On-Farm Manure Removal as Secondary Agriculture and the Threshold Burden to Prove FLSA Employment
Case: Porter v. T.J. Crowder and Sons, No. 25-1310
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: November 12, 2026
Disposition: Judgment for the defendants affirmed.
Precedential status: This is a nonprecedential order and judgment. It may be cited for its persuasive value, but it is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Its significance therefore lies in its application and clarification of existing law, rather than the creation of a generally binding new rule.
1. Introduction
This decision addresses two distinct questions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): when work performed for an independent contractor qualifies for the agricultural overtime exemption, and what a claimant must establish before seeking wages for informally performed tasks.
Christopher and Breanna Porter sued T.J. Crowder and Sons, LLC, doing business as Humalfa, and its owner, Farrel Crowder. Mr. Porter sought overtime compensation for handling manure at a cattle feedlot. Ms. Porter sought wages for tasks she performed during a disputed period between formal periods of employment with Humalfa.
The court affirmed judgment against both plaintiffs. It held that Mr. Porter’s particular duties—collecting raw manure from cattle pens and moving it to another location on the same feedlot—qualified as secondary agriculture. Although his employer operated a separate composting business, his work was integral to the feedlot’s livestock operations. Ms. Porter’s claim failed on a different ground: she did not adequately establish or defend on appeal the threshold proposition that she was Humalfa’s employee during the disputed period.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
Mr. Porter’s manure-handling work
Humalfa converts cattle manure into fertilizer. One of its composting operations was located on a feedlot owned and operated by Five Rivers Cattle Feeding in Yuma, Colorado. Five Rivers employees cleaned the cattle pens and gathered manure into piles. Humalfa employees then loaded the manure and transported it to a compost yard situated within the same feedlot.
Removing the manure was time-sensitive: accumulated manure would restrict the cattle’s movement. At the compost yard, the manure was turned and processed for approximately eight weeks. Composting reduced the quantity needed for fertilizer use and made transportation over longer distances economically practical.
Mr. Porter worked for Humalfa from 2007 through 2021, with an interruption in 2019. Although Humalfa employed and paid him, he worked almost exclusively at the Five Rivers feedlot. His duties were to load manure from the pens, haul it to the compost yard, and deposit it in windrows for turning. His hours generally ranged from forty to fifty per week and sometimes reached seventy. Humalfa paid him straight time without an overtime premium.
Ms. Porter’s disputed employment
Ms. Porter formally worked for Humalfa briefly in 2018 and again beginning November 8, 2021. Her claim concerned the intervening period, when she said she had resumed working without being paid.
The district court found that she occasionally helped her husband, purchased parts, and delivered weight tickets to Humalfa’s office. Mr. Crowder knew she sometimes helped Mr. Porter and likely knew she sometimes purchased parts. Nevertheless, the evidence concerning when this work began was “contradictory and convoluted,” and the district court found her estimate of the time spent on these activities “incredible.”
The district court’s decisions
After one bench trial, the district court held that Mr. Porter’s work was agricultural and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement. Following a second bench trial, it assumed for purposes of analysis that Ms. Porter was an employee but held that she had failed to prove recoverable damages under the applicable burden-shifting framework.
The Tenth Circuit exercised appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and decided the appeal on the briefs, without oral argument.
3. Summary of the Opinion
- Mr. Porter’s work qualified as secondary agriculture. He performed his duties on a farm, and removing manure was an integral part of maintaining the feedlot’s cattle operation.
- The employer’s separate commercial identity was not decisive. Humalfa’s independent composting business did not change the agricultural character of Mr. Porter’s particular tasks.
- The court did not classify Humalfa’s entire operation. Whether employees who composted manure or transported the finished fertilizer were exempt remained undecided.
- Ms. Porter’s judgment was affirmed on an alternative ground. Rather than reviewing the district court’s damages ruling, the court relied on her failure to establish and adequately defend employee status under the economic-realities test.
- Regulations concerning payment for known work did not resolve employee status. Ms. Porter’s reliance on those provisions assumed the employment relationship she first needed to establish.
