Objective Probable Cause Sustains a “Pretext” Traffic Stop and Rule 403 Permits Drug-Handling Phone Videos to Prove Constructive Possession and Maintaining a Drug Premises

Case: United States v. Corey Jermaine Burroughs (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (unpublished)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a multi-pronged narcotics investigation in Montgomery, Alabama. Police suspected Corey Jermaine Burroughs of smuggling synthetic cathinones (“flakka”/bath salts) into Alabama prisons by spraying drugs onto “fake legal papers” to evade mail inspection. Surveillance focused on a residence at 2100 Locust Street, which Burroughs had listed as his residence upon release from prison in 2019.

The key issues on appeal were:

  • Fourth Amendment: whether a traffic stop was unsupported by probable cause because it was “pretextual.”
  • Evidence (Rule 403): whether phone videos depicting Burroughs handling and discussing drugs at the residence (and elsewhere) were irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial character evidence.
  • Sufficiency: whether evidence supported convictions for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) and maintaining a drug premises (21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and rejected each challenge:

  • The stop was constitutional because the officer had probable cause to believe traffic violations occurred; alleged “pretext” was irrelevant under objective Fourth Amendment doctrine.
  • The videos were relevant to knowledge, possession, intent to distribute, and maintaining the premises, and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
  • Evidence—drugs found in the kitchen, Burroughs leaving the house with drugs, his admission he was the person in the videos, and the remodeling/maintenance footage—was sufficient to support constructive possession, intent to distribute, and maintaining a drug premises.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

i. Fourth Amendment traffic-stop doctrine (objective probable cause; pretext irrelevant)

  • Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996): The controlling framework. The court relied on Whren for two propositions:
    1. a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure; and
    2. it is reasonable when police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred—regardless of subjective motivation.
    Burroughs’s “pretext” argument ran directly into Whren’s rule that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role” in ordinary probable-cause analysis.
  • United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020): Reinforced the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Whren—probable cause is satisfied when an officer witnesses a traffic violation.
  • Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011): Supplied the broader constitutional principle that probable cause is an objective inquiry regulating conduct, not thoughts; objective justification defeats arguments focused on intent.
  • United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), and United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2017): Provided the standard of review framework for suppression rulings (mixed questions; facts for clear error, law de novo).
  • United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2025): Supported deference to credibility determinations where the officer’s testimony is credited and uncontradicted.

ii. Rule 403, relevance, and “unfair prejudice”

  • United States v. McGregor, 960 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1991): Set the tone that Rule 403 exclusion is an “extraordinary remedy” used sparingly, and evidence must be evaluated in a light favoring admission.
  • Cauchon v. United States, 824 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1987): Clarified that relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; Rule 403 targets only unfair prejudice.
  • Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997): Provided the operative definition of unfair prejudice as evidence that lures the factfinder into guilt on grounds different from proof specific to the charged offense. The panel used Old Chief to conclude the videos were prejudicial in the “right” way—because they bore directly on the charged conduct.
  • United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.

iii. Sufficiency of the evidence; constructive possession; drug premises

  • United States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015): Provided the sufficiency standard—view evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; affirm unless no reasonable construction supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1989): Supplied the § 841(a) elements (knowledge, possession, intent to distribute) and the principle that intent may be inferred circumstantially, including from quantity.
  • United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1998): Provided the constructive possession articulation—dominion or control over the premises where the contraband is kept.
  • United States v. Pineiro, 389 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir. 1992): Provided § 856(a)(1) elements and the non-exclusive factors evidencing “maintaining” a premises (control, duration, repairing, continuity, etc.).
  • United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2012): Offered an analogy supporting constructive possession where the defendant’s connection to a residence and proximity/links to the location supported dominion or control.

B. Legal Reasoning

i. The stop: probable cause based on observed traffic violations

The court treated the stop as a straightforward Whren/Wilson case: Detective Curlee testified he observed speeding and three failures to signal—traffic offenses under Alabama law. The magistrate judge credited that testimony; Burroughs offered no contrary evidence. Under Schmitz, the appellate court deferred to credibility findings and held probable cause existed.

