People v. Buchanan: Distinct Second-Degree Weapon Possession Counts May Support Consecutive Sentences, Yet Appellate Courts May Reduce to Concurrent in the Interest of Justice

Case: People v. Buchanan, 2026 NY Slip Op 04459 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t July 16, 2026)
Court: Appellate Division, Third Department
Posture: Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction (manslaughter 1st degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon 2nd degree) and sentence (aggregate 40 years).
Disposition: Judgment modified to run all sentences concurrently; as modified, affirmed.

1. Introduction

The case arises from a July 2022 bar-side altercation in Schenectady. Markeith Buchanan (defendant) was physically assaulted outside the bar, went to his vehicle, retrieved a firearm, returned toward the bar area, and fired a single shot that fatally wounded the victim. Defendant proceeded to trial asserting justification (self-defense).

A jury convicted him of: (1) the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]); and (2) two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree—one for possessing a loaded firearm (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and another for possessing a loaded firearm with intent to use unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]).

On appeal, he challenged (i) legal sufficiency/justification; (ii) weight of the evidence; (iii) duplicity of the two weapon counts; (iv) a Sandoval ruling permitting limited impeachment by a prior robbery conviction; and (v) the legality and propriety of consecutive sentences on the two weapon counts.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Legal sufficiency: The Third Department held the sufficiency challenges were entirely unpreserved; additionally, the manslaughter sufficiency claim was forfeited because defendant requested that lesser included charge.
• Weight of the evidence: The verdicts were supported by the weight of the evidence, including the jury’s rejection of justification and the finding that defendant had an opportunity to retreat.
• Duplicity: The duplicity claim (counts 2 and 3) was unpreserved; the court declined to reach it in the interest of justice given defendant’s strategic choice to concede guilt on one weapon count.
• Sandoval: The limited cross-examination about a prior robbery conviction was affirmed as a proper exercise of discretion and, in any event, the challenge was unpreserved due to failure to object after the compromise.
• Sentencing: Consecutive sentences for counts 2 and 3 were lawful because they were based on separate and distinct acts; nevertheless, the Third Department exercised discretion to modify to concurrent sentences, reducing the aggregate sentence to 25 years plus 5 years’ PRS.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Preservation, forfeiture, and the scope of appellate review

The court’s preservation rulings draw on a line of cases emphasizing that appellate courts generally will not review legal sufficiency claims unless the defendant made (and properly renewed) a sufficiently specific motion for a trial order of dismissal.

• People v Kearney; People v Strange; People v Branton; People v Colbert: These cases support the forfeiture principle applied here: when a defendant affirmatively requests that a lesser included offense be charged, the defendant cannot later argue on appeal that the evidence was legally insufficient for that lesser offense. Buchanan extends this procedural consequence to the manslaughter conviction because defendant requested the lesser included charge.
• People v Baber; People v Harris (177 AD3d 1199); People v Cipriani; People v Benton: These cases anchor the court’s holding that a sufficiency argument premised on justification must be raised in a trial-order-of-dismissal motion, and that failing to renew the motion after the defense case is fatal to preservation. The Third Department treated the failures as complete forfeiture of legal sufficiency review.
• People v Ashe; People v Prusinski: These cases explain a key doctrinal “back door”: even where legal sufficiency is unpreserved, a weight-of-the-evidence review still requires the appellate court to assess whether the elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and whether justification was disproven.
• People v Davis; People v Abreu: These supply the standard for weight review: (1) determine whether a different verdict would have been unreasonable; and (2) weigh probative force and competing inferences, with appropriate deference to credibility assessments.

B. Justification and the duty to retreat

• People v Harris (186 AD3d 907): Used for the proposition that once justification is invoked, the People must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Department applied that burden framework while upholding the jury’s rejection of justification.
• People v DeCamp: Cited for New York’s retreat limitation: even if a person reasonably believes deadly force is imminent, the person may not use deadly force if they know they can retreat with complete safety. The video timeline and defendant’s decision to return from the car with a gun were evaluated through this lens.
• People v Zeoli; People v Cutting; People v Gibson: These cases supported the Third Department’s conclusion that the evidence permitted the jury to infer the requisite intent for manslaughter and weapon-possession-with-intent, and to reject defendant’s justification narrative.

C. Weapon possession proof and admissions

• People v Agan: Cited in rejecting the argument that count 2 rested solely on defendant’s testimony; the court emphasized that video evidence and logical inferences supported possession of a loaded firearm.

