Oklahoma’s Initiative Power Bars County Signature Caps and Unjustified Restrictions on Petition Advocacy

Case: McVAY v. LEPAK and DRUMMOND
Citation: 2026 OK 81
Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Opinion filed: November 10, 2026
Author: Justice Gurich

1. Introduction

In McVAY v. LEPAK and DRUMMOND, the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated Senate Bill 1027, a comprehensive revision of the state’s initiative and referendum procedures. The decision protects two related interests: the people’s constitutionally reserved power to propose legislation and constitutional amendments independently of the Legislature, and the freedom to communicate, organize, and finance advocacy during petition circulation.

The petitioners—Steven Craig McVay, Amy Cerato, Kenneth Ray Setter, and Anthony Stobbe—challenged restrictions affecting circulator qualifications, county signature totals, petition summaries, compensation, financial support, and disclosure. The respondents, Secretary of State Benjamin Lepak and Attorney General Gentner Drummond, defended the legislation as promoting integrity, transparency, understandable petitions, and greater suburban and rural participation.

The central question was whether these objectives justified restrictions on political participation and expression. The Court concluded that the Act’s principal provisions violated the federal or Oklahoma Constitution. It then held that the remaining provisions could not survive independently, notwithstanding an express severability clause. The entire Act was therefore void, leaving the preceding versions of the amended statutes in force.

The decision was divided: five justices concurred and four dissented. Although the supplied opinion identifies separate dissenting writings, their contents are not included; their reasoning cannot be assessed here.

2. Background and Procedural Setting

S.B. 1027 became effective on May 23, 2025, and amended 34 O.S. §§ 3, 6, 8, and 9. Among other changes, it imposed county-specific signature ceilings, required circulators to be registered Oklahoma voters, expanded requirements governing the “gist” printed on signature sheets, and restricted circulation-related compensation and funding.

The petitioners commenced this original proceeding on June 12, 2025, requesting declaratory relief and a writ prohibiting enforcement. They argued that the Act made petition campaigns prohibitively expensive and infringed speech, association, petition rights, separation of powers, and equal protection.

The Court initially denied interim relief in this action. In a related proceeding, however, it temporarily prevented application of S.B. 1027 to State Question 836. The Court subsequently assumed original jurisdiction in the present case on November 18, 2025, after oral argument.

The related decision, In re INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836, 2025 OK 56, established that State Question 836 was legally sufficient to proceed to signature collection. It supplied procedural context rather than the constitutional rule governing S.B. 1027. Two petitioners were proponents of that measure, while another petitioner expressed an imminent intention to pursue a turnpike-related initiative.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Court granted declaratory relief and held S.B. 1027 unconstitutional and unenforceable in its entirety.

Provision Principal reason for invalidation
Oklahoma voter-registration requirement for circulators Controlling United States Supreme Court precedent had already invalidated the same type of restriction.
County-specific signature caps They prohibited otherwise qualified voters from signing, burdened political speech, violated the state petition right, and made certain constitutionally authorized resubmissions mathematically impossible.
Additional gist requirements They imposed unjustified content controls, prior restraints, and compelled speech on petition advocacy.
Secretary of State review of gists The review provision could not operate independently after the new substantive gist requirements were invalidated.
Incentive-based compensation ban It burdened effective political communication without evidence establishing that the restriction was necessary to combat fraud.
Out-of-state circulation-funding restriction It discriminated among speakers and was not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest in protecting Oklahoma voices.
Public notice of circulators’ paid status and employers It compelled content-specific speech without adequately identifying the interests actually supporting a proposal.
Compensation disclosures and weekly expenditure reports The burdens were disproportionate to their limited informational value and insufficiently related to an informed electorate.
Remaining provisions They could not be severed consistently with legislative intent.

The Court did not hold that all petition regulation is forbidden. Its reasoning repeatedly distinguished legitimate protection of the initiative process from unnecessary restrictions on participation and advocacy.

