No Limitations Period for Denaturalization; Non‑Shepard Evidence May Establish Statutory‑Period Timing

Introduction

In United States v. Lazaro Prat, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court order revoking the defendant’s naturalized citizenship for illegal procurement. The government alleged that Prat lacked the “good moral character” required for naturalization because, during the statutory period, he committed a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT)—conspiracy to commit health care fraud. On appeal, Prat raised three principal challenges:

That the government’s denaturalization action was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 in light of Kokesh v. SEC;
That the record did not establish a CIMT within the statutory period; and
That the district court improperly considered Florida DMV records, which he argued were outside the permitted “Shepard documents” used in categorical/modified categorical analyses.

A per curiam panel (Judges Jill Pryor, Brasher, and Anderson) rejected each argument. The opinion clarifies two important points in denaturalization law in this Circuit: (1) § 2462’s five‑year limitations period does not apply to civil denaturalization actions, notwithstanding Kokesh; and (2) courts may consider non‑Shepard, circumstance‑specific evidence (such as DMV records) to establish non‑element facts like timing in the “good moral character” window, without implicating the Sixth Amendment.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court in full.

No time bar under § 2462: Denaturalization is a remedial, equitable measure, not a punitive “penalty” within § 2462. Supreme Court authority—Johannessen, Trop, Fedorenko, and Costello—confirms there is no congressionally imposed limitations period for revoking citizenship obtained illegally, and Kokesh’s “penalty” analysis does not change that.
CIMT during the statutory period established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence: Prat abandoned any argument that conspiracy to commit health care fraud is not categorically a CIMT. The court held that the government met its burden through Shepard‑approved records, including a Factual Proffer in which Prat admitted to using pharmacies he controlled to submit false Medicare claims between 2004 and 2008—dates that fall within his statutory period (April 29, 1997 to April 29, 2009).
DMV records properly considered (and, in any event, unnecessary): The court found the Shepard documents alone sufficed to show qualifying conduct during the statutory period. It further held that the district court did not err in considering Florida DMV records to corroborate timing because timing is a non‑element fact that may be proven through a circumstance‑specific approach under Nijhawan; the Sixth Amendment is not implicated in this civil denaturalization context.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958): Establish that denaturalization is not punitive; it withdraws “ill‑gotten privileges” and is an exercise of Congress’s power over naturalization, not a punishment.
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981): Denaturalization is a suit in equity; strict compliance with statutory prerequisites is required, and lack of such compliance renders citizenship “illegally procured.” District courts must enter judgment when the government proves ineligibility by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1984); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988): Confirm the longstanding absence of a limitations period for denaturalization absent congressional action, with denaturalization actions pursued decades after naturalization upheld.
Kokesh v. SEC, 581 U.S. 455 (2017): Defined “penalty” under § 2462 in the securities context, holding SEC disgorgement may be punitive. The panel distinguishes Kokesh because denaturalization is not punitive and not designed for deterrence.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1451(a): Set the “good moral character” requirement for the five years preceding the application through naturalization and provide that committing a CIMT during that period precludes a finding of good moral character; authorize revocation for illegal procurement.
Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002): Defines “moral turpitude,” noting crimes involving dishonesty or false statements generally qualify.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Gelin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); George v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 953 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2020): Provide the categorical and modified categorical frameworks and limit the evidentiary universe (Shepard documents) when identifying the statutory elements of the conviction.
United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249 (11th Cir. 2021): In the criminal sentencing context (ACCA), restricted the court to Shepard documents to decide whether prior offenses occurred on “different occasions.” The panel notes this background while emphasizing that the timing question here is a non‑element fact in a civil immigration proceeding.
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009): Authorizes a circumstance‑specific approach for non‑element facts in immigration law (e.g., loss amount for an aggravated felony), permitting adjudicators to look beyond the elements to case‑specific records.
United States v. Lopez, 75 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2023): Clarified the divisibility and mens rea issues for 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) money‑laundering conspiracies in the CIMT context. The panel here explained Lopez did not address health care fraud or the timing issue at stake.
Standards of review and briefing: Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) (de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6)); Samara v. Taylor, 38 F.4th 141 (11th Cir. 2022) (de novo review of judgment on the pleadings); Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) (judgment on pleadings standard); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (abandonment for inadequate briefing).

Legal Reasoning

1) § 2462’s Five‑Year Limit Does Not Apply to Denaturalization

The panel grounded its time‑bar analysis in the Supreme Court’s longstanding characterization of denaturalization as a remedial, equitable action that strips unlawfully obtained status. Because denaturalization is not a “penalty,” § 2462—which applies to actions “for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture”—does not apply. The court:

Relied on Johannessen, Trop, and Fedorenko to reiterate that denaturalization imposes no punishment and is not designed to deter others’ misconduct.
Noted the historical practice, confirmed in Costello, Koziy, and Kungys, of permitting denaturalization actions decades after naturalization in the absence of a specific congressional limitations period.
Rejected reliance on Kokesh’s definition of “penalty” because denaturalization’s purpose is corrective, not punitive; deterrence is not its object.
Dismissed DOJ press releases as irrelevant to statutory interpretation; executive branch statements cannot transform a remedial action into a punitive one.

