Introduction

In United States v. Preston Buie (No. 24-11916, Oct. 20, 2025), a non-argument, unpublished per curiam decision of the Eleventh Circuit, the court addressed two recurring and consequential questions:

• When does an officer impermissibly prolong a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment—particularly where the officer calls for a K‑9 unit and asks contraband/consent questions while the driver is still engaged in stop-related tasks?
• Is the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), facially unconstitutional in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi?

The facts are stark: a deputy stopped Buie for following too closely. A general alert had put the officer on notice to watch for a similar vehicle, and Buie’s answers about his travel were evasive. Within minutes, a K‑9 unit arrived, alerted on Buie’s truck, and a search yielded twelve bricks of cocaine and a loaded handgun. A jury convicted Buie of drug trafficking and two firearm offenses, including felon-in-possession. On appeal, Buie challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and argued that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, offering a notable clarification to stop-prolongation doctrine: the “clock” for Fourth Amendment purposes is measured by what the officer actually does; a motorist’s own hesitation does not count against the officer. The panel also reaffirmed, in line with recent circuit authority, that § 922(g)(1) remains facially valid after Bruen and Rahimi.

Summary of the Opinion

• Fourth Amendment: The officer did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop by (i) calling for a K‑9 unit during time already consumed by Buie’s ongoing search for his insurance, or (ii) asking two questions about contraband and consent while Buie was still searching. The only measurable delay—the approximately 30-second pause while Buie silently stared at a paper before denying consent—was caused by Buie, not by the officer. Because there was no prolongation, the K‑9’s alert and ensuing search were lawful.
• Second Amendment: Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional. The court, relying on District of Columbia v. Heller and Eleventh Circuit precedent (United States v. Rozier), and expressly invoking the Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Dubois, held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogates Rozier. Felon-in-possession prohibitions remain “presumptively lawful.”

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Framed the Decision

• Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014): Establishes that a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure. The court cited Heien to frame the stop’s constitutional context.
• Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015): The bedrock rule that officers may not prolong a traffic stop for non-mission tasks; the length of delay is immaterial—any extension requires independent justification. Rodriguez also instructs courts to measure diligence by what the officer actually did.
• United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Reinforces Rodriguez and warns against officers “slipping in” unrelated inquiries after the traffic business is done. Campbell’s focus is squarely on the officer’s actions and whether they added time to the stop.
• United States v. Braddy, 11 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2021): Permits unrelated checks during a stop if they do not extend its duration. The court cited Braddy for this “no added time” principle.
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognizes an individual Second Amendment right but emphasizes it is not unlimited; specifically cautions that felon-in-possession prohibitions remain intact.
• United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1) under Heller; suggests felon disarmament laws do not offend the Second Amendment.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Sets the current Second Amendment test focusing on text and historical tradition. The opinion notes Bruen’s consistency with Heller.
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Reaffirms that certain longstanding restrictions (including for felons and the mentally ill) are “presumptively lawful.”
• United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): The Eleventh Circuit’s recent statement that Bruen and Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier; § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Fourth Amendment: No Prolongation Because the Officer Did Not Add Time

The panel’s analysis turns on a refined application of Rodriguez and Campbell: courts must look at what the officer actually did and whether those actions added time to the stop beyond the traffic mission. Two features of the encounter were pivotal.

1. Calling the K‑9 unit did not add time. The officer made the call while Buie was still lawfully detained and actively engaged in a mission-related task—searching for his proof of insurance after license and registration checks. Even though a K‑9 request is not an “ordinary inquiry” of a traffic stop, it is permissible if it runs concurrently with stop-related tasks and therefore does not lengthen the stop. The panel emphasized that the stop would have taken the same amount of time even if the K‑9 call had not been made at that moment.
2. The contraband and consent questions did not prolong the stop. The officer asked two unrelated questions while Buie continued searching for insurance. The panel then addressed a micro-timing nuance: Buie froze for approximately 30 seconds before denying consent. Under Campbell and Rodriguez, the timekeeper is the officer’s conduct, not the motorist’s; because the officer did not require or cause that pause, it cannot be attributed to him. In other words, subject-caused delay does not count as officer-caused prolongation.

Distinguishing Campbell: In Campbell, the officer’s questions came after the traffic mission had essentially concluded and added 25 seconds to the stop. Here, by contrast, the questions occurred while the motorist was still performing a mission-related task. The Eleventh Circuit characterized this as the officer waiting on the motorist, not the motorist waiting on the officer. That framing is critical to the “no-added-time” analysis.

Bottom line: Because the officer neither delayed the traffic business nor extended the stop’s overall duration with unrelated tasks, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Once the K‑9 alerted, the ensuing vehicle search and seizure of contraband followed.

B. Second Amendment: § 922(g)(1) Remains Facially Valid After Bruen and Rahimi

The court rejected Buie’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1). Anchoring its analysis in Heller and the Circuit’s own decision in Rozier, and expressly relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Dubois, the panel concluded that Bruen’s text-and-history method did not displace Heller’s and Rozier’s treatment of felon disarmament laws as presumptively lawful. Rahimi’s language reinforces that understanding.

