One $400 Children’s Advocacy Center Assessment in a Criminal Case: The Grammar-Based Rule of State v. Mildfelt

Case: State v. Mildfelt, No. 126,968
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas
Opinion filed: November 6, 2026
Author: Justice Wall

1. Introduction

In State v. Mildfelt, the Kansas Supreme Court resolved how the Children’s Advocacy Center assessment under K.S.A. 20-370(a) applies when a defendant receives multiple convictions in one criminal case. The court held that a qualifying defendant must pay one $400 assessment, regardless of the number of convictions in that case.

The assessment helps finance Children’s Advocacy Centers, which coordinate child-abuse investigations through a child-friendly, multidisciplinary process. Their forensic-interview model allows investigators to observe a single interview, improving its effectiveness while reducing the trauma associated with repeated questioning.

A jury convicted Jack Rex Mildfelt Jr. of six child-sex crimes involving two minor victims. The Saline District Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 100 years and imposed six $400 Children’s Advocacy Center assessments, totaling $2,400. Mildfelt challenged the assessment amount, arguing that the statute required only one payment. The State defended assessment on a per-conviction basis.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the assessment. On review, the Supreme Court rejected that interpretation. Its decision rests on a distinction between language identifying which defendants qualify for an assessment and language specifying how many assessments they owe.

2. Summary of the Opinion

K.S.A. 20-370(a) provides:

“any defendant convicted of a crime under chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, in which a minor is a victim, shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400 to the clerk of the district court.”

The Supreme Court reached five principal conclusions:

  1. The statutory language is ambiguous. Read in isolation, it reasonably permits either a per-defendant or a per-conviction interpretation.
  2. Ordinary grammar resolves the ambiguity. The phrase describing a conviction involving a minor modifies “defendant”; it identifies the defendants subject to the payment obligation. The obligation itself is to pay “an assessment fee.”
  3. Other fee statutes do not establish a contrary rule. Their different terminology and express assessment provisions do not show that the word “crime” necessarily requires one fee for every conviction.
  4. The legislative history is inconclusive. It demonstrates a funding and accountability purpose, but does not establish the intended assessment unit.
  5. The holding concerns multiple convictions within one criminal case. The court expressly reserved how the statute applies when a defendant has qualifying convictions in separate cases.

The court reversed the Court of Appeals on the reviewed issue, vacated the district court’s $2,400 assessment, and remanded for an amended journal entry imposing a single $400 assessment. The convictions and imprisonment sentence were not disturbed.

3. Analysis

A. Legal Reasoning

Statutory interpretation begins with text, but plausible alternatives establish ambiguity

The court treated statutory interpretation as a question of law subject to unlimited review. Its objective was to identify and implement legislative intent, beginning with the ordinary meaning of the enacted words. Canons of construction and legislative history became relevant once the court found that the text supported more than one reasonable interpretation.

Mildfelt read “convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim” as a qualifying condition. Under that reading, a defendant who satisfies the condition owes the singular assessment specified in the statute. The State instead treated each qualifying conviction as a separate trigger for payment.

The court accepted both readings as initially plausible. The indefinite article “a” did not independently resolve their disagreement: “a crime” could signify one crime, but could also mean any qualifying crime. Accordingly, the lower court erred in treating the per-conviction interpretation as compelled by plain language.

This distinction matters. The Supreme Court did not hold that Mildfelt’s position was the only possible ordinary-language reading from the outset. It held that his position became the better interpretation after applying a reliable interpretive tool to an ambiguous provision.

The grammar canon separates eligibility from the payment obligation

The decisive tool was the grammar canon: statutory words ordinarily receive the meaning assigned by proper grammar and usage, unless that treatment contradicts legislative intent or purpose.

The court analyzed the sentence in three parts:

  • “Any defendant” identifies the person subject to the statutory command.
  • “Convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim” is a participial phrase modifying “defendant.” It describes the qualifying defendant.
  • “Shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400” states that defendant’s payment obligation.

