Online “Readily Available” Coverage Selection Forms and E-Signatures Satisfy New Jersey Coverage-Selection Requirements (Third Circuit, Nonprecedential)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from an online automobile insurance purchase by Alemah McMillian, a New Jersey citizen, from Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) in 2015. McMillian selected the minimum personal injury protection (“PIP”) option of $15,000. After a 2021 accident produced medical expenses exceeding that limit, she sued GEICO and affiliates, alleging—among other theories—that GEICO violated the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act’s coverage-selection protections, specifically the requirements in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-23(a) relating to (i) providing a coverage selection form with premium-credit information and (ii) obtaining a signed, returned form.

The key issue on appeal was whether GEICO’s online process complied with those notice and signature/receipt requirements, particularly in light of a 2005 regulation addressing internet applications: N.J. Admin. Code § 11:3-15.4(a)(2). The District Court entered summary judgment for GEICO; the Third Circuit affirmed on de novo review.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for GEICO because McMillian failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on two essential points she would bear at trial:

• Notice / availability: McMillian’s declaration that she did not see the coverage selection form until after the accident did not meet the governing legal standard, which required only that the form be “readily available” on GEICO’s website for internet applications. Record evidence (including testimony from a GEICO Senior Underwriter) supported that the website link made the form available and included premium rate credit information.
• Signature/receipt: GEICO produced an electronic coverage selection form reflecting McMillian’s electronic signature dated July 23, 2015, and McMillian admitted clicking a box to process her request with a general e-signature. Her remaining arguments—e.g., inferences from event logs—were insufficient to create a triable issue, especially in light of GEICO’s engineer declaration explaining the logs.

The panel also rejected (as forfeited/ill-developed and procedurally problematic) McMillian’s attempt to add an argument about a “Buyer’s Guide,” noting both inadequate appellate development and that the complaint did not plead that theory.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Administrative-law deference and the validity of the online regulation

• Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 946 A.2d 564, 571 (N.J. 2008).
  The panel invoked Reilly for New Jersey administrative-law principles: regulations adopted pursuant to legislative mandate are presumed valid; agency statutory interpretations receive deference unless plainly unreasonable, contrary to statutory language, or undermining legislative intent. That framework matters because the opinion treated N.J. Admin. Code § 11:3-15.4(a)(2)—the rule allowing “readily available” online access to satisfy the statutory “accompanied by” requirement—as presumptively valid and controlling absent a successful challenge (none was mounted here).

Implied private right of action (explicitly not decided)

• Zanetich v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 123 F.4th 128, 138-41 (3d Cir. 2024).
  The court noted that the New Jersey statute lacks an express private right of action and that McMillian’s theory assumed an implied cause of action. While GEICO did not contest that premise, the panel cautioned that it was not deciding the issue, citing Zanetich for New Jersey’s standard for implying a private cause of action. This preserves (for future cases) a potentially dispositive threshold defense in similar statutory-enforcement suits.

Summary judgment standards and the “no genuine dispute” requirement

• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
  Used for the definition of a “genuine” dispute—whether evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant.
• Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
  Anchors the principle that a movant may win by showing the nonmovant lacks evidence on an essential element on which it bears the burden at trial.
• Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 630 (3d Cir. 2024), and Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, 169 F.4th 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2026).
  Cited for the Third Circuit’s contemporary articulation of the Celotex burden framework.
• SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2022).
  Cited for the “scintilla of evidence” insufficiency at summary judgment (quoting Anderson).

Appellate forfeiture / inadequate briefing and constructive amendment concerns

• Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017), and Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 821 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006).
  Used to refuse consideration of ill-developed or passing arguments (here, the “Buyer’s Guide” point).
• Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 327 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012).
  Cited for the observation that circuits disagree about whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) constructive amendment applies at the summary judgment stage; the panel flagged that McMillian’s “Buyer’s Guide” theory would raise this procedural complication even if adequately briefed.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning is a straightforward application of (1) the regulatory adaptation of statutory notice requirements to internet transactions and (2) federal summary judgment doctrine.

A. The “notice” obligation is about online availability, not subjective recollection

The statutory text requires that the application be “accompanied by” a coverage selection form, and that the form identify premium-credit/dollar-savings ranges. The 2005 regulation supplies the internet-specific compliance pathway: for an internet application, the requirement is satisfied if the form is “readily available” on the insurer’s website. The panel treated McMillian’s evidence—her statement that she did not see the form—as legally mismatched to the operative standard. The question was not whether she later remembered reading it, but whether GEICO made it readily available during the online purchase flow.