4. Analysis

A. Standing and Original Jurisdiction

Standing

Under Fent v. Contingency Rev. Bd., 2007 OK 27, standing ordinarily requires a concrete actual or imminent injury, a causal connection to the challenged conduct, and likely redress through a favorable decision. The petitioners satisfied these requirements through their past participation, intended future participation, active initiative sponsorship, and allegations that the Act directly burdened their protected activities. The respondents did not contest standing.

The decision therefore rested on the petitioners’ connection to the regulated process, not merely disagreement with public policy. Although all were registered voters, their allegations also identified direct effects on contemplated or ongoing petition activity.

Why the Supreme Court heard the case directly

Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, supported the Court’s authority to provide declaratory relief through its constitutional superintending jurisdiction. That authority is exceptional rather than routine:

  • Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 of Okla. Cnty. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ., 2024 OK 39, emphasized the extraordinary circumstances required for original jurisdiction.
  • Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, established that assumption of original jurisdiction is discretionary and that original declaratory proceedings are rare.
  • Keating v. Johnson, 1996 OK 61, identified public importance and urgency as recurring justifications.
  • Tobacco Settlement Endowment Tr. Fund v. Stitt, 2026 OK 1, supported direct review of a purely legal constitutional challenge of major statewide importance.

These considerations converged here. The Act immediately affected pending and future petitions, applied to certain petitions already in progress, and presented constitutional questions requiring no further fact-finding. The Court considered the submitted record and briefing sufficient for facial review.

B. The Governing Constitutional Framework

Petition circulation is political expression

The Court treated signature gathering as more than an administrative prerequisite to ballot placement. Circulators discuss proposed political change, persuade potential signers, and create opportunities for statewide debate.

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), supplied the foundational proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of speech against state interference. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), identified initiative circulation as “core political speech,” entitled to especially strong protection.

Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. (ACLF), 525 U.S. 182 (1999), reinforced that characterization while recognizing states’ substantial room to protect the initiative process’s integrity and reliability. Through its reference to Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), the Court acknowledged that no simple formula separates valid ballot-access regulation from unconstitutional restrictions on political interaction.

The quotation from Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1983), adopted through Meyer v. Grant, added that legislation limiting the initiative power should be closely scrutinized and narrowly construed.

Strict scrutiny and the burden of justification

For the challenged restrictions on core political expression, the Court required the State to establish a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), supplied that formulation. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton, 606 U.S. 461 (2025), described strict scrutiny as constitutional law’s most demanding test, requiring the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.

The Court contrasted this approach with the ordinary presumption of statutory validity described in Kiesel v. Rogers, 2020 OK 65. Relying on State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Pile, 1979 OK 152, it explained that restrictions on First Amendment freedoms do not receive the usual presumption in the same way. Prior restraints, in particular, face a heavy presumption against validity.

This allocation of the burden was decisive: identifying an attractive public objective was not enough. The State had to explain why the particular restriction was constitutionally necessary.

Independent protection under Oklahoma law

The Oklahoma Constitution separately protects speech, assembly, and the people’s reserved initiative and referendum powers. Article V, §§ 1–2 makes those powers independent of ordinary legislative lawmaking.

In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 1991 OK 110, quoting In re Referendum Petition No. 18, State Question No. 437, 1966 OK 152, characterized the petition right as sacred and deserving careful preservation. Ruth v. Peshek, 1931 OK 674, framed preservation of that reserved power as a judicial duty.

For state constitutional petition claims, Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK 39, supplied an undue-burden framework: regulatory benefits must be weighed against the burdens imposed on the constitutional right. The Court used that approach independently when invalidating the county caps.

C. Circulator Voter Registration: A Directly Controlling Precedent

The Act required circulators to be registered Oklahoma voters. This issue was straightforward because Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. (ACLF) had invalidated Colorado’s equivalent registered-voter requirement.

