Objective Verifiability and Accuracy in FCRA Reporting: Garcia v. Synovus Bank

Introduction

In Pablo Antonio Garcia v. Synovus Bank, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed critical questions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Plaintiff‐appellant Pablo Garcia had obtained three business loans and a personal line of credit from Synovus Bank. After Synovus charged off and reported all of his loans as past due and accelerated, Garcia disputed the accuracy of the “past due” reporting on his personal account. The district court denied his motions in limine, for judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50(b)), and for a new trial (Rule 59). A jury returned a defense verdict. Garcia appealed the post‐trial rulings and verdict, challenging (1) the accuracy of reporting, (2) the reasonableness of Synovus’s reinvestigation, and (3) the district court’s procedural rulings on his motions. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal of the motion in limine for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denials of his Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions.

Summary of the Judgment

Procedural History: Garcia sued under FCRA § 1681s-2(b), alleging inaccurate reporting and an unreasonable reinvestigation. The district court denied summary judgment, allowed evidence of acceleration and charge‐off, and refused a jury instruction distinguishing charge‐off from acceleration.
Trial: Garcia testified he never missed payments on his personal line, never received notice of acceleration, and that Synovus’s internal system showed no modification of the maturity date. Synovus’s witnesses and experts testified charge‐off triggers acceleration and that a past‐due balance equal to the entire loan amount objectively signified acceleration.
Post-Trial Motions: Garcia’s motions in limine, for judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50(b)), and for a new trial (Rule 59) were denied. The jury verdict was for Synovus.
Appeal: The Eleventh Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction over the motion in limine appeal (untimely Rule 59 motion did not toll appeal period) but reviewed and affirmed the denials of Garcia’s Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions. The court concluded that: (a) Georgia law does not establish a clearly settled duty to provide affirmative notice of acceleration, so reporting a charge‐off as past due was not legally inaccurate; and (b) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Synovus both accelerated and reasonably investigated the dispute.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. (11th Cir. 2016) – Charge-off as an accounting loss and uncollectible debt.
Holden v. Holiday Inn Club Vacations Inc. (11th Cir. 2024) – FCRA § 1681s-2(b) requires factual inaccuracy or objective misleadingness.
Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC (11th Cir. 2019) – Standard of review for motion in limine (abuse of discretion).
Yates v. Pinellas Hematology & Oncology, P.A. (11th Cir. 2021) – De novo review of Rule 50(b); factual sufficiency standard.
McGinnis v. American Home Mortg. Serv., Inc. (11th Cir. 2016) – Abuse of discretion standard for new trial motions.
Green v. Drug Enforcement Administration (11th Cir. 2010) – Jurisdictional requirement for timely notice of appeal.
Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc. (11th Cir. 2010) – Rule 6(b)(2) is a claims‐processing rule; untimely tolling motions cannot extend appeal deadline absent waiver.

Legal Reasoning

Jurisdiction Over Motions in Limine: Appeals from motions in limine must be tied to a timely notice of appeal from a final judgment. Garcia’s Rule 59 motion was filed more than 28 days after judgment—untimely under Rule 59(b)—so it did not toll the 30-day appeal period. Because his notice of appeal came after that period, the court lacked jurisdiction over the in limine order.
Rule 50(b) Motion – Judgment as a Matter of Law:
- Standard: De novo review, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
- FCRA § 1681s-2(b) claims require proof of both inaccuracy and an unreasonable reinvestigation.
- “Maximal accuracy” imposes liability only if a report is factually incorrect or objectively likely to mislead. Legal questions can constitute “inaccuracy” only if the law is sufficiently settled that the correct application is “objectively verifiable.”
- Georgia law does not clearly require an affirmative acceleration notice when a charge‐off triggers acceleration. The unsettled status of this legal question forecloses finding an “inaccuracy” under FCRA simply because Garcia did not receive notice.
- Factually, Synovus’s witnesses and experts testified that charge‐off in normal bank practice triggers acceleration, that internal fields showing a past‐due full balance reflect acceleration, and that reporting was consistent with those internal records. A reasonable jury could accept that evidence over Garcia’s contrary testimony.
Rule 59 Motion – New Trial:
- Standard: Abuse of discretion; a new trial is permitted only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or would result in a miscarriage of justice.
- The court found ample evidence—direct testimony from Synovus’s collection director and expert witnesses—to support the jury’s conclusion that the debt was accelerated and that Synovus’s reinvestigation comported with reasonableness standards under FCRA.
- The disputed evidence went to credibility and factfinding, squarely within the jury’s province. No miscarriage of justice resulted from refusal to grant a new trial.

Impact

The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Garcia v. Synovus Bank clarifies two important areas of FCRA jurisprudence:

Objective Verifiability Threshold: Courts will not treat unsettled legal questions—such as whether a bank must give affirmative acceleration notice—as “inaccuracies” under FCRA. Reported credit information must be shown to conflict with a clearly established legal duty before a furnisher risks liability.
Tolling and Jurisdictional Rules: Parties cannot rely on district court extensions of time for Rule 50(b) or Rule 59 filings to extend their window for appeal. Failure to meet the strict deadlines under Rules 4(a)(4) and 6(b)(2) will strip the appellate court of jurisdiction over certain orders.

Future FCRA cases will require plaintiffs to pinpoint not only a factual discrepancy but also a legal standard that is settled and objectively verifiable. At the same time, litigants must adhere strictly to post-trial timing rules if they intend to preserve appellate rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Charge-off: An accounting action in which a lender deems a debt uncollectible and records it as a loss. It does not necessarily require consumer notice.
Acceleration of Debt: A contractual right allowing a lender to declare the entire unpaid balance due immediately after a default or other trigger event.
Motion in Limine: A pretrial request to exclude certain evidence from trial.
Rule 50(b) (Judgment as a Matter of Law): A post-verdict motion arguing that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict based on the evidence presented.
Rule 59 (New Trial): A motion seeking a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, would result in a miscarriage of justice, or was affected by prejudicial errors.
Tolling: The legal effect of pausing or extending a deadline. Under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4), timely Rule 50(b) or Rule 59 motions toll the time to appeal—but only if those motions are timely.

Conclusion

Garcia v. Synovus Bank reaffirms that FCRA accuracy claims must be premised on objectively verifiable inaccuracies—legal or factual—and that unsettled questions of state contract law will not create liability for furnishers. It also underscores the inflexibility of appellate deadlines: extensions of time for post-trial motions do not extend the appeal window. Together, these rulings sharpen the contours of FCRA § 1681s-2(b) litigation, emphasizing rigorous proof of inaccuracy, reasonableness in credit reinvestigation, and strict procedural compliance.