Introduction

In Stone v. City of Livingston, 2025 MT 233N, the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed a grant of summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff who pursued state and federal malicious prosecution, false arrest/false imprisonment, defamation, and constitutional claims arising from a 2020 confrontation at the City-County Complex in Livingston. The decision—issued as a memorandum opinion under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules—expressly “does not serve as precedent” and is noncitable. Nonetheless, it provides a clear, practical application of settled doctrines that frequently control civil rights and tort suits against prosecutors and municipalities: absolute prosecutorial immunity, the requirements for § 1983 malicious prosecution under Thompson v. Clark, the Monell policy-or-custom prerequisite for municipal liability, qualified immunity for individual officials, and the strictures of Montana Rule 56 at summary judgment.

The case centers on Chad Stone’s interactions with local officials on August 26, 2020, subsequent citations and an arrest on a failure-to-appear warrant, and his 2024 civil lawsuit against the City of Livingston, the Livingston Police Department, and former City Attorney Courtney Lawellin. The key issues on appeal were whether the District Court prematurely granted summary judgment, whether probable cause supported the charges and arrest, whether various immunities barred Stone’s claims, and whether the City could be liable under Monell without proof of a policy or custom.

• Court: Supreme Court of Montana
• Disposition: Affirmed; summary judgment for defendants
• Opinion type: Memorandum opinion (nonprecedential, noncitable)
• Primary doctrines: Absolute prosecutorial immunity; Monell municipal liability; qualified immunity; Rule 56 summary judgment standards

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed summary judgment for the City of Livingston, its police department, and former City Attorney Lawellin on all claims. It held:

• State malicious prosecution claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity when a prosecutor initiates charges within the scope of official duties; that immunity extends to the governmental entity for those claims.
• Stone’s federal malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment (via § 1983 and Thompson v. Clark) fails because the record showed probable cause supported the citations and arrest.
• His false imprisonment/false arrest claim against the City fails for lack of Monell proof; he identified no municipal policy, custom, or practice as the moving force behind any constitutional deprivation.
• Lawellin is immune in her individual capacity under Montana’s public employee immunity statute (§ 2-9-305, MCA) and under federal qualified immunity (Pearson v. Callahan).
• Defamation and alleged First, Second, and Fifth Amendment violations were undeveloped and unsupported; dismissal was proper.
• Procedural challenges (lack of discovery opportunity, absence of mediation order, recusal, and transcripts) were either meritless or unpreserved.

The Court also emphasized that a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment with bare allegations. Stone’s late-filed paper, treated as both a response and an independent summary judgment motion, did not present admissible evidence or specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 26, 2020, Stone confronted then-County Attorney Kendra Lassiter inside a locked office at the City-County Complex, cornered her against a wall, and engaged in a profanity-laced tirade that drew staff attention. Law enforcement escorted him out; outside, officers observed Stone’s young daughter strapped in a car seat in a non-running vehicle, in direct sun, on a day in the 80s. Stone later repeatedly phoned and berated the County Attorney’s office staff.

On August 28, 2020, a Livingston police sergeant called Stone to advise that four misdemeanor citations had issued (assault, disorderly conduct, harassment by electronic communication, and endangering the welfare of a child), told him he could retrieve them at the department, and provided the date for initial appearance. Stone neither retrieved the citations nor appeared; a bench warrant for failure to appear issued October 6, 2020. On October 14, 2020, officers arrested Stone on the warrant during a custody exchange at the City-County Building.

