendant understood appeal admonishments.
On ordinary review, she would have applied abuse of discretion to the evidentiary ruling under In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, and manifest-weight review to the fitness finding under People v. Stahl, 2014 IL 115804. She found the stipulation and evidence inadequate under those standards.
Her principal disagreement concerned the reach of earlier retrospective-hearing cases. She stressed that People v. Mitchell and the line including People v. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461, and People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d 316, involved a former statutory entitlement to hearings for defendants receiving psychotropic medication. Denial of that statutory entitlement did not necessarily establish a constitutional competency violation.
She regarded People v. Thompson, 36 Ill. 2d 332, People v. Thomas, 43 Ill. 2d 328, and People v. Sandham as more persuasive guides because they required new proceedings in the competency circumstances before them. Her discussion of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), through Pate v. Robinson, underscored why retrospectively assessing competency may differ from retrospectively determining whether a confession was voluntary.
Given nearly eight years of delay and the absence of meaningful observations from the restoration hearing, she would have vacated the plea and sentence immediately. The disagreement therefore concerns how reliably contemporaneous documents can cure a missing valid competency determination, not whether such a determination is constitutionally necessary.
10. Potential Impact
For guilty-plea appeals
The decision restores a safety valve for serious errors inadvertently omitted from postplea motions. It does not make preservation optional: defendants must still identify their claims, satisfy the applicable plain-error requirements when default occurs, and confront substantive waivers created by valid pleas.
Its immediate application to pending appellate cases may affect cases in which People v. Ratliff had been invoked to categorically deny plain-error review. Its limited overruling should not be mistaken for rejection of that decision’s separate jurisdictional and postplea-motion principles.
For restoration proceedings
Courts and counsel must distinguish an expert’s conclusion from evidence supporting that conclusion. A sufficient record should identify the evaluator, explain the relevant examination and findings, address the statutory functional capacities, and clarify medication-related issues when material.
Stipulations remain useful, but cannot become substitutes for an evidentiary foundation or independent judicial judgment. Counsel’s agreement does not relieve the State of its burden.
For recordkeeping and remedial litigation
The missing report illustrates how document preservation can determine the fate of a conviction. Section 104-19 requires relevant medical reports to be maintained separately by the clerk; separate maintenance must not result in their disappearance from the materials available for lawful review.
Appellate courts must identify a concrete basis for believing reliable historical evidence exists before ordering retrospective proceedings. Conversely, elapsed time alone does not compel reversal if unusually strong contemporaneous evidence permits accurate reconstruction.
Questions left open
The decision does not fully resolve how its forfeiture analysis affects similarly worded rules outside guilty-plea appeals, how much additional testimony may properly supplement historical records, or when competency concerns excuse postplea requirements altogether. The separate opinions identify those issues without producing a single comprehensive rule governing them.
11. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Fitness to stand trial
- The present ability to understand the criminal proceedings and assist counsel. It is different from whether the defendant was legally insane when the alleged offense occurred.
- Restoration to fitness
- A judicial determination that a previously unfit defendant has regained the abilities needed to proceed. Treatment-center discharge alone does not establish it.
- Preponderance of the evidence
- Proof that a proposition is more likely true than not. The State must meet this burden when proving restoration.
- Forfeiture
- Losing ordinary review by failing to raise an issue at the required time. Plain-error review may remain available.
- Waiver
- Intentionally giving up a known right. A valid guilty plea waives important rights that plain error cannot simply restore.
- Second-prong plain error
- Review of an unpreserved error because it is sufficiently serious to undermine the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.
- Merger rule
- The principle that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily includes earlier nonfinal rulings that helped produce it.
- Stipulation
- An agreement about evidence or facts. Agreeing to what an expert would say does not require the judge to accept the expert’s conclusion.
- Retrospective fitness hearing
- A later hearing asking whether the defendant was fit at an earlier proceeding. It requires reliable evidence of the defendant’s condition at that earlier time.
- Vacating the restoration order versus vacating the plea
- Removing an unsupported fitness ruling does not necessarily establish actual historical unfitness. Here, the plea remains subject to the limited retrospective inquiry rather than being immediately set aside.
12. Conclusion
People v. Johnson protects the integrity of guilty pleas through two complementary rules. Inadvertently omitted postplea claims remain eligible for plain-error review, but valid substantive waivers remain binding. And a defective restoration hearing may be repaired retrospectively only when reliable contemporaneous evidence makes an accurate determination reasonably probable.
The immediate result is a conditional remand, not automatic preservation or invalidation of Johnson’s plea. The broader lesson is that neither counsel’s agreement nor procedural finality can substitute for a properly supported determination that a defendant has the capacity to participate in the criminal process.