4. Legal Reasoning
A. The agricultural exemption turns on both location and function
The FLSA generally requires overtime compensation when a covered employee works more than forty hours in a week. Section 213(b)(12), however, exempts employees “employed in agriculture” from that overtime requirement.
The statutory definition of agriculture in 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) has two components:
- Primary agriculture: “farming in all its branches.”
- Secondary agriculture: practices performed “by a farmer or on a farm” that are “incident to or in conjunction with” the relevant farming operations.
Humalfa relied on secondary agriculture. The parties did not genuinely dispute that Mr. Porter worked on a farm: both the cattle pens and the compost yard were within the Five Rivers feedlot. The principal question was whether his work sufficiently related to the feedlot’s agricultural operations.
The court answered yes because removing manure was essential to maintaining usable cattle pens. The work’s immediate function was not merely to supply raw material for Humalfa’s fertilizer business; it also enabled Five Rivers to continue raising cattle. That operational relationship brought Mr. Porter’s duties within the statutory language.
The disjunctive wording—“by a farmer or on a farm”—also matters. Secondary agriculture does not invariably require that the worker’s direct employer be the farmer. But working on farm property is not enough by itself: the necessary connection to the farm’s operations must still exist.
B. The analysis focuses on the employee’s actual duties
Mr. Porter emphasized that Humalfa and Five Rivers were separate businesses with different commercial objectives. Five Rivers raised cattle; Humalfa manufactured a marketable fertilizer product. The court accepted the distinction but did not treat it as dispositive.
Instead, it separated Mr. Porter’s duties from the larger commercial process. He collected raw manure and moved it within the feedlot. He did not claim that his role included processing the manure into compost or transporting the finished product off the farm.
This distinction explains the decision’s limited reach. Work at the beginning of a commercial chain may remain agricultural even though later activities raise different questions. The court expressly reserved the exempt status of other Humalfa employees because their duties and relevant circumstances were not before it.
The opinion therefore does not establish that composting is categorically agriculture. Nor does it establish that all work necessary to a farming business is exempt. Its conclusion depended on the unusually direct relationship between removing livestock waste and maintaining the livestock operation itself.
C. The regulations require a totality assessment, not a single-factor rule
The most substantial counterargument arose from Department of Labor regulations addressing independent businesses operating on farms.
Under 29 C.F.R. § 780.143, work not performed by or for the farmer strongly suggests that it is outside the farming operation. The regulation cautions that a separate enterprise cannot transform nonagricultural work into agriculture merely by relocating its operations onto a farm. Section 780.144 similarly describes qualifying practices as established parts of agriculture, subordinate to the farming operation, and not independent businesses.
These provisions supported Mr. Porter’s argument, but the court gave two reasons why they did not control the outcome:
- His work served the feedlot’s agricultural function. Even if Humalfa’s broader composting enterprise operated for its own benefit, removing raw manure was also integral to Five Rivers’ cattle operation.
- The regulations themselves resist categorical application. Their references to “strong indication,” “ordinarily,” and “generally” must be read alongside § 780.145, which directs attention to all relevant circumstances and rejects mechanical reliance on isolated factors.
The court also emphasized that the phrases “for the farmer” and “in connection with” do not reproduce the precise statutory formulation. The controlling inquiry remained whether a fair reading of § 203(f) encompassed Mr. Porter’s work.
This reasoning did not invalidate the regulations or make the independent-business concern irrelevant. Rather, it treated those provisions as guidance within a broader statutory and factual inquiry. Separate ownership and commercial benefit remained relevant, but neither automatically defeated the exemption.
D. Fair interpretation and the employer’s burden remain distinct
The court corrected the interpretive premise that FLSA exemptions must be narrowly construed against employers. Under current Supreme Court authority, exemptions receive a fair interpretation.
That interpretive approach does not shift the burden of proof. Humalfa still had to establish the exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. Nor did it create a presumption that activities occurring on farms are exempt.