After trial was vacated and venue transfer ordered (but apparently not effectuated), the criminal case was neither fully prosecuted nor dismissed. In February 2024, Stone filed this civil action alleging malicious prosecution, false arrest/imprisonment, defamation, and violations of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court managed discovery, but Stone’s own disclosures and responses lagged; defendants produced reports, witness statements, and the City’s full 95-page file. Stone later complained that service of the citations had not been proven, and the record revealed no formal proof of service by personal delivery or first-class mail under §§ 46-6-211(2), -213(2), MCA. Stone, however, did not move to compel or otherwise challenge defendants’ discovery responses after receiving them.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on December 12, 2024. Stone’s response was due January 6, 2025, but no timely response was filed. On January 8, Stone filed a document titled as his own motion for summary judgment (dated January 6), which the Supreme Court construed both as an untimely independent motion and as his response. The District Court granted summary judgment to defendants, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Absolute prosecutorial immunity (Montana law):
  • State ex rel. Department of Justice v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 172 Mont. 88, 560 P.2d 1328 (1976) – Prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability for filing and maintaining criminal charges within the scope of duties.
  • Rosenthal v. Madison County, 2007 MT 277, 339 Mont. 419, 170 P.3d 493 – Prosecutorial immunity extends to the governmental entity; plaintiffs cannot end-run immunity via respondeat superior.
  • Renenger v. State, 2018 MT 228, 392 Mont. 495, 426 P.3d 559 – Reiterates immunity and articulates probable cause standards relevant at summary judgment.
  • Ronek v. Gallatin County, 227 Mont. 514, 740 P.2d 1115 (1987) – Reinforces immunity principles at the county level.
  • Rupnow v. Montana State Auditor & Commissioner of Insurance, 2024 MT 14, 415 Mont. 81, 542 P.3d 384 – Confirms absolute immunity for prosecutorial and quasi-prosecutorial functions.
• Federal malicious prosecution and qualified immunity:
  • Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022) – Recognizes a Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim analogous to malicious prosecution for wrongful initiation without probable cause (with favorable termination requirement, not reached here).
  • Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) – Qualified immunity shields officials unless they violate clearly established rights; courts may address either prong first.
• Municipal liability under § 1983:
  • Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – Municipal liability attaches only where a policy, practice, or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.
  • Miller v. City of Red Lodge, 2003 MT 44, 314 Mont. 278, 65 P.3d 562 – Montana application of Monell; no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
  • Tia Tam LLC v. Missoula County, 2022 MT 229, 410 Mont. 465, 520 P.3d 312 – Restates two-prong Monell test (constitutional deprivation plus policy/custom causing it).
  • Germann v. Stevens, 2006 MT 130, 332 Mont. 303, 137 P.3d 545 – State-law employee immunity does not itself bar § 1983 claims against the government entity, but Monell must still be satisfied.
• Summary judgment and procedure:
  • M. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)(2) – Nonmovant must present specific facts by affidavits or admissible materials showing a genuine issue; bare pleadings are insufficient.
  • Renenger (again) – Requires “material and substantial evidence” to avoid summary judgment.
  • Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154 – Pro se litigants must follow procedural rules.
  • Fenwick v. State, 2016 MT 80 – Harmless error standard; no reversal absent substantial injustice affecting result.
  • Miller v. Herbert, 272 Mont. 132 (1995) – Titles of filings do not control their legal effect.
  • Paulson v. Flathead Conservation District, 2004 MT 136 – Issues not raised below are not reviewed on appeal.
  • MUDCR 2(b), M. R. Civ. P. 6(d) – Motion briefing timelines.
• Montana statutes:
  • § 2-9-305, MCA – Public employee immunity from personal liability for acts within scope of employment (with exceptions for oppression, fraud, or malice outside the scope).
  • §§ 2-9-101, -102; § 7-32-4103, MCA – On entity liability and municipal police departments (Livingston PD not a separate suable governmental entity, per defendants’ position).
  • §§ 46-6-211(2), -213(2), MCA – Service requirements for citations and notices to appear (no record evidence of service here).

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Summary Judgment and Procedural Posture

The Court underscored familiar Rule 56 principles: the nonmovant must timely respond and present admissible evidence with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Stone missed the response deadline and, even treating his late filing as a response, offered only allegations from his pleadings without evidentiary support. Under Rule 56(e)(2), that is insufficient. His own untimely motion for summary judgment required leave (not sought) and was properly disregarded. The Court reiterated that pro se status does not excuse noncompliance with procedural rules.

