Ohio Redefines “Harborer” Under R.C. 955.28(B): Strict Liability Requires Sheltering, Protecting, or Exercising Control Over the Dog

1. Introduction

In L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2219 (decided June 17, 2026), the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed whether the owner of a manufactured-home community could be held strictly liable for a child’s injuries from a dog bite under R.C. 955.28(B) as a “harborer” of the dog.

The minor plaintiff, L.H., was bitten at a playground within Oakwood Village after a resident’s dog—tethered by a leash to playground equipment—bit L.H. on the face, requiring more than 50 stitches. L.H. sued both the dog’s owner (who defaulted) and Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C. (“Sun”), the community owner, asserting Sun was a statutory “harborer” and therefore strictly liable.

The key issue was narrow but consequential: does a property owner “harbor” a dog merely by allowing residents to keep dogs and permitting leashed dogs in common areas?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Second District and reinstated summary judgment for Sun. The court held:

  • “To harbor a dog under R.C. 955.28(B), one must shelter, protect, or exercise control over it.”
  • A manufactured-home community owner that allows dogs in residents’ dwellings and allows leashed dogs in common areas is not a “harborer” absent evidence that it sheltered, protected, or exercised control over the specific dog.

Because the dog remained the resident-owner’s dog and the community rules required residents to keep dogs leashed and under resident control (and there was no evidence Sun provided shelter/food/dog housing or otherwise controlled the dog), Sun was not a harborer as a matter of law.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Summary-judgment framework

  • McConnell v. Dudley, 2019-Ohio-4740: Cited for the familiar three-part summary-judgment test (no genuine issue of material fact; entitlement as a matter of law; only one reasonable conclusion).
  • Harris v. Hilderbrand, 2023-Ohio-3005: Reinforced that Supreme Court review of summary judgment is de novo and referenced the strict-liability structure of R.C. 955.28(B).

These cases did not drive the substantive definition of “harborer,” but they framed why the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law on an undisputed record.

B. Statutory-interpretation approach

  • Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902): Quoted for the canon that courts must apply the statute enacted, not speculate about what the legislature “intended” beyond the text.
  • Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 2003-Ohio-1099 and Summerville v. Forest Park, 2010-Ohio-6280: Used to emphasize that unambiguous statutory language is applied as written.
  • State v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-6773: Cited for the rule that undefined statutory terms receive their plain and ordinary meaning.

Together, these authorities supported the majority’s methodological choice: resolve “harborer” by ordinary meaning (including dictionary sources) rather than by a long line of intermediate appellate gloss.

C. Elements of a strict-liability dog-bite claim

  • Beckett v. Warren, 2010-Ohio-4: Cited for the plaintiff’s burden under R.C. 955.28 to prove (1) ownership/keepership/harborship, (2) proximate cause, and (3) damages.

Beckett was important because the court treated “harborer” status as a threshold statutory element; if Sun was not a harborer, strict liability could not attach regardless of the severity of harm.

D. Dictionary and out-of-state authority on “harbor”

  • Bright v. Maznik, 162 Idaho 311 (2017) (quoting Markwood v. McBroom, 110 Wash. 208 (1920)): Invoked to show “harbor” contemplates protection and undertaking to control the animal’s actions.
  • Steinberg v. Petta, 114 Ill.2d 496 (1986): Cited for the proposition that harboring involves some measure of care, custody, or control.
  • Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14 (1992): Cited for defining harboring as affording lodging, shelter, or refuge.

These cases were persuasive support for the majority’s view that “harborer” is an active relationship with the animal (shelter/protection/control), not merely a passive property-based concept.

E. Ohio appellate definition rejected by the majority

  • Ward v. Humble, 2022-Ohio-3258 and Vallejo v. Haynes, 2018-Ohio-4623: Identified as examples of Ohio appellate decisions that defined “harborer” as possession/control of premises plus silent acquiescence to the dog’s presence.

The majority expressly distinguished “acquiescing” from “harboring,” concluding that acquiescence is not enough under the statutory term. This is the opinion’s central doctrinal move and effectively disapproves the prevailing appellate formulation.

F. Dissent’s historical and doctrinal authorities

Justice Fischer’s dissent framed the majority’s approach as an abrupt break from decades of Ohio law and argued that any policy shift should be legislative. The dissent relied on:

  • Statutory history and older Supreme Court discussions: Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61 (1913), Warner v. Wolfe, 176 Ohio St. 389 (1964), Hirschauer v. Davis, 163 Ohio St. 105 (1955).
  • Legislative-response narrative: Trenka v. Cipriani Invest. Co., 1983 WL 2635 (8th Dist. Oct. 6, 1983), cited to argue the 1987 insertion of “harborer” may have been intended to reach landlords in circumstances where “owner/keeper” did not.
  • The widely used landlord/common-area “harborer” line: Godsey v. Franz, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1087 (6th Dist. Mar. 13, 1992) (and its reference to Garrard v. McComas ([10th Dist.] 1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 179), Sengel v. Maddox, 16 Ohio Supp. 137 (C.P. 1945), Hilty v. Topaz, 2004-Ohio-4859, plus numerous district-court applications including Flint v. Holbrook, 80 Ohio App.3d 21 (2d Dist. 1992), Thompson v. Irwin, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4728 (12th Dist. Oct. 27, 1997), Morris v. Cordell, 2015-Ohio-4342, Brown v. Terrell, 2018-Ohio-2503, Hall v. Zambrano, 2014-Ohio-2853, H.W. v. Young, 2020-Ohio-1384, Lopiccolo v. Vidal, 2012-Ohio-4048, Burgess v. Tackas, 125 Ohio App.3d 294 (8th Dist. 1998), and others the dissent catalogued.

Although the dissent’s authorities did not carry the day, they are critical for understanding what the majority opinion is departing from: the premise-based, acquiescence-focused definition used in most districts and reflected in Ohio Jury Instructions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Identify the operative statutory term and interpret it by ordinary meaning. Because R.C. Chapter 955 does not define “harborer,” the court used the plain meaning of “harbor” informed by dictionaries and persuasive case law.
  2. Define “harborer” as an active relationship to the dog. The court concluded harboring denotes “sheltering, protecting, or exercising control over” the dog—concepts that go beyond merely letting a dog be present on one’s property.
  3. Reject the appellate “silent acquiescence” standard as inconsistent with the statutory term. The majority reasoned that “acquiesce” means implied consent by silence, while “harbor” involves affirmative shelter/protection/control. Therefore, the common appellate definition improperly expands the statute.
  4. Apply the new definition to the undisputed record. Sun allowed dogs subject to restrictions (e.g., breed restrictions) and required leashing and cleanup in common areas, but these rules were framed as requiring owners to control their dogs. There was no evidence Sun provided dog sheltering resources (dog houses/food) or exercised control over the specific dog.
  5. Conclude Sun is not a harborer as a matter of law; summary judgment is appropriate. Because harborer status is an element of strict liability under R.C. 955.28(B), the claim failed at the threshold.

3.3 Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal effects are likely to be substantial:

  • Narrower strict-liability exposure for landlords and property owners. Property owners who merely permit dogs (even in common areas) are less likely to be “harborers” unless they actively shelter/protect/control the animal.
  • Recalibration of the landlord/common-area theory. The dissent’s approach would have maintained the long-standing rule that permitting dogs in landlord-controlled common areas can create harborer status. The majority’s rule requires more than permission and premises control; litigants must now develop evidence of active control/protection/shelter by the defendant.
  • Shift in litigation strategy. Plaintiffs may increasingly rely on non-statutory theories (e.g., negligence premises liability) where strict liability under R.C. 955.28(B) is harder to establish against non-owners.
  • Likely conflicts with existing intermediate appellate precedent. Because the majority explicitly criticizes the “silent acquiescence” line (e.g., Ward v. Humble; Vallejo v. Haynes), lower courts and practitioners should expect doctrinal cleanup and re-briefing of “harborer” across Ohio.
  • Potential legislative response. The dissent’s statutory-history argument highlights a plausible path for legislative clarification if the General Assembly prefers the broader, premises-based approach.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Strict liability (R.C. 955.28(B))
Liability without proving negligence. If someone is an “owner, keeper, or harborer” of the dog, they can be liable for injuries the dog causes, unless a statutory exception applies.
Owner / keeper / harborer
The statute lists different categories of legally responsible persons. This opinion focuses on “harborer,” holding it requires the defendant to shelter, protect, or exercise control over the dog.
Harboring vs. acquiescence
“Acquiescence” means passive permission or silent consent. The court held “harboring” is not passive; it requires active sheltering/protection/control.
Common areas
Shared spaces such as playgrounds, hallways, and lawns not exclusively possessed by a tenant/resident. The dissent would treat landlord control of common areas, plus permission for dogs there, as sufficient for “harborer” status. The majority requires additional evidence of active shelter/protection/control.
Summary judgment
A pretrial ruling when material facts are not genuinely disputed and the law entitles one party to win. Here, the controlling question was legal: what “harborer” means and whether Sun’s conduct met that definition.

5. Conclusion

L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C. establishes a clarified—and materially narrower—definition of “harborer” for purposes of Ohio’s dog-bite strict-liability statute: to harbor a dog under R.C. 955.28(B), one must shelter, protect, or exercise control over it. Merely allowing residents to keep dogs and permitting leashed dogs in common areas does not, by itself, create harborer status.

The decision realigns “harborer” with ordinary meaning and persuasive authority but does so by rejecting a widespread Ohio appellate approach centered on premises control and silent acquiescence—an approach the dissent viewed as entrenched and policy-laden. Going forward, strict-liability claims against property owners will likely turn on concrete evidence of affirmative involvement with the dog, not simply the property owner’s power to regulate the premises.