Orally Adopted Supervised-Release Conditions: Record-Based Affirmance Despite Unverified Counsel Review

United States v. Bell, No. 25-20208, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, opinion revised November 3, 2026.

Central holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing discretionary supervised-release conditions that it orally adopted from a previously supplied sentencing worksheet, where the record supported the defendant’s understanding and anticipation of those conditions. The Fifth Circuit left unresolved whether the court was additionally required to verify that the defendant had reviewed the worksheet with counsel.

Precedential qualification: The opinion is not designated for publication under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5. It is best understood as a fact-specific application of existing law, not a new binding circuit rule eliminating verification requirements.

1. Introduction

This appeal concerns the procedural safeguards governing supervised-release conditions, particularly when a sentencing court adopts conditions by reference instead of reading them aloud. Marquavia Chancenique Bell argued that the district court inadequately pronounced the conditions imposed after her second revocation of supervised release because it never confirmed that she had reviewed the relevant sentencing worksheet with her attorney. The United States defended the sentence, emphasizing the court’s express adoption of the worksheet and Bell’s failure to object.

The dispute arose against a history of repeated supervision violations:

Proceeding Background and disposition
Original sentencing Bell pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess counterfeit securities and received nine months’ imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.
First revocation After new offenses and unlawful controlled-substance use, the court revoked supervision and imposed nine months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release.
Second revocation Following further violations involving new offenses and failure to report law-enforcement contact, the court imposed eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by another year of supervised release.

Before the second revocation hearing, the Probation Department provided Bell, her attorney, and the court with a Judge’s Sentencing Options Worksheet. Its appendix recommended supervised-release conditions, including substance-abuse requirements, and incorporated the district court’s standard conditions under General Order No. 2017-01.

During the hearing, the court referred to the worksheet several times. After announcing the sentence, it answered “yes” when the probation officer asked whether it would adopt the appendix’s conditions. Bell did not object. The written judgment subsequently included four mandatory conditions, fifteen standard conditions, and a special substance-abuse condition.

Bell challenged the fifteen standard conditions and the special condition, except for the portion of standard condition ten consistent with a statutorily required restriction. She sought a remand directing that the challenged conditions be stricken.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed Bell’s sentence. Its decision proceeded through four principal conclusions:

  1. The challenged conditions required pronouncement. Although labeled “standard” or “special,” they were discretionary rather than required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
  2. Pronouncement may occur through incorporation. A court need not recite every condition verbatim; it may orally adopt an identifiable document containing the conditions.
  3. The consultation-verification question remained open. The panel did not decide whether the district court had an additional duty to confirm that Bell reviewed the worksheet with counsel, or whether the absence of that confirmation required plain-error rather than abuse-of-discretion review.
  4. Bell’s claim failed even under abuse-of-discretion review. The prior judgments, advance disclosure, repeated references to the worksheet, express oral adoption, and absence of objection supported the conclusion that Bell understood and could anticipate the conditions imposed.

The court did not hold that the challenged conditions were exempt from pronouncement because they had appeared in earlier judgments. Nor did it conclusively determine that the district court’s procedure satisfied every aspect of the pronouncement requirement. Instead, it concluded that the alleged omission did not establish an abuse of discretion on this record.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

i. Constitutional foundations and incorporation by reference

United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)

Diggles supplies the governing framework. A defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to be present at sentencing requires oral pronouncement of discretionary supervised-release conditions, while statutorily required conditions need not be pronounced. It also permits adoption of conditions from a standing order or another document rather than requiring a word-for-word recital.

The unresolved issue in Bell’s appeal arose from Diggles’s discussion of ensuring an opportunity to review the relevant document with counsel. The panel declined to decide whether that discussion imposes an additional verification duty in the circumstances presented.

United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2020)

Grogan reinforces both the obligation to pronounce the sentence and the principle that pronouncement does not require verbatim recitation. It supports treating express adoption of a conditions document as a permissible sentencing method.