The district court’s factual findings were reviewed for clear error, while its ultimate exemption determination received de novo review. This division allowed the appellate court to accept supported findings about Mr. Porter’s duties and their operational importance while independently deciding whether those facts satisfied the statute.
The court also rejected the argument that Humalfa had to produce evidence on every potentially relevant regulatory consideration. Because the inquiry examines the total situation rather than a mandatory checklist, the absence of evidence on some considerations did not necessarily defeat the exemption.
E. Variable hours supported the facts but did not replace the statutory test
Mr. Porter argued that regular working hours weighed against agricultural treatment. The court responded that his hours varied because manure removal was time-sensitive and essential. Those factual findings were not clearly erroneous.
More importantly, the court grounded its decision in § 203(f), not in general explanations of why Congress adopted agricultural exemptions. The opinion therefore does not make irregular hours a universal prerequisite for agricultural status or regular hours an automatic disqualification.
F. Employee status came before Ms. Porter’s wage and damages arguments
Ms. Porter’s claim presented a threshold problem: the FLSA provisions she invoked apply to employees, and she bore the burden of establishing the employment relationship.
The governing inquiry was the economic-realities test. Humalfa argued that she had not satisfied it, relying on testimony that Mr. Crowder had not asked her to perform the tasks, that existing employees should have performed them, and that no employment paperwork existed for the disputed period. Humalfa also emphasized her testimony that she performed the tasks to encourage the company to hire her.
Those circumstances did not produce a detailed appellate application of every economic-realities factor. Instead, the decisive procedural point was that Ms. Porter did not meaningfully answer Humalfa’s employee-status argument.
She relied on 29 C.F.R. § 785.11 and related provisions addressing compensation for work an employer knows an employee is performing. The court held that those provisions did not, by themselves, establish that she was an employee in the first place. Her argument assumed the very relationship Humalfa disputed.
The court treated the inadequately developed issue as waived on appeal and affirmed on that alternative ground. It therefore did not decide whether the district court correctly applied the damages framework.
The limitation is important: the opinion does not make hiring paperwork indispensable to FLSA coverage, establish that an express request is always necessary for compensable work, or declare that unpaid work undertaken in hopes of employment can never create an employment relationship. Its conclusion rested on the disputed record and the failure to develop the controlling appellate argument.
5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. Defining agriculture and its boundaries
- Rodriguez v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 360 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2004)
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The court relied on this decision for the agricultural exemption’s broad coverage of the agricultural field, coupled with the limitation that it applies only to agriculture. It supported an inclusive but bounded reading of § 203(f). The opinion also identified its older narrow-construction language as displaced by later Supreme Court authority; the agricultural-definition discussion remained useful.
- Maneja v. Waialua Agric. Co., 349 U.S. 254 (1955)
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This decision supplied two central principles: the exemption embraces agriculture broadly but does not extend beyond it, and whether a practice is incidental to farming requires examination of all surrounding facts. It supported the court’s refusal to let either Humalfa’s business identity or the farm location alone decide the case.
- Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004)
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This was the principal circuit authority for distinguishing primary from secondary farming and identifying secondary farming’s two requirements. Its recognition that subordinate and necessary tasks may be incidental to agriculture directly supported treating manure removal as part of the feedlot operation.
- Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949)
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This decision framed the inquiry as whether an activity forms part of the agricultural function or is separately organized as an independent productive activity. That distinction gave substance to Mr. Porter’s independent-business argument. The court nevertheless concluded that his particular manure-removal duties remained part of the feedlot’s agricultural function, despite Humalfa’s separate enterprise.
- Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC, 997 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2021)
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The court cited this decision for the geographical meaning of work performed “on a farm.” It supported the conclusion that Mr. Porter satisfied the location requirement because his relevant work occurred within the feedlot. It did not resolve the separate question whether his duties were incidental to farming.
- Donovan v. Frezzo Brothers, 678 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1982)
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Mr. Porter invoked this decision’s characterization of mushroom composting as more akin to manufacturing than agriculture. The court distinguished its relevance: Mr. Porter handled raw manure rather than performing the composting process. The decision thus illustrated a possible boundary for processing work without determining the classification of the duties actually at issue.