On the record, the panel pointed to evidence that the webpage where PIP coverage was selected included a link to the coverage selection form, and testimony that the link produced a form including the premium rate credit range information. McMillian’s attacks on that testimony were characterized as insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.

B. The “signature/receipt” obligation can be satisfied by e-signature proof in the record

The statute and implementing rules contemplate a signed coverage selection form returned to the insurer. In the online context, the record included: (i) GEICO’s produced electronic coverage selection form displaying McMillian’s e-signature and date; and (ii) McMillian’s admission that she clicked the box to apply a “general e-signature.” Given that evidence, the panel held that her residual arguments (including inferences drawn from event logs) were inadequate—particularly in light of a GEICO engineer’s declaration explaining the log artifacts.

C. Burden framing: the plaintiff would have to prove two negatives at trial

The panel notably framed McMillian’s burden as proving two negatives: (1) the form with premium rate credit information was not readily available on the website, and (2) she did not electronically sign such a form. That framing mattered at summary judgment because GEICO could prevail by pointing to the absence of evidence capable of carrying those burdens at trial, consistent with Celotex Corp. v. Catrett as applied through Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield and Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC.

3.3. Impact

• Practical compliance roadmap for online insurers (persuasive, though nonprecedential): The opinion reinforces that New Jersey insurers selling online can satisfy § 39:6A-23(a)’s coverage-selection notice obligation by ensuring the form is “readily available” on the website during the application process, consistent with N.J. Admin. Code § 11:3-15.4(a)(2).
• Litigation posture: record evidence of “availability” and e-signature is decisive: The decision highlights the evidentiary importance of (i) workflow design (links placed at the point of coverage selection), (ii) reproducible form outputs (showing premium credit ranges), and (iii) durable e-signature artifacts. Plaintiffs relying primarily on after-the-fact nonrecollection face difficulty creating a “genuine dispute” without technical or documentary counterproof.
• Unresolved gateway issue—implied private right of action: By expressly not reaching whether § 39:6A-23(a) implies a private cause of action (while citing Zanetich v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc.), the opinion signals that future defendants may successfully litigate that threshold issue, potentially narrowing or foreclosing class actions premised on statutory violations.
• Administrative-law resilience of the 2005 internet regulation: The reliance on Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J. underscores that challenges to the “readily available” standard face the presumption of validity and deference to the Commissioner’s interpretation—unless litigants can show unreasonableness, conflict with statutory language, or frustration of legislative intent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• PIP Coverage: “Personal Injury Protection” pays medical expenses for injuries from auto accidents, regardless of fault. New Jersey sets a default $250,000 level, but insureds may choose lower options (here, $15,000).
• Coverage selection form: A mandated disclosure/choice document designed to ensure consumers understand options and potential premium credits/savings when selecting coverages.
• “Readily available” (internet applications): Under N.J. Admin. Code § 11:3-15.4(a)(2), the insurer need not physically attach a paper form; it must make the form easily accessible on its website during the online application process.
• Electronic signature (e-signature): A legally recognized method of signing electronically. In practice, a click-through signature interface and stored signed form can serve as proof of signature/receipt.
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling. If the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence on essential elements such that a reasonable jury could find in its favor, the court decides the case as a matter of law without trial.
• De novo review: On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same legal standard as the district court, without deferring to the district court’s legal conclusions.
• “Nonprecedential” opinion: It resolves the parties’ dispute but (under the court’s internal operating procedures) is not binding precedent in future Third Circuit cases—though it can still be cited as persuasive authority where permitted.

5. Conclusion

Alemah McMillian v. Geico Indemnity Co. affirms that, for online New Jersey auto-insurance sales, compliance with coverage-selection notice obligations turns on whether the coverage selection form is “readily available” on the insurer’s website, not on the applicant’s later recollection of viewing it. It also illustrates how electronically stored coverage-selection forms bearing an applicant’s e-signature—supported by admissions regarding the click-through signature process and technical explanations of system logs—can be dispositive at summary judgment. While the decision is nonprecedential and leaves open whether § 39:6A-23(a) implies a private right of action, it provides a clear evidentiary and regulatory template likely to shape how similar online-application challenges are litigated.