D. Duplicity and strategic waiver dynamics

• People v Allen: Cited for the general requirement that duplicity objections be preserved, and for the doctrinal treatment of duplicity claims on appeal.
• People v Wells: Used as a comparative reference point on preservation/handling of duplicity issues.
• People v Macias (quoting People v Becoats): Provides the policy rationale the Third Department adopted: allowing unpreserved duplicity claims would permit “sandbagging”—letting an issue ride at trial to gain advantage and then seeking reversal on appeal. The court found this case exemplified that risk because defense counsel conceded guilt on count 2 to enhance credibility on justification.
• People v Bonilla; People v Woods; People v Benn; and again People v Agan: These were invoked to justify declining to exercise interest-of-justice review to reach an unpreserved duplicity claim, while acknowledging appellate discretion exists (CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

E. Sandoval impeachment discretion and preservation

• People v Erfurt; People v Cooper: These support the preservation rule applied: when a trial court offers a Sandoval compromise, the defendant must object after the ruling to preserve a challenge.
• People v Pietoso: Cited for the governing Sandoval principle: prior conduct is admissible for impeachment if it logically bears on credibility.
• People v Fuller; People v Bowes; People v White: These reinforce that robbery is highly probative of credibility and that limiting the underlying facts can appropriately reduce prejudice.
• People v Sandoval: The foundational authority for balancing probative value (credibility) against unfair prejudice in allowing impeachment by prior bad acts/convictions.

F. Consecutive versus concurrent sentencing for weapon counts

• Matter of Johnson v Morgenthau: Central to the “separate and distinct acts” test: consecutive sentences are not allowed when offenses are based on a single act or an act that is “continuous in nature.” The Third Department used this as the conceptual baseline.
• People v Smith: Cited as a contrasting/illustrative application of consecutive-sentence analysis in the Third Department.
• People v Lewis: Cited as a modern comparator in the Court of Appeals’ discussion of weapons possession and sentence structure (the Third Department cited it as “compare” authority).
• People v Billups: The Third Department relied on Billups’ distinction between (i) possession “simultaneous with the shooting” and (ii) possession that predates the formation of intent. Billups also supplied the policy observation that the Legislature prioritizes reducing illegal guns, while emphasizing that consecutive sentencing is discretionary even when permissible.
• People v Williams (quoting People v Malloy): These cases provide the doctrinal phrasing the court applied: consecutive sentences can be justified where evidence shows the defendant possessed the weapon for a sufficient period of time before forming the specific intent to use it unlawfully.
• People v Bonville; People v Mayette; People v Anderson; People v Rahaman: Cited to support the Third Department’s use of its discretionary authority to modify sentencing in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15 [3] [c])—here, choosing concurrency despite legality of consecutive terms.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Unpreserved sufficiency challenges: specificity and renewal matter

The opinion illustrates a two-step procedural gatekeeping structure. First, a defendant must make a trial-order-of-dismissal motion that is sufficiently specific to alert the trial court to the alleged defect (here, failure to disprove justification). Second, if the defense presents evidence after the People rest, the defendant must renew the motion. Buchanan failed both steps, foreclosing legal sufficiency review.

The court also added an independent bar as to manslaughter: because defendant requested the lesser included charge, he forfeited a sufficiency challenge to that conviction (as framed by the cited cases).

B. Weight of the evidence: justification, intent, and retreat

Although the court could not reach legal sufficiency, it still performed a full weight review. The video evidence and testimony supplied the crucial narrative: after being assaulted, defendant got to his vehicle, retrieved a gun, and returned toward the bar. The court treated the “retreat” question as pivotal: once the victim stepped away and defendant had reached his car, the jury could find defendant had an opportunity to avoid deadly force with complete safety but instead re-approached with a loaded firearm.

On intent, the Third Department relied on the circumstances—knowingly pointing a loaded gun and firing at close range—to support the requisite intent for manslaughter (intent to cause serious physical injury resulting in death) and for Penal Law § 265.03 (1) (b) (possession with intent to use unlawfully against another).

C. Duplicity: the court’s “no sandbagging” posture

The court’s refusal to reach the unpreserved duplicity argument is notable for its candid assessment of trial strategy. It reasoned that defendant welcomed the dual-count structure because admitting guilt to Penal Law § 265.03 (3) could bolster the credibility of his justification claim as to the homicide-related counts. Quoting the policy concerns in People v Becoats (via People v Macias), the court declined to reward that tactical choice with appellate relief.

