Negligent Reliance on Ambiguous THC Lab Results Does Not Create a Franks Violation: Qualified Immunity and Limits on Monell Failure-to-Train

I. Introduction

In Degollado v. City of Port Lavaca (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal (with prejudice) of a smoke shop owner’s and employee’s civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Port Lavaca officers and the City. The case arose from a 2021 warrant-backed search and arrests premised on controlled buys and laboratory testing that showed “THC,” but not its type (delta-8 vs. delta-9) or concentration—critical distinctions after hemp’s descheduling and Texas’s evolving regulatory posture.

The plaintiffs—Alexandra Degollado, Daniel Herrera, Jr., and Faded Smoke Shop, L.L.C.—alleged that Corporal Kyle Curtis misled the magistrate in the warrant affidavit and that other officers failed to intervene. They also pursued municipal liability against the City of Port Lavaca based on alleged failure to train regarding delta-8 legality, and asserted a “malicious prosecution” claim framed under Texas law.

The central issues were: (1) whether the complaint plausibly alleged a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation under Franks v. Delaware based on affidavit inaccuracies/omissions; (2) whether other officers could be liable for failing to intervene in a warrant-authorized search; (3) whether the City could be liable under Monell for failure to train absent a pattern of similar violations; (4) whether a state-law malicious prosecution claim is barred by sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act; and (5) whether a post-dismissal retention theory could be raised for the first time on appeal.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Qualified immunity—failure to intervene: The court held plaintiffs failed to identify clearly established law requiring officers to intervene to stop a search and seizure executed under a warrant; liability for a warrant allegedly lacking probable cause is generally confined to the affiant/warrant preparer.
  • Qualified immunity—Franks claim against the affiant: Even accepting that the affidavit inaccurately characterized DPS lab results as confirming a Penalty Group 2 controlled substance, the complaint did not plausibly allege the required scienter—intentional or reckless falsehood—as opposed to negligence. Reliance on ambiguous lab results was not “reckless disregard for the truth.”
  • Municipal liability: The failure-to-train theory failed because plaintiffs pleaded neither a pattern of similar constitutional violations nor facts meeting the Fifth Circuit’s narrow “single incident” path to deliberate indifference.
  • Malicious prosecution: The court agreed plaintiffs pleaded a state-law malicious prosecution claim; it was barred by the TTCA’s intentional-tort exception to any waiver of immunity.
  • Post-dismissal retention: Any claim about retention of seized property after charges were dismissed was forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Pleading and appellate standards

  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly: The court reiterated the Rule 12(b)(6) requirement that the complaint plead enough facts to state a plausible claim (used to frame the sufficiency of allegations).
  • Shakeri v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. (quoting Hines v. Alldredge and True v. Robles): Provided the Fifth Circuit’s de novo standard of review and plausibility formulation for dismissal.
  • Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc.: Supplied the “bedrock principle” that claims raised first on appeal are not considered (used to reject the post-dismissal retention theory).
  • Rollins v. Home Depot USA: Applied forfeiture to plaintiffs’ attempt to recast their malicious prosecution claim as federal on appeal.

2. Qualified immunity framework

  • Winfrey v. Rogers (quoting Hope v. Pelzer) and Mullenix v. Luna: Reinforced that qualified immunity protects officers unless they are on notice their conduct is unlawful, and protects “all but the plainly incompetent.”
  • Nevarez v. Dorris (quoting McLin v. Ard): Heightened pleading demand in qualified-immunity cases at the motion-to-dismiss stage— plaintiffs must plead specific facts both plausibly showing liability and defeating immunity “with equal specificity.”
  • Ashcroft v. al-Kidd and Culberson v. Clay County: Anchored the “clearly established” requirement and the need for particularized contours of the right.
  • Taylor v. Riojas: Cited for the narrow possibility of “obvious” violations obviating the need for factually similar precedent; the court held plaintiffs did not invoke or satisfy that route.

3. Warrant-based liability, failure to intervene, and the affiant limitation

  • Melton v. Phillips (en banc), quoting Malley v. Briggs and Michalik v. Hermann: Recognized that officers can be liable for warrant-authorized searches when an affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief is unreasonable—but, critically, the Fifth Circuit has “rightly recognized” such liability attaches only to the affiant or the person responsible for preparing the warrant application. This citation was central to rejecting the non-affiant officers’ exposure on the pleaded theory.

4. Franks doctrine and the scienter requirement

  • Franks v. Delaware: The governing rule—Fourth Amendment violation occurs if the affiant includes a knowingly/recklessly false statement, and the statement is necessary to probable cause.
  • Winfrey v. Rogers: Provided the Fifth Circuit’s articulation of the two-prong Franks test and underscored that negligence does not defeat qualified immunity.
  • Hart v. O'Brien (abrogated on other grounds by Kalina v. Fletcher): Cited to confirm Franks claims can supply the clearly established constitutional violation in the qualified immunity context.
  • Terwilliger v. Reyna: Reinforced that a warrant is not evidence of probable cause if Franks elements are met.
  • Brewer v. Hayne: Quoted for the proposition that negligence alone will not defeat qualified immunity.
  • United States v. Martin: Used for the rule that a misstatement vitiates an affidavit only if it is the product of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.
  • Hart v. O'Brien (again): Provided the definition of recklessness—entertaining “serious doubts” as to the truth.

