Neutral Laws Require Neutral Enforcement: Second Circuit Holds that Hostility-Tainted Discipline by a State Athletics Association Violates the Free Exercise Clause

Introduction

In Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders, No. 24-1704 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction and ordered the reinstatement of Mid Vermont Christian School to the Vermont Principals’ Association (VPA). The case arises from Mid Vermont’s forfeiture of a girls’ high school playoff basketball game rather than play against a team fielding a transgender athlete. The school asserted that requiring its girls to compete against “biological males” would contravene its religious beliefs about sex and gender. In response, the VPA expelled Mid Vermont from all state-sponsored extracurricular activities.

Plaintiffs (the school, students, and parents) sued, alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause and seeking a preliminary injunction restoring VPA membership. The district court denied relief, concluding that the VPA’s policies are neutral and generally applicable. The Second Circuit did not reach that question. Instead, it held that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because the VPA’s decisionmaking and disciplinary process were not neutral in application: they were tainted by hostility toward Mid Vermont’s religious beliefs. The court also found irreparable harm and a public interest in correcting constitutional violations, and it directed that a preliminary injunction issue reinstating the school to full VPA membership pending resolution on the merits.

Summary of the Opinion

The VPA is a state actor. Its actions are subject to the First Amendment.
Without deciding whether the VPA’s gender-identity policy is neutral and generally applicable, the court held that the VPA’s enforcement against Mid Vermont was not neutrally applied. Official expressions of hostility toward the school’s religious beliefs tainted the disciplinary process.
Key hostility indicators included: public statements by the VPA’s Executive Director criticizing religious schools and Mid Vermont’s forfeit “under the guise of religious freedom”; an appeal decision declaring Mid Vermont’s religious claim “wrong”; unprecedented severity and breadth of the sanction; and procedural irregularities in rushing to an “immediate” expulsion without following established notice-and-hearing norms.
Under Masterpiece Cakeshop and related Supreme Court authority, hostility in enforcement violates the Free Exercise Clause and warrants setting aside the tainted action “without further inquiry.” The panel thus did not apply strict scrutiny or analyze general applicability.
Irreparable harm was established both because the loss of First Amendment freedoms is per se irreparable and because students lost competitive opportunities and potential scholarship pathways.
The public interest favors enjoining constitutionally defective enforcement and restoring student access to extracurricular opportunities.
Disposition: Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant a preliminary injunction “insofar as it seeks Mid Vermont’s reinstatement to full membership in the VPA.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): No official may prescribe what is orthodox in religion. The Second Circuit drew on Barnette to criticize the VPA committee’s conclusion that Mid Vermont’s religious view was “wrong,” underscoring that government actors may not adjudicate religious orthodoxy.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993): The “minimum requirement of neutrality” prohibits government action driven by animus toward religion. The opinion quoted Lukumi to stress that even a “slight suspicion” of animus requires officials to proceed with constitutional vigilance. The court found multiple hostility markers here.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. 617 (2018): Laws must be applied in a manner neutral toward religion; official hostility invalidates adjudicatory outcomes. The Second Circuit applied Masterpiece directly: the VPA Executive Director’s statements and the committee’s language manifested hostility, compelling relief without reaching strict scrutiny or general applicability.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021): Even where a law is facially neutral and generally applicable, the government violates the Free Exercise Clause if it proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious beliefs. This principle supports the court’s focus on the neutrality of enforcement, not just the text of the policy.
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022): The Court endorsed setting aside outcomes of proceedings infected by hostility “without further inquiry.” The Second Circuit relied on this posture to grant relief once hostility was shown.
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2002); Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): Together, these cases discourage government and courts from second-guessing the validity or centrality of a plaintiff’s religious beliefs and focus instead on sincerity and burden. The VPA committee’s adjudication of the “wrongness” of the school’s belief ran afoul of these principles.
New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020): The severity of government sanctions can evidence hostility. The Second Circuit analogized the VPA’s unprecedented, expansive expulsion as a hostility signal reinforcing the constitutional problem.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020); Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2020): Loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable harm, and the court must correct constitutional harms promptly. These cases guided the irreparable-harm and public-interest analysis.
A.H. ex rel. Hester v. French, 985 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2021): The public interest is served by remedying constitutional violations; cited to support injunctive reinstatement.
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. School District of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2004): Loss of competitive opportunities can be irreparable in the scholastic athletics context, reinforcing the injunction’s necessity.
Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332 (2025): Quoted for the Free Exercise Clause’s core protection of the performance of religious acts in daily life. This reflects the Court’s contemporary articulation of Free Exercise protections.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel framed the preliminary injunction standard applicable to government action: the movants must show (1) irreparable harm, (2) likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) that the public interest favors relief. It reviewed legal determinations de novo.

On the merits, the court focused on neutrality in enforcement, not on the facial validity or general applicability of the VPA’s policies. Citing Masterpiece and Fulton, the court held that the Free Exercise Clause demands not only neutral laws but also neutral enforcement. It identified several features demonstrating hostility:

Contemporaneous official statements: The VPA Executive Director, a key enforcement decisionmaker, testified publicly days after the forfeit (and weeks before discipline) decrying “blatant discrimination under the guise of religious freedom” and criticizing religious schools’ practices. The court viewed this as “official expressions of hostility to religion.”
Adjudication of religious “wrongness”: The VPA committee’s appeal ruling expressly declared the school’s religious claim “wrong” and reasoned about what participation in sports does or does not “signify” to believers. The court cited Barnette and Second Circuit precedent to reject government evaluation of theological validity or orthodoxy.
Severity and breadth of sanction: An unprecedented, across-the-board expulsion from all VPA activities (athletics and co-curriculars like debate and science fairs) suggested hostility. Even the district court flagged this breadth as “unnecessary and excessive,” after which some non-athletic activities were reinstated.
Procedural irregularities: The VPA rushed to an “immediate” determination, ignoring its own detailed disciplinary procedures (investigation, notice, recommended penalty, hearing). Only after the fact did it issue a notice of violation. Deviations from established process reinforced the inference of hostility.

Having found that the enforcement process failed the “minimum requirement of neutrality,” the panel concluded that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their Free Exercise claim. Importantly, the court emphasized that, when hostility taints a decision, the result is invalid “without further inquiry,” obviating any need to apply strict scrutiny or to decide whether the policy is generally applicable. On that basis, it did not reach Plaintiffs’ alternative theories (general applicability, individualized exemptions, public benefits).

For irreparable harm, the court relied on categorical First Amendment principles and practical harms: students lost opportunities to compete in VPA events, reducing exposure and pathways to athletic scholarships. The public interest favored correcting the constitutional harm and restoring competitive opportunities. The court therefore reversed and instructed entry of a preliminary injunction reinstating Mid Vermont to full VPA membership pending merits resolution.

What the Court Did Not Decide

Facial validity or general applicability of the VPA’s gender-identity policy: The panel expressly declined to reach whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable. Its ruling rests solely on hostility in enforcement.
Ultimate merits: The court adjudicated likelihood of success for preliminary relief; it did not issue a final judgment on liability or remedies.
Scope beyond reinstatement: The injunction granted is limited “insofar as it seeks Mid Vermont’s reinstatement to full membership in the VPA.” The court did not order any revision of VPA policies, nor did it adjudicate broader requests (e.g., that the VPA may not require policy alignment).
Town Tuitioning claims: Plaintiffs’ tuition-related claims were not part of this appeal.
Rights of transgender students or Title IX/other statutory issues: The opinion does not pass on the legality of transgender participation policies or the balance of competing legal rights; it focuses on the constitutional defect of religious hostility in this particular enforcement action.

Impact and Implications

This decision carries significant implications for state agencies and quasi-public associations that regulate school athletics and activities:

Neutral enforcement is mandatory: Even if a policy is facially neutral, officials must avoid expressing hostility to religion when applying it. Public remarks by empowered decisionmakers will be scrutinized for indicators of intolerance or bias.
Process matters: Adhering to established procedures (notice, investigation, hearing) is not merely technical. Procedural deviations, especially when coupled with severity, can corroborate a finding of hostility.
Severity as a signal: Unprecedented, sweeping penalties may suggest animus or hostility and jeopardize enforcement actions.
Training and recusal: Agencies should train officials to avoid commentary that could be construed as disparaging religious beliefs. Decisionmakers who have made accusatory or pejorative public statements about the parties or their beliefs should consider recusal to preserve neutrality.
Remedial posture: Where hostility is shown, courts within the Second Circuit may set aside enforcement results without strict scrutiny or further balancing and issue preliminary injunctive relief restoring the status quo ante.
Practical athletics administration: Associations must separate policy defense from adjudication. Even if associations believe state law compels certain inclusivity policies, their enforcement mechanisms must respect Free Exercise neutrality in each case.

In the specific context of transgender participation in scholastic sports, the opinion does not resolve underlying policy disputes. It does, however, make clear that state actors cannot cloak hostility toward religious objections in the course of discipline. Thus, future disputes will likely turn on careful record development around neutrality in enforcement rather than solely on facial challenges to policies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Free Exercise neutrality: The Free Exercise Clause protects religious practice. Even if a law does not target religion on its face, the government violates the Clause if it enforces the law with hostility toward religious beliefs.
Hostility versus disagreement: Government may disagree with a litigant’s position and still enforce laws. What is forbidden is official intolerance or disparagement of religious beliefs, adjudicating the “rightness” of theology, or singling out religious actors with unusual penalties or procedures.
Facial neutrality vs. neutral application: A rule can look neutral in text (facial neutrality) but be enforced in a non-neutral way. Neutral application requires that decisionmakers act without religious bias.
Preliminary injunction standard: To obtain interim relief against government action, plaintiffs generally must show likely success on the merits, irreparable harm without an injunction, and that the public interest favors relief.
Per se invalidity when hostility is shown: Under Masterpiece and Kennedy, if the record shows official religious hostility tainted an enforcement decision, courts set aside that result without proceeding to strict scrutiny or weighing government interests.
State actor: Entities that function as arms of the state (like a statewide principals’ association running public extracurriculars) are bound by constitutional constraints such as the First Amendment.

Conclusion

Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders crystallizes a clear rule in the Second Circuit: Neutral laws must be enforced neutrally. When the government or a state actor disciplines a religious entity in a manner accompanied by official expressions of hostility, by unprecedented severity, and by procedural irregularities, it violates the Free Exercise Clause. The court’s decision—ordering preliminary reinstatement without reaching strict scrutiny or the facial validity of the VPA’s policy—underscores that hostility-tainted enforcement is per se unconstitutional “without further inquiry.”

Going forward, agencies and associations that regulate scholastic activities must ensure that decisionmakers avoid rhetoric or actions that could be construed as disparaging religious beliefs, adhere to established procedures, and calibrate sanctions appropriately. For litigants, the case emphasizes the evidentiary importance of contemporaneous statements and the disciplinary record in establishing non-neutral enforcement. While the opinion leaves unresolved broader questions about the underlying policy and the balance of competing rights, it significantly strengthens the doctrinal guardrails requiring government actors to proceed with genuine neutrality toward religion in enforcement decisions.