4. Analysis: Precedents and Legal Reasoning
A. Different procedural rulings required different standards of review
The appeal involved three distinct forms of judicial decision-making, and the applicable standard of review materially shaped the result.
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Summary judgment—independent review.
Newcomb v. Spring Creek Cooler, Inc., 926 F.3d 709, 713 (11th Cir. 2019), supplied the rule that summary judgment receives de novo review.
FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011), required the evidence and reasonable inferences to be viewed favorably to Ronda as the nonmoving party.
BBX Cap. v. FDIC, 956 F.3d 1304, 1314 (11th Cir. 2020), explained that a material fact can affect the outcome and that a genuine dispute exists when a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
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Striking defenses—abuse of discretion.
United States of Am. ex rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc., 146 F.4th 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2025), established the review standard for orders striking affirmative defenses.
Citizens for Police Accountability Pol. Comm. v. Browning, 572 F.3d 1213, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2009), explained that discretion is abused through incorrect legal standards, unreasonable legal application, improper procedures, or clearly erroneous factual findings.
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Trial damages findings—clear error.
The court applied a substantially more deferential standard to the damages determination, discussed below.
Although the opinion sometimes uses “clear error” language while discussing the striking of defenses, it expressly identifies abuse of discretion as the governing standard for those orders. Its analysis should not be read as replacing that standard with unrestricted factual deference.
B. A broad final-judgment appeal preserved review of earlier orders—but not undeveloped arguments
Fitzgerald argued that Ronda had forfeited review of the stricken defenses because she did not separately appeal the order striking them. The panel disagreed. Her notice appealed the final judgment and all earlier rulings merging into it, which was sufficient to encompass both summary judgment and the earlier pleading order.
State Exch. Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982), supported consideration of an appeal involving both an order striking defenses and summary judgment. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004), informed the panel’s conclusion that the relevant issues had been sufficiently briefed for appellate consideration.
But a broad notice of appeal did not preserve every possible legal theory. Under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014), and its supporting citation to Walter Int’l Prods. Inc. v. Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1413 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011), merely listing an issue or mentioning it without developed argument and authority amounts to abandonment.
That rule disposed of challenges concerning trauma-related evidentiary exclusions, various procedural rulings, and alleged litigation misconduct under Rules 60(b) and 60(d)(3). Thus, the opinion distinguishes bringing an order within appellate review from adequately preserving and arguing a particular objection to it.
C. The Sunshine in Litigation Act did not require invalidation on this record
Florida Statutes § 69.081 prohibits judgments whose purpose or effect is to conceal a “public hazard.” The statutory definition includes a “person” who has caused and is likely to cause injury. Ronda argued that Fitzgerald constituted such a hazard and that confidentiality improperly concealed an ongoing public-safety risk.
The panel upheld the striking of this defense by relying on the statute’s treatment in Florida appellate decisions:
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski, 830 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), described the Act as limited to health-and-safety concerns, including products-liability settings.
- Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1025–26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), traced the legislation to concerns about product-liability settlements and noted the absence of a decision extending it to the relevant sexual-harassment confidentiality issue.
- Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 896 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), expressly left unresolved whether the Act prohibited enforcement of confidentiality provisions in a sexual-harassment settlement.
These authorities did not establish that settlements involving sexual misconduct necessarily fall within the Act. The panel therefore found no abuse of discretion in rejecting Ronda’s proposed application.
Important limit: The court did not hold that an individual can never be a statutory public hazard. Nor did it decide that sexual misconduct can never implicate public health or safety. Its narrower conclusion approved the district court’s ruling against the legal background presented. The tension between the definition’s express inclusion of a “person” and the cases’ product-liability emphasis remains significant for future, differently developed litigation.
D. Florida’s freedom-of-contract policy outweighed the generalized public-policy objection
Ronda argued that enforcing confidentiality concealed alleged criminal conduct and conflicted with Florida’s policy against sexual misconduct. The panel instead emphasized the strong policy favoring enforcement of private agreements.
City of Largo v. AHF-Bay Fund, LLC, 215 So. 3d 10, 16 (Fla. 2017), required “extreme caution” before invalidating a contract on public-policy grounds. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 167 So. 394, 412 (Fla. 1936), supplied the foundational proposition that freedom of contract is the general rule. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting v. Gajwani, 934 So. 2d 501, 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), framed the competing showing as substantial prejudice to a dominant public interest sufficient to overcome contractual freedom.
The reporting exception was central. Ronda could communicate with law enforcement, did file reports, participated in investigations, and supplied evidence. Fitzgerald did not seek damages for that permitted conduct. Consequently, the agreement was not treated as an undertaking to obstruct criminal investigation or prevent official reporting.