2) The Government Proved a CIMT Occurred During the Statutory Period

To revoke citizenship for illegal procurement, the government must show by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the person lacked the statutory qualifications at the time of naturalization. One such prerequisite is “good moral character” during the five‑year period leading to and including the grant of citizenship, which is negated by committing a CIMT. The court’s analysis proceeded as follows:

Abandonment of the categorical challenge: Prat did not “plainly and prominently” challenge the district court’s determination that conspiracy to commit health care fraud qualifies as a CIMT; that argument was therefore abandoned on appeal (Sapuppo).
Shepard materials established timing and substance: The court held the government met its clear, unequivocal, and convincing burden through Shepard‑approved records—principally Prat’s Factual Proffer and the amended judgment—which showed:
- Prat admitted he “owned and controlled” three pharmacies used to submit false Medicare claims.
- One such pharmacy, Medline, was incorporated in 2004 and dissolved in 2008, and Prat admitted causing false claims through Medline—necessarily placing fraudulent acts within 2004–2008.
- From February 8, 2005 through July 29, 2008, Prat and his co‑conspirator obtained roughly $10.6 million in Medicare reimbursements, over $7 million of which he knew were proceeds of false and fraudulent claims.
- The amended judgment placed the conspiracy’s end date at August 8, 2008.
These admissions situate the CIMT within Prat’s statutory period (described by the court as April 29, 1997 to April 29, 2009), thereby negating good moral character and rendering citizenship illegally procured.

3) Non‑Shepard DMV Records Were Properly Considered to Establish Timing

Although the court deemed the Shepard documents sufficient, it squarely addressed the evidentiary challenge to the Florida DMV records, which showed a vehicle registration on January 24, 2006. Prat’s Factual Proffer admitted the vehicle was purchased to launder proceeds from false Medicare claims. The court held:

Timing is a non‑element fact: Whether the offense conduct occurred within the statutory “good moral character” period does not define the legal elements of the crime of conviction; it is a collateral, temporal fact relevant to eligibility for naturalization.
Nijhawan’s circumstance‑specific approach applies: Just as immigration adjudicators may look beyond elements to establish non‑element facts like loss amounts, courts may consult non‑Shepard evidence to establish timing in denaturalization contexts.
No Sixth Amendment problem: Because this is a civil denaturalization proceeding and the timing determination concerns a non‑element fact, the Sixth Amendment constraints that animated Dudley in the criminal sentencing context do not apply.
Lopez distinguished: Lopez dealt with whether a particular conspiracy statute categorically involves moral turpitude—not with health care fraud or statutory‑period timing. It did not control this case.

Impact

Reaffirmation of no limitations period: The Eleventh Circuit continues the unbroken line of authority that denaturalization actions are not subject to § 2462, even after Kokesh. Practitioners should expect the government to bring denaturalization cases regardless of the time elapsed since naturalization, absent a statute enacted by Congress imposing a limitations period.
Expanded evidentiary toolkit for timing: By approving the use of non‑Shepard, circumstance‑specific evidence to establish when conduct occurred, the court lowers the risk that denaturalization actions founder on proof of timing. Records like DMV filings, banking records, or other administrative documents may corroborate that the CIMT fell within the statutory window.
CIMT classification preserved for another day: Because the defendant abandoned his categorical challenge to conspiracy to commit health care fraud as a CIMT, this case does not create new law on that classification. Parties litigating the CIMT status of health care fraud or conspiracy thereto should look to other authorities and be mindful of briefing requirements to avoid abandonment.
Unpublished but instructive: The opinion is “Not for Publication” and thus not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Nevertheless, it is a clear application of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit doctrine and will likely be cited for its persuasive treatment of the § 2462 and evidentiary issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Denaturalization: A civil process to revoke citizenship when it was obtained by fraud or without satisfying statutory requirements. It is remedial, not punitive.
Good moral character period: Generally the five years preceding the naturalization application through the date of naturalization. Committing certain offenses (including CIMTs) during this period bars naturalization.
Crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT): Offenses involving dishonesty, fraud, or conduct that is “base, vile, or depraved.” Fraud crimes typically qualify.
Categorical approach: Courts compare the statutory elements of a prior conviction to a generic definition (e.g., CIMT) without examining the specific facts.
Modified categorical approach: When a statute is divisible (lists alternative elements), courts may consult a limited set of “Shepard documents” (charging instrument, plea agreement, plea colloquy, etc.) to identify which alternative formed the basis of conviction—still focusing on elements, not facts.
Shepard documents: Judicially approved records of the conviction used to determine the precise statutory elements involved in a prior offense for categorical analysis.
Circumstance‑specific approach (Nijhawan): For non‑element facts relevant to immigration consequences (e.g., loss amount, timing), adjudicators may look at case‑specific evidence beyond the formal elements of the offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2462: A five‑year statute of limitations for actions seeking penalties. It does not apply to denaturalization because denaturalization is not a penalty.
Standard of proof in denaturalization: The government must meet a “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard—higher than preponderance but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Abandonment on appeal: Arguments not clearly and prominently raised with supporting authority are deemed abandoned and will not be considered.

Conclusion

United States v. Lazaro Prat reinforces two central tenets of denaturalization law in the Eleventh Circuit. First, civil denaturalization is not constrained by § 2462’s five‑year limitations period because it is a remedial, equitable action rather than a “penalty,” and Kokesh does not alter that conclusion. Second, while categorical and modified categorical analyses govern whether a conviction fits a generic category like a CIMT, courts may use non‑Shepard, circumstance‑specific evidence to establish non‑element facts—here, the timing of the offense conduct within the statutory “good moral character” period—without raising Sixth Amendment concerns in this civil context.

The government satisfied its demanding burden through Shepard‑approved records showing that Prat conspired to commit health care fraud and did so within the relevant timeframe; the DMV records, though permissible to corroborate timing, were ultimately unnecessary to sustain the judgment. For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of precise appellate briefing on CIMT classification, confirms the enduring absence of a time bar for denaturalization absent congressional action, and clarifies that a broader evidentiary palette can be used to prove non‑element timing facts in denaturalization proceedings.