The Court also rejected Stone’s assertion that he was deprived of discovery. The City produced officer identities, reports, witness statements, and the entire 95-page file, and even reached out to schedule depositions. Stone did not move to compel or object to defendants’ responses after receiving them, foreclosing his later complaint about discovery deficiencies.

2) Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Bars State Malicious Prosecution Claims

Stone alleged state-law malicious prosecution against former City Attorney Lawellin and, derivatively, against the City for initiating charges arising from the August 26 incident. The Court held those claims barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity because initiating and maintaining criminal charges are core prosecutorial functions performed within the scope of official duties. Montana decisions (Eighth Judicial District Court; Rosenthal; Renenger; Ronek) establish that the prosecutor is absolutely immune regardless of negligence or lack of probable cause, and that immunity extends to the governmental entity to prevent circumvention via vicarious liability. Rupnow further confirms the breadth of absolute immunity for prosecutorial and quasi-prosecutorial functions.

3) Federal Malicious Prosecution under Thompson v. Clark

For Stone’s § 1983 claim, the Court applied Thompson’s recognition of a Fourth Amendment analogue to malicious prosecution for wrongful initiation without probable cause. The Court found the Rule 56 record—eyewitness statements and contemporaneous officer reports—established probable cause for the four misdemeanor citations (assault, disorderly conduct, harassment by electronic communication, and child endangerment). Under Renenger, a mere probability suffices to establish probable cause for charging. Because probable cause existed, the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim failed on the merits.

Notably, the Court did not reach other Thompson elements, such as favorable termination. The underlying criminal case here was not transferred, fully prosecuted, or dismissed. The Court resolved the federal claim on probable cause and immunity grounds, leaving favorable termination issues for other cases.

4) False Arrest/Imprisonment and Monell Limits on Municipal Liability

Stone’s false imprisonment claim focused on his October 14, 2020 arrest on a bench warrant for failure to appear. He did not sue the issuing judge or arresting officers; his remaining target was the City (the Livingston Police Department was not a separate suable entity under Montana law, as defendants asserted, citing §§ 2-9-101, -102 and § 7-32-4103, MCA).

Because municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983, Monell applies. A plaintiff must prove both (1) a constitutional deprivation and (2) that a municipal policy, practice, or custom—not merely an isolated act—was the moving force behind it. Even assuming arguendo that an arrest on a failure-to-appear warrant without proper notice might implicate constitutional concerns, Stone identified no City policy or custom causing his arrest. Without evidence of an official policy or persistent, widespread custom causally linked to the alleged deprivation, the Monell claim failed as a matter of law.

5) Individual Capacity Claims: State-Law Immunity and Qualified Immunity

Under § 2-9-305, MCA, public employees acting within the scope of their duties are immune from personal liability, absent conduct amounting to oppression, fraud, or malice outside the scope. Initiating charges was plainly within Lawellin’s role as City Attorney, and Stone presented no evidence of conduct outside the scope or within the statute’s exceptions. Thus, state-law personal liability claims against her were barred.

Separately, under Pearson v. Callahan, Lawellin was entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages because Stone failed to demonstrate any violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Again, the Court did not need to reach the “clearly established” prong: no underlying constitutional violation was shown, so the inquiry ended there.

6) Service of Citations and the Failure-to-Appear Warrant

The record contained no proof that the citations or a notice to appear were served in compliance with §§ 46-6-211(2) and -213(2), MCA. Stone had specifically requested such proof in discovery, and defendants pointed to the sergeant’s voicemail and the citations themselves rather than service records. The Supreme Court flagged the absence of service proof, but it did not change the outcome: Stone had not moved to compel or objected to the responses; and, critically, the Monell barrier independently defeated municipal liability. The Court also noted that City Attorney Lawellin did not participate in the arrest, further insulating her from any false arrest theory.