- Donovan v. Marrero, 695 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1982)
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This decision provided the closest analogy. It treated removing spent mushroom compost as incidental to mushroom farming because removal was integral to the growing process. The Tenth Circuit regarded removal of raw manure from cattle pens similarly. It also rejected the suggestion that discussion of agricultural working patterns in that case displaced the statutory inquiry.
B. Interpretation, proof, and appellate review
- E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 604 U.S. 45 (2025)
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This decision established the applicable burden: an employer must prove an FLSA exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. It supplied the evidentiary standard Humalfa had to meet, without imposing a heightened burden.
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79 (2018)
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This decision rejected the rule that FLSA exemptions receive a narrow construction. Its fair-interpretation approach governed the court’s reading of the agricultural exemption and corrected contrary language appearing in the district court’s analysis and older authorities.
- Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388 (1960)
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The opinion discussed this decision as the source of narrow-construction language quoted in earlier circuit authority. That historical interpretive approach did not govern the appeal after the Supreme Court’s later rejection of it.
- Wilson v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 80 F.4th 1170 (10th Cir. 2023)
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The court included this decision among circuit opinions containing the narrow-construction formulation. Its role was explanatory: it showed why the opinion needed to clarify the controlling interpretive approach, rather than supply the rule used to resolve Mr. Porter’s exemption.
- Lederman v. Frontier Fire Prot., Inc., 685 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2012)
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This decision likewise appeared in the discussion of historical narrow-construction authority, including its collection of additional cases. The court did not rely on that interpretive formulation as current law.
- Jordan v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 724 (10th Cir. 2020)
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This decision confirmed the Tenth Circuit’s recognition that the Supreme Court had rejected the former narrow-interpretation principle. It reinforced the use of fair statutory interpretation in this appeal.
- Dep't of Lab. v. City of Sapulpa, 30 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1994)
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This decision supplied the division between deferential clear-error review of factual findings and independent review of the ultimate exemption determination. It also explained why the appellate court accepted the district court’s supported account of the underlying facts.
- Archuleta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 543 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2008)
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The court used this decision to emphasize that exemption questions are intensely fact-specific, supporting both its focus on Mr. Porter’s actual work and its refusal to classify other Humalfa workers. It also cited the decision for the claimant’s burden to prove an FLSA violation. That proposition coexisted with the employer’s separate burden to prove an exemption.
C. Employment status, damages, and appellate preservation
- Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc., 703 F.3d 497 (10th Cir. 2012)
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This decision identified the economic-realities test as the governing approach to statutory employee status. It supplied the framework Ms. Porter needed to address, although the court resolved her appeal without undertaking a complete factor-by-factor analysis because she did not meaningfully respond under that framework.
- Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 2016)
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The court relied on this decision for the proposition that FLSA liability requires an employer–employee relationship and that the claimant bears the burden of alleging and proving it. This supported reaching the employment-status issue before considering Ms. Porter’s hours or damages.
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946)
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The district court used this decision’s burden-shifting framework to evaluate Ms. Porter’s damages. Generally, the framework permits proof through a just and reasonable inference when an employee has performed uncompensated work and adequate employer records are unavailable. The opinion noted its statutory supersession on other grounds. Because the appellate court affirmed on employee status, it did not endorse or reject the district court’s application of the damages framework.
- Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2004)
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This decision justified affirmance on an alternative ground. Employee status had been argued, briefed, and factually developed below; Humalfa maintained the argument on appeal; and resolving it required no additional factual findings. Those circumstances permitted the appellate court to affirm without deciding the damages issue relied upon by the district court.
- In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig. (Hossley-Embry Grp. II), 111 F.4th 1095 (10th Cir. 2024)
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This decision supported two preservation rulings. Ms. Porter waived any wage claims for other periods by not developing them in her opening brief. She also waived the employee-status issue by failing to develop an argument answering Humalfa’s economic-realities contention. The latter omission was central to affirmance.