The respondents conceded that the precedent controlled. The Court accordingly invalidated the new requirements in 34 O.S. §§ 6 and 8(E).

The holding should be stated precisely: the Court rejected a voter-registration qualification for circulators. It did not independently adjudicate every conceivable residency requirement or other circulator qualification.

D. County Signature Caps: Constitutional Participation Cannot Be Geographically Rationed This Way

S.B. 1027 limited signatures collected from any county to 11.5% of that county’s most recent gubernatorial vote for statutory measures and 20.8% for constitutional measures.

The statutory language prohibited collection, not merely counting

The respondents attempted to characterize these provisions as limits on signatures counted toward qualification. The Court rejected that interpretation because the statute expressly limited signatures “collected.” Once a county reached its ceiling, other qualified voters could not sign.

This distinction shaped the constitutional analysis. The caps did not merely require a campaign to demonstrate geographically distributed support; they directly excluded eligible participants.

The asserted rural-participation benefit was unpersuasive

The Court found that small counties could become unattractive destinations for campaigns because so few signatures could be collected there. Its Harmon County example illustrated the problem: a statutory petition could obtain only seventy-five signatures despite a registered electorate of 1,378.

The Court also observed that the caps did not require universal rural participation. The necessary signatures could still be obtained from a limited group of populous counties, while the aggregate available outside Oklahoma and Tulsa Counties remained insufficient to qualify a measure.

The Court took judicial notice of legislative debate under Oklahoma’s evidence statute. Indep. Sch. Dist. # 52 of Okla. Cnty. v. Hofmeister, 2020 OK 56, supported judicial notice of reliable public records available online. That precedent served an evidentiary role, not a substantive First Amendment role.

Equalizing political voices does not justify suppressing others

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), supplied a central principle: government may not restrict some speakers to increase others’ relative influence. The Court applied that principle to reject the justification that restricting participation in some counties would enhance rural voices.

Meyer v. Grant further established that constitutional protection does not depend on the popularity or perceived social usefulness of the ideas advanced. Government cannot determine which viewpoints deserve access to political discussion.

Independent conflicts with the Oklahoma Constitution

The caps also failed the state undue-burden test because their exclusionary effects outweighed their asserted benefits. Article V, § 2 reserves a right of proposal to legal voters; the Legislature could not pursue wider geographic participation by denying that right to otherwise qualified voters.

A separate mathematical defect made the conflict especially clear. Article V, § 6 permits a previously rejected measure to be proposed again within three years upon obtaining signatures meeting a 25% threshold. The Act’s county ceilings, aggregated statewide, permitted totals below that threshold. The respondents’ proposed exception for resubmitted measures had no basis in the statutory text.

The Court distinguished geographic requirements in Arkansas, Ohio, and Florida: the cited requirements came from state constitutions and generally imposed minimum geographic representation rather than prohibiting additional signatures.

Importantly, the Court did not decide the petitioners’ equal-protection claim or undertake a special-law analysis. Those possible objections were unnecessary once other constitutional grounds disposed of the caps.

E. Gist Requirements: Informing Voters Does Not Permit Unnecessary Editorial Control

The “gist” is the short description printed on each petition signature sheet. S.B. 1027 imposed additional vocabulary, neutrality, and fiscal-impact requirements and authorized the Secretary of State to reject nonconforming gists.

The influential analogy to Ohio’s petition-summary system

Brown v. Yost, 133 F.4th 725 (6th Cir. 2025), was persuasive rather than controlling authority. It concerned Ohio’s requirement that its attorney general approve petition summaries as fair and truthful. The Oklahoma Court adopted its reasoning that governmental editorial review can severely burden advocates’ control over a central campaign document.

Several precedents supported that reasoning:

  • Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), protected editorial control and judgment against government intrusion.
  • Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), supported strict scrutiny where the burden on protected participation is severe.
  • Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018), quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), established the presumptive unconstitutionality of content-based speech restrictions absent sufficiently tailored justification.
  • Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243 (2022), supplied the government-speech factors discussed in Brown v. Yost: historical practice, likely public perception, and governmental control.

