No Preclusion, No Standing:
The Fourth Circuit’s Redressability Rule for Declaratory Relief in Wells v. Johnson

Introduction

In August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit delivered a published opinion in Maurice Wells, Jr. v. Terry Johnson that significantly tightens the standing requirements for plaintiffs who request declaratory judgments. The court held that a plaintiff who seeks only a declaratory ruling must demonstrate – with allegations at the pleading stage and evidence at the summary-judgment stage – that the declaration’s preclusive effect is likely to yield a concrete, litigation-related benefit. Absent such a showing, Article III’s redressability prong is unsatisfied, federal jurisdiction is absent, and any merits ruling must be vacated.

The opinion, authored by Judge Richardson and joined by Judge Niemeyer and Senior Judge Floyd, also reiterates an important procedural corollary: where a removed action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the district court must remand—not dismiss—under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Summary of the Judgment

Maurice Wells participated in a 2020 racial-justice demonstration outside the Alamance County courthouse. Following a dispute with counter-protesters he was arrested, later convicted in state district court (appeal pending), and sued Sheriff Terry Johnson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. Wells sought only declaratory relief; he did not request damages or injunctive relief.

The district court, after removal, granted summary judgment to Sheriff Johnson, concluding that Wells’s state conviction established probable cause and precluded his First Amendment claim. On appeal the Fourth Circuit raised jurisdiction sua sponte, required supplemental briefing, and ultimately held that Wells lacked standing because the declaration he requested would not redress any injury:

• It would not bind the State of North Carolina in his criminal case;
• It would not likely deter future prosecutions or arrests because Wells showed no concrete plans to protest again;
• And it could not compensate him for the past arrest.

Lacking redressability, the federal courts were without power to adjudicate the § 1983 claim. The panel therefore vacated the merits judgment and remanded with instructions to remand to state court.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) – Identified preclusion as the feature that saves proper declaratory judgments from redressability problems. The Wells court adopts this analysis wholesale.
• California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659 (2021) – Reaffirmed that declaratory relief “cannot alone supply jurisdiction otherwise absent.” Used by the panel to stress that a declaration without concrete consequences is non-justiciable.
• MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) – Provided the “genuine threat” test for defensive declaratory suits. Wells could not satisfy that test for future prosecution.
• Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) – Classic statement that a declaratory judgment must issue a decree of “conclusive character.” Forms the historical spine of the opinion.
• Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) – Suggested that a declaration about past injury is useful only if it will operate as res judicata in an accounting action—a hypothetical the Fourth Circuit doubts in practice.
• Roach v. West Virginia Regional Jail, 74 F.3d 46 (4th Cir. 1996) – Controls the remedy: when a removed case lacks jurisdiction, the district court must remand, not dismiss.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Article III Framework. Standing demands (i) injury, (ii) causation, and (iii) redressability. Wells easily satisfied injury and causation (arrest and prosecution). The fight was over redressability.
2. Declaratory Judgments = Redress via Preclusion. Relying on Haaland, the panel held that a declaration supplies redress only to the extent its preclusive effect will likely benefit the plaintiff in future litigation. Moral vindication or persuasive effect is constitutionally insufficient.
3. Four Hypothetical Injuries Tested. The court marched through four possibilities—ongoing prosecution, future prosecution, future arrest, and past arrest—and demonstrated why preclusion would help in none of them:
   • The declaration would not bind the State (not a party) in the criminal appeal.
   • No concrete plan to protest again; no “genuine threat” of future prosecution.
   • No evidence of likely future arrest, nor assurance that Johnson would be the arresting authority.
   • For the 2020 arrest, a declaration would be purely hortatory; compensation belongs in a damages claim, not a declaration alone.
4. Removed-Case Procedural Mandate. Because Wells originally sued in state court, § 1447(c) compels remand, not dismissal, once federal jurisdiction fails. The panel reaffirmed Roach and rejected Sheriff Johnson’s “futility” argument.

C. Impact of the Decision

The decision establishes a clear, articulate rule in the Fourth Circuit: “Declaratory judgments provide redress through preclusion, not merely because they might affect a defendant’s behavior.”

• Practical Litigation Strategy – Plaintiffs who want declaratory relief must now plead facts (and later marshal evidence) showing imminent or ongoing litigation in which the declaration’s preclusive effect will matter. Otherwise, they must add a claim for damages or injunctive relief—or stay in state court.
• First Amendment Protest Litigation – Demonstrators challenging arrests often ask for declarations without damages to avoid qualified-immunity hurdles. Wells warns that this minimalist approach may doom federal standing.
• Removed Cases – Defendants considering removal must weigh the risk that, if federal standing is lacking, they will be sent back to state court even after years of discovery.
• Declaratory-Only Claims Generally – Civil-rights clinics, public-interest entities, and patent licensees (frequent declaratory plaintiffs) must now document concrete litigation threats and parties who will be bound by preclusion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Declaratory Judgment

A judicial statement that clarifies the legal rights of the parties, but does not order anyone to do (or pay) anything. Its power lies in the doctrine of issue preclusion—the rule that parties cannot relitigate issues already decided between them.

2. Redressability

The requirement that the court’s chosen remedy is likely to fix or prevent the plaintiff’s injury. For a declaration, that means the plaintiff must be able to use it later—e.g., it will block a prosecution or an expected lawsuit—or it must change the defendant’s legally enforceable obligations.

3. Standing “Not Dispensed in Gross”

The plaintiff must show standing for each form of relief requested. Having standing to seek damages does not automatically confer standing to seek a declaration, and vice versa.

4. Removal and Remand (28 U.S.C. § 1447(c))

When a defendant transfers (removes) a case from state to federal court but the federal court later discovers it lacks jurisdiction, it must remand the case back to state court. The federal court cannot dismiss unless the action had started in federal court.

Conclusion

Wells v. Johnson crystallizes an exacting doctrine: a declaratory plaintiff in federal court must show that the judgment will (i) bind the right party, and (ii) affect an imminent or ongoing lawsuit in a way that tangibly benefits the plaintiff. This “No Preclusion, No Standing” rule narrows the avenue for declaratory-only constitutional claims and fortifies the remedial-focused view of Article III jurisdiction. Litigants pursuing purely declaratory relief must now build a robust record of looming litigation or add alternative remedies; defendants contemplating removal must likewise account for the strict remand mandate should federal standing falter. The decision thus reverberates beyond protest-arrest cases, providing a roadmap—and a warning—on how, when, and why declaratory judgments can be entertained in the federal courts of the Fourth Circuit.