Burroughs’s claim that the stop was “pretextual” failed because the panel applied al-Kidd and Whren: even if the officer hoped to stop Burroughs “by any means necessary,” the Fourth Amendment question is objective—whether the circumstances justified the seizure.

ii. The videos: relevance and Rule 403 balancing

The district court admitted multiple videos from 2021–2023 showing Burroughs handling drugs, discussing distribution (“about to flood this place with this sh-t”), and working inside 2100 Locust Street with equipment similar to what police later found (press, sealer), plus a video consistent with drug-processing activity (wet paper laid out to dry).

The Eleventh Circuit approved the admission on two linked grounds:

  • Relevance: The videos made it more probable that Burroughs knew about drug activity at 2100 Locust Street, constructively possessed drugs found there, intended distribution, and used/maintained the location as a drug premises.
  • Rule 403: Applying McGregor/Cross (favor admission) and Old Chief/Cauchon (unfair prejudice is not mere damage), the court held the videos did not invite conviction on an improper basis; they went to the core contested issues—especially rebutting Burroughs’s theory that he “didn’t know what was going on” and did not control the house.

iii. Sufficiency: constructive possession, intent to distribute, and maintaining premises

On § 841(a) counts, the court emphasized a convergence of evidence supporting knowledge and constructive possession:

  • Large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl found in the kitchen at 2100 Locust Street;
  • Burroughs listed the residence as his address on release paperwork (and admitted it);
  • he was arrested leaving the residence with marijuana and flakka (also found inside shortly thereafter);
  • phone videos placed him inside the home producing/handling/packaging drugs with similar equipment; and
  • he admitted he was the person in the videos.

For intent to distribute, the court relied on (i) “dealer amounts” testimony and (ii) incriminating statements in the videos, consistent with Cremades’s approval of quantity-based inferences.

On § 856(a)(1), the court treated the same evidence as demonstrating Burroughs’s knowing maintenance of the place for manufacturing/distribution. The remodeling/renovation video was especially important to the “maintained” element, aligning with Clavis’s list of factors (repairing, continuity, control).

C. Impact

Although unpublished (and thus generally non-precedential), the opinion consolidates several practical points likely to shape litigation strategy in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Suppression motions: Where an officer can credibly testify to observed traffic violations, “pretext” arguments will typically fail absent evidence undermining the objective basis or credibility findings.
  • Digital evidence of prior/ongoing conduct: Videos spanning multiple years may be admitted when they directly connect the defendant to the charged premises, controlled substances, distribution intent, and “maintenance” behaviors—especially when the defense claims lack of knowledge or control.
  • § 856 prosecutions: Evidence of “maintenance” need not be limited to leases or bills; renovation/repair and continuity of drug-related use can supply the maintenance inference when paired with manufacturing/distribution proof.
  • Constructive possession proofs: The decision illustrates how prosecutors can build constructive possession through a “totality” of premises links (address listing, departure from the house with drugs, presence in videos, equipment matching, and admissions), even without direct evidence of ownership.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Probable cause (traffic stop): A reasonable basis to believe a traffic law was violated. If an officer observes speeding or failure to signal, that alone can justify the stop.
  • Pretextual stop: A stop where the officer’s real interest is investigating something else (e.g., drugs), but uses a traffic violation as the legal basis. Under Whren, the stop is valid if the traffic violation objectively occurred.
  • Rule 403 “unfair prejudice”: Not “evidence that hurts.” It is evidence that risks a verdict for improper reasons (emotion, propensity, confusion) rather than proof of the charged elements.
  • Constructive possession: Possession without physical holding—proved by dominion or control over the place where drugs are found (plus contextual evidence showing knowledge and ability to control).
  • Maintaining a drug premises (21 U.S.C. § 856): More than being present; it requires knowingly operating/maintaining a location for manufacturing, distributing, or using controlled substances. “Maintenance” can be shown through control, continuity, and acts like repairing or renovating.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Corey Jermaine Burroughs applies settled Fourth Amendment, evidentiary, and sufficiency principles to affirm three drug-trafficking-related convictions. The court’s key takeaways are: (1) an objectively supported traffic stop survives claims of pretext; (2) drug-handling videos tied to the charged location and substances are powerfully probative and generally admissible under Rule 403; and (3) constructive possession and “maintaining” a drug premises can be proven through a cumulative record linking the defendant to the residence, tools of distribution, ongoing drug activity, and acts demonstrating upkeep and control.