The government-speech distinction mattered because private petition advocates do not become government speakers merely by participating in a state-created initiative process. A petition seeking legal change remains fundamentally the proponents’ communication.

Existing safeguards undermined the need for new controls

Under In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 1990 OK 75, a gist already had to be brief, informative, descriptive of the proposal’s effect, and nondeceptive. Oklahoma also already permitted direct judicial challenges to misleading gists.

The respondents failed to justify additional content restrictions against this background. The Court held that the new requirements impermissibly compelled some speech while restraining other speech.

This was not a holding that misleading gists are protected or that all accuracy requirements are invalid. The preexisting rules remained part of the legal framework restored by the judgment.

The Court did not resolve the separate separation-of-powers challenge to the Secretary of State’s enlarged role. It instead held the new review provision incapable of independent execution once its substantive standards had been invalidated.

F. Incentive-Based Compensation: Economic Burdens Can Be Speech Burdens

The Act prohibited compensation based on signatures collected, signature sheets submitted, or similar incentives. Although hourly compensation remained available, the Court found a constitutionally significant burden.

The controlling importance of effective communication

Meyer v. Grant invalidated a complete prohibition on paying circulators because it reduced the number of advocates, the hours they could work, the audience reached, and the likelihood of ballot qualification. It also rejected the proposition that less effective or more expensive communication alternatives eliminate a First Amendment injury.

S.B. 1027 did not impose the complete prohibition found in Meyer v. Grant. Nevertheless, the Court applied its reasoning to the restriction’s practical effects. Evidence indicated that performance-based payment was common and that replacing it could increase costs or reduce access to professional circulation services.

The comparative authorities did not establish a categorical rule

The opinion surveyed decisions addressing different compensation restrictions:

  • Limit v. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Wash. 1994), concerned Washington’s prohibition on per-signature payment.
  • Term Limits Leadership Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Miss. 1997), concerned Mississippi’s per-signature restriction.
  • Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2001), addressed North Dakota’s prohibition on payments related to signatures obtained.
  • Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006), concerned Oregon’s constitutional prohibition on per-signature compensation.
  • Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2008), addressed Ohio’s broader restriction to time-based compensation. Its discussion placed that restriction closer to the complete ban in Meyer v. Grant because of its breadth and sanctions.
  • Pierce v. Jacobsen, 44 F.4th 833 (9th Cir. 2022), concerned Montana’s signature-based payment prohibition.
  • Az. Petition Partners LLC v. Thompson ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 530 P.3d 1144 (Ariz. 2023), addressed Arizona’s prohibition on compensation based on signatures collected.

The Oklahoma Court described these authorities as reaching varying conclusions depending substantially on the restriction’s scope and the evidence supporting fraud concerns. It did not treat them as establishing that every incentive-payment restriction is necessarily valid or invalid.

Speculative fraud concerns were insufficient

The State supplied no evidence showing fraud in Oklahoma’s previous incentive-payment system. Existing safeguards already criminalized false signatures and required verification against voter-registration information.

Nichols v. Ziriax, 2022 OK 76, illustrated the substantial verification process, even under an earlier version requiring fewer matching data points. The current system required four of five specified voter-information fields to match.

The holding therefore combined demonstrated speech burdens, the restriction’s breadth, an absence of supporting fraud evidence, and existing alternative safeguards. It did not declare fraud prevention an illegitimate objective or establish that incentive arrangements can never present risks.

G. Out-of-State Funding: A Speaker’s Location Does Not Eliminate Speech Protection

S.B. 1027 prohibited persons and entities that neither resided nor did business in Oklahoma from contributing toward, or paying for, petition circulation. The State defended the restriction as protection against outside interests overwhelming Oklahoma voices.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), supplied the principal analogy. That decision concerned independent corporate and union spending in candidate elections, not this precise form of petition financing. The Oklahoma Court nevertheless applied its broader principles: financing political communication implicates speech, speaker-based restrictions require justification, and alternative channels of advocacy do not necessarily cure a prohibition.

Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), quoted through Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, supplied the compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring standard.

The State’s reliance on State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999), was unpersuasive because that decision relied substantively on Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), which Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission overruled.

The Court also rejected the analogy to foreign influence. The Act reached non-Oklahoma United States citizens, not merely foreign nationals. Its “doing business” exception was insufficiently clear to dispel the burden, and permission to purchase advertisements did not substitute for the freedom to support circulation.

Even assuming the State’s objective was compelling, the blanket restriction was not narrowly tailored. The holding concerns this circulation-funding prohibition; it should not be read as eliminating all constitutionally permissible distinctions between contributions, expenditures, or foreign participation.

H. Disclosure Requirements: Different Forms of Disclosure Require Different Analysis

Public notice during circulation

The Act required circulators to display conspicuous notice stating whether they were paid and identifying their payor. The Court treated this as compelled, content-based speech imposed at the moment of political interaction.

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), supported requiring narrow tailoring to a compelling interest for content-based regulation in a public forum. The Court also carefully noted that Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. (ACLF) had expressly left unresolved the constitutionality of badges identifying paid status and payors. The result therefore was not dictated by that precedent.

The requirement failed because identifying a signature-gathering firm would often reveal little about the interests sponsoring or benefiting from a measure. The notice burden did not adequately serve the State’s stated informational objective.

Reports to the Secretary of State

The Act separately required disclosure of circulators’ compensating employers and weekly expenditure reports from anyone spending money on circulation. These reports were published online. Neither requirement included a minimum financial threshold.

Buckley v. Valeo recognized that compelled disclosure can burden associational privacy. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), supplied the plurality’s warning that administrative and recordkeeping obligations can deter political participation, particularly by small organizations.

The applicable disclosure analysis required a substantial relationship between the disclosure and a sufficiently important governmental interest, rather than automatically treating every reporting obligation like the direct speech restrictions discussed earlier. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission supplied that formulation, while Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), required the governmental interest’s strength to reflect the actual burden’s seriousness.

The three possible governmental interests

Drawing on Buckley v. Valeo, the Court considered enforcement of contribution limits, prevention of corruption, and information useful to voters.

  1. Contribution-limit enforcement: Oklahoma imposed no relevant contribution limits on state-question campaigns, so reporting was not needed to enforce such limits.
  2. Corruption prevention: Candidate-election concerns did not transfer readily to ballot measures. Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. (ACLF), Meyer v. Grant, and First Nat! Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), distinguished ballot advocacy from the exchange-of-favors risks associated with candidates.
  3. Voter information: This was legitimate in principle, but the reports’ actual content supplied too little useful information to justify their breadth.

The lack of thresholds meant that trivial spending could trigger recurring reports. Moreover, the respondents emphasized that the provisions generally disclosed payments to circulation firms, not individual campaign donors. That limitation weakened their asserted usefulness in identifying the forces behind a proposal.

The Court acknowledged language in Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. (ACLF) approving sponsor-level financial disclosure, but characterized that discussion as dicta because the particular requirement was no longer contested. It distinguished those observations from the individualized disclosures actually invalidated there.

The resulting holding was targeted: these requirements imposed burdens exceeding their limited informational benefits and lacked the necessary substantial relationship to the asserted interest. The opinion did not reject petition-finance transparency as a general objective.

I. Severability: An Express Clause Does Not Guarantee Partial Survival

S.B. 1027 contained a severability clause, but 75 O.S. § 11a still required examination of whether the remaining provisions were independent, legislatively intended, and capable of execution.

The Court identified provisions not separately invalidated on their merits, including an Open Records Act notice, signatory attestation, signature-removal procedures, federal labor standards, an additional ballot-title requirement, retroactivity, and technical amendments.

