No Article III Adversity for § 1983 Equitable Relief Against Adjudicatory Firearms-Licensing Judges; Absolute Immunity for Licensing Denials

Introduction

Kellogg v. Nichols (2d Cir. amended Mar. 5, 2026) addresses two recurring obstacles in federal constitutional challenges to New York’s firearms licensing system: (1) absolute judicial immunity when a state judge denies a pistol/concealed-carry license application under N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00, and (2) Article III jurisdiction—specifically whether a federal “case or controversy” exists—when the only defendant is the state judge who adjudicated the license applications.

Plaintiffs Jeremy Kellogg and Jonathan Harmon, Columbia County residents, applied for concealed-carry/pistol licenses. Their applications were assigned to County Court Judge Jonathan D. Nichols, acting as the statutory “licensing officer” under N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00(10). After hearings, Judge Nichols denied both applications based on criminal history and related findings bearing on statutory eligibility (including “good moral character”).

Rather than suing an executive enforcement official, Plaintiffs sued Judge Nichols under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in both individual and official capacities, seeking nominal damages and broad declaratory/injunctive relief declaring New York’s licensing scheme unconstitutional and enjoining enforcement of several criminal statutes penalizing unlicensed possession.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal in full and made two central holdings:

  1. Individual-capacity damages claims: A state court judge deciding firearms license applications acts in a judicial capacity and is protected by absolute judicial immunity. The panel reaffirmed Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2020), on this point.
  2. Official-capacity equitable claims: Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Nichols were barred by Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement because a judge who adjudicates applications under a statute is not an adverse party to a litigant challenging that statute’s constitutionality. The court thus held there was no justiciable controversy between these plaintiffs and this judicial defendant for the relief sought.

The court emphasized the narrowness of its jurisdictional holding: the plaintiffs sued only the adjudicating judge, sought broad facial equitable relief, and did not seek prospective relief compelling issuance of licenses.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Judicial immunity for licensing decisions

The court’s immunity analysis is anchored in:

  • Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2020), abrogated on other grounds by N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
    Role in this case: Treated as binding circuit precedent that New York judges, when denying firearms license applications, issue “actual rulings” on individual applications and therefore act judicially (not administratively) for immunity purposes. Kellogg treats this as dispositive of damages claims.
  • Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009), and Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
    Role in this case: Provide the “functional approach” to determine whether conduct is “judicial.” Kellogg applies the hallmark identified in Bliven v. Hunt—a decision “in relation to a particular case”—to firearms licensing denials, treating them as adjudicative decisions protected by absolute immunity.
  • United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 2004), and Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2009).
    Role in this case: Used to reject plaintiffs’ invitation to overrule Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo; a panel is bound unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.

2. Article III adversity and suits against adjudicatory judges

The jurisdictional holding relies on a distinct line of authority about who is a proper defendant in constitutional challenges:

  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), S. Jackson & Son, Inc. v. Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exch. Inc., 24 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 1994), In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
    Role in this case: Establish the foundational point that federal courts require a concrete dispute between adverse parties, and that jurisdiction must exist for each claim and each form of relief.
  • Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (notably footnote 18), and Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30 (2021).
    Role in this case: Supply the key proposition: ordinarily “no case or controversy” exists “between a judge who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant who attacks the constitutionality of the statute.” Kellogg treats Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson as crystallizing the adversity defect when plaintiffs sue adjudicating judges instead of enforcement officials.
  • In re Justices of Sup. Ct. of P.R., 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.).
    Role in this case: Provides the conceptual framework: judges “sit as arbiters” without a personal or institutional stake, so the usual constitutional defendant is an enforcement official, not an adjudicator.
  • Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976).
    Role in this case: A key Second Circuit analogue: suing a state judge over application of a statute in judicial proceedings lacked the “honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights” necessary for Article III. Kellogg extends Mendez v. Heller from divorce adjudication to firearms-licensing adjudication.
  • Circuit consensus authorities invoked to reinforce the functional, adjudicator-versus-enforcer distinction: Lindke v. Tomlinson, 31 F.4th 487 (6th Cir. 2022); Reule v. Jackson, 114 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2024); Frazier v. Prince George's Cnty., 140 F.4th 556 (4th Cir. 2025); and (for related nonconstitutional/§ 1983 framing) Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 2017), R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1994).
    Role in this case: Support the proposition that where a judge is functioning adjudicatorially (even in non-adversarial, application-based contexts), Article III adversity is absent.
  • D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
    Role in this case: Used to illustrate that adjudication can occur in single-party application settings (e.g., bar admission), strengthening the analogy to firearm license applications.
  • “Sub silentio jurisdiction” cautions: Gallego v. Northland Grp. Inc., 814 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); and State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
    Role in this case: The panel distinguishes cases like N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen and Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), where courts proceeded despite judge defendants; Kellogg reasons those decisions did not address adversity and therefore cannot resolve the jurisdictional question by assumption.

3. The New York firearms and review framework

  • Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), and Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
    Role in this case: Provide descriptive backdrop of New York’s licensing architecture and the general prohibition on firearm possession absent a license.
  • N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
    Role in this case: Contextualizes the constitutional landscape and is referenced to note that the NYSP Superintendent “oversee[s] the enforcement” of licensing laws—highlighting that enforcement officials, unlike adjudicating judges, are the usual targets for prospective relief.
  • Article 78 and state review mechanisms: Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001); Loehr v. Admin. Bd. of Cts. of State of N.Y., 29 N.Y.3d 374 (2017); Selkin v. State Bd. for Pro. Med. Conduct, 63 F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Seymour v. Nichols, 801 N.Y.S.2d 426 (3d Dep't 2005); Diperna-Gillen v. Ryba, 187 N.Y.S.3d 442 (3d Dep't 2023).
    Role in this case: Underpin the panel’s emphasis that applicants have “traditional judicial safeguards” and state-court avenues to litigate constitutional challenges to licensing determinations.