The court’s through-line is straightforward:

• Heller carved out felon-in-possession restrictions as longstanding and outside the core right.
• Rozier applied Heller and upheld § 922(g)(1) in this Circuit.
• Bruen stated its holding was “in keeping with Heller.”
• Rahimi reaffirmed that felon-in-possession prohibitions are presumptively lawful.
• Dubois confirmed that Rozier remains good law post-Bruen and Rahimi.

Accordingly, the facial challenge fails. The panel did not address any as-applied challenge; only a facial attack was presented and rejected.

3) Impact and Practice Implications

A. Fourth Amendment practice

• Officer-action-only clock: This opinion sharpens a practical rule for the Eleventh Circuit—courts will measure prolongation solely by the officer’s actions. If a driver’s conduct (e.g., hesitating before answering) causes a pause, that time is not chargeable to the officer.
• Concurrent tasks are key: Officers may call for K‑9 assistance and ask unrelated questions if those activities occur while the motorist is independently engaged in legitimate stop business (such as locating documents). That concurrency insulates the stop from a Rodriguez problem.
• Timing evidence matters: Because suppression battles often turn on seconds, officers should contemporaneously document the timeline, and defendants should probe whether allegedly “concurrent” tasks were truly simultaneous or in fact added time. Here, deference to the district court’s credibility findings and the specific timeline (including the six-minute arrival of the K‑9) were decisive.
• Limits remain: Campbell still prohibits tacking on unrelated inquiries once the traffic mission has concluded. Officers cannot manufacture “idle time” to shoehorn investigative questions. The safe harbor applies when the driver—not the officer—is the one causing the passage of time.

B. Second Amendment litigation

• Facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit. By embracing Dubois’s reading of Bruen and Rahimi, this panel confirms that Rozier remains binding law in the Circuit.
• As-applied terrain left open: The panel’s opinion addresses only a facial challenge. Litigants contemplating as-applied challenges (for example, those predicated on the nature of the prior conviction or time since conviction) will need to navigate Eleventh Circuit precedent carefully; this opinion neither endorses nor rejects such claims.
• Inter-circuit alignment: The opinion’s Second Amendment holding keeps the Eleventh Circuit aligned with the Supreme Court’s repeated signals that felon disarmament is historically grounded and presumptively lawful.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prolongation (Rodriguez/Campbell): A traffic stop’s “mission” includes addressing the traffic violation and ordinary tasks such as checking license, registration, and insurance, and writing the ticket. Any unrelated activity that adds time beyond that mission violates the Fourth Amendment unless supported by independent reasonable suspicion. The court measures this by looking at what the officer actually did and whether it lengthened the stop—time attributable to the motorist does not count against the officer.
• Concurrent checks: Unrelated questions or actions (like calling a K‑9) are allowed if they occur while the driver is otherwise engaged in mission-related tasks, so they do not prolong the overall stop.
• K‑9 sniffs: A dog sniff itself is not part of the traffic mission. But if conducted without adding time to the stop—or if supported by independent reasonable suspicion/probable cause—it is permissible. Once the dog alerts, that typically provides probable cause to search the vehicle.
• Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause: Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold permitting brief investigative steps (like prolonging a stop); probable cause is a higher standard justifying searches and arrests. Here, the panel did not need to decide reasonable suspicion because it found no prolongation at all.
• Facial vs. as-applied challenges: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues unconstitutionality in the challenger’s particular circumstances. Buie raised a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1), which the court rejected.
• “Presumptively lawful” firearm restrictions: Heller identified categories of longstanding regulations—such as bans on felon possession—that do not infringe the core Second Amendment right. Later cases (including Rahimi) have reiterated this presumption.
• Standards of review: Factual findings in suppression rulings are reviewed for clear error with deference to district court credibility determinations; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Statutory constitutionality is reviewed de novo.

Conclusion

United States v. Buie contributes two significant clarifications to Eleventh Circuit practice. First, on the Fourth Amendment, it crystallizes a practical and defendant-neutral timing rule: prolongation turns on the officer’s conduct, not the motorist’s. Calls for a K‑9 unit and unrelated questioning—often fraught territory after Rodriguez—are permissible when they occur concurrently with mission-related tasks and do not lengthen the stop. Time that passes because the motorist hesitates or is otherwise occupied is not chargeable to the officer.

Second, on the Second Amendment, the court reaffirms that § 922(g)(1) remains facially constitutional post-Bruen and Rahimi, consistent with Heller, Rozier, and the Eleventh Circuit’s own decision in Dubois. While the opinion is unpublished and therefore non-precedential, it is an instructive and up-to-date synthesis of the Circuit’s approach. For law enforcement, defense counsel, and trial courts, Buie underscores the importance of the precise stop timeline and signals that facial Second Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(1) will not succeed in this Circuit.

Outcome: Affirmed—no Fourth Amendment violation; § 922(g)(1) constitutional on its face.