United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364 (5th Cir. 2022)

This decision explains that notice at sentencing can be provided by stating conditions individually or referring to a recommended list in a standing order or another document. It supports the legal significance of the judge’s affirmative response when asked to adopt the worksheet appendix. The opinion also cites it through other authorities addressing whether the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to object.

United States v. Gomez, 960 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2020)

Gomez connects the pronouncement obligation to statutory discretion: conditions required by law need not be announced because an objection to their imposition would be futile. It also provides the distinction between abuse-of-discretion and plain-error review based on the defendant’s opportunity to object.

United States v. Fraga, No. 23-40248, 2024 WL 111388 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2024) (unpublished)

Fraga supports Bell’s exclusion of the statutorily required portion of standard condition ten from her challenge. Its role is limited: it illustrates why a legally required weapons restriction need not be orally pronounced, rather than resolving the discretionary conditions at issue.

ii. Opportunity to object and the standard of review

United States v. Quezada-Atayde, 148 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2025)

This case reiterates that every condition not required by § 3583(d) must be pronounced. It also describes an established compliant procedure: confirming review of the presentence report with counsel and orally adopting the listed conditions. Bell sought to make the absence of comparable confirmation decisive; the panel did not decide whether that procedure was indispensable here.

United States v. Villafana-Mondragon, 170 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2026)

This decision is especially important because it identifies the unresolved question whether Diggles imposes an additional duty to verify counsel-assisted review. It also supports examining the record for reasonable inferences about the defendant’s opportunity to understand the conditions.

United States v. Prado, 53 F.4th 316 (5th Cir. 2022)

Cited through United States v. Villafana-Mondragon, this case supplies the opportunity-to-object formulation: a defendant who could object but did not ordinarily faces plain-error review; one who lacked that opportunity receives abuse-of-discretion review.

United States v. Mudd, 685 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Huor, 852 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2017)

These cases appear as supporting authorities in the quotation from United States v. Gomez. They underpin the distinction between review where a defendant lacked an opportunity to object and review where an available objection was not made. They do not independently resolve the worksheet-verification issue.

iii. Authorities illustrating the unresolved verification question

United States v. Green, No. 24-30608, 2025 WL 1735720 (5th Cir. June 23, 2025) (unpublished)

Green used abuse-of-discretion review where the court failed to confirm review of proposed conditions in the presentence report. Its reasoning supports Bell’s contention that missing confirmation can mean the defendant lacked an adequate opportunity to object.

United States v. Richard, No. 21-30179, 2023 WL 4559369 (5th Cir. July 17, 2023) (unpublished)

Richard states that, before adopting conditions from a document, the court must ensure an opportunity for counsel-assisted review. It represents a comparatively explicit formulation of the procedural protection Bell invoked.

United States v. Griffin, No. 21-50294, 2022 WL 17175592 (5th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022) (unpublished)

Griffin contrasts inadequate notice—where the court neither asks about report review nor refers to the relevant conditions—with adequate notice where the court confirms review and adopts the report. It shows why both documentary review and oral identification matter.

United States v. Jackson, No. 20-50922, 2022 WL 738668 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (unpublished)

Jackson treated the absence of an inquiry about counsel-assisted report review as relevant to pronouncement. Bell cites it indirectly through the discussion in United States v. Griffin and directly as part of the authorities supporting her procedural concern.

United States v. Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179 (5th Cir. 2021)

This separate Martinez decision appears within the quotation from United States v. Griffin. It supports the sufficient procedure of confirming review and announcing adoption of a report recommending standard conditions.

United States v. Chavez, No. 20-50550, 2022 WL 767033 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) (unpublished)

Chavez combines the relevant safeguards: an opportunity to review recommended conditions with counsel, followed by oral adoption while the defendant is present and able to object. It helps explain the procedural model against which Bell challenged her hearing.

United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023)

This case recognizes express confirmation of document review as sound procedure, while also acknowledging decisions accepting oral reference to discretionary conditions in a standing order. It illustrates why the authorities do not yield a simple categorical answer about an express verification requirement.