7) Unpreserved or Meritless Ancillary Claims

The Court affirmed dismissal of Stone’s defamation and First, Second, and Fifth Amendment claims as undeveloped and unsupported at summary judgment. Arguments about judicial recusal, transcripts, and mediation were either not raised below (and thus unpreserved) or rendered moot by summary judgment (mediation). The Court reiterated the standard rule against addressing issues not presented to the district court.

Impact and Practical Implications

While nonprecedential and noncitable, Stone reinforces several settled—and often outcome-determinative—principles in civil litigation against prosecutors and municipalities:

• Absolute prosecutorial immunity remains robust: State-law malicious prosecution and related claims aimed at charging decisions will fail where the prosecutor acted within the scope of official duties—even if the plaintiff alleges negligence or lack of probable cause.
• Thompson does not displace immunity or Monell: The recognition of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in Thompson coexists with absolute prosecutorial immunity and Monell’s policy-or-custom requirement. Plaintiffs must still negate probable cause and navigate immunity doctrines.
• Monell’s gatekeeping force is decisive: Municipalities are not liable under respondeat superior. Absent evidence of an official policy, widespread practice, or deliberate indifference that directly caused the alleged constitutional violation, municipal claims will not survive summary judgment.
• Procedural rigor matters—especially for pro se litigants: Timely, evidentiary responses to summary judgment are mandatory. Failure to present affidavits, exhibits, or admissible materials identifying genuine factual disputes will result in dismissal.
• Service defects may not translate into municipal liability: Even where records do not demonstrate formal service of citations or notices to appear (as §§ 46-6-211 and -213 contemplate), plaintiffs must still tie any alleged deprivation to a municipal policy or custom to reach the City under § 1983.
• Police departments are typically not suable entities: As raised by defendants here, plaintiffs should direct claims to the municipality itself, not its constituent departments, under Montana law.

For practitioners and municipalities, the case underscores best practices: meticulously document service of citations and notices; preserve and produce proof of service during discovery; and be proactive in coordinating depositions. For plaintiffs, it highlights the need to develop Monell theories early and to support claims with admissible evidence at the summary judgment stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Memorandum opinion (noncitable): A short decision resolving the case based on settled law; it cannot be cited as precedent in Montana courts.
• Summary judgment: A mechanism to resolve cases without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The nonmovant must respond with evidence, not mere allegations.
• Absolute prosecutorial immunity: Complete immunity from civil damages for prosecutors when performing core prosecutorial tasks (e.g., initiating and maintaining charges), even if undertaken negligently or without probable cause.
• Qualified immunity: Protects individual government officials from § 1983 damages unless they violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would know. Courts can dispose of claims if no constitutional violation is established.
• Monell liability: A city or county can be liable under § 1983 only if an official policy or widespread custom is the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation. There is no automatic vicarious liability for employees’ actions.
• Probable cause: A practical, common-sense determination that there is a fair probability a person committed an offense. For charging decisions, a showing of mere probability suffices.
• Malicious prosecution (federal): After Thompson, a § 1983 claim alleging wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause, typically requiring favorable termination of the prosecution. Immunity doctrines and probable cause often control the outcome.
• Scope of employment immunity (Montana): § 2-9-305, MCA generally shields public employees from personal liability for acts within their job duties, with narrow exceptions.
• Service of citations/notices to appear: Montana law contemplates personal service or first-class mail for citations and notices to appear. Service defects alone do not create municipal liability without a policy/custom link.

Conclusion

Stone v. City of Livingston delivers a clear, pragmatic application of settled law: absolute prosecutorial immunity forecloses state malicious prosecution claims arising from charging decisions; § 1983 malicious prosecution fails where probable cause existed; and municipal liability cannot proceed without Monell evidence of a policy or custom causing the alleged violation. Layered atop these merits rulings, the decision reiterates that litigants—pro se or otherwise—must meet Rule 56’s evidentiary burdens and preserve issues below. Although the opinion is nonprecedential, its reasoning provides a roadmap for courts and litigants confronting the recurring intersection of prosecutorial discretion, municipal liability, and civil rights litigation in Montana.