1. Introduction
In United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s newly articulated miscarriage-of-justice exception to sentencing appeal waivers. The central question was whether an allegedly erroneous enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight justified disregarding an otherwise valid waiver of appellate rights.
Rashon Jermaine Harris pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C). He received a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment and challenged enhancements imposed under U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.2, 2D1.1(b)(1), and 2D1.1(b)(5). The government sought dismissal because Harris’s plea agreement waived appeals of his conviction and sentence, except for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
The Fifth Circuit initially enforced that waiver. After the Supreme Court decided Hunter v. United States, however, it vacated the appellate judgment and remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Fifth Circuit again dismissed the appeal. Its principal contribution is to distinguish potentially correctable sentencing mistakes from the exceptional, egregious errors that permit a defendant to escape a valid appeal waiver.
4. Legal Reasoning
A. Hunter Establishes an Exceptional, Not Routine, Route Around a Waiver
The controlling framework comes from Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). Under that decision, an agreement not to appeal a sentence becomes unenforceable when enforcement would produce a miscarriage of justice: an egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that this standard requires more than identifying an incorrect ruling. The error must be obvious, not one a judge could reasonably make, and of a kind that undermines public confidence in the judiciary. These requirements sharply limit the exception’s reach.
Hunter v. United States supplied three illustrative categories:
- A sentence exceeding the punishment authorized by the relevant statute;
- A sentence infected by a blatant constitutional error; and
- A sentence imposed without a minimum of civilized procedure.
Those examples are not exhaustive. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court expressly excluded ordinary mistakes in applying sentencing law, including routine Guidelines-calculation errors. The Fifth Circuit treated that exclusion as decisive: the exception cannot become a general mechanism for obtaining the sentencing review that a defendant agreed to relinquish.
B. The Waiver Was Knowing, Voluntary, and Broad Enough to Cover the Appeal
Under United States v. Higgins, the court first asks whether a waiver was knowing and voluntary and then whether its plain language covers the appeal. A defendant must understand that the right to appeal exists, that the agreement relinquishes that right, and the consequences of relinquishment.
Harris’s written agreement waived challenges to his conviction and sentence on any ground other than ineffective assistance of counsel. At rearraignment, he confirmed that he had read and discussed the agreement with counsel. After the government summarized the waiver, he also confirmed that he understood and accepted it.
Those statements mattered because declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of truthfulness. Harris’s argument that a same-day initial appearance and guilty plea left inadequate time for an informed decision did not overcome that record.
Importantly, the court did not announce that every same-day plea is necessarily voluntary. It assessed the actual chronology: Harris had originally been indicted approximately six months earlier, and the refiled count was one of the original charges. The initial appearance on the new case number therefore did not represent his first exposure to the accusation.
C. Reckless Endangerment Requires More Than Flight but Not Actual Injury
Section 3C1.2 applies when a defendant recklessly creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person while fleeing a law-enforcement officer. The inquiry concerns the creation and disregard of risk, rather than whether an injury ultimately occurs.
Drawing on United States v. Humbles and United States v. Jimenez, the court explained that the enhancement is not confined to conduct producing actual harm or displaying extreme dangerousness. Recklessness requires awareness of a risk whose disregard grossly departs from the care a reasonable person would exercise in comparable circumstances.
At the same time, the court expressly acknowledged an important limitation: flight alone does not justify the enhancement. In its footnote, the court agreed with defense counsel’s statement that § 3C1.2 does not apply automatically to every defendant who flees law enforcement.
D. The Record Supported a Reasonable Risk Assessment, Even If the Findings Were Thin
Harris characterized his conduct as driving approximately thirty yards across vacant property belonging to his mother, without actually endangering anyone. Cross-examination weakened the government’s initial description of flight through multiple separately owned yards: the witnesses could not dispute that the relevant property belonged to Harris’s mother or establish that it was occupied.
The court nevertheless identified several circumstances supporting the district court’s assessment:
- All three witnesses described driving across a residential yard or yards rather than roads intended for vehicles.
- One officer described Harris driving in reverse before turning around.
- Harris’s juvenile nephew had recently walked in the area and placed a package in Harris’s vehicle.
The opinion does not establish that the nephew remained in the vehicle’s path during the flight. Rather, his recent presence helped support the conclusion that the area was not necessarily free of pedestrian risk. Ownership of the property and uncertainty about its occupancy were not dispositive.
The court also recognized weaknesses in the sentencing explanation. The district judge made broad observations about the dangers of fleeing police, and the appellate court described the factual findings as “thin.” Its conclusion therefore should not be read as endorsing a categorical presumption that vehicular flight is reckless endangerment.
E. The Alternative Holding Preserves the Distinction Between Error and Reviewability
The court’s final step was independent of whether the enhancement was ultimately correct. Even assuming an error, it would not have produced a sentence above the statutory maximum, a blatant constitutional violation, or a proceeding lacking minimum civilized procedure.
This alternative reasoning is central to the decision. A sentencing ruling can be debatable—or even mistaken—without opening an appeal barred by a valid waiver. Harris needed to establish an exceptional injustice, not merely an arguable Guidelines error.
6. Potential Impact
A. Appeal Waivers Retain Substantial Force
The decision demonstrates that recognition of a miscarriage-of-justice exception does not substantially reopen ordinary Guidelines disputes. Defendants must show why an asserted error threatens the integrity of the judicial process, rather than simply explain why the sentencing calculation may be wrong.
B. Ordinary Error Review and Waiver Enforcement Remain Distinct
A challenge potentially successful in an unrestricted sentencing appeal may fail when appellate rights have been waived. The court’s treatment of United States v. Ibarra illustrates that unsupported factual findings and plain-error analysis cannot automatically be translated into an exception to a waiver.
C. The Decision Does Not Authorize Automatic Flight Enhancements
Sentencing courts must still identify conduct creating the required substantial risk. The express endorsement of the mere-flight limitation preserves that substantive constraint, even though the waiver prevented Harris from obtaining ordinary review of the enhancement’s application.
D. Plea Records and Procedural Context Matter
Clear waiver language and an adequate courtroom explanation remain important to enforceability. Conversely, an objection based on the speed of a plea must be evaluated against the defendant’s actual history with the charge, not merely the date on which a new case number began.
E. The Holding Has Defined Limits
The decision does not exhaustively define miscarriage of justice, hold that every Guidelines-related error is insulated from review, or decide an ineffective-assistance claim. Nor does it establish that thin findings invariably suffice. Its holding concerns an ordinary enhancement dispute supported by testimony and governed by a valid, broad waiver.