United States v. Martinez-Rivera, No. 24-20031, 2025 WL 985711 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025) (unpublished)

Martinez-Rivera distinguishes failure to verify report review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A) from an actual conflict between the oral sentence and written judgment. It reviewed an unpreserved verification claim for plain error. Bell’s opinion draws on that distinction in identifying her complaint as procedural rather than a claim that the written judgment changed the orally adopted conditions.

United States v. Mojano-Rodriguez, No. 24-20487, 2025 WL 2556261 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2025) (unpublished)

This decision likewise applied plain-error review to an unobjected-to failure to comply with Rule 32’s verification requirement. It supports the government’s preservation argument, without resolving whether the same result necessarily follows for Bell’s revocation worksheet.

iv. Record-based interpretation and previously imposed conditions

United States v. Currier, 160 F.4th 656 (5th Cir. 2025)

Currier supplies two important propositions. First, abuse-of-discretion review ordinarily asks whether a discrepancy between the oral and written sentence is a genuine conflict or merely an ambiguity. Second, it found no abuse where unpronounced conditions duplicated those in an original judgment. That treatment of familiar conditions supported the panel’s reliance on Bell’s earlier judgments.

United States v. Woods, 102 F.4th 760 (5th Cir. 2024)

Cited through United States v. Currier, this case provides the conflict-versus-ambiguity formulation. Its significance is to explain the usual inquiry while highlighting that Bell did not claim a substantive discrepancy between the adopted conditions and the written judgment.

United States v. Lezama-Ramriez, 173 F.4th 191 (5th Cir. 2025)

This authority permits reasonable inferences from court documents and statements by the defendant and counsel when assessing the opportunity to review a report and understand the conditions imposed. Bell extends that record-based approach to an Options Worksheet rather than a presentence report. The opinion also relies on this authority when considering the absence of any statement that review had not occurred and the defendant’s ability to anticipate the conditions.

United States v. Esparza- Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2001)

Cited through United States v. Lezama-Ramriez, this decision supplies the underlying permission to draw reasonable inferences about counsel-assisted review from the record. Its influence is methodological: the appellate court need not examine the sentencing colloquy in isolation.

The opinion also references In re Conditions of Prob. & Supervised Release, General Order No. 2017-01. This standing order was the documentary source incorporated into the worksheet; it was not a separate appellate precedent resolving Bell’s challenge.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The statutory source, not the label, determines the pronouncement obligation

The court first classified the conditions by legal necessity. A condition does not become mandatory merely because a district court calls it “standard” or includes it in a standing order. If § 3583(d) does not require it, the sentencing judge exercises discretion in imposing it, and oral pronouncement is required.

This preserves a meaningful opportunity to challenge restrictions on liberty. Administrative convenience cannot convert discretionary restrictions into conditions that need no announcement.

2. Express incorporation matters, but verification presents a separate question

The district court did not silently add the challenged conditions after the hearing. It expressly adopted the worksheet appendix in Bell’s presence. That fact distinguished her claim from a straightforward case in which discretionary conditions first appear in the written judgment.

Nevertheless, identifying and adopting a document is analytically different from ensuring that the defendant had an adequate opportunity to review it. Bell’s challenge focused on the latter step. The panel acknowledged that distinction but declined to decide whether the missing express confirmation itself violated the pronouncement requirement.

3. The court avoided an unnecessary choice between review standards

Bell sought abuse-of-discretion review because, in her view, inadequate verification deprived her of an opportunity to object. The government sought plain-error review because the court openly adopted the conditions and Bell remained silent.

The panel resolved the appeal without choosing between those positions. Even assuming deficient pronouncement and examining the claim for abuse of discretion, it found no basis for relief. The opinion therefore should not be read as selecting plain-error review for all unpreserved verification claims.

