No Fourth-Amendment “Seizure” When Police Assist a Private Carrier:
A Detailed Commentary on Samuel Ghee, IV v. Flix North America, Inc.

1. Introduction

In Samuel Ghee, IV v. Flix North America, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit delivered a multifaceted opinion that intersects constitutional law, tort law, and procedural doctrine. The appellant, Mr. Samuel Ghee, IV, travelled on a Greyhound bus from Selma to Atlanta. After an altercation with driver Shonda Keenan, police officers George Moore and Isaac Sanchez were summoned, and Greyhound refused further carriage. Mr. Ghee—acting pro se—filed suit against the officers, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and its parent company, Flix North America, Inc., alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state-law torts, breach of contract, and judicial bias.

The district court (M.D. Ga.) denied a motion to recuse, granted summary judgment to the officers, and dismissed all claims against Greyhound and Flix under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, Mr. Ghee contested every adverse ruling. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board, thereby clarifying three important legal points:

1. The absence of a Fourth-Amendment “seizure” when officers merely assist a private carrier in ejecting a passenger who is free to leave;
2. The continued vitality of the economic-loss rule in Georgia for tort claims against common carriers; and
3. The high threshold for recusal, conspiracy, and assault allegations at both the summary-judgment and pleading stages.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Recusal: The court found no objective reason for doubt about the district judge’s impartiality; rulings alone do not imply bias (citing Liteky).
• § 1983 Claims Against Officers: No Fourth-Amendment seizure; therefore, no probable cause required, and no underlying constitutional violation to support a conspiracy theory.
• State-Law Claims Against Greyhound:
  • Economic-loss rule barred tort recovery where only lost fare and incidental costs were alleged.
  • Pleadings failed to state viable claims for assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
• Claims Against Flix: Insufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil; parent company dismissed.
• Result: District court judgment affirmed; motion for default judgment on appeal denied.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Several foundational cases guided the court’s reasoning:

• Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) – Defines a “seizure” as the termination of freedom of movement by “physical force or show of authority.”
• Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) – Set the “reasonable person” test for determining when police contact becomes a seizure.
• United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965 (11th Cir. 2003) – Categorizes police–citizen encounters into three levels, only the third of which triggers full Fourth-Amendment scrutiny.
• Peery v. City of Miami, 977 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 2020) – Explains that being told to leave one location does not constitute a seizure if one is free to go elsewhere.
• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) – Establishes that judicial rulings alone rarely warrant recusal.
• Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) – Articulates elements for § 1983 conspiracy: agreement and actual deprivation of a constitutional right.
• Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. O'Quin, 52 S.E. 427 (Ga. 1905) & Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, 7 S.E. 2d 174 (Ga. 1940) – Recognize a carrier’s potential liability for wrongful ejection.
• General Electric Co. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 608 S.E. 2d 636 (Ga. 2005) – Georgia’s economic-loss rule limiting recovery in tort for purely economic damages.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) – Plausibility standard for motions to dismiss.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 No Fourth-Amendment Seizure

The officers neither displayed weapons nor restrained, searched, or arrested Mr. Ghee. They merely informed him of Greyhound’s right to refuse service and facilitated retrieval of his luggage. Applying Bostick and Mendenhall, the panel concluded that a reasonable person would feel free to leave the terminal— he simply could not remain on that particular bus. In Eleventh-Circuit parlance, this was “level-one” police–citizen interaction (see Perkins), imposing no Fourth-Amendment burden, and therefore negating probable-cause or conspiracy theories ab initio.

3.2.2 Conspiracy Claim Failure

Because no constitutional right was violated, the second element of a § 1983 conspiracy—actual deprivation—was absent. Even if there had been an “agreement” among the officers and Greyhound, liability cannot lie without an underlying wrong.

3.2.3 Economic-Loss Rule and Common-Carrier Duties

Georgia common-carrier law imposes “extraordinary diligence,” but wrongful ejection sounds in tort only if personal injury or property damage ensues. Mr. Ghee pleaded solely economic losses (missed travel, incidental expenses), thus triggering the economic-loss rule and confining any remedy to contract—a theory he did not pursue with specificity in his complaint. By contrast, had he pleaded physical harm, emotional distress with medical corroboration, or damage to belongings, the tort claim might have survived.

3.2.4 Assault, IIED, and Corporate-Veil Claims

• Assault: Georgia requires an intentional act creating apprehension of imminent physical harm; no such allegation was made.
• IIED: The complaint lacked facts indicating “severe” distress as required under Georgia law.
• Piercing the Veil: Beyond naming Flix as Greyhound’s parent, Mr. Ghee offered no facts suggesting domination, fraud, or misuse, failing the pleading standard set out in Iqbal.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

Though unpublished (“[DO NOT PUBLISH]”) and therefore non-precedential under 11th Cir. R. 36-2, the opinion nonetheless signals how the Eleventh Circuit will treat similar issues:

1. Police Facilitation ≠ State Seizure: When officers merely effectuate a private entity’s right to exclude, courts will likely deem the encounter consensual unless physical restraint or authoritative commands are present.
2. Economic-Loss Rule Enforcement: Plaintiffs must allege tangible personal or property damage when suing carriers in tort. Pure fare-refund disputes belong in contract claims (or consumer-protection forums).
3. Heightened Pleading for Recusal and Conspiracy: Bare assertions of bias or collusion—especially in pro se filings—face steep hurdles.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Fourth-Amendment “Seizure”: A person is seized only when police restrain movement through force or authority. If you can walk away, no seizure occurred.
• Levels of Police–Citizen Encounters:
  1. Casual, consensual talk—no constitutional test.
  2. Brief investigative stop (“Terry stop”)—requires reasonable suspicion.
  3. Full arrest—requires probable cause.
• Economic-Loss Rule: You can’t sue in tort for money lost from a broken promise unless physical harm or property damage accompanies it.
• Common Carrier: A business (bus, train, airline) that transports the public for hire; owes “extraordinary diligence” for passenger safety in Georgia.
• § 1983 Conspiracy: Requires (1) an agreement, and (2) actual deprivation of a federal right—both must be proven.
• Judicial Recusal: A judge steps aside only when a reasonable observer would doubt impartiality; adverse rulings alone are insufficient.
• Corporate Veil: The legal separation between a corporation and its parent/shareholders; “piercing” it demands proof of misuse or fraud.

5. Conclusion

Ghee v. Flix North America reiterates enduring doctrines rather than forging bold new law, yet its synthesis of Fourth-Amendment, state-tort, and procedural principles offers a succinct roadmap for future litigants: police accommodation of a private carrier’s decision to eject a passenger does not, standing alone, implicate the Fourth Amendment; the economic-loss rule strictly limits tort recovery against common carriers for purely monetary damages; and speculative allegations, whether of judicial bias or conspiracy, will not survive scrutiny. Practitioners should heed the decision’s cautionary tale: plead facts, not conclusions; distinguish economic from physical harms; and remember that an invitation to depart is not a seizure.