6. Potential Impact and Limits
Independent contractors performing integrated farm work
The decision offers persuasive support for applying the agricultural overtime exemption to contractor employees whose actual duties are closely integrated with a farm’s operations. Direct employment by the farmer is not invariably necessary when the statutory “on a farm” alternative is satisfied.
Its usefulness is strongest in factually similar disputes involving on-farm collection and removal of agricultural waste. It provides much less support for treating processing, manufacturing, or off-farm transportation as agricultural merely because those activities begin with a farm byproduct.
Evidence must describe the work, not merely the business
Future litigants should develop evidence about where the employee worked, what the employee actually did, how the work related to the relevant farming operation, and where it fell within any broader production process. A business label such as “composting company” or a location label such as “farm” will not independently answer the statutory question.
The opinion also exposes a recurring tension: a separate commercial enterprise can perform work that benefits both itself and a farmer. The court resolved that tension here through employee-specific duties and the total circumstances, not through a general rule favoring either commercial independence or operational necessity.
Informal work and appellate advocacy
For wage claimants, the decision underscores the need to establish employee status separately from proving that useful work occurred. Employer knowledge of tasks may be relevant, but invoking regulations about compensable hours is not a substitute for addressing a disputed employment relationship.
The appellate lesson is equally important. A party must answer a developed alternative basis for affirmance, especially when the issue concerns an element on which that party bears the burden. Attacking only the district court’s stated rationale may leave an independently sufficient ground unanswered.
What remains unresolved
- Whether Humalfa employees engaged in actual compost processing or finished-product transportation qualify for an exemption.
- Whether Ms. Porter could have established employee status through a fully developed economic-realities argument.
- Whether the district court correctly applied the damages framework to her evidence.
- Any separate minimum-wage exemption: the exemption applied to Mr. Porter under § 213(b)(12) concerns overtime.
Because the order is nonprecedential, its future influence will depend on the persuasiveness of its reasoning and the similarity of the facts.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Secondary agriculture
Work that supports a farming operation rather than directly growing crops or raising animals. It must satisfy both the statutory location-or-performer requirement and the necessary relationship to the farming operation.
- “Incident to or in conjunction with” farming
Work performed as a supporting part of, or together with, the farm’s agricultural activities. Here, removing manure kept the cattle pens usable.
- Preponderance of the evidence
Proof that something is more likely true than not. Humalfa bore this burden when asserting the overtime exemption.
- Clear error and de novo review
Clear-error review generally preserves supported trial-level factual findings. De novo review means the appellate court decides the legal question independently.
- Economic-realities test
An assessment of the actual working relationship to determine whether someone is an employee under the FLSA. Labels and paperwork do not alone decide the issue.
- Work “suffered or permitted”
Work an employer allows to occur can be compensable even without an express instruction. In this appeal, however, reliance on hours-worked regulations did not adequately establish the disputed underlying employment relationship.
- Affirmance on an alternative ground
An appellate court leaves the judgment intact for a legally sufficient reason different from the trial court’s stated reason, where the record and procedural circumstances permit it.
- Appellate waiver
As used in the opinion, the loss of an issue through inadequate appellate argument. Merely mentioning a position does not necessarily preserve it.
- Exceptions to nonprecedential status
Law of the case concerns rulings within the same litigation; res judicata concerns claims already resolved; collateral estoppel concerns issues already determined. These doctrines can give the judgment binding consequences without making it general precedent.
8. Conclusion
The opinion’s central lesson is that the agricultural overtime exemption requires a practical, employee-specific examination. Mr. Porter’s on-farm manure removal remained secondary agriculture because it directly supported the feedlot’s cattle operation, notwithstanding his employer’s separate composting business.
Ms. Porter’s claim illustrates a different threshold: before obtaining wages or invoking relaxed damages proof, a claimant must establish employee status and adequately defend that issue on appeal. Together, the rulings clarify the sequence and focus of FLSA analysis while leaving broader compost-processing and informal-employment questions unresolved.