Nexus Requires Evidence the Persecutor Cared About a Protected Ground; Generalized Country Violence Does Not Satisfy CAT

Introduction

In Ismael Torrijos-Zamora v. Pamela J. Bondi (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision rejecting claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection.

The petitioner, Ismael Torrijos-Zamora, a Mexican national, alleged that gang members (the huachicoleros) threatened him after he organized civic activities and sports aimed at steering boys away from gangs. He also suspected police collusion based on alleged intimidation by officers after he sought help. The central issues were whether (1) the threats were “on account of” a protected ground (the nexus requirement), including political opinion or particular social group membership, and (2) country-conditions evidence and allegations of corruption established eligibility for CAT protection.

Summary of the Opinion

The court upheld the agency’s decision primarily on nexus grounds. It agreed with the Board that the record— including Torrijos-Zamora’s own testimony—supported the conclusion that the gang targeted him to protect its criminal enterprise (recruiting boys for fuel theft), not because of his political opinion or membership in a cognizable particular social group.

The court also rejected the CAT challenge, concluding that the Immigration Judge considered the country reports and reasonably found they described generalized violence and geographically limited gang activity, not proof that Torrijos-Zamora himself was more likely than not to be tortured with government acquiescence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Scope and standard of judicial review

  • Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 831 (7th Cir. 2025), citing Meza v. Garland, 5 F.4th 732 (7th Cir. 2021): The court reiterated it reviews the IJ’s decision “as modified by the Board,” framing what portions of the agency reasoning are properly before the court.
  • Mateo-Mateo v. Garland, 124 F.4th 470 (7th Cir. 2024), citing Borjas Cruz v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1000 (7th Cir. 2024): These cases supplied the familiar split between de novo review for legal questions and substantial evidence review for factual findings.
  • Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. ---- (2026), quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019): The court emphasized the deferential nature of substantial-evidence review—whether “a reasonable mind might accept” the evidence as adequate—and paired it with the INA’s “compelled to conclude to the contrary” constraint in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

2) Asylum and withholding: the nexus requirement

  • Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2021), citing Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2008): These cases anchored the court’s articulation of the asylum framework, especially that persecution must be “on account of” a protected ground.
  • Ferreyra v. Barr, 962 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2020): The court relied on Ferreyra’s formulation that it is not enough to show both harm and a protected characteristic; the protected ground must be the persecutor’s motive.
  • de Paz-Peraza v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 390 (7th Cir. 2025): This was the key “gang-motive” precedent. The court invoked it for the principle that harm driven by a gang’s “recruitment and retaliation goals” does not establish nexus to a protected ground.
  • Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454 (7th Cir. 2023), quoting W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2018): These cases supported the Board’s and court’s treatment of asylum and withholding together on nexus, because the nexus requirement is the same for both forms of relief. Granados Arias and de Paz-Peraza were also cited to validate the permissibility of consolidated analysis.
  • Mohideen v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005): Cited for the proposition that the Board may err if it ignores evidence supporting nexus. The court distinguished Mohideen on the facts, finding no ignored evidence here.

3) CAT: individualized likelihood, not generalized violence

  • Singh v. Garland, 89 F.4th 602 (7th Cir. 2024): Provided the regulatory standard: the applicant must show it is “more likely than not” he will be tortured if removed (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2025)). Singh was also cited for the proposition that ability to relocate can defeat these protection claims.
  • Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2017): Used twice—first, for the CAT burden (“more likely than not”), and second, in a footnote to clarify that when the Board affirms without modifying CAT reasoning, the court reviews the IJ’s CAT analysis.
  • Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th 836 (7th Cir. 2021), citing Barry v. Barr, 916 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2019): These cases were used to reject reliance on generalized violence as proof that this petitioner faces a specific risk of torture.
  • Mabuneza v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1222 (7th Cir. 2021): Reinforced the individualized-risk requirement: a CAT applicant must show he personally faces a substantial risk of torture.
  • Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2016): Cited for the court’s repeated refusal to treat documentary country evidence, standing alone, as sufficient to establish CAT eligibility.

Legal Reasoning

1) Nexus failed because the record supported a criminal-enterprise motive

The court treated nexus as the dispositive issue for asylum and withholding. Critically, it relied on the petitioner’s own admissions during government examination: the gang targeted him because “they felt that [he] was taking their local boys away” —boys the gang needed for fuel theft. That testimony gave the agency substantial evidence to find the gang’s motive was enterprise protection/recruitment, not retaliation for political opinion or harm “because of” membership in a particular social group.

The court also rejected the argument that the Board “ignored” a political-opinion theory. The Board acknowledged the petitioner’s civic and voting-related activity but found no evidence the gang cared about it. Under Ferreyra v. Barr, identifying political activity is not enough; the petitioner must show it motivated the persecution. The court concluded the record did not compel a contrary finding under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.

2) Consolidating nexus analysis for asylum and withholding was legally correct

Torrijos-Zamora argued the Board analyzed nexus only for asylum. The Seventh Circuit rejected that reading and held the Board permissibly consolidated the analysis because the nexus requirement is the same for both claims, citing Granados Arias v. Garland and W.G.A. v. Sessions. The court also noted Seventh Circuit caselaw commonly proceeds this way.

3) CAT failed because generalized country evidence did not establish an individualized probability of torture

The court found the IJ did not ignore country reports; rather, the IJ considered them and found them insufficient to show the petitioner was more likely than not to be tortured. The court emphasized its recurring CAT principle: widespread violence and corruption do not, without more, demonstrate that this applicant faces torture. Citing Nyandwi v. Garland, Barry v. Barr, and Mabuneza v. Garland, the court required individualized targeting and risk, and cited Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch for rejecting documentary evidence alone as dispositive.

Impact

Although labeled a nonprecedential disposition, the order is consistent with—and operationalizes—existing Seventh Circuit doctrine in three ways likely to guide litigants and adjudicators:

  1. Applicant testimony can be decisive on nexus. Where the applicant concedes the persecutor’s motive is recruitment/retaliation in service of a criminal enterprise, nexus arguments tied to political opinion or social group will be difficult to sustain absent additional evidence of protected-ground animus.
  2. Board/IJ may consolidate asylum and withholding nexus analysis. Challenges premised on analytical “separation” will fail if the Board’s combined approach is traceable to the shared nexus requirement recognized in Granados Arias v. Garland and W.G.A. v. Sessions.
  3. CAT claims require individualized proof beyond country conditions. The decision reinforces a demanding evidentiary expectation: country reports showing violence and corruption must be connected to the applicant’s personal likelihood of torture, not just general danger.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Nexus: The required link between the harm and a protected reason (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). It asks: “Did they target you because of that protected characteristic or belief?”
  • Political opinion (in asylum law): Not just having civic views, but showing the persecutor targeted you because of those views (or views they imputed to you).
  • Particular social group: A legally recognized group defined by certain characteristics; even if a group is cognizable, the applicant must still prove the persecutor acted because of membership in that group.
  • Substantial evidence review: A highly deferential appellate standard. The court does not decide whether it would have reached the same result; it asks whether the agency’s finding is reasonably supported by the record and not “compelled” to be the opposite.
  • CAT “more likely than not”: A probability standard—greater than 50%—that the applicant will be tortured if removed, typically requiring individualized evidence of risk.
  • Generalized violence vs. individualized risk: Evidence that a country is dangerous is not enough; the applicant must show a personal, particularized likelihood of torture.
  • Government “acquiescence” (CAT context): Torture must be inflicted by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official. Allegations of corruption must connect to the applicant’s feared torture in a concrete way.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit denied relief because the record supported a finding that the threats were motivated by the gang’s recruitment and enterprise interests—insufficient for nexus—and because country-conditions evidence of violence and corruption did not establish an individualized, more-likely-than-not probability of torture required for CAT protection. The decision underscores a recurring theme in immigration protection cases: motive and individualized proof—often anchored in the applicant’s own testimony—frequently determine outcomes.