On this reading, “a crime” is embedded within a description of the person who must pay. It is not an instruction to multiply the assessment by the number of convictions. The phrase “an assessment fee,” meanwhile, expresses a singular obligation.

The court therefore rejected an interpretation that gave controlling weight to “a crime” without adequately considering its grammatical function in the complete sentence. The holding depends on the provision’s structure, not simply on the proposition that a singular article always prevents multiple assessments.

Comparisons with other fee statutes did not establish a per-conviction assessment

The Court of Appeals had relied on comparisons with other Kansas fee statutes. The Supreme Court questioned whether those provisions were sufficiently related to K.S.A. 20-370 to be read in pari materia. It emphasized differences in enactment context and statutory placement; only K.S.A. 20-369 appeared in the same article and chapter.

More importantly, even assuming the comparisons were appropriate, they did not resolve the ambiguity. Other statutes commonly include express language specifying the assessment unit:

Statute Relevant language or structure Significance
K.S.A. 12-16,119(a) A booking or processing fee “for each complaint.” Expressly identifies the complaint as the assessment unit.
K.S.A. 20-369(a) A qualifying fee not exceeding $100 “per case.” Expressly adopts a case-based limit.
K.S.A. 22-4529 An application fee payable regardless of application fees paid in another proceeding. Directly addresses the relationship between separate proceedings.
K.S.A. 28-172a(c) For multiple counts, the highest applicable docket fee controls; the assessed defendant pays only one fee. Shows that references to counts can coexist with a single-fee rule.
K.S.A. 28-176(a) A $400 forensic-services cost “for every individual offense.” Demonstrates unmistakable language imposing an offense-by-offense assessment.
K.S.A. 2025 Supp. 32-1049a(d) A reinstatement fee “for each charge or sentence” on which satisfaction was not made. Expressly identifies the relevant charge or sentence.
K.S.A. 75-724(a)-(b) A DNA database fee with specific provisions concerning previously submitted samples and previously paid fees. Uses “offense” terminology without establishing that the word itself necessarily requires a fee for every conviction.

These provisions undermined the proposed equation between the word “crime” and per-conviction assessment. The Legislature uses varied nouns and, frequently, explicit assessment instructions. K.S.A. 20-370(a) lacks comparable language such as “for every individual offense.”

Legislative history established purpose, but not the assessment unit

The State relied principally on the statute’s enactment history. The Supreme Court examined both the original 2004 legislation and the 2013 amendment, concluding that neither resolved the question presented.

The 2004 enactment. H.B. 2568 created the funding mechanism. Proponents described it as a way to hold perpetrators accountable and shift some financial responsibility to defendants whose conduct made advocacy-center services necessary. But the same materials characterized the assessment as a “token fee” that might not produce significant income.

Those statements support a general funding purpose. They do not establish whether legislators intended one payment per defendant or one payment per conviction. The court rejected the assumption that a revenue-raising purpose necessarily implies the interpretation generating the most revenue.

The 2013 amendment. The Legislature increased the assessment from $100 to $400 and removed language allowing courts to waive it. The State’s historical argument nevertheless depended on indirect indications rather than an express discussion of assessment frequency.

Committee minutes attributed to Senator Greg Smith a statement that “fees” were not collected until “the party” was found guilty. An earlier appellate decision had treated that plural-singular combination as evidence supporting multiple assessments against one defendant. The Supreme Court found the inference unreliable: the minutes were expressly nonverbatim and had not been submitted to speakers for correction, while Senator Smith’s written testimony referred to a singular “fee” assessed against the convicted offender.

Another proponent compared the proposed $400 assessment with the $400 KBI laboratory fee. Although the KBI statute expressly imposes its fee “for every individual offense,” the Supreme Court concluded that the testimony compared amounts, not assessment methods. The surrounding discussion concerned declining distributions to a growing number of advocacy centers and the need to increase the assessment.

The broader interpretive lesson is evidentiary: legislative history must address the disputed question with sufficient clarity. General objectives, isolated word choices, and comparisons directed at another issue cannot reliably supply a statutory multiplication rule.