5. Municipal liability and failure to train

  • St. Maron Props., L.L.C. v. City of Houston (quoting Peña v. City of Rio Grande City): Set the three-part Monell pleading standard (policy, policymaker, moving force) and summarized the three routes to “official policy.”
  • City of Canton v. Harris: The canonical failure-to-train framework; liability requires a “deliberate” or “conscious” municipal choice and deliberate indifference.
  • Connick v. Thompson (via Peña v. City of Rio Grande City): Emphasized the “stringent” fault standard and that a pattern of similar violations is “ordinarily” required.
  • Burge v. St. Tammany Par. (via Peña v. City of Rio Grande City): Acknowledged the theoretical “single incident” path to deliberate indifference.
  • Gabriel v. City of Plano (quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier): Captured the Fifth Circuit’s skepticism toward single-incident failure-to-train liability; ordinarily one incident is insufficient.

6. Texas sovereign immunity and intentional torts

  • Aguirre v. City of San Antonio (quoting City of Watauga v. Gordon), citing Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Petta: Confirmed TTCA waives immunity only for certain negligent conduct and does not waive immunity for claims arising out of intentional torts; “intentional conduct, no matter how it is pled,” falls within the exception.
  • Humphreys v. City of Ganado, City of Hempstead v. Kmiec, and Closs v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.: Cited for the proposition that malicious prosecution is an intentional tort, supporting application of the TTCA bar.
  • Horner v. City of Highland Village (citing Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co.): Used to show plaintiffs pleaded Texas malicious prosecution elements (and thus a state-law claim).

7. Judicial notice and the delta-8 regulatory backdrop

  • Fed. R. Evid. 2 01: The court took judicial notice of the public/legal developments concerning delta-8 in Texas.
  • Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Sky Mktg. Corp.: Supplied the procedural and substantive context for Texas’s shifting treatment of delta-8, including the Department’s March 2021 schedule update, injunction proceedings, and appellate views that delta-8 had “always been illegal under Texas law.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Failure-to-intervene: clearly established law and role-based limits

The court disposed of the failure-to-intervene claim at qualified immunity’s second prong: plaintiffs did not carry their burden to cite clearly established law requiring officers to intervene to stop the execution of a warrant-authorized search and seizure. The panel then reinforced a structural limitation drawn from Melton v. Phillips: when the alleged defect is that the warrant affidavit lacked probable cause, liability generally attaches to the affiant or the person responsible for preparing the warrant application, not to executing officers who did not prepare it. Because the complaint alleged only that Curtis prepared the affidavit, the non-affiant officers were insulated from the pleaded failure-to-intervene theory.

2. The Franks claim: inaccuracy is not enough without intentional or reckless falsehood

The court treated Franks v. Delaware as the correct “clearly established” source, but held plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an actual Franks violation. The opinion separated (i) whether the affidavit contained a false statement and (ii) whether any false statement was made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.

  • “Sent to the lab” statement: Plaintiffs argued the affidavit implied the leafy substance was tested, but the affidavit said only it was “sent” for analysis. Absence of lab records showing testing did not make “sent” false, and in any event the court deemed the point immaterial to probable cause because it did not report results.
  • Field test statement: The complaint alleged only that no images of the positive test existed—insufficient, standing alone, to allege the statement “field tested positive for marijuana” was false.
  • DPS lab “Penalty Group 2” characterization: The court agreed the complaint plausibly alleged inaccuracy: the lab reported “THC” but did not identify delta-8 vs. delta-9 or concentration, so it did not establish the substance was a Penalty Group 2 controlled substance. But the court held that inaccuracy did not satisfy Franks’s scienter requirement.

The core holding is the scienter analysis: even if the affidavit overstated what the lab results meant, the complaint at most supported negligence, not “reckless disregard for the truth.” The court emphasized that Curtis sought lab confirmation of illegality; the lab returned “THC,” and THC is illegal in some circumstances. In a regulatory environment marked by ambiguity about forms of THC beyond delta-9, it was not unreasonable (and thus not reckless) for the officer to infer illegality from the lab’s ambiguous confirmation. Because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege Curtis “entertained serious doubts” as to the truth, the Franks claim failed and qualified immunity applied.

3. Monell failure-to-train: no pattern, and the “single incident” exception remains rare

On municipal liability, the panel applied St. Maron Props., L.L.C. v. City of Houston and City of Canton v. Harris to require facts plausibly showing deliberate indifference. The plaintiffs pleaded conclusory assertions that Curtis was not “properly supervised and trained” about delta-8 and that the City’s “inadequate training policy” caused injury.

