No Parcel-Specific Findings Required to Include Property in a State Historic District; Owner Objections Limit National Register Action to an Eligibility Submission

1. Introduction

Matter of Sunoco, LLC v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Places (2026 NY Slip Op 04539 [3d Dept July 23, 2026]) addresses how New York’s historic preservation authorities may draw historic district boundaries and make findings when listing a district on the State Register of Historic Places, particularly where a property owner challenges inclusion of its parcel.

The dispute concerns Papscanee Island along the Hudson River in the Town of East Greenbush, Rensselaer County. The record described the island’s long historical arc—from Mohican habitation and the 1609 Hudson encounter, through Dutch colonization—while noting that the island is largely undeveloped except for an industrialized northern end and an active fuel terminal operated on a 38-acre parcel owned by Sunoco, LLC.

After the Stockbridge-Munsee Band of Mohicans sponsored a nomination for state and national listing, the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation produced a detailed historical report. The Historic Preservation Board ultimately recommended a revised district boundary that excluded the most industrialized northern parcels, yet included Sunoco’s mid-island parcel. Despite objections by a majority of owners within the proposed district, the Deputy Commissioner (acting as the Commissioner) listed the district on the state register and submitted forms to the Keeper of the National Register.

Sunoco brought an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul (i) inclusion of its parcel within the district and (ii) the district’s listing on the state register, including arguments about the adequacy of findings and the Commissioner’s authority regarding the national register. Supreme Court dismissed the petition; the Third Department affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The court applied CPLR 7803(3) review (no evidentiary hearing required by law) and upheld the administrative determination because it had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious.
  • The court held that the Commissioner’s boundary decision—tracking the island’s historic cultural landscape, excluding the heavily industrialized northern area due to a “paucity of data” and documentation limits, but including Sunoco’s parcel—was rational.
  • The court rejected the claim that exclusion of the northern industrial parcels amounted to a prior agency decision on similar facts requiring an explanation for “departure.”
  • The court rejected the contention that the Commissioner had to make parcel-specific findings addressing Sunoco’s objections or proving that Sunoco’s parcel, standing alone, met listing criteria.
  • The court approved supplementation of the record with affidavits from the Commissioner and an agency archaeologist explaining what was before the Board and the rationale for including Sunoco’s parcel.
  • The court held that where a majority of owners object, the Commissioner cannot “nominate” to the national register, but must still submit the materials to the Keeper for an eligibility determination; the Commissioner followed that procedure and did not exceed authority.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Standards of Article 78 review and rational-basis deference

  • Matter of Lake George Assn. v NYS Adirondack Park Agency, 228 AD3d 52 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 908 (2024): Quoted for the governing CPLR 7803(3) standard and later relied upon to support deference where an agency boundary/line-drawing choice has a rational foundation in the record. In Sunoco, this case anchored the court’s approach: the question is not whether another boundary would be reasonable, but whether the chosen one is rational.
  • Matter of White Plains Fine Wine & Spirits LLC v New York State Liq. Auth., 184 AD3d 1068 (3d Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 919 (2020): Cited alongside Lake George Assn. for the limited scope of review where the agency acted without a required evidentiary hearing.
  • Matter of Murphy v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 21 NY3d 649 (2013): Supplied the canonical definition that an action is arbitrary and capricious if taken “without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts.” The court used this framing to evaluate whether the district boundary and inclusion of Sunoco’s parcel were reasoned and fact-based.
  • Matter of Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 NY3d 1042 (2013): Cited for the principle that if the determination has a rational basis it must be sustained “even if a different result would not be unreasonable.” This was pivotal to rejecting Sunoco’s “could-have-excluded-us” narrative: the existence of plausible alternatives does not defeat rationality.

“Departure from prior agency determination” doctrine

  • Matter of Lyell Mt. Read Bus. Ctr. LLC v Empire Zone Designation Bd., 129 AD3d 137 (3d Dept 2015): Cited for the rule that when an agency departs from a prior decision on similar facts, it must explain the departure. The Third Department invoked it to frame Sunoco’s argument—but then held there was no qualifying “prior decision” here.
  • Matter of Callanan Indus. v Rourke, 187 AD2d 781 (3d Dept 1992): Used as a contrast (“compare”) to illustrate when the departure doctrine applies: there, an unexplained departure from a determination rendered the previous month on similar facts was annulled as arbitrary and capricious. In Sunoco, exclusion of the northern parcels was treated as part of the boundary-setting process, not a prior similar-facts determination requiring special justification.