D. Sandoval compromise: robbery as credibility evidence, with prejudice-limiting constraints

Even though unpreserved, the court reached the merits and found no abuse of discretion: robbery is strongly probative of veracity, and the trial court’s limitation—no reference to an underlying shooting—reduced unfair prejudice. The opinion thus reflects a conventional Sandoval balance: admit the conviction’s existence while sanitizing inflammatory details.

E. Consecutive sentences: legally permissible, yet reduced as a discretionary matter

On legality, the Third Department held consecutive sentences were authorized because the two weapon counts were founded on separate acts: (i) long-term loaded possession (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and (ii) later possession with intent to use unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]). The facts emphasized by the court—illegal purchase two years earlier, routine driving with the loaded gun, leaving it in the glove compartment, then retrieving it after the altercation—fit squarely within the “sufficient period of time before forming the specific intent” framework drawn from People v Williams/People v Malloy and the non-simultaneity distinction highlighted in People v Billups.

Yet the court then separated legality from discretion: even where consecutive sentencing is permissible and serves legislative anti-gun policy, the appellate court may conclude concurrency is more appropriate on these facts and may modify the sentence in the interest of justice. That is the opinion’s most consequential operational move: it reduces the aggregate term from 40 years to 25 years (each with five years’ PRS), without disturbing the convictions.

3.3 Impact

• Sentencing practice in weapons-plus-violence cases: Buchanan confirms that, post–People v Billups and People v Lewis, courts will closely examine whether weapon possession predates (and is separable from) the formation of unlawful intent, enabling consecutive sentences. But it equally underscores that appellate courts may still choose concurrency as a discretionary “interest of justice” correction—especially where consecutive stacking produces an exceptionally long aggregate term.
• Trial preservation discipline: The decision is a sharp reminder that defendants must (i) articulate justification-based sufficiency arguments in a trial order of dismissal and (ii) renew the motion after defense proof. Buchanan demonstrates that failing to do so shifts appellate review to the more deferential weight-of-the-evidence framework.
• Duplicity as a “strategy-sensitive” claim: The court’s reliance on People v Becoats signals a continued reluctance to entertain unpreserved duplicity claims where the record suggests tactical acquiescence. Defendants seeking duplicity relief must timely object or risk a finding that they intentionally “welcomed” the error.
• Sandoval rulings: The opinion reinforces that robbery convictions remain prime impeachment material and that “sanitizing” details is a favored judicial technique to balance probative value against prejudice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence: Legal sufficiency asks whether, as a matter of law, any rational juror could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt—but it is generally reviewable only if preserved by proper motions. Weight of the evidence is a factual review in which the appellate court considers the whole record, evaluates competing inferences, and decides whether the verdict is supported by the credible evidence while still deferring to the jury on credibility.
• Justification (self-defense) and “duty to retreat” (Penal Law § 35.15): Even if a defendant fears deadly force, New York law can require retreat—if the defendant knows retreat can be accomplished with complete safety. Here, the prosecution’s theory (accepted by the jury) was that defendant could have left after reaching his vehicle but instead returned with a firearm.
• Duplicity: A duplicitous count improperly charges more than one offense in a single count, risking a non-unanimous verdict. Buchanan did not decide the merits; it held the issue was unpreserved and declined discretionary review because counsel strategically conceded one count at trial.
• Sandoval ruling: A pretrial decision on whether (and how) the prosecution may impeach a testifying defendant with prior convictions or misconduct. Courts balance credibility value against unfair prejudice and may “sanitize” details.
• Consecutive vs. concurrent sentences: Consecutive sentences stack (one after another); concurrent sentences overlap. New York allows consecutive sentences only when offenses are based on separate and distinct acts (not a single continuous act). Even if consecutive sentences are legally allowed, the judge (and on review, the Appellate Division) can still choose concurrency as a matter of discretion.
• Interest of justice jurisdiction (CPL 470.15): A discretionary appellate power to modify certain outcomes (including sentences) even when no reversible legal error is found, used sparingly and with explanation tied to fairness and proportionality.

5. Conclusion

People v. Buchanan is less about redefining substantive homicide or weapons law than about the mechanics of appellate review and sentencing structure in gun cases. The Third Department (i) enforced strict preservation rules for sufficiency and duplicity claims; (ii) upheld the jury’s rejection of justification under a weight-of-the-evidence analysis heavily informed by video proof and the retreat doctrine; (iii) approved a restrained Sandoval compromise; and (iv) delivered the opinion’s most meaningful practical lesson: even when consecutive weapon-possession sentences are legally permissible as separate and distinct acts, the Appellate Division may still reduce the aggregate punishment by ordering concurrency in the interest of justice.