The court found the allegations failed under the ordinary route because plaintiffs pleaded no “pattern of similar constitutional violations” as required by Connick v. Thompson and Peña v. City of Rio Grande City. It also found the pleading did not meet the Fifth Circuit’s stringent approach to single-incident liability described in Gabriel v. City of Plano (and Snyder v. Trepagnier). In short, an isolated incident tied to a novel and evolving legal landscape—without concrete facts about training content, policymaker knowledge, or prior similar misconduct—did not plausibly show deliberate indifference.

4. Malicious prosecution: state-law framing and the TTCA bar

The panel accepted the district court’s reading that plaintiffs pleaded Texas malicious prosecution: their complaint invoked supplemental jurisdiction for “common law claims” and adopted Texas elements via Horner v. City of Highland Village, which itself relied on Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co.. Attempting to pivot to a “federal malicious prosecution” theory on appeal was forfeited under Rollins v. Home Depot USA.

Once characterized as a Texas tort claim, the TTCA analysis was straightforward under Aguirre v. City of San Antonio: malicious prosecution is an intentional tort (supported by Humphreys v. City of Ganado, City of Hempstead v. Kmiec, and Closs v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.), and the TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional torts regardless of how pleaded. Sovereign immunity therefore barred the claim against both the officers (to the extent sued in official capacities implicating the governmental unit) and the City.

5. Post-dismissal retention theory: preservation matters

Plaintiffs argued on appeal that retaining $14,000 in products after the criminal cases were dismissed was independently unlawful. The court did not reach the merits because the theory was not pleaded or ruled on below. Under Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc., it was forfeited.

C. Impact

  • Affidavit challenges in hemp/THC cases: The decision underscores that showing an affidavit was inaccurate—particularly in describing ambiguous lab results—is insufficient without plausible facts of intentional deception or recklessness. For regulated substances in flux, plaintiffs should expect courts to treat mistaken inferences from ambiguous lab outputs as negligence unless “serious doubts” are well pleaded.
  • Executing officers vs. affiants: By leaning on Melton v. Phillips, the opinion reinforces a role-based allocation of liability in warrant cases: absent exceptional circumstances, the attack runs against the affiant/warrant preparer, not officers who execute the warrant.
  • Monell pleading discipline: The ruling continues the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive approach to single-incident failure-to-train claims; plaintiffs must plead concrete facts showing deliberate indifference (policymaker awareness, obvious need, training gaps tightly linked to a likely constitutional violation), not merely that an officer misunderstood a complex, changing statutory scheme.
  • State tort workarounds limited by immunity: Framing malicious prosecution as a state-law claim invites the TTCA bar; plaintiffs must carefully select and preserve federal theories where available and timely pleaded.
  • Issue preservation: The forfeiture ruling signals that property-retention disputes require explicit pleading and development in the district court—particularly where distinct constitutional doctrines (e.g., due process, Takings, or Fourth Amendment retention principles) may apply.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A protection for government officials that blocks damages suits unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time, so a reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful.
  • Franks v. Delaware violation: A narrow Fourth Amendment doctrine: a warrant becomes constitutionally defective if the affiant included a material false statement (or omission) knowingly or recklessly, and that falsehood was necessary to the magistrate’s probable-cause finding. Mistakes or carelessness (negligence) generally are not enough.
  • Probable cause and warrants: Probable cause is a fair probability a crime occurred and evidence will be found. A warrant usually provides a strong shield, and challenging it typically requires showing the affidavit was materially tainted in the Franks sense.
  • Monell municipal liability: Cities are not automatically liable for employees’ actions. A plaintiff must link the injury to an official policy or custom and show it caused the constitutional violation. For failure to train, the gap must reflect “deliberate indifference,” usually shown by a pattern of similar violations.
  • TTCA intentional-tort bar: Texas may waive immunity for certain negligence claims, but not for intentional torts such as malicious prosecution. Re-labeling an intentional act as negligence does not avoid the bar.
  • Forfeiture on appeal: Appellate courts generally will not consider arguments not raised in the trial court; theories must be pleaded and litigated below.

V. Conclusion

Degollado v. City of Port Lavaca reinforces three practical rules in Fourth Amendment and § 1983 litigation: (1) affidavit inaccuracies—especially those stemming from ambiguous lab reports in a shifting regulatory environment—do not defeat qualified immunity without plausible allegations of intentional or reckless deception under Franks v. Delaware; (2) when a search is executed under a warrant, liability theories tied to a deficient affidavit typically target the affiant, not non-affiant executing officers; and (3) Monell failure-to-train claims remain difficult to plead without a pattern of similar violations or detailed facts showing an obvious, policymaker-ignored need for training. The opinion also illustrates how state-law tort claims can be extinguished by sovereign immunity under the TTCA and how unpleaded theories—like post-dismissal retention— can be lost through forfeiture.