Legal Reasoning

1. Immunity: the denial of a firearms license application is treated as a judicial act

The court follows the established “functional approach” from Forrester v. White and Bliven v. Hunt, asking whether the challenged conduct is a judicial function rather than an administrative/ministerial one. It then treats Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo as controlling: firearms-licensing judges issue individualized rulings applying statutory criteria to facts developed through hearings, which is paradigmatically adjudicative.

The practical consequence is categorical for damages claims: because Judge Nichols’s denials were judicial decisions, absolute immunity bars individual-capacity § 1983 damages.

2. Jurisdiction: even if immunity were irrelevant, Article III blocks equitable relief against an adjudicator with no stake in enforcement

The panel’s main development is jurisdictional: it holds that where a judge’s role is adjudicatory—deciding whether an applicant satisfies statutory requirements—there is no “case or controversy” between the applicant and the judge for purposes of broad declaratory/injunctive relief attacking the statute itself.

Kellogg operationalizes Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson and Pulliam v. Allen by applying them to New York firearms licensing:

  • No enforcement authority: Judge Nichols cannot prosecute unlicensed possession under N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01 et seq.; enjoining him would not prevent criminal enforcement.
  • No institutional/personal stake: The judge did not promulgate the criteria and does not have an interest in defending the scheme as a policy matter (contrasting situations discussed in In re Justices of Sup. Ct. of P.R. and Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985)).
  • Adjudication can exist without two-party litigation: The court analogizes license adjudication to warrant or bar-admission contexts, citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman.
  • Judicial safeguards and review: Hearings, written reasons, and New York appellate review (including Article 78 and hybrid/conversion procedures) reinforce that the judge is acting as adjudicator, not as “opponent.”

Notably, the court uses this jurisdictional conclusion to avoid reaching the statutory limitation on injunctions against judges in § 1983 (as discussed by the district court and referenced through Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999)).

3. The holding is explicitly narrow and fact-bound

The opinion stresses that it is deciding only the posture presented: plaintiffs denied licenses, suing only the adjudicating judge, and seeking broad facial relief and injunctions against criminal enforcement provisions—without seeking prospective relief requiring the judge to issue a license. The court leaves open how Article III would apply if enforcement-capable officials were defendants, if the challenged acts involved revocation/cancellation (see O'Brien v. Keegan, 87 N.Y.2d 436 (1996)), or in other configurations (including scenarios discussed in Antonyuk v. James and Frey v. City of New York, 157 F.4th 118 (2d Cir. 2025)).

Impact

  • Reshapes defendant selection in Second Amendment licensing litigation (at least in judge-licensing counties): Plaintiffs seeking to invalidate or enjoin enforcement of New York’s licensing regime in federal court must ordinarily sue officials with enforcement authority (or other adequate institutional stakes), not the adjudicating judge.
  • Reinforces a bifurcated remedial structure: (a) challenges to a judge’s denial are steered toward state appellate mechanisms (including Article 78 and declaratory judgment routes), while (b) broad pre-enforcement challenges are steered toward executive enforcement defendants.
  • Limits federal-court end runs around state appellate review: By framing the defect as Article III adversity, the decision operates as a threshold jurisdictional bar—often earlier and broader than merits-based defenses.
  • Clarifies the continuing force of Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo after N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen: Bruen altered Second Amendment merits analysis but did not disturb the immunity characterization of licensing denials as judicial acts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Absolute judicial immunity: A doctrine that generally bars damages suits against judges for acts performed in their judicial role. The key question is functional: was the act adjudicative (protected) or administrative/ministerial (potentially not)?
  • Individual capacity vs. official capacity: Individual-capacity suits seek to hold an official personally liable (often for damages). Official-capacity suits seek relief against the government function the official represents (often injunctions/declarations).
  • Article III “case or controversy” and “adversity”: Federal courts can only decide real disputes between parties with adverse legal interests. If a defendant is not the party who enforces (or can meaningfully change) the challenged rule, the case may be nonjusticiable.
  • Declaratory vs. injunctive relief: A declaratory judgment states what the law is (or whether conduct is unconstitutional). An injunction orders a party to do or stop doing something. Both require jurisdiction and must be capable of redressing the plaintiff’s injury.
  • Article 78 proceeding: A New York procedure for judicial review of certain governmental determinations; it can accommodate constitutional issues and may be converted or paired with declaratory judgment mechanisms in appropriate cases (as the opinion notes through New York and federal authorities).

Conclusion

Kellogg v. Nichols delivers a two-part directive for firearms licensing challenges in the Second Circuit: (1) when a New York state judge denies a firearms license application, that decision is a judicial act shielded by absolute immunity from individual-capacity damages suits; and (2) when plaintiffs sue only that adjudicating judge for sweeping declaratory and injunctive relief against the licensing regime and related criminal enforcement, Article III typically bars the action for lack of adversity.

The decision’s broader significance lies less in Second Amendment merits and more in litigation architecture: it channels applicant-specific disputes toward state review, and it requires federal constitutional challenges seeking to restrain enforcement to be brought against true enforcement officials rather than adjudicators.