4. The complete record supported understanding and anticipation

The court relied on several reinforcing circumstances:

  • Advance disclosure: Both Bell and her attorney received the worksheet before the hearing.
  • Identifiable conditions: The worksheet contained the imposed conditions and referenced the standing order.
  • Prior exposure: Thirteen of the fifteen standard conditions appeared in the original presentence report and all three judgments. Bell had not objected to that report.
  • Continuity of substance-abuse restrictions: Every judgment included drug-testing requirements, and both revocation judgments addressed substance abuse more broadly.
  • Continuity of proceedings: The same district judge conducted the two revocation hearings approximately eighteen months apart.
  • Notice during the hearing: The judge referred to the worksheet repeatedly and expressly adopted its appendix.
  • No asserted review problem: Bell never stated that she had not reviewed the worksheet with counsel and did not object to adoption.

These facts supported reasonable inferences about Bell’s understanding; they did not amount to an express finding that a particular consultation occurred. Nor were all conditions described as literally identical throughout all three judgments. The important point was substantial continuity, especially between the two revocation judgments.

5. The holding does not create a general exception for repeated conditions

The court expressly recognized that the disputed conditions required pronouncement. Their earlier imposition mattered to the record-based abuse-of-discretion analysis, not to whether they were discretionary. Similarly, Bell’s silence was one circumstance among several—not a freestanding rule that silence always cures inadequate notice.

The opinion also did not conduct a separate substantive review of whether every condition was appropriately tailored. Its focus was the procedural challenge Bell actually advanced.

C. Potential Impact

Greater attention to the complete sentencing record. Future litigants may invoke Bell’s reasoning when advance disclosure, express adoption, and prior judgments collectively demonstrate familiarity with conditions. A missing verification question will not necessarily establish entitlement to vacatur.

Application beyond presentence reports. The opinion applies the reasonable-inference approach to a revocation worksheet. Its functional focus is whether the record supports understanding of the adopted conditions, rather than whether the document bears a particular title.

Continuing importance of explicit safeguards. The decision does not make verification unnecessary. The safest procedure remains to identify the document, confirm an opportunity for counsel-assisted review, announce adoption, and invite objections. That approach avoids the unresolved question the panel declined to answer.

Limits in materially different cases. Bell provides less support for affirmance where conditions are new, documents were not supplied, the adopted list is unclear, counsel reports inadequate review time, or the written judgment includes restrictions absent from the adopted material. Those cases would lack central features of this record.

Limited precedential reach. Because the decision is unpublished and expressly reserves the verification issue, it cannot fairly be presented as resolving the broader tension among the cited authorities.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release
A period of court-ordered supervision following imprisonment. Violating its conditions can lead to revocation, additional imprisonment, and another term of supervision.
Oral pronouncement
The judge’s announcement of the sentence in the defendant’s presence. For discretionary conditions, this protects the opportunity to hear and challenge the restrictions being imposed.
Incorporation by reference
Adopting an identified written list instead of reading every condition aloud. Whether the defendant had adequate notice of that list remains important.
Mandatory versus standard conditions
“Mandatory” means legally required. “Standard” usually describes a routinely used condition; it does not necessarily mean the law requires it.
Abuse-of-discretion review
Appellate review of whether the district court’s decision fell outside permissible legal bounds. Bell’s challenge failed even under this standard.
Plain-error review
A more demanding route to relief generally used for errors that could have been challenged below but were not. The panel did not decide that it governed Bell’s appeal.
Conflict versus ambiguity
A conflict exists when the written judgment substantively differs from the oral sentence. An ambiguity is uncertainty that may be clarified from the record. Bell did not allege that the adopted conditions differed from the written judgment.
Rule 32 verification
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A) requires verification that a defendant and counsel have read and discussed the presentence report and any addendum. The cited cases discuss that obligation, but Bell does not definitively establish an identical verification requirement for the revocation worksheet.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Bell affirms a sentence through a narrow, record-dependent rationale. Advance disclosure, express oral adoption, and substantial continuity with earlier conditions supported the conclusion that Bell understood and could anticipate the restrictions imposed.

The decision’s significance lies equally in what it leaves open: it does not eliminate the pronouncement requirement, conclusively resolve counsel-review verification, or establish that silence alone cures defective notice. Explicit confirmation of review remains the clearest way to protect the defendant’s participation and prevent avoidable sentencing disputes.