Negligent Loss of Dashcam Footage Does Not Create a Youngblood Due-Process Violation Without Bad Faith; Tennessee § 39-17-417 Cocaine Convictions Qualify as ACCA “Serious Drug Offense[s]”

I. Introduction

In United States v. Jamal Gardner (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction and a 360-month sentence imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The case arose from a February 2, 2019 shooting incident in Columbia, Tennessee, where officers testified that Gardner fired on police from property he owned, then fled to Michigan and later surrendered. Investigators recovered firearms and bloodstains bearing Gardner’s DNA, and the jury convicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

On appeal, Gardner raised two principal issues: (1) a due-process claim—raised for the first time on appeal—arguing the government violated his constitutional rights by failing to preserve a police dashcam recording; and (2) a sentencing claim that his prior Tennessee cocaine convictions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 are not ACCA predicates because the statute is categorically broader than ACCA’s “serious drug offense[s]” definition.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on both issues. First, the court held Gardner did not establish a due-process violation under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) because he failed to show the government acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the dashcam footage; at most, his showing sounded in negligence, which is insufficient. The panel also noted the argument was not preserved below, and Gardner did not explain why the court should entertain it despite forfeiture principles.

Second, the court held Gardner’s Tennessee drug convictions qualify as ACCA “serious drug offense[s],” relying on and incorporating by reference its same-day decision in United States v. Starling, No. 25-5440 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2026). The panel additionally observed that differences in the vintage of Gardner’s Tennessee convictions did not materially change the relevant statutory analysis.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Edge, 989 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
    Role in the opinion: The panel invoked Edge for the Sixth Circuit’s general rule that arguments not raised in the district court are ordinarily not considered on appeal absent an “exceptional” case or a “plain miscarriage of justice.” This framed Gardner’s due-process claim as procedurally uphill because he presented the dashcam issue below as a spoliation matter (seeking an adverse-inference instruction), not as a constitutional Youngblood claim.
  • Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)
    Role in the opinion: Youngblood supplied the governing constitutional standard where evidence is only “potentially exculpatory” (as Gardner characterized the dashcam video). The court emphasized Youngblood’s core requirement: a defendant must show “bad faith” to establish a due-process violation from failure to preserve potentially useful evidence, to avoid imposing an “undifferentiated and absolute duty” to retain all such material.
  • United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1996)
    Role in the opinion: The panel used Jobson to articulate the Sixth Circuit’s three-part test implementing Youngblood: (1) bad faith; (2) apparent exculpatory value before destruction; and (3) lack of comparable evidence by other means. The court resolved the claim primarily at the first element—no bad faith—making remand for severe sanctions inappropriate.
  • United States v. Wright, 260 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2001)
    Role in the opinion: Wright reinforced that even “grossly negligent” conduct does not satisfy Youngblood’s bad-faith requirement. The opinion relied on Wright to draw a firm line between (i) spoliation-type remedies for negligence and (ii) constitutional due-process violations requiring intentional misconduct or animus.
  • Lyons v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 812 F. App'x 305 (6th Cir. 2020)
    Role in the opinion: Cited for the proposition that an appellant can forfeit a claim by failing to address required elements of the governing test in appellate briefing. The panel applied this logic to note Gardner did not meaningfully brief the second and third Jobson/Youngblood elements, reinforcing why his due-process theory could fail even apart from bad faith.
  • United States v. Soriano, 401 F. Supp. 3d 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
    Role in the opinion: Gardner relied on Soriano to argue that “bad faith” can be inferred when circumstances “negate any innocent explanation.” The Sixth Circuit rejected Gardner’s use of Soriano, explaining it did not shift the burden to the government to prove innocence and did not alter binding Sixth Circuit precedent requiring defendants to prove bad faith.
  • Jones v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1992)
    Role in the opinion: Cited (through Jobson) for the principle that “mere speculation” about what lost evidence might show does not establish apparent exculpatory value. The panel used that point to underscore that Gardner’s alternative-shooter theory was unsubstantiated given the trial record tying him to the scene.
  • United States v. Starling, No. 25-5440 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2026)
    Role in the opinion: The panel treated Starling as dispositive of the ACCA question and incorporated its reasoning by reference. The opinion’s only added analysis was to confirm that intervening Tennessee amendments did not materially change the relevant drug schedule or penalty provision for purposes of the ACCA predicate inquiry.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Lost dashcam footage: spoliation sanction vs. constitutional violation

The district court had already granted a trial remedy: an adverse-inference instruction allowing the jury to infer the missing dashcam footage was favorable to Gardner if it found the government at least negligent in failing to preserve it. On appeal, Gardner attempted to repackage the same loss of evidence as a constitutional due-process violation requiring far more severe remedies (dismissal/anti-reprosecution or a new trial with DNA exclusion).