Adequate findings and meaningful judicial review

  • Matter of Burnham v New York State Governor's Off. of Empl. Relations, 217 AD3d 1147 (3d Dept 2023): Cited for the proposition that inadequate findings can impede meaningful judicial review and may warrant annulment. The court distinguished that concern here, finding no authority requiring parcel-by-parcel findings within a district listing.
  • Friends of St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church v Fed. Emergency Mgt. Agency, 658 F3d 460 (5th Cir 2011): Cited to support the court’s conclusion that inclusion within a historic district does not require that each included parcel independently satisfy listing criteria as if it were a standalone nomination.

Supplementing the administrative record

  • Matter of Hammonds v New York State Educ. Dept., 206 AD3d 1334 (3d Dept 2022): Relied on to approve respondents’ submission of affidavits supplementing the record in an Article 78 context—here, affidavits from the Commissioner and an archaeologist (Bradley Russell) explaining what information was before the agency and the rationale for the challenged decision.

State/national register coordination and federal process

  • Moody Hill Farms Ltd. Partnership v U.S. Dept. of the Interior, National Parks Serv., 205 F3d 554 (2d Cir 1999), cert denied 528 US 874 (1999): Cited for the general proposition that nominations considered for the state register should concurrently be considered for the national register and that both state and federal regulations should be followed. In Sunoco, this supported the Commissioner’s use of national forms and the dual-track procedural framework.
  • Matter of Keil v Greenway Heritage Conservancy for the Hudson Riv. Val., Inc., 184 AD3d 1048 (3d Dept 2020): Cited in a footnote for preservation rules—Sunoco’s substantive due process theory (to the extent it depended on parcel-specific findings) was unpreserved because raised for the first time on appeal.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Statutory and regulatory structure governing state listing

The court’s reasoning is grounded in the preservation statute and implementing regulations. It emphasized:

  • Under PRHPL 14.07 (1) (g), the Commissioner “shall include” in the state register places determined significant after consultation with the Board (see also PRHPL 14.03 [2]).
  • The substantive criteria are those in 9 NYCRR 427.3 (a), focusing on “quality of significance” and “integrity” (location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, association) and the four recognized bases of significance (events, persons, design/construction, information potential).
  • If listing is appropriate, 9 NYCRR 427.5 (d) requires a written decision “with an appropriate finding in support.”

(b) Boundary line-drawing as a rational, integrity-based cultural landscape determination

The Commissioner’s findings were reflected in the December 2023 packet seeking a national register eligibility determination. The agency justified the district boundary as capturing the island’s 1600s-era extent and “the most intact and undeveloped cultural landscape” reflecting Mohican history themes from pre-contact through Dutch colonization.

Critically, the northern industrialized area was excluded “due to a paucity of data resulting from development” and the lack of documentation required to assert national-level significance. The court treated this as a legitimate integrity/documentation rationale rather than an arbitrary carve-out.

(c) No “prior similar-facts determination” requiring a departure explanation

Sunoco attempted to reframe the boundary revision (excluding the northern industrial parcels while keeping Sunoco’s) as an agency inconsistency tantamount to a “departure” that demanded an explanation. The Third Department rejected the premise: the exclusion of those parcels was not a prior final agency determination on similar facts, but part of the evolving nomination/boundary-setting process. As such, the “departure doctrine” cases did not compel annulment.

(d) No requirement for parcel-specific findings or parcel-by-parcel eligibility

A central contribution of the decision is its practical rule for district nominations: absent a controlling authority to the contrary, the Commissioner is not required to write parcel-specific findings addressing each owner’s objections or showing that each parcel would qualify for listing if nominated alone. The court’s reasoning reflects how historic districts function: eligibility and significance are assessed for the district as a whole, with boundary justifications tied to integrity, setting, associative values, and information potential across the landscape.