The decisive question was not simply whether some surviving text could function mechanically. It was whether the Legislature would have enacted those provisions without the Act’s unconstitutional foundation, and whether they still embodied its intended scheme.

The Court declined to presume that they would. None advanced the asserted rural-inclusion objective, and existing ballot-title safeguards already addressed clarity and deception. Standing alone, the remnants no longer represented the legislative package.

Thus, provisions not independently held unconstitutional nevertheless fell with the Act. The retroactivity clause, for example, did not receive a separate merits ruling in this opinion; it lost effect through nonseverability.

5. Potential Impact

Immediate statutory consequences

Because the unconstitutional amendments were void, the Court treated them as though they had never been enacted. The versions of 34 O.S. §§ 3, 6, 8, and 9 preceding S.B. 1027 remained effective. The judgment did not leave Oklahoma without petition regulation; it restored the prior framework.

Future geographic restrictions

The decision creates a strong obstacle to ordinary legislation that excludes qualified signers after county ceilings are reached. Its separate reliance on Article V also means that future proposals must respect the Constitution’s statewide thresholds and its express mechanism for resubmitting rejected measures. The opinion does not resolve every possible geographic-distribution requirement.

Evidence-based regulation

Future restrictions on compensation or circulation methods will require more than generalized references to integrity. Legislators and defending officials will need to address actual risks, practical burdens, narrower alternatives, and safeguards already in place.

Disclosure design

The reporting analysis makes financial thresholds, frequency, administrative cost, and informational usefulness especially important. Requirements identifying meaningful financial sponsorship may present a different constitutional question from reports that chiefly identify vendors or capture negligible expenditures.

Protection of advocacy before ballot qualification

The opinion strengthens protection at the signature-gathering stage, when proposals are still seeking access to a statewide vote. Its reasoning rejects the assumption that extensive governmental editorial control becomes permissible merely because petition circulation is regulated by statute.

Limits on the decision’s reach

The decision is authoritative on Oklahoma law, while federal constitutional propositions remain subject to controlling United States Supreme Court law. Its close division also matters institutionally, but the supplied text does not permit speculation about the dissenters’ preferred tests or outcomes.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Initiative and referendum
An initiative allows citizens to propose a legal change. A citizen-initiated referendum allows voters to seek a public decision on legislation. The opinion’s references to referendums concern citizen-initiated petitions.
Signing is not necessarily endorsing
A signature supports placing a proposal before voters. It does not necessarily express agreement with the proposal itself. Final enactment requires approval at the statewide election.
Strict scrutiny
The government must establish an exceptionally important objective and show that its restriction is narrowly designed to achieve it without unnecessary interference with protected rights.
Undue burden
A court weighs a regulation’s benefits against the obstacles it places in the way of a constitutional right.
Prior restraint and compelled speech
A prior restraint conditions expression on advance approval. Compelled speech requires a person to communicate a message the government specifies.
Disclosure scrutiny
Disclosure may be permissible, but it must have a substantial relationship to a sufficiently important governmental interest, with adequate justification for the burden imposed.
Dicta
Judicial observations unnecessary to deciding the dispute. They can be persuasive without constituting the case’s binding holding.
Severability
The question whether valid portions of a law can remain effective after other portions are invalidated. A severability clause favors preservation but does not settle whether the remaining scheme reflects legislative intent.

7. Conclusion

McVAY v. LEPAK and DRUMMOND establishes that Oklahoma may protect petition integrity, but may not pursue that objective through unjustified restrictions on qualified signers, political advocacy, circulation financing, or association.

Its most significant contribution is the combination of federal speech protection with Oklahoma’s independently reserved initiative power. Because the unconstitutional provisions formed the Act’s foundation, the Court invalidated S.B. 1027 as a whole and restored the preexisting statutes.

The Court allowed ten days for a rehearing petition and five additional days for a response, expressly prohibiting extensions of those periods.