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning turned on the sharp doctrinal distinction between: (a) spoliation-type trial management remedies that can be triggered by negligence, and (b) Youngblood due-process violations that require proof of bad faith when the evidence is only potentially exculpatory. Because Gardner argued only “potentially exculpatory” value, Youngblood governed—and that meant negligence was legally insufficient.

Applying the Sixth Circuit’s three-part Jobson test, the panel found Gardner’s showing failed at step one: he identified, at most, failures to retrieve and preserve footage that might have been recoverable—classic negligence arguments. The court reiterated (via Wright) that even gross negligence does not equal bad faith, which requires “official animus” or a “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”

2. ACCA predicates: Tennessee cocaine convictions qualify

Gardner’s sentencing challenge was resolved by the court’s same-day precedent in United States v. Starling, which the panel incorporated by reference. The panel thus reaffirmed that a conviction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(c)(1) qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under ACCA.

The opinion also addressed a potential temporal wrinkle: Gardner’s three Tennessee convictions spanned 1996, 1998, and 2012. The panel held the intervening Tennessee amendments did not materially change the drug schedule or penalty provisions relevant to the ACCA analysis, so Starling applied without modification.

C. Impact

  • Preservation of evidence litigation in the Sixth Circuit: The decision reinforces that defendants cannot convert negligent evidence-handling into a constitutional claim when the evidence is only “potentially” helpful. Practically, this channels many lost-evidence disputes toward spoliation instructions or other trial remedies rather than case-terminating sanctions.
  • Appellate preservation incentives: By foregrounding forfeiture principles (via Edge) and briefing forfeiture (via Lyons), the opinion signals that defendants should raise Youngblood arguments explicitly in the district court if they intend to seek constitutional remedies later.
  • ACCA litigation involving Tennessee drug convictions: By adopting Starling and extending it across older statutory versions, the opinion strengthens the government’s position that Tennessee cocaine convictions under § 39-17-417(c)(1) are reliable ACCA predicates, reducing room for categorical-approach challenges premised on historical statutory variation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Material exculpatory” vs. “potentially exculpatory” evidence: “Material exculpatory” evidence is clearly favorable and significant to guilt/innocence. “Potentially exculpatory” evidence might help, but its value is uncertain or speculative. The constitutional test is stricter for “potentially exculpatory” evidence: the defendant must prove bad faith.
  • Youngblood “bad faith”: Bad faith means more than carelessness—it implies intentional wrongdoing, hostility, or a deliberate effort to keep helpful evidence from the defense. Negligence (even serious negligence) does not meet this standard in the Sixth Circuit.
  • Spoliation/adverse-inference instruction: A trial remedy allowing jurors to infer missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that failed to preserve it. This is not the same as a constitutional violation and does not automatically require dismissal or suppression of other evidence.
  • ACCA “serious drug offense[s]” and predicate convictions: ACCA increases penalties when a defendant has qualifying prior convictions. Here, the court treated Gardner’s Tennessee cocaine convictions as fitting ACCA’s definition (as explained in Starling), making the 15-year minimum applicable and supporting the Guidelines-driven 360-month sentence imposed.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Jamal Gardner delivers two clear takeaways for Sixth Circuit practice. First, when missing evidence is only potentially exculpatory, a defendant must prove bad faith to obtain constitutional relief under Arizona v. Youngblood; negligence supports, at most, trial-level spoliation remedies like adverse-inference instructions. Second, following United States v. Starling, Tennessee cocaine convictions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(c)(1) qualify as ACCA “serious drug offense[s],” including under older, materially similar versions of Tennessee law. The result: Gardner’s conviction and ACCA-enhanced sentence were affirmed.