(e) Use of affidavits to support review and explain rationale

Addressing the claim that the findings were too general to allow meaningful review, the court approved supplementation of the record with explanatory affidavits. The Commissioner attested that Sunoco’s parcel (unlike the northern industrial parcels) was surrounded by agricultural land typical of the district. Archaeologist Bradley Russell further explained that Sunoco’s parcel was near significant sites and resources and, due to undisturbed ground, had “potential to provide information important to our prehistory and history” (tracking 9 NYCRR 427.3 [a] [4]).

The court’s approach is pragmatic: where the record and permissible explanatory material demonstrate a rational connection between the facts found (landscape context, integrity, archaeological potential) and the decision made (boundary inclusion), Article 78 relief is unavailable even if excluding the parcel might also have been reasonable.

(f) State register listing vs national register nomination when owners object

The decision also clarifies the procedural fork created by owner objections. The court explained:

  • Under 36 CFR 60.6 (n) and 9 NYCRR 427.1 (b) (1), if a majority of owners object, the Commissioner cannot “nominate” the district to the national register—but must still submit the documentation to the Keeper for a determination of eligibility.
  • Owner objections do not bar listing on the state register (9 NYCRR 427.1 [b] [1]; [d]).
  • Use of standard national register forms is contemplated for state listing (9 NYCRR 427.2 [b]).

Because the Commissioner’s cover letter and the national register form indicated the submission was for eligibility only, the court found no overreach and no basis to annul the state listing.

3.3 Impact

  • Administrative manageability for district listings: The decision reduces incentives for challengers to demand individualized findings for each included parcel, reinforcing that historic district determinations may proceed with district-level findings so long as the boundary is rationally justified under PRHPL/9 NYCRR criteria.
  • Boundary justification can rely on integrity/data considerations: Excluding heavily altered areas due to diminished integrity or “paucity of data” is endorsed as a rational basis, particularly where documentation standards (including for national-level assertions) are part of the administrative record.
  • Owner objections reshape—rather than halt—the national register pathway: The opinion reinforces the key distinction: objections can block a nomination but not an eligibility submission to the Keeper, and they do not preclude state listing.
  • Record supplementation via affidavits: Agencies defending district boundaries may lean on post-decision affidavits to clarify what was considered and why, so long as they are used to explain—not retroactively invent—the rationale.
  • Litigation posture in Article 78: The opinion underscores that challengers must identify a legal requirement for the specific procedural step they claim is missing (here, parcel-specific findings). Absent such authority, generalized findings tied to regulatory criteria can suffice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 78 (CPLR article 78)
A special proceeding used to challenge actions by New York administrative agencies. When no evidentiary hearing is required by law, courts review whether the decision was lawful and whether it was “arbitrary and capricious” or an abuse of discretion (CPLR 7803 [3]).
Arbitrary and capricious
A decision made without a sound, fact-based reason. If there is a rational basis in the record, courts will uphold the decision even if another outcome would also have been reasonable.
Historic district vs individual property listing
A historic district is evaluated as a whole—its landscape, integrity, and collective historical/archaeological significance. A parcel can be included because it contributes to the district’s integrity or information potential, even if that parcel alone might not warrant individual designation.
Integrity (9 NYCRR 427.3 [a])
The extent to which a place still conveys its historic character through location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. Industrial development can diminish integrity and reduce available archaeological data.
National Register “nomination” vs “determination of eligibility” (36 CFR 60.6 [n])
If a majority of property owners object, the state official may be barred from nominating for listing, but must still send the documentation to the Keeper for a determination of eligibility—an official finding about whether the property would qualify.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Sunoco, LLC v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Places reinforces a deferential, rational-basis framework for reviewing historic district boundary decisions under Article 78 and confirms two practical rules with broad significance. First, absent a specific legal mandate, the Commissioner need not produce parcel-specific findings or demonstrate that each included parcel could independently qualify for listing, so long as the district-level determination is grounded in PRHPL and 9 NYCRR criteria and has a rational basis. Second, majority owner objections do not prevent state listing and do not eliminate federal involvement; they convert the national register pathway into a required submission for a Keeper eligibility determination rather than a nomination for listing. Together, these holdings strengthen the administrative viability of landscape-scale preservation decisions while clarifying the limits of owner-veto power in the state–federal register process.