The court did not rely on absurdity or lenity

Mildfelt also invoked the absurdity canon and the rule of lenity. The court expressed doubt about their applicability but did not decide that issue because grammar already resolved the ambiguity.

The decision therefore does not establish that a per-conviction assessment would be legally absurd, nor that lenity necessarily governs this assessment. Its operative rationale is the statute’s grammatical structure, supported by the absence of persuasive contrary evidence.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion draws on precedents addressing statutory interpretation generally, the grammar canon specifically, and earlier interpretations of this assessment statute. Their roles should be distinguished: some provide the analytical framework, while others supply reasoning the court rejects.

Earlier decisions concerning the Children’s Advocacy Center assessment

State v. Mildfelt, No. 126,968, 2025 WL 2815647, at *4 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion)

This was the decision under review. The Court of Appeals held that the statute’s plain language required $400 for each qualifying conviction. The Supreme Court rejected both the panel’s finding of unambiguous text and its ultimate assessment rule, reversing on the issue presented for review.

State v. Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d 236, 563 P.3d 234 (2025)

State v. Sanders supplied the principal rationale adopted below. It emphasized that K.S.A. 20-370(a) refers to a “crime,” not a “case,” and compared the provision with other fee statutes. The Supreme Court accepted per-conviction assessment as a possible initial reading but rejected the claim that this terminology compelled it. The decision displaces that reasoning on the assessment question; it does not purport to address unrelated holdings in State v. Sanders.

State v. McDuffie, No. 113,987, 2017 WL 2617648 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion)

State v. McDuffie played a dual role. Its recognition that “a crime” could mean either one crime or any crime supported the Supreme Court’s ambiguity finding. But its reliance on legislative history to select per-conviction assessment was rejected. In particular, the Supreme Court found inadequate its revenue-maximization assumption, its emphasis on nonverbatim committee minutes, and its inference that comparison with the KBI fee imported that statute’s assessment method.

Precedents establishing the interpretive framework

State v. Terrell, 315 Kan. 68, 70, 504 P.3d 405 (2022)

This case establishes that statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to unlimited review. It authorized the Supreme Court to determine the statute’s meaning independently rather than defer to the lower courts.

State v. Ninh, 320 Kan. 477, 484, 570 P.3d 1169 (2025)

This precedent identifies legislative intent as the interpretive objective and ordinary statutory language as the starting point. It frames the court’s analysis as an effort to implement the Legislature’s enacted choice, not to select a preferred funding policy.

Jarmer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 318 Kan. 671, 673, 546 P.3d 743 (2024)

This decision permits resort to interpretive canons and legislative history when statutory language is ambiguous. It supports the court’s progression from competing textual readings to grammar and enactment materials.

Glaze v. J.K. Williams, 309 Kan. 562, 564, 439 P.3d 920 (2019)

This case defines ambiguity as susceptibility to two or more reasonable interpretations. That standard explains why the existence of a plausible State interpretation did not establish that the State’s reading was mandatory.

Martin v. City of Topeka, 322 Kan. 681, 692, 596 P.3d 799 (2026)

This decision describes canons as accepted rules assisting courts in determining the intended meaning of statutory text. It provides the conceptual basis for using grammar as an interpretive tool rather than as a substitute for legislative intent.

Precedents concerning related statutes and grammatical construction

State v. Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. 251, 259, 527 P.3d 911 (2023)

This case explains the in pari materia doctrine: statutes concerning the same subject may be read together to identify legislative intent. It supplied the standard against which the lower court’s comparisons with other assessment statutes were evaluated.

Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022)

This precedent recognizes that related statutes can inform even the initial plain-language inquiry. The Supreme Court therefore did not reject statutory context as categorically premature; it rejected the particular comparisons as insufficient to establish an unambiguous assessment rule.

Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244, 93 S. Ct. 477, 34 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1972)

This decision states that reading statutes together makes the most sense when the same legislative body enacted them at the same time. It supported caution against assuming that separately enacted fee provisions formed a unified scheme controlling K.S.A. 20-370(a).

Godsoe v. Harder, 164 Kan. 86, 90, 187 P.2d 515 (1947)

The court cited this older Kansas decision to demonstrate the longstanding use of grammatical rules in discerning legislative intent. The grammar-based approach was thus presented as established interpretive practice, not a newly created technique.

State v. Toliver, 306 Kan. 146, 151, 392 P.3d 119 (2017)

This decision applied common English grammar after finding statutory ambiguity. It directly supports the sequence followed in Mildfelt: identify competing reasonable readings, then use sentence structure to resolve the dispute.

Precedent concerning legislative-history evidence

Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980)

This case cautions that remarks by a single sponsoring legislator ordinarily do not control statutory meaning. It reinforced the court’s refusal to make Senator Smith’s reported word choice decisive, especially given the minutes’ limitations and his differently worded written testimony.

C. Impact and Limits

Immediate effect on assessment orders

Kansas courts applying K.S.A. 20-370(a) must impose one $400 assessment on a qualifying defendant in a criminal case, rather than multiply that amount by the number of qualifying convictions. For Mildfelt, the ruling reduced the assessment by $2,000.

The decision establishes the governing statutory interpretation. It does not itself resolve the procedural availability of relief for every previously entered assessment, including questions concerning final judgments, repayment, or collateral review.

Broader significance for statutory construction

The opinion directs attention to the function of words within a sentence. A phrase identifying eligible persons should not automatically be treated as a formula counting payment-triggering events. That distinction may inform future disputes involving statutes that attach financial obligations to a qualifying status.

The decision also limits two interpretive shortcuts: assuming that superficially similar fee statutes use identical assessment methods, and assuming that a funding purpose requires the interpretation producing the greatest revenue.

Its methodological holding remains contextual. The court did not make grammar universally superior to all other interpretive evidence. The grammar canon governs unless legislative intent or purpose contradicts it; here, competing sources supplied no persuasive contradiction.

Questions expressly left open

  • Separate criminal cases: The court did not decide whether the same defendant may owe additional assessments for qualifying convictions in different cases. The holding is not a lifetime one-fee exemption.
  • A per-victim theory: Neither party advanced that interpretation. Although Mildfelt’s case involved two victims, the court did not separately adjudicate a developed per-victim argument.
  • Lenity and absurdity: Their applicability remained undecided.

The Legislature may clarify a different assessment method through express language. Until then, the judicially established rule governs the current provision.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory ambiguity
A law is ambiguous when its words reasonably support more than one meaning—not merely because the parties disagree.
Grammar canon
The presumption that lawmakers use ordinary grammatical rules. Here, sentence structure identifies a qualifying defendant who owes one assessment.
Participial phrase
A verb-based phrase functioning like an adjective. “Convicted of a crime” describes “defendant”; it does not independently direct how many fees to impose.
In pari materia
Reading laws on the same subject together to understand their meaning. A superficial resemblance between fee statutes does not necessarily make their assessment rules interchangeable.
Rule of lenity
A principle favoring defendants when qualifying ambiguity remains in criminal-law interpretation. The court did not decide whether it applied here.
Absurdity canon
A narrowly used principle allowing rejection of a reading producing a legally absurd result. The court did not base its decision on that principle.
Vacatur and remand
Setting aside the challenged ruling and returning the case to the lower court for specified action. Here, that action was replacing the $2,400 assessment with $400.

5. Conclusion

State v. Mildfelt establishes that K.S.A. 20-370(a) requires one $400 Children’s Advocacy Center assessment for a qualifying defendant, regardless of the number of convictions in the criminal case.

Its broader significance lies in disciplined statutory interpretation: grammar distinguishes the condition triggering an obligation from the measure of that obligation, while general funding purposes and equivocal legislative history cannot supply a multiplication rule absent from the enacted text. The result is clear within a single criminal case, while assessment across separate cases remains unresolved.