The holding therefore supports enforcement of the particular restrictions on employer contacts, public accusations, and settlement disclosure. It does not approve every agreement that might suppress evidence or interfere with law enforcement.
E. Fraudulent inducement failed at the pleading stage
Ronda alleged that Fitzgerald had misrepresented the agreement’s purpose, portraying confidentiality as protection for financial privacy rather than a restriction on discussing the alleged assault.
Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007), provided Florida’s four elements of fraudulent inducement: a material false statement, knowledge of falsity, intended reliance, and injury resulting from reliance.
The district court struck the defense because Ronda did not satisfy the heightened requirements for pleading fraud and because the alleged oral representations were adequately covered or expressly contradicted by the written contract. Her appellate argument did not identify reversible error in either basis.
This was not a determination that fraud can never undermine a settlement. It was a pleading-specific ruling, reinforced by the agreement’s express terms and the inadequacy of the appellate challenge.
F. Economic pressure did not establish duress; unconscionability was not preserved
Duress
The court distinguished difficult circumstances from legally sufficient coercion. Ronda’s dependence on Fitzgerald’s financial assistance for therapy did not, standing alone, establish that she lacked meaningful freedom to contract.
Corporacion Peruana de Aeropuertos Aviacion Comercial v. Boy, 180 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), quoting Herald v. Hardin, 116 So. 863, 864 (Fla. 1928), defined duress as improper external pressure that practically destroys free agency. Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), required both involuntariness and improper coercive conduct by the opposing party.
Cableview Commc’ns. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable Se., LLC, 901 F.3d 1294, 1304 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2018), supplied two further propositions. First, comparable bargaining power and sophistication weigh against involuntariness, drawing on Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So. 3d 1145, 1161 (Fla. 2014). Second, financial pressure alone is insufficient, following Spillers v. Five Points Guar. Bank, 335 So. 2d 851, 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
Here, negotiations were conducted at arm’s length with attorneys. Ronda also had advice from her husband and therapist. She identified no record evidence that Fitzgerald’s wrongful conduct left her without an alternative to signing. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find economic duress.
The distinct theory that trauma or mental illness impaired her understanding was not properly developed on appeal. Lucas v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001), supported treating that argument as abandoned. The appellate court therefore did not conduct a fresh merits assessment of psychological incapacity.
Unconscionability
Ronda’s appellate claim that the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable was not considered on its merits. Her counsel’s earlier description of the agreement as “unconscionable,” made during a public-policy argument, did not adequately present the separate legal theory later advanced.
The court required more than a descriptive label: the district court needed a developed argument identifying the challenged bargaining process and allegedly oppressive contractual terms. This portion of the opinion is principally a preservation ruling, not approval of the agreement under a substantive unconscionability test.
G. The First Amendment challenge failed under the panel’s state-action analysis
Ronda argued that judicial enforcement converted a private speech restriction into governmental action. Because she first raised the constitutional theory on appeal, the court applied civil plain-error principles.
S.E.C. v. Diversified Corp. Consulting Grp., 378 F.3d 1219, 1227 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004), supported that review posture. Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d 1338, 1352 (11th Cir. 2017), quoting Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 990 (11th Cir. 1982), described the limited circumstances for considering an unpreserved pure legal issue to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
The substantive authorities established a distinction between governmental restrictions and voluntarily assumed private obligations:
- Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973), established that the First Amendment restrains governmental, not merely private, action.
- Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), supported Ronda’s argument that judicial enforcement of a private agreement can constitute state action, particularly in the context of constitutionally impermissible discrimination.
- Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991), was acknowledged as an example involving state action through judicial application of promissory-estoppel rules.
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), supplied the countervailing principle that governmental approval or acquiescence in private conduct is not by itself state action.
- Youngblood-West v. Aflac Inc., 796 F. App’x 985, 992 (11th Cir. 2019), an unpublished decision cited by Fitzgerald, provided a closely related example of enforcing a private agreement in which a party voluntarily restricted speech.
The panel’s principal circuit authority was United E Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1995). That decision recognized enforceable, limited speech restrictions negotiated by disputing parties of equal bargaining power. Quoting Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968), it warned that treating every judicially enforced private right as governmental action would erase the distinction between private and state conduct.
The panel found no constitutionally impermissible discrimination and no judicially created obligation extending beyond the parties’ agreement. It therefore concluded that enforcing these negotiated restrictions was not governmental action implicating Ronda’s First Amendment rights.
Scope: This reasoning does not mean judicial enforcement can never constitute state action; the opinion expressly recognizes otherwise. Its conclusion depends on the particular settlement, its voluntary formation, and the absence of additional constitutionally significant circumstances.
H. The damages decision turned on contractual purpose, causation, and trial evidence
Review of the trial court’s findings
Hiatt v. United States, 910 F.2d 737, 742 (11th Cir. 1990), established clear-error review of the damages award. Marmol v. Kalonymus Dev. Partners, LLC, 161 F.4th 715, 728 (11th Cir. 2025), emphasized considerable deference to the district court.
In re Superior Constr. Co., Inc. v. Brock, 445 F.3d 1334, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006), quoting Lindsey v. Navistar Int’l. Transp. Corp., 150 F.3d 1307, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998), explained why findings based on live testimony receive particular respect: the trial judge directly observes the witnesses and is better positioned to evaluate them.
Although the damages subsection’s heading refers to abuse of discretion, the opinion repeatedly states and applies clear-error review to the damages findings.
Why reputational damages were recoverable
Ronda invoked the general rule against noneconomic damages in contract actions. The panel answered by examining the injury the settlement was specifically designed to prevent.
Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744, 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), explained that contract compensation seeks to place the injured party in the position performance would have produced and includes losses naturally and proximately resulting from breach. T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1531 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985), quoting Hobbley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), supported recovery for reputational injury when the parties contemplated it as a probable result of breach.
The settlement’s provisions strongly demonstrated that contemplation. Restrictions on employer contact, online references, and disparagement directly protected Fitzgerald’s professional standing. Reputational injury was therefore not an unrelated or unexpectedly remote consequence; it was a central risk the agreement addressed.
The $2 million reputation-related award
The district court found that Fitzgerald had enjoyed professional advancement and an excellent reputation before the breaches and that Ronda intentionally breached to damage that reputation. Fitzgerald and fact witness Jessica Bergman testified about the injury.
The evidence included Fitzgerald’s previous annual earnings of £550,000, an anticipated chief executive role, placement on paid leave, exclusion from professional contacts and activities, the failure of his new company, and customer dissatisfaction and rumors following his disappearance from business affairs. Fitzgerald estimated that restoring his executive reputation would take five to six years and testified that $2 million represented only part of his income loss.
Ronda neither objected to that testimony nor introduced contradictory evidence. Those omissions did not eliminate Fitzgerald’s burden of proof, but they were important to the panel’s assessment of the record supporting the findings.
A significant classification issue: Although the opinion calls the $2 million award “noneconomic,” it explains its amount through anticipated salary and bonus losses during reputational rehabilitation. The decision should therefore not be understood as broadly authorizing emotional-distress damages in ordinary contract litigation. It upheld a reputation-related award supported by employment consequences and testimony; it did not separately analyze possible overlap between that valuation and the economic award.
The economic award
| Component |
Amount |
| Settlement payment |
$97,000.00 |
| Lost long-term incentive |
$274,453.27 |
| Lost bonuses |
$219,300.00 |
| Lost performance share units |
$155,950.00 |
| Total economic damages |
$746,703.27 |
The district court found these losses directly and proximately caused by the breaches. Employer records, expert testimony, and a stipulated summary exhibit supported the calculations. Expert Sheri Fiske’s quoted loss figure was $472,250, less than the full economic award; the opinion also relied on other documentation and the separately identified components rather than presenting that figure as the entire award.
The panel rejected the claim that Fitzgerald’s own conduct, rather than the contractual breaches, necessarily caused the losses. It found sufficient support for the trial court’s contrary causation findings.
The decision does not establish automatic repayment of settlement consideration whenever a nondisparagement obligation is breached. It affirms inclusion of the $97,000 payment in this award without separately developing a general restitution or election-of-remedies rule.
I. Alleged deficient civil representation did not create an ineffective-assistance claim
Ronda alleged that counsel improperly coordinated with her legal insurer, filed a pretrial stipulation without approval, and submitted a reconsideration motion late. The panel did not need to resolve those allegations as professional-conduct questions because the asserted constitutional remedy was unavailable.
Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Laboratories, Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 711 F.2d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1983), established the absence of a constitutional or statutory entitlement to representation in the ordinary civil litigation context at issue.
Ronda’s reliance on Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1476 (11th Cir. 1991), failed because that habeas decision discussed counsel’s performance in an underlying criminal proceeding when assessing procedural default. It did not create a right to effective representation in private contract litigation.
The holding concerns the absence of an ineffective-assistance basis for reversing this judgment. It does not decide whether counsel violated professional